QUeensland Alcohol-related violence and Night Time Economy Monitoring (QUANTEM)

FINAL REPORT (April 2019)

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LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS USED IN THE REPORT

Acronym	Definition
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
AIC	Akaike information criterion
AMCOS	Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society Limited
AOD	Alcohol and other drugs
APRA	Australasian Performing Right Association
ARIMA	Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average
BAC	Blood alcohol concentrate
BCR	Benefit cost ratio
BIC	Bayesian information criterion
CAD	Call to assist data
CBD	Central business district
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CI	Confidence interval
DANTE	Dealing with Alcohol-Related Harm and the Night-time Economy
DARF	Digital Ambulance Report Form
DASHED	Drug and Alcohol Intoxication and Subsequent Harm in the Night-Time Entertainment Districts
DET	Department of Education and Training
EARF	Electronic Ambulance Report Form
ED	Emergency department
ETP	Extended trading permit
GVA	Gross value added
HAH	High alcohol hours
ICD	International Classification of Diseases
LAH	Low alcohol hours
LGA	Local government area
NAIP	National Alcohol Indicators Project
NCIS	National Coronial Information System
NEP	Night-time entertainment precinct
NHMRC	National Health and Medical Research Council

Acronym	Definition
NPV	Net present value
OLGR	Office of Liquor Gaming Regulation
POINTED	Patron Offending and Intoxication in Night-Time Entertainment Districts
PPRA	Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000
QACIR	Queensland Ambulance Case Information Reporting
QAS	Queensland Ambulance Service
QCAA	Queensland Curriculum and Assessment Authority
QCAD	Queensland Calls to Assist Dataset
QGSO	Queensland Government Statistician's Office
QPRIME	Queensland Police Records and Information Management Exchange
QPS	Queensland Police Service
SARIMA	Seasonal Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average
SD	Standard deviation
SNP	Safe night precinct
SNPSS	Safe night precinct support services
TMR	Department of Transport and Main Roads
TRA	Tourism Research Australia

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In an effort to reduce deaths, assault and injury associated with alcohol-fuelled violence, the Queensland Government responded to community concerns by implementing a broad-based multi-faceted Policy. Key measures included ceasing alcohol service at 3am and the introduction of mandatory ID scanners in Safe Night Precincts (SNPs). The Queensland Government's Tackling Alcohol-Fuelled Violence Policy (TAFV) 2016 had three broad aims:

1. A safer night time environment, in particular in entertainment precincts;
2. To achieve cultural change around alcohol consumption behaviour which includes more responsible drinking practices within SNPs in Queensland; and
3. A regulatory framework that balances the interests of the liquor industry with a reduction in alcohol-fuelled violence.

The measures introduced in the Policy were based on the successful 'Newcastle intervention', which closed venues at 3:30am. In Newcastle these measures resulted in steady reductions in harms over time (1, 2). Fidelity to Newcastle measures remains poor, in part due to a large proportion of licensed venues that remained open (but not serving alcohol) after 3am.

Key contextual findings from the current study about the levels of harm experienced by patrons in Queensland SNPs include:

- Blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels measured are substantially higher than those seen in other comparable Australian cities,
- Self-reported experience of physical assault (29% in Fortitude valley) is almost twice that reported in other Australian cities,
- In Fortitude Valley, women tend to experience the greatest levels of harm, particularly unwanted sexual attention in and around licensed venues.

Our evaluation of the TAFV policy has found that introduction of the TAFV legislation has been associated with the following trends:

SAFETY:

- No deaths around licensed venues in a safe night precinct since 2016,
- Significant reductions in ambulance call outs statewide (High alcohol hours vs low alcohol hours ratio: 11% on average per month, 3-6am), and in all SNPs (29% 3-6am),
- A 29% average reduction per month across the state in the rate of serious assaults during 3am-6am, but a 19% increase earlier in the night (8pm –midnight),

- Significant reductions in serious assaults were seen in Fortitude Valley (40%, 3-6am) and Toowoomba SNPs, with stable trends elsewhere,

- Significant reductions statewide in hospital admissions for ocular bone fractures (4% on average per month statewide and 12% in greater Brisbane),

- A levelling out of hospital admissions for alcohol intoxication statewide and in Brisbane,

- Stable trends in emergency department attendances,

- Continuing very low levels of violence outside SNPs,

- No significant displacement of issues to outside SNPs for most of the state,

- ID scanners detected a total of 14,795 banned patrons trying to enter venues,

- The average times taken to scan a patron during weekend nights was between 13 seconds (Fortitude Valley) and 20 seconds (Airlie Beach),

- At least one serious crime (including rape and grievous bodily harm) per week across Queensland has been solved using ID scanner data,

- Very low numbers of successful prosecutions of venues serving unduly intoxicated patrons.

DRINKING CULTURE:
- Pre-drinking levels of SNP patrons remain high and have not changed,

- Education/awareness campaigns were ineffective at reducing intoxication and violence.

IMPACT ON BUSINESS:
- Increased number of liquor licences across Queensland,

- Stable number of people detected attending Fortitude Valley,

- No major changes in the number and type of nightlife venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP,

- Increased number of people using transportation (public transport, taxis, and Uber) during weekend nights in Fortitude Valley over time,

- All live music performances have continued to increase, but the number of *original* live music performances may have continued declining since 2012,

- Some smaller venues have experienced unintended consequences from ID scanning (e.g. reported reductions in midweek trading, having to rescan patrons accessing toilets),

- Tourism has continued to grow strongly statewide, and;

- Acknowledging limitations, the economic evaluation identified an overall benefit of $16 million of the legislation to the Queensland community, and has returned $2.30-$4.59 for every dollar spent.

Overall, there have been promising reductions in some key measures of alcohol-related harm across Queensland, but levels of alcohol consumption and harm remain high. Further refinement and

regulation is required to ensure people attending Queensland nightlife return home safely. Legislative amendments are also required to better balance impact on business. The key barriers to achieving reduced suffering from alcohol-related violence and burden on the community are continued high levels of alcohol consumption and insufficient regulation of the market. Recommendations are made with the explicit goal of reducing alcohol-related violence, injury and other harm.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

To achieve reductions in the very high levels of alcohol-related harm in Queensland and improve Queensland's alcohol consumption patterns while balancing the impact on business, the following recommendations are made. Supportive text for recommendations can be found in Sections 8 and 9. Recommendations are presented in groupings.

2.1. IMPROVING QUEENSLAND'S LIQUOR LICENSING TO REDUCE ALCOHOL-RELATED VIOLENCE AND HARM

Recommendation 1:   Close all venues in SNPs at 3:30am.

Recommendation 2:   Stop the Extended Trading Permits scheme.

Recommendation 3:   Retain mandatory networked ID scanners, with amendments;

   a) Reduce the days on which mandatory scanning is required for venues closing before 1am to Friday, Saturday and Sunday nights, as well as late trading public holidays.

   b) Allow venues with external toilet and smoking facilities to 'stamp' patrons to avoid the need for rescanning.

   c) Community clubs be granted exemption from mandatory networked scanning, but remain subject to other restrictions, including the risky venues scheme.

   d) Add an offence to the Liquor Act of making vexatious bans for ID scanner operators/licencees on the scanner network.

   e) Limit the amount of time that venue-based bans remain on the system to six months.

   f) Make banning lists available to all venues in Queensland operating after midnight.

Recommendation 4:   Introduce a two-year moratorium on liquor licences for on-licensed premises except for restaurants and licensed cafes where people can only purchase alcohol if they are having a meal.

Recommendation 5:   Conduct a Review of SNP boundaries and criteria for inclusion, and introduce annual reviews of SNPs.

   a) Remove Caxton Street as an SNP.

   b) Remove Ipswich as an SNP.

Recommendation 6:   Remove funding to the SNP project scheme.

   a) Support for SNP board administration should continue.

Recommendation 7:   Introduce a targeted, evidence-based High-Risk Venues scheme.

   a) Queensland government should implement a targeted, evidence-based, high-risk venues scheme which replicates and improves on the NSW Violent Venues scheme to incorporate Last Drinks data from hospitals and ambulance attendance location information.

Recommendation 8: Add a section to the Liquor Act to include a statement that: 'the licensee/their employee must satisfy themselves that a person is not unduly intoxicated before serving them alcohol or allowing consumption'.

Recommendation 9: The Liquor Act should be amended to ensure that 'Mistake of fact' (Section 24 of the Criminal Code) cannot be exploited to avoid responsibility for serving an unduly intoxicated person.

a) The changes should ensure that the modified Mistake of Fact is a defence rather than an excuse, meaning that the defendant would have to establish the defence on the balance of probabilities rather than the prosecution having to exclude the excuse beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically:

b) If undue intoxication of a person is material to the charge of an offence against the Act, the operation of section 24 of the Criminal Code is excluded;

c) In these instances it is for the defence to prove that, at the time of the offence, the relevant person honestly and reasonably believed that the person whose undue intoxication is material to the offence was not unduly intoxicated;

d) Evidence that the relevant person did not assess the level of intoxication of the person whose undue intoxication is material to the offence is evidence that any belief that the person was not unduly intoxicated was not reasonable.

Recommendation 10: Amend the Liquor Act to include an offence of not complying with Risk Assessed Management plan.

Recommendation 11: Amend the Liquor Act to include, and document, consideration of violence rates, family violence rates and the current density of outlets in any granting of new liquor licenses or changes to existing licenses.

Recommendation 12: The Liquor Act should ensure that all liquor licensing decisions are transparent, that reasons are published for every decision, and that there is timely and easy public access (e.g. posted on the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) website) to all submissions and evidence that an applicant seeks to rely upon throughout the proceedings in support of their application.

Recommendation 13: Amend the Liquor Act to make CCTV mandatory for all venues that trade after midnight.

Recommendation 14: Include casinos in trading hour restrictions and mandatory ID scanning or the high-risk venues scheme if implemented.

2.2. IMPROVING COMMUNITY INFORMATION ON ALCOHOL-RELATED HARM

Recommendation 15:   Introduce last drinks questions to Emergency services across Queensland:

a) Police
   i) *Where did you consume your last drink?*

b) Emergency Departments
   i) *Where did the event occur? (to be asked as a routine administration question)*
   ii) *How many alcoholic drinks have you consumed in past 12 hours? (to be asked by clinical or administrative staff)*
   iii) *Where did you consume your last drink? (to be asked by clinical or administrative staff)*

c) Ambulance
   i) *How many alcoholic drinks have you consumed in past 12 hours?*
   ii) *Where did you consume your last drink?*

Recommendation 16:   Improve the collection of Alcohol sales data:

a) Liquor suppliers who do not provide comprehensive and accurate data within three months of request should be subject to a substantive penalty.

b) The OLGR should be given powers under the liquor act to audit liquor suppliers' records to ensure that data provided is accurate.

c) The OLGR should conduct random audits of 5% of the data provided annually.

2.3. INCREASING PATRON ACCOUNTABILITY

Recommendation 17:   Increase of minimum police bans to 1 month with an option of up to 6 months.

2.4. REDUCING ALCOHOL AND DRUG-RELATED HARM IN QUEENSLAND

Recommendation 18:   Introduce a Minimum Unit Price on alcohol across Queensland.

Recommendation 19:   Trial the introduction of government support scheme for original live music played before 10 pm.

Recommendation 20:   Create a health promotion scheme whereby National Health and Medical Research Council guidelines for low-risk drinking are prominently posted on all points of sale in Queensland.

Recommendation 21:   Conduct a trial of the 'clubs against drugs' program.

Recommendation 22:   Commission a comprehensive independent review of the Alcohol and Other Drug school education program.

a) This review should be led by the Department of Premier and Cabinet and explicitly cover issues of implementation and monitoring, along with the development of an ongoing impact assessment and regular reporting.

b) Every school in the state should identify specific individuals as the responsible anti-violence and alcohol and other drug officer, and this person should be listed on reports to the government and on school websites.

c) Every school should have a publicly-available plan for alcohol and other drug education and anti-violence outlined on the school website.

d) The Department of Education should be required to collect and keep records of the content delivered in each school which document the elements presented, and the year levels and classes delivered to.

e) The Department of Education should report to the Department of Premier and Cabinet annually on the compliance within schools.

f) A review of program content and delivery should be conducted every 3 years by suitably qualified independent evaluators which includes a range of impact measures to be specified by the review.

g) Similarly, a comprehensive review of the teaching package should be conducted by suitably qualified, independent, drug education experts, to ensure best practice given the existence of an extensive literature on what works in school-based drug education.

Recommendation 23:   A review of anti-violence strategies and campaigns should be conducted to inform a whole of government approach to violence. The review should be overseen by an independent expert advisory committee.

Recommendation 24:   Implement an alcohol awareness campaign which conforms to best evidence and does not use 'responsible drinking' wording.

a) Mass media campaigns should be included as key components of comprehensive approaches to improving population health behaviours.

b) Sufficient funding must be secured to enable frequent and widespread exposure to campaign messages continuously over time, especially for ongoing behaviours.

c) Adequate access to promoted services and products must be ensured.

d) Changes in health behaviour might be maximised by complementary policy decisions that support opportunities to change, provide disincentives for not changing, and challenge or restrict competing marketing.

e) Campaign messages should be based on sound research of the target group and should be tested during campaign development.

f) Outcomes should undergo rigorous independent assessment and peer-reviewed publications should be sought.

2.5. ENSURING FUTURE RESPONSES TO ALCOHOL-RELATED VIOLENCE ARE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT

Recommendation 25:   The Department of Health should be required to set up an independent expert research steering committee to oversee the commissioning and reporting of any monitoring all evaluation research. This steering committee should have veto rights, and membership should include suitably qualified people (Ph.D. or MD) with backgrounds in medicine, public health, alcohol and other drugs and social welfare, along with relevant department representation.

Recommendation 26:   The Queensland Government Statistician's Office (QGSO) should amend sampling and reporting practices for the Queensland Preventative Health Survey

Recommendation 27:   Commission ongoing Independent evaluation and monitoring of alcohol-related harm in Queensland
a) This should include an independent, expert evaluation of the impact of the opening of the Queen's Wharf Brisbane casino that is publicly available, and led by an independent steering group.

3. SAFE NIGHT PRECINCT SUPPORT SERVICES RECOMMENDATIONS

Additional funding was granted through the Department of Communities for safe night precinct support services (SNPSS). A separate evaluation of these services was conducted in 2017, funded by the Department of Communities and led by Prof Miller. The recommendations from the SNPSS evaluation report are included here.

Recommendation 28:   Support Services funding should be scaled according to number of venues and levels of harm:
a) Levels of harm should be measured using ambulance attendance and police-recorded serious assaults.

Recommendation 29:   Conduct recurrent evaluations to monitor Support Service improvement and new risks and opportunities.

Recommendation 30:   Evaluation should be conducted every two years and the reports be publicly available to monitor performance on investment.

Recommendation 31:   Consider funding for Support Services via a levy on venues.

Recommendation 32:   Recurring funding should be provided to train Support Service personnel.

Recommendation 33:   The government should conduct quarterly site visits in order to hold individuals and Support Services accountable.

Recommendation 34:   Support Services personnel should be required to wear high-visibility clothing in order to stand out in the night-time environment.

Recommendation 35:   It is suggested that all rest and recovery services have a stable presence in the main thoroughfare of their SNP.

Recommendation 36:   A review should be conducted of radio networks in SNPSS, with the aim of making use of the networks mandatory for all parties involved, including police.

Recommendation 37:   Universal data collection, a minimum dataset, and storage methods across Support Services is suggested.

Recommendation 38:   There should be a universal set of guidelines across SNPSS to dictate how Support Services should operate.

4. INTRODUCTION

The harms associated with alcohol consumption are a growing concern for the Australian community and present a challenge to all levels of government. In Australia, the estimates of costs attributable to alcohol-related harms range from $15.3b (3) to $36b (4). The social and economic costs of alcohol-related violence are also immense and were estimated at $311m in 2004-05 (3, 5), around $450 million in today's dollar considering inflation.

Night-time violence and injuries tend to cluster around bars, pubs and clubs within night-time entertainment precincts (NEPs; 6). An estimated 40% of all assaults in Australia are reported to occur in NEPs (2). Further, the rates of verbal and physical abuse by a person affected by alcohol are more than twice the rate for other drug types (7). In 2013, almost nine percent of Australians aged 14 years and older had been physically abused by someone under the influence of alcohol, 13% were fearful of abuse and 22% of Australians were a victim of alcohol-related verbal assault (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare; AIHW; 8). Alcohol-related harm and disorder can have a significant, adverse impact upon the perceptions of safety among the broader community. This concern and perception extends beyond those who have been directly involved in an incident of alcohol-related, anti-social behaviour or harm (7).

Governments have responded to alcohol-related concerns by implementing a variety of legislative regulations, amendments and practices that aim to address alcohol-related violence and risky drinking practices (9). Some strategies have a strong evidence base, such as reducing late night alcohol sales decreasing the rate of alcohol injuries and assault (10-12). The effectiveness of other strategies, such as education campaigns, is less clear (13, 14). One of the limitations in assessing the impact of strategies implemented to reduce alcohol-related harms is that alcohol policies comprise multiple strategies and changes to practice, which are usually introduced simultaneously. For example, the New South Wales (NSW) Liquor Amendment Act 2014 included risk-based licensing fees, earlier cessation of alcohol sales, lockout conditions, a ban on takeaway sales after 10pm, and extension of banning orders to prevent troublesome patrons entering key entertainment areas.

In 2016, the Queensland Government responded to community concerns about alcohol-fuelled violence and alcohol-related harms by implementing a broad-based multi-faceted Policy that aims to tackle alcohol-fuelled violence. The Queensland Government's Tackling Alcohol-Fuelled Violence Policy (TAFV) 2016 has three broad aims:

1. To achieve cultural change around drinking behaviour which includes more responsible drinking practices (it is assumed this is drinking behaviour within night-time

entertainment precincts (NEPs), also known as Safe Night Precincts (SNPs) in Queensland);

2. A safer night time environment, in particular in entertainment precincts; and

3. A regulatory framework that balances the interests of the liquor industry with a reduction in alcohol-fuelled violence.

The elements of the Policy are detailed in Table 1.

Table 1: Tackling Alcohol-fuelled Violence Policy 2016

Elements of the Policy which commenced on 1 July 2016
• regular service hours for alcohol in licensed venues across Queensland ends at **2am**, except for premises located within a Safe Night Precinct approved for **3am** trading;   • A ban on the sale of rapid intoxication, high alcohol-content drinks after midnight;   • 3am lockouts removed.
Elements of the Policy commencing after 1 July 2016
• introduction of **mandatory operation of networked ID scanners** in late-night trading licensed premises located in Safe Night Precincts (to commence 1 July 2017);   • extension of the powers of courts to impose **banning orders on persons convicted of drug offences in Safe Night Precincts**. These changes will be subject to consultation with stakeholders and would require legislative changes.   • extended trading permits restricted to 6 per venue per calendar year on 1 February 2017 (previously 12 per year as per existing policy).
Elements of the Policy which commenced prior to 1 July 2016 and are continuing
• existing applications to extend hours for the sale of takeaway liquor beyond 10pm to be voided, with no new applications to be accepted, though existing approvals to sell takeaway liquor will remain – from 4 March 2016 (the date of assent of the Tackling Alcohol-Fuelled Violence Legislation Amendment Bill 2015); these amendments were applied retrospectively from 10 November 2015;   • the continuation of the 15 Safe Night Precincts, including rest and recovery services (also called Safe Spaces), around the State;   • the continuation of the local board model for management of Safe Night Precincts, including the grant funding pool for alcohol-related violence initiatives in Safe Night Precincts;   • targeted drug and alcohol assessment and referral programs for alcohol- and drug-related offences;   • the discontinuation of the Sober Safe Centre initiative, and instead, continuing the trial of paramedics in watch-houses;   • the development of the Alcohol and other drug education program as an optional resource for schools to use in meeting their obligation under the curriculum;   • the continuation of social marketing about alcohol- and drug-related violence;   • the continuation of implementation oversight mechanisms.
Elements of the Policy repealed prior to introduction
• introduction of 1am lockout in prescribed 3am Safe Night Precincts – **repealed** (was to commence on 1 February 2017).

Note. Reprinted [adapted] from "Queensland Alcohol-related violence Night Time Economy Monitoring project (QUANTEM): A study protocol," (15).

4.1. EVALUATION PROCESS AND TIMELINES

The TAFV legislation was enacted in the Queensland Parliament on 15 February 2016. Trading hours restrictions came into force on 1 July 2016, and mandatory ID scanners were introduced on 1 July 2017. The Department of Premier and Cabinet released a Request for Tender on 16 April 2016, with submissions due 5 May 2016. The research team was advised that they had been awarded an Australian Research Council Linkage grant on 6 May 2016. Tender submission was awarded to the Deakin University-led team on 16 May 2016. The final report was contracted to be submitted on 31 October 2018. The project was postponed until 2 April 2019, due to the delayed access to key datasets, including hospital admissions data, car crash data, and comparison data from other jurisdictions.

The evaluation was sent for review (1 March 2019) to two independent, anonymous peer reviewers, selected and managed by Prof Michael Farrell, Director of the National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre. The reviews and the research team responses are available in Appendix 16.

4.2. THE CURRENT STUDY

This project, *QUeensland Alcohol-related violence and Night Time Economy Monitoring (QUANTEM),* assesses the impact of the Policy on patterns of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms in Queensland, while also identifying unintended consequences of the Policy on the night-time economy. The approach to this Policy evaluation is unique in terms of the breadth of data sources consulted and comprehensiveness of perspectives considered. The evaluation included multiple data collection components and analysis of administrative data sources, and has been designed with the strengths of a complex interventions framework in mind.

The study had the following objectives:

1. To evaluate the extent to which the Policy is achieving its objectives, defined as:

   a) a cultural change around drinking behaviour, including more responsible drinking practices
   b) a safer night-time environment, in particular in entertainment precincts, including a reduction in the number of deaths associated with violence in and around licensed premises
   c) a regulatory framework that appropriately balances the interests of the liquor industry with a reduction in alcohol-fuelled violence

2. To the extent that it is possible, identify which initiatives are contributing to the achievement of the intended outcomes. Alternatively, identify which initiatives in combination can be credited with achieving improvements.

3. To the extent that it is possible, identify which measures do not appear to be effective, so efforts can be redirected to more effective measures.

4. Provide a cost-benefit assessment of the Policy, including the effect on the night-time economy.

4.2.1. STUDY AREAS

The current study was undertaken state-wide across Queensland, Australia, with a particular focus on designated NEPs, otherwise known in Queensland as safe night precincts: SNPs. SNPs were established in Queensland in 2014 under the former Government's Safe Night Out Strategy. Across Queensland there are currently 15 documented SNPs, including: Airlie Beach; Brisbane central business district (CBD); Broadbeach CBD; Bundaberg CBD; Cairns CBD; Fortitude Valley; Gladstone CBD; Inner West Brisbane (including Caxton Street); Ipswich CBD; Mackay CBD; Rockhampton CBD; Sunshine Coast (Caloundra, Maroochydoore, and Mooloolaba); Surfers Paradise CBD; Toowoomba CBD; and Townsville CBD (for maps of the SNPs please see https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/hospitality-tourism-sport/liquor-gaming/liquor/safe-night-precincts/maps). This project will focus primarily on a sub-sample of five SNPs, four of which typically receive media attention around alcohol-related violence and harms, and the other chosen due to its proximal location to the research team. SNPs include: Cairns, Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise, Toowoomba, and Townsville.

This report will focus on key outcomes measures across all SNPs, with a specific focus on the five key SNPs. Population estimates within each SNP city are detailed below. It is important to note that these population numbers are not reflective of the number of people who attend such a nightlife district during peak hours (16), and as such, any fluctuations in local population are unlikely to impact on trends, as much as population trends across the local government area (LGA).

### 4.2.1.1.1.	CAIRNS POPULATION

As of 2017, the estimated residential population of Cairns city was 12,199 people (17). The median age of residents was 35, with an estimated 14.4% of residents aged 15-24 years and 25.1% of residents aged 25-34 years.

### 4.2.1.1.2.	CAIRNS NIGHT-TIME ECONOMY

As at June 2017, there are a total of 190 licensed venues in the Cairns SNP (18). Figure 1 presents the map of the Cairns SNP.

Figure 1: Cairns precinct map

4.2.1.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY

4.2.1.2.1. FORTITUDE VALLEY POPULATION

As of 2017, the estimated residential population of the Fortitude Valley was 8,024 people (17). The median age of residents was 31, with an estimated 17% of residents aged 15-24 years and 42.3% of residents aged 25-34 years.

4.2.1.2.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY NIGHT-TIME ECONOMY

In June 2017, there were a total of 152 licensed venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP (18). The Fortitude Valley precinct map is presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Fortitude Valley precinct map

4.2.1.3.   SURFERS PARADISE

4.2.1.3.1.   SURFERS PARADISE POPULATION

As of 2017, the estimated residential population of Surfers Paradise city was 25,995 people (17). The median age of residents was 37, with an estimated 15.2% of residents aged 15-24 years and 23.9% of residents aged 25-34 years.

4.2.1.3.2.   SURFERS PARADISE NIGHT-TIME ECONOMY

As at June 2017, there are a total of 161 licensed venues in the Surfers Paradise CBD SNP (18). The Surfers Paradise precinct map is presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Surfers Paradise precinct map

4.2.1.4. TOOWOOMBA

4.2.1.4.1. TOOWOOMBA POPULATION

As of 2017, the estimated population of Toowoomba central was 13,899 people (17). The median age of residents was 37, with an estimated 13.7% of residents aged 15-24 years and 15.6% of residents aged 25-34 years.

4.2.1.4.2. TOOWOOMBA NIGHT-TIME ECONOMY

As at June 2017, there are a total of 47 licensed venues in the Toowoomba CBD SNP (18). The Toowoomba precinct map is presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Toowoomba precinct map

4.2.1.5. TOWNSVILLE

4.2.1.5.1. TOWNSVILLE POPULATION

As of 2017, the estimated population of Townsville city was 9,502 people (17). The median age of residents was 37, with an estimated 16.1% of residents aged 15-24 years and 19.6% of residents aged 25-34 years.

4.2.1.5.2. TOWNSVILLE NIGHT-TIME ECONOMY

As at June 2017, there are a total of 90 licensed venues in the Townsville CBD SNP (18). The Townsville precinct map is presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Townsville precinct map

4.2.1.6. COMPARISON SITES

Comparison sites (locations where SNPs are not designated or interstate sites) were used to compare trends in SNPs across ambulance, emergency department, and police data. Comparison sites detailed in Table 2 and further details are included in the comparison site chapter.

Table 2: Research and comparison sites

Queensland sites	Comparison sites
Fortitude Valley	Perth (CBD + Northbridge, WA)
	West End, Brisbane (Qld)
Cairns	St Kilda (Vic)
	Noosa Heads/Noosaville (Qld)
Surfers Paradise	Melbourne (Chapel St, Vic)
Toowoomba	Geelong (Vic)
	Greater Newcastle (NSW)
Townsville	Adelaide (CBD, SA)
	Greater Newcastle (NSW)

5. METHODS

The methodology for this project is based in part on the design employed in three previous research projects:

5. Dealing with Alcohol-Related Harm and the Night-time Economy; DANTE (2);
6. Patron Offending and Intoxication in Night-Time Entertainment Districts; POINTED (16); and
7. Drug and Alcohol Intoxication and Subsequent Harm in the Night-Time Entertainment Districts; DASHED (19).

These projects examined entertainment precincts in Newcastle and Geelong (DANTE; 2), Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Wollongong, and Geelong (POINTED; 16), and Canberra and Hobart (DASHED; 19). The specific methodology for this project has been outlined in a peer-reviewed journal article (15), although some study elements have been added to the methods as the research team became aware of the availability of specific datasets.

Data collection for QUANTEM was undertaken Queensland-wide with a specific focus on five SNPs (Fortitude Valley, Cairns, Surfers Paradise, Toowoomba, and Townsville), and involved a number of related components to assess the level and drivers of alcohol- and other drug-related harm at each site. Components of data collection varied across each site and are detailed in Table 3.

Table 3: Study elements across research sites

Study Element	Queensland Wide	All SNP Sites	Fortitude Valley	Cairns	Surfers Paradise	Townsville	Toowoomba	West End
Administrative data								
Ambulance attendance[a]	✔							
Ambulance call-outs	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Emergency department	✔							
Hospital admissions	✔							
Police assaults	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Police banning	✔							
Police call-outs		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	
Police tasking			✔	✔	✔		✔	
Alcohol sales	✔							
Licensing data	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
School intervention	✔							
Queensland health survey	✔							
Courts	✔							
Tourism	✔			✔				
Crash (traffic accident)								
Coronial	✔							
Taxi			✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	
Uber			✔	✔				
Public transport data			✔		✔			✔
Patron interviews			✔	✔	✔			✔
Follow-up surveys			✔					✔

Study Element	Queensland Wide	All SNP Sites	Fortitude Valley	Cairns	Surfers Paradise	Townsville	Toowoomba	West End
Foot traffic			✓	✓				
ID scanner (Scantek and OLGR)		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Precinct mapping			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Live music/performance			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Venue observations			✓					✓
Key informant interviews			✓	✓	✓			
Economic evaluation	✓							

aDue to data collection issues (outlined in the ambulance data chapter) ambulance attendance data were not able to be analysed

5.1. ETHICAL APPROVAL

Ethics approval was obtained from Deakin University, The University of Queensland, Queensland Police Service, Department of Health, and James Cook University Ethics committees. Different components were covered by different application as the project entered different stages, or because new data sources were identified. Specific approval codes are: Deakin University (HEAG-H 183_2016; HEAG-H 95_2016; 2016-244; 2017-265; HEAG-H 101_2015; 2011-095; HEAG-H 95_2016); University of Queensland (2017000012; 2016001021; 2016001020; 2017000281), Queensland Police Service (DOC17/1297998), Department of Health (RD007413), and James Cook University (H6726; H6721).

5.2. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Building on methods used in projects such as DANTE (20), DASHED (19) and the National Alcohol Indicators Project (NAIP; (21), administrative and archival data sources were utilised to provide a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the Policy. Administrative data refers to data that are collected for purposes other than the research being conducted. Using existing data is a cost effective way of determining trends within a community (22), and a reliable way to assess trends over time (23, 24). However, there are some limitations involved in the use of administrative data sources, which will be discussed later in this section (25).

Measures for administrative data consist of unit record data relevant to the specific type of information. Data were obtained from January 2009, where available; where we could not get data back to January 2009, we requested data from the earliest data available. The following types of unit record data have been included in this report, with a specific focus on five SNPs (Fortitude Valley, Cairns, Surfers Paradise, Toowoomba, and Townsville):

- Ambulance attendance and call-out data from Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS)
- Injury presentations and alcohol intoxication presentations in emergency departments from Queensland Health
- Hospital admissions for alcohol-related injury and intoxication data from Queensland Health
- Police crime records (including assault offences, call outs, tasking, and banning) from Queensland Police Service (QPS)
- Courts (breach of liquor licences and court-invoked patron banning) from Magistrates Court and the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR)

- Licensed venue data

- Australian Business Registry data

- School alcohol and other drug (AOD) education audit of Queensland secondary schools

All administrative data were used to assess trends in alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms. These data were de-identified to protect privacy. Where possible, trends were examined before and after the Policy introduction. Patterns of harms during high-alcohol hours (HAH; (23) were examined for much of the data, given that this is the time period the Policy focuses on, and when most harms have been identified. HAH are typically defined as Friday and Saturday, 8pm to 6am, and are shown by international research to be a reliable proxy for alcohol-related harms (23, 24, 26, 27). HAH varies dependent on the nature of the data and data source and is defined for unit record data below (23, 26, 27).

5.2.1. AMBULANCE ATTENDANCES AND CALL-OUTS

Ambulance call-out and attendance data were examined from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2018. Ambulance attendance data are not presented in the current report due to issues related to data recording from October 2017 to June 2018. In October 2017, Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) commenced the transition from the Queensland Ambulance Electronic Ambulance Report Form (EARF) database to the Digital Ambulance Report Form (DARF). During this transition, some sites used both systems while others used one, resulting in missing or multiple records of the same event. Due to the inconsistency between and within sites' data collection methods, this results in unreliable rates of ambulance attendance within this time period (see Figure 6). Although attempts were made to rectify these issues, these data remain unreliable and thus unusable.

Figure 6: count of ambulance attendances during HAH, Queensland

Ambulance call-out data were obtained from the Queensland Ambulance Case Information Reporting (QACIR) database. QACIR provides a mechanism to replicate daily ambulance case data, enabling timely statistical analysis and performance reporting. De-identified data were accessed for call-outs and cases attended by ambulance paramedics across Queensland from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2018. These data do not include specific patient-related clinical variables and only record incidents and responses from the communications and dispatching system. After consultation with the research team, 148 relevant distinctive Determinant Codes in the following five categories were selected to capture cases more likely to be alcohol-related: assault/sexual assault; falls; psychiatric/abnormal behaviour/suicide attempt; stab/gunshot/penetrating trauma; and, traumatic injuries. The key outcome variables were: 1) the number of ambulance call-outs during HAH (Friday and Saturday, 8pm to 6am); and 2) the number of ambulance call-outs during HAH, across Queensland SNPs.

5.2.2. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PRESENTATIONS

Emergency department (ED) records provide a source of data for the monitoring of alcohol-related injuries in Australia (11, 28). ED records capture a broad spectrum of alcohol-related injuries (e.g., minor fractures from falls and assaults, along with alcohol poisoning) which are often not serious

enough to result in admission to a hospital ward, but they occur relatively frequently among high-risk population groups (29).

De-identified ED unit records covering specific hospitals which serve night-time entertainment precincts (NEPs) were obtained for the period 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2018. Core fields requested include: primary diagnosis; patient age and gender; time/date of presentation; postcode; and a location description where injury occurred (e.g., at home/street). The analyses use injury presentations during HAH as a proxy for alcohol-related harm, based on extensive international research (11, 30). We focussed on two main categories of ED presentations during HAH with a number of sub-analyses. These were: 1) presentations related to injury or poisoning (ICD-10 S00-T98 or I-CD9 800-999) and 2) presentations related to alcohol intoxication or harmful use (ICD-10 F10.0-F10.1). Research supports the link between alcohol use and specific types of injuries (31). Therefore, sub-analyses focussed specifically on injuries relating to fights (head and hand injuries – ICD-10 S02 and S62) were conducted. Additionally, presentations for young men (aged 18-40) and presentations at the two major hospitals likely to receive presentations for injuries occurring in Fortitude Valley (Royal Brisbane and Princess Alexandra) were examined. During data cleaning[1], data from hospitals that provided incomplete records (e.g., missing data for particular years) were eliminated (5.8% of records).

5.2.3. HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS

Hospital admissions data were also analysed to investigate the changes in more serious incidents that resulted in hospitalisation, specifically admissions related to alcohol intoxication, fractured mandible, nose, orbit of the eye, hand or wrist, and intracranial injury. Self-harm admissions were also examined. De-identified state-wide data were analysed for the period of 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2018. Core fields included month and year of admission, time of admission, and ICD-10 codes. Analyses examined monthly trends for admissions, where at least one of the key target admissions causes were included in the patient's ICD-10 codes. The specific ICD-10 codes examined are outlined in Table 4.

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[1] Data cleaning is the process of detecting and correcting (or removing) corrupt or inaccurate records from a database

Table 4: ICD-10 codes examined in hospital admissions data analysis

Code	Descriptor
F10.0 and F10.1	Alcohol intoxication and harmful use
S02.0-S02.9	Fracture of skull and facial bones
S62.0-S62.8	Fracture at wrist and hand level (inc. fingers)
S06.0-S06.9	Intracranial injury
X70-X84	Intentional self-harm (all self-harm types, such as hanging, guns, fire, sharp object, jumping, motor vehicle etc)

5.2.4. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Police assaults data were obtained from the Queensland Police Records and Information Management Exchange (QPRIME) database. Three offense types (serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent)) occurring in a public place during HAH were examined. Data were provided by QPS and contains unit level records of assault events, including: 1) time and date of the offence; 2) location of the offence; 3) and offense type. Data were examined for the period of 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2018.

Common assaults include: assaults, common and assaults, minor (not elsewhere classified). Serious assaults include: assault occasioning bodily harm; assault, aggravated (non-sexual); assault, Police Powers and Responsibilities Act (PPRA, 2000[2]); assault, serious (other); grievous bodily harm; wounding. Public nuisance (violent) offenses can be an on-the-spot fine, with no conviction recorded, or an arrest and chargeable offense.

5.2.4.1. LIMITATIONS OF POLICE DATA

A very important limitation in relation to QPS data relates to the way in which assaults have been reported in relation to offences occurring in domestic settings. In response to the Bryce inquiry into family violence in Queensland (32), a number of changes were made to QPS practice in recording family violence and sexual assaults. In particular, as of mid-2016, family violence offences are now also recorded as assaults, meaning that many of the changes in assault-related trends occurring in suburban settings have been influenced by this change in reporting practice. While officers can use a tick box to flag the incident as being family violence, it is apparent that many such cases are not flagged. Implementation was not uniform in terms of the date it commence, nor the fidelity of

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[2] The Police Powers and Responsibilities Act (2000) deems that it is an offence to assault or obstruct a policer officer. Source: https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/2017-09-13/act-2000-005

'switch-on', meaning that different stations and officers adopted the recording at different times and for different cases. Therefore, as a proxy for domestic violence cases, offenses that occurred on a private premises were excluded from the data.

5.2.5. POLICE – OTHER DATA

In addition to assaults data, the project has been granted access to a number of other datasets from QPS, which are relevant to the task of determining the impact of the range of measures implemented under the TAFV legislation.

5.2.5.1.   POLICE CALL-OUT TO ASSIST DATA

In addition to examining assaults in entertainment districts during HAH, we also analysed Queensland Call-Out to assist data (QCAD; police-based logged records) to assess any potential impact on parties occurring in private residences. This will test whether claims that greater restrictions on alcohol availability in nightlife areas are related to changes in noise complaints and other troubles associated with alcohol consumption outside nightlife districts. While these data carry a number of important limitations, QCAD data can provide a sensitive indicator of the impact of the TAFV Policy.

There are very few studies that have published calls to assist data (CAD). A recent example was Devilly and colleagues (33) who reported on police attendance in Fortitude Valley as a part of a research project that was associated with a reported reduction in calls for assistance. While these findings are promising, the study design was a very simple pre-post test with no randomisation or other basic sampling control measures and the article did not report on whether the authors controlled for other policing levels, nor whether changes in CAD numbers equated to reductions in assaults recorded by police. Regardless, the article demonstrated that CAD data can be used, and may even be a sensitive measure of crime and anti-social behaviour in night-time entertainment districts. On the other hand, more recent, and sophisticated analyses has suggested that there are substantial limitations and concerns about using CAD data and other forms of recording of lower level crime as the recording is highly dependent on local policing priorities, staffing levels, watchhouse cultures and the business of the night (34). For the purposes of this evaluation, QCAD data will be used alongside assaults data to investigate the apparent impact of the 2016 TAFV policy on police-recorded incidents.

Police call-out data were obtained from the QPS for the period of 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2018. QPS data were extracted from the QCAD. The QCAD data contain unit level records of calls to assist. Core fields include: type of incident (initial coding as recorded at time of call and revised coding at the time police reach the scene); geographic location; and date and time of day of incident. In order to

more accurately capture possible alcohol-related call out types, we retained selected revised incident types (see Table 5). Each call-out case is assigned one revised incident type in the data file. Call-out data for each SNP are presented separately.

Table 5: Revised incident types included in QPS call-out data analyses

Revised incident type
Alcohol Related Incident
Assault Other
Assist Emergency Services
Assist External Agency
Attempted Rape
Attempting/Threatening Suicide
Civil Matter / Keep the Peace
Community Assistance
Crisis Situation
Disturbances
Disturbances/Disputes
Drug Related
Drunk
Indecent Act(s)
Indecent Assault
Liquor Act Offence
Occurred on Licensed Premises
Offences Against Property
Offences Against the Person
Out of Control Event
Person Collapsed
Police Assistance
Police In Trouble
Rape
Reckless Acts - Transport
Serious Assault
Serious Nuisance Dwelling Pk
Sexual Offences
Substance Abuse
Threats Against the Person
Wilful Damage / Destruction
Wilful Exposure

5.2.5.1.1.   LIMITATIONS OF POLICE CAD DATA

There a number of key limitations to be considered in the use of CAD data. In particular, there are a substantial number of calls which are hoaxes or were not resolved. Further, some cases have no voice (e.g., silence on the phone) and parties may abscond (that is, police may not be able to locate people

involved in an incident once they arrive on scene). Such cases have been cleaned from the dataset for the purpose of this report.

5.2.5.2.   POLICE TASKING DATA

An important element in the interpretation of data generated from law enforcement sources is whether the outcomes observed and recorded by police are indicative of trends in crime, or related to change in police numbers, or indeed police practice. For example, greater numbers of police on the street in an SNP may mean that more assaults are observed and acted upon by police. On the other hand, this may also act as a deterrent; currently we have no reliable evidence either way. While it is likely that this will affect lower-level crimes such as common assault or anti-social behaviour offences, it has not been previously determined whether levels of policing resources will impact the recording of crimes such as serious assaults. To address this issue, we have obtained police tasking data.

Police tasking data were obtained from 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2018 from the QPS. Reliable tasking data were only available for five of the 15 SNPs: Cairns, Fortitude Valley, Sunshine Coast, Surfers Paradise, and Toowoomba. Tasking encompasses police assigned hours to the following five task categories: administration, enforcement, community engagement, general, and liquor. For this report, non-administrative tasks during HAH were used.

5.2.5.3.   PATRON BANNING DATA

Police banning data were obtained from the QPS for the period 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2018. QPS data were extracted from the QPRIME database. Police Banning Notices are administered to people engaging in anti-social behaviour in or around licensed venues. Banning schemes vary in design across Australia (35), but in Queensland, the minimum ban is 10 days, with an option for police to expand it up to six months. The key outcome variable was the number of Police Banning Notices that were administered, both overall, and after 3am. The patron bans can be viewed as both outcome variables and interventions, thus making 'impact' difficult to tease out. For example, fewer patron bans may mean that less people are engaging in anti-social behaviour. Alternatively, police might hand out more bans if they wish to reduce anti-social behaviour, which might in turn influence assault rates. Data were filtered by suburbs and trends for SNPs are presented separately.

5.2.6. LICENSED VENUE DATA

A key element of the evaluation of the impact of the 2016 TAFV legislation is to assess the impact of the Policy on business, and especially the liquor industry. Alcohol outlet density (both on and off-licence) is a key factor that must be accounted for when assessing the impact of late night alcohol

changes. In line with this, the evaluation has accessed data relating to liquor licences granted in Queensland.

Liquor license data were obtained from OLGR for the period 30 June 2010 to 30 June 2018, and data on extended trading permits were obtained for the period 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2018. A range of relevant data is available, which can be broken up into three main categories of information:

1. The current and historical number of licences;
2. The number of new licence approvals;
3. The number of extended trading permits granted; and,
4. Prosecutions and convictions regarding Liquor Act breaches.

Extended trading permits allow a venue in SNPs to trade until 5am 'for the period of the special occasion'[3]. Venues can hold permits for six dates[4] in a calendar year for trading between 12 midnight and 5am.

There are a number of important points to note when considering reporting of liquor licence data in Queensland. Firstly, in 2009 licensing data were migrated to the COGS database, superseding and existing electronic recoding system, which had in turn superseded an earlier electronic record system, meaning systematic data is not readily available prior to this. Secondly, licensing changes can result in apparent changes in reported data, without actually changing the number of venues or businesses in question. An important example of this occurred in 2015 when the specific category 'nightclub' was created, and most venues that were operating as nightclubs under general licences transferred across to this category. However, some sources have reported these increased in the number of licences as an

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[3] The Act defines a 'special occasion' as a unique or infrequent special public event of local, state or national significance. Examples of special public events include a local music festival or a televised international sporting match involving an Australian team, or, a private function not open to the public, such as a wedding or birthday.

New Year's Eve and Australia Day have been determined as special occasions by the Commissioner for Liquor and Gaming Regulation. Licensees who want to apply to extend their trading hours to any time between 2am and 5am on these days will not need to provide evidence of a private function. Source: https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/hospitality-tourism-sport/liquor-gaming/liquor/licensing/applications/permits.

[4] As at February 2017. From 1 July 2016 to 31 January 2017, up to 12 permits per a one year period were allowed.

increase in the number of businesses, rather than simply reflecting a change in the labelling of the business's category.

5.2.7. SAFE NIGHT PRECINCT OPERATIONAL GRANTS

The previous Queensland government set up the system of SNPs and as an incentive to industry, arranged a scheme whereby boards could apply for money to implement programs they liked. Operational grant funding applications are expected to link to the management plan developed by the local board for achieving cultural change around drinking behaviour, promoting responsible drinking practices and ensuring safer environments in and around licensed venues (https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/hospitality-tourism-sport/liquor-gaming/liquor/safe-night-precincts/grants). SNP boards can apply for grant funding of up to $250,000 AUD per year for each SNP from the Queensland state government. Twenty-nine grants have been approved since the inception of the program, worth over $1.5 million AUD in funding. The impact of these programs on the number of police records of serious assaults during HAH per month were tested. All grants which commenced before March 2018 were analysed. In cases where a SNP had multiple grants, all grants were included in the same model. ARIMA time series analysis was used to estimate the influence of the programs implemented through the grant scheme on monthly police-recorded assaults.

5.2.8. COURTS DATA

Courts data were examined for case finalisations including at least one charge of serious assault, common assault, and/or drunkenness. Additional parameters which may limit the interpretability of results include: related offence(s) occurring on a high-alcohol day (Saturday or Sunday) in an SNP suburb (not necessarily within SNP boundary); and a guilty outcome (i.e. not resulting in dismissal, withdrawal, transfer to other court, or 'noble prosequi' outcome). Monthly counts (based on case finalisation date) for 1 January 2009 to 30 September 2018 were reported in descriptive analyses and graphs. Counts for assaults and serious assaults included a small number of historical cases whereby the offence date occurred before January 2009. Approximately one percent of cases involve assault and/or serious assault offences that were committed more than five years prior to finalisation in court, with offences dating back to June 1988.

5.2.9. CORONIAL DATA

The coronial data presented in this report were obtained by the National Coronial Information System (NCIS) who completed a requested data report to determine the number of alcohol-related deaths in Queensland. The NCIS is an electronic database of coronial information containing case details from the coronial files. The data entered into the NCIS include the police report of death, autopsy reports,

toxicology reports and coronial findings from nine jurisdictions in Queensland as reported to the Queensland coroner. Queensland coronial data where the deceased died as a result of external causes involving alcohol were obtained for the period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2018. Data included only closed cases (i.e., cases where the final determination has been made and alcohol has been definitively identified as a contributing cause).

5.2.10. CRASH DATA

Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) record of all fatal and non-fatal vehicular crashes reported by the Queensland Police Service. Annual traffic crash counts provided by TMR for the period 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2018 were used to investigate patterns of alcohol-related crashes. Blood alcohol content (BAC) is not routinely recorded at crash sites, making it an unreliable measure as to whether alcohol was involved (36). To rectify this, an approximate measure based on data from crashes that occurred during alcohol-related hours for vehicular crashes was analysed instead. This measure should be treated not as an absolute indication of the frequency of alcohol-related crashes but as an estimation. Alcohol-related hours for vehicular crashes include; Friday 10pm-6am, Saturday 6pm-6am, Sunday 6pm-6am, Tuesday 10pm-2am, Wednesday 10pm-2am and Thursday 6pm-2am (1).

5.2.11. HEALTH SURVEY DATA

The Queensland preventative health survey collected alcohol consumption data from 2010 to 2016, then again in 2018. It is a general population survey and the number of participants aged 18 years or older providing alcohol consumption data as part of the survey ranged from 3,433 to 19,398 per year. From 2015, participants were contacted by landline and mobile telephone. Data are collected from approximately October to March each year.

5.2.12. SECURE TAXI RANK DATA

The Department of Transport & Main Roads (TMR) routinely records secure taxi rank data for Queensland. These data were obtained for Queensland across five SNP sites (Fortitude Valley, Cairns, Surfers Paradise, Toowoomba, and Townsville) for the period of 1 June 2009 to 30 June 2018. Secure taxi ranks operate on Friday and Saturday nights from approximately 11:00pm to 6:00am. The total number of passengers are recorded by taxi rank marshals located at each secure taxi rank. Data were analysed to map the total number of passengers in each SNP and to identify any potential changes over time. While these data do not provide a precise measure of the numbers of people leaving SNPs, they do provide a valuable source of information regarding the numbers of people leaving SNPs over time.

5.2.13. PUBLIC TRANSPORT DATA

The Department of Transport & Main Roads (TMR) routinely records transport data including train boarding and alighting data for Queensland. These data were only available for five of the 15 SNP sites; Fortitude Valley, West End, Broadbeach, Sunshine Coast (only Maroochydore) & Surfers Paradise for the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2018. Both boarding and alighting records are collected by passengers using a paper ticket or tapping a 'Go Card' which can be used on all TransLink trains (including Airtrain). The only reliable data available was all train boardings and alightings on Friday and Saturday nights from 8:00pm to 6:00am. Total number of boardings were recorded per hour for Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise, Brisbane city and West End. Data were analysed to map total number of passengers entering and leaving selected SNPs to identify any potential changes over time.

5.2.13.1.1. LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT DATA

Public transport data were not available for Cairns, Toowoomba or Townsville. TMR identified that alightings data collected is lower than boardings due to paper ticket products and counts which do not generally have alighting data attached to them.

5.2.14. UBER DATA

Uber Australia routinely records data relating to passenger pickups and drop-offs for certain areas in Queensland. Data were obtained for four sites across Queensland (Fortitude Valley, Sunshine Coast, Gold Coast, and Cairns) for the period 1 April 2016 to 30 June 2018 for Fortitude Valley, 1 August 2014 to 30 June 2018 for the Gold Coast, 1 February 2016 to 30 June 2018 for the Sunshine Coast and 1 March 2017 to 30 June 2018 for Cairns. Data captured all pickup and drop-offs on Friday and Saturday nights from 8pm to 6am.

5.2.15. TOURISM DATA

5.2.15.1. GOVERNMENT DATA

Tourism data were obtained from the Queensland Government Statistician's Office (QGSO) and Tourism Research Australia (TRA). QGSO is a unit within the Queensland Treasury and collects state-wide data using telephone interviews and web-based surveys. The TRA is part of the Australian Trade and Investment Commission, and is tasked with collecting national tourism data from both international and domestic markets.

The total number of international and national tourists visiting Queensland were obtained from the TRA's International Visitor Survey (https://www.tra.gov.au/International/ivs-methodology) and

National Visitor Survey (https://www.tra.gov.au/Archive-TRA-Old-site/Research/Domestic-tourism-by-Australians/National-Visitor-Survey-methodology/nvs-methodology). The International Visitor Survey samples 40,000 departing, short-term international travellers aged 15 years and over who visit Australia each year. The survey is conducted in the departure lounges of the eight major international Australian airports: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Cairns, Perth, Adelaide, Darwin, and the Gold Coast. The number of international backpackers were also examined as part of the International Visitor Survey. The National Visitor Survey is a large-scale survey which has been conducted continuously since January 1998, and is designed to measure domestic and outbound travel by Australian residents. Using telephone surveys, 120,000 interviews are conducted each year among Australian residents aged 15 year or older.

The economic value of tourism was examined using Gross Value Added (GVA) and persons employed data from TRA (https://www.tra.gov.au/Economic-analysis/economic-value). GVA refers to the total capital revenue and labour income raised by the tourism industry, as well as the resulting net taxes that the government receive. GVA is comprised of both direct and indirect values, with direct values referring to money spent and generated within the tourism industry and indirect values referring to the economic "flow-on" effect generated by the tourism industry. For all tourism data, descriptive data are presented.

5.2.15.2. CAIRNS TOURISM SURVEY DATA

Street-intercept, patron interviews were conducted in October 2018 (Friday 12th, Friday 19th, and Tuesday 23rd) in key tourist hot spots (the pier, the lagoon and along the esplanade) of Cairns. The aim of the survey was to supply insight into trends in tourism patterns in Cairns. The survey data collected also provides some insight and context into the impact of the policy interventions on tourism in Queensland.

The interview consisted of three sections:
1. Demographics: gender, postcode/country of origin, age, occupation, who are they travelling with
2. Time in Cairns: Main reasons for visiting, top attraction, how much time has been spent in Cairns, accommodation
3. Night time experiences: Experiences after midnight, plans to go out after 3am
4. Knowledge of drinking laws in Queensland

5.3. PATRON INTERVIEWS

Surveys of patrons inside and outside licensed venues are increasingly being utilised to examine night-time economies around the world (37-42). Voas and Colleagues (42) identified these surveys as 'portal studies' and proposed that three environmental components must be present to be appropriate for measuring alcohol and other drug use: (1) at least theoretically, a venue should be associated with an increased risk of alcohol and other drug consumption; (2) the fieldwork should be in a location that permits intercepting and assessing respondents before entering or upon exiting a venue; and (3) the location should have respondents entering and exiting the venue across a sufficient amount of time to conduct brief interviews and testing. They also highlight a number of advantages to the method over traditional telephone or household surveys, including the ability of survey teams to observe the environment, and reduced recall bias.

5.3.1. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The patron interviews were designed to be a systematic random sample (selecting every third person) of all people attending night-time entertainment districts in Fortitude Valley, Cairns, and Surfers Paradise. Interviews were also conducted in the comparison site of the non-SNP night-time entertainment district of West End, a suburb in Brisbane. Patron interviews were conducted in busy thoroughfares in each site, as well as with individuals surrounding/queuing outside venues, leaving venues, and sitting down near the main thoroughfare. Researchers worked in groups of no less than four in these public thoroughfares and outside selected licensed venues. Each team had a team leader responsible for liaising with venue staff, carrying support equipment, and overseeing team operations and safety. All interviewers wore easily identifiable clothing from their relevant institution.

Patron interviews were conducted by members of the research team on Saturday nights. In Fortitude Valley, patron interviews were conducted weekly from 11 June 2016 to 30 July 2016 to provide a baseline. Thereafter, patron interviews were conducted monthly in Fortitude Valley. In Cairns, interviews commenced from August 2016, in West End from October 2016 and from September 2016 in Surfers Paradise. Interviews were conducted monthly in Cairns and bi-monthly in West End and Surfers Paradise. The data collection period occurred between 10pm and 4am Saturday nights due to target patrons generally arriving and leaving the entertainment precinct at these times. Patron interviews were not conducted inside licensed premises.

Once participants agreed to be interviewed, they were given a business card with a web address (www.quantem.info) and contact details of the study investigators and ethics committee if they wanted to know more about the study or be informed of study findings. The interview questions were developed using Tap Forms software and researchers recorded participants' responses on iPod Touch

or iPhone devices. All patrons were also asked to provide a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) reading using a breathalyser.

A randomly selected sub-sample (about every fifth person) were asked if they were willing to undergo a swab for the presence of other drugs. All responses were recorded to allow for the calculation of response rates. Results from the drug tests were recorded in the interview file and used to understand the reliability of self-reported data. Testing required one non-invasive scrape of the tongue and results were generally identified within two minutes. Drug tests were not able to provide a measure of impairment (as they only tested for the presence or absence of a drug). Test results were not useful to police because an officer could not guarantee the chain of evidence, and to guarantee valid results tests require adherence to strict administration guidelines, which police would not be able to ensure.

5.3.2. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The patron interview had seven sections:

8. Interviewee demographics—including sex, age, postcode and occupation.
9. Current night out—involving questions about how many hours they had been 'drinking/partying' for, at what time they arrived in the precinct, where they were going, the quantity of alcohol they had consumed prior to going out (in standard drinks, which is 10g of ethanol in Australia), their use of illicit drugs, their energy drink consumption (with and without alcohol), their use of social media to track venues (hours of business and promotions), and their general use of social media.
10. Impact of last drinks laws—involving questions about the effect of the new legislation introduced by the Queensland Government on July 1st 2016, if they go out earlier or later, pre-drink more, look for venues that are open until 5am, go home earlier, feel more or less safe, witness more or less violence, experienced improved or worsened atmosphere or no changes; how safe they felt tonight and in the last licensed venue; and if they recalled any government media campaigns to reduce drinking.
11. Aggression/offending/alcohol-related consequences—involving questions about their involvement in verbal aggression, physical aggression or unwanted sexual attention in and around licensed venues during the three months prior to interview; the role that alcohol and other drug use played in these incidents of aggression; the number of people involved; and engagement in other offending (i.e., property damage, driving when over the alcohol limit, driving while under the influence of drugs, being refused service/refused entry/ejected from a licensed venue) and experience of personal injury or accidents during that time. They were also asked if they had ever been issued with a police ban notice.

12. Intentions for the rest of the night—how they planned to get home, and estimated self-rating of their blood alcohol concentration (BAC) reading. Their BAC reading was also recorded (at the end of this interview section) using a breathalyser – participants were asked for their consent before this was done, and they could complete the interview without being breathalysed if they did not want to be.

13. Drug testing—a sub-sample of participants were asked if they would consent to a drug swab. Drug testing was recorded at the end of the interview.

14. Interview notes—interviewers noted signs of intoxication, rated the degree of intoxication, height, weight and ethnicity of the interviewee, and provided general comments for each participant. They also noted the location of the interview. If the participant declined to participate or finished early, they would note a reason why.

5.3.2.1. BRIEF INTERVIEWS

Based on the POINTED (16) and DASHED (19) project protocols, researchers also developed a brief interview schedule to be used with people who were moving between venues, in queues to enter venues that were moving quickly, or who were not interested in doing the full interview. If people did not agree to a full five-minute interview, they were then asked if they would be able to answer seven questions instead (approximately three minutes). Only core questions (demographics, alcohol and illicit drug consumption, impact of last drinks laws, experience of aggressive incidents, how getting home) were retained from the full interview schedule, along with the breathalyser test and drug swabs. All of the key elements described above were covered in the brief interview. In addition, all interviewer information, such as intoxication rating, signs of intoxication and general comments were still recorded.

5.3.2.2. FOLLOW-UP SURVEY

Patron interview participants in Fortitude Valley and West End sites were asked to do a follow-up online survey that they could access from the next day (for up to one week) for a small reimbursement (43). The aim of the follow-up survey was to explore the participants' activities for the remainder of their night out. Participants in Fortitude Valley and West End were asked to provide either an email address or mobile phone number to which the survey link could be sent. Reminder emails/texts were sent two days later. This follow-up method had been successfully trialled previously in Canada on 170 participants, with 68% (64% male, 75% female) of street survey participants completing the online survey (43). The response rate in the Canadian for heavy drinkers was 53%, and online follow-up survey completers were similar in demographic characteristics to those who did not respond, although they generally pre-drank less.

The follow-up survey took approximately 15-20 minutes to complete and included questions on: venues participants visited; experiences from the night before; alcohol-related incidents/consequences (injury, assault, and regretted behaviour); how much participants spent; the amount of alcohol consumed; and substance use. All participants who completed the completed the survey received a $20 Coles Myer gift voucher.

The follow-up survey had seven sections:

15. Interview details—contact method used; this information was used to match data from the participant's field interview with their follow-up survey.

16. Night out—involving questions on what time they got home, reasons for going out, where they went on the night they were interviewed, if they attended the venue due to an event or promotion; how much was spent in licensed venues, how safe they felt at the last venue; knowledge on clubs that are open late, how they found out which venues are open until 5am).

17. Consumption patterns— involving questions on consumption of alcohol prior to going out, dollar value spent on alcohol before going out; how much alcohol was consumed (in standard drinks, which is 10g of ethanol in Australia) in each hour from before 5pm to 6am (where applicable); their use of illicit drugs after their interview; their energy drink consumption (with and without alcohol); and how much fun they had.

18. Aggression/offending/alcohol-related consequences—involving questions about their involvement in: verbal aggression, physical aggression or unwanted sexual attention in and around licensed venues on the night they were interviewed; the role that alcohol and other drug use played in these incidents of aggression; who was involved; the instigator and the instigator's sex and engagement in other offending (i.e., property damage, being refused service/refused entry/ejected from a licensed venue); and experience of personal injury or accidents during that time.

19. The rest of the night—questions including how they got home; their retrospective self-rated ability to drive/ride home; and how safe they felt going home.

20. Use of social media—including questions on apps used that night; what apps were used for; if videos or photos were uploaded; if they regretted any posts and why; which apps they are most likely to use while intoxicated; frequency of posting/uploading something they regretted in the last three months and reason; and frequency of use of gambling apps usually used on a typical night out and on the evening interviewed.

21. Personal characteristics—involving questions about personality (i.e. impulsivity and aggression); masculinity; and childhood experiences of violence.

5.3.3. LIMITATIONS OF PATRON INTERVIEWS

Although patron interviews have substantial benefits in terms of investigating patterns among people who are visiting NEPs, a number of limitations should be noted. Firstly, such surveys do not represent all people who attend licensed venues. This survey only represents patrons interviewed in busy thoroughfares late at night, and while the response rates are very good, a small proportion of people approached do not engage with researchers and might therefore may represent a different group of patrons. Secondly, as potential participants are in the middle of a night out, interviews are necessarily kept short and are not suitable for in-depth questions. Thirdly, such interviews were conducted within a comparatively public environment, and therefore were not highly personal. Finally, the use of self-report data can be subject to biases (e.g., recall bias, self-presentation bias).

5.4. ENTERTAINMENT PRECINCT FOOT TRAFFIC

The number of people attending a SNP is a key element that can confound estimates of Policy effects. This is due to the reliance on counts of alcohol-related incidents without data regarding whether there were changes in the numbers of people attending the area. To address this, foot traffic counts were undertaken at the Fortitude Valley and Cairns SNP. This allows analysis of trends over time and provides a proxy for person density in each location.

People entering entertainment precincts in Fortitude Valley and Cairns were counted via the use of a wireless sensor (http://www.kepleranalytics.com.au). This wireless sensor was calibrated by Kepler Analytics who developed and manage the sensor, to ensure it is capturing people who are walking past the set up point within the SNP. The sensor captures Wi-Fi signals from a person's phone within a 20 metre radius, and records the number of people with Wi-Fi switched on in a particular area. Each phone has a unique mac address which is used to determine whether a Wi-Fi signal is from a new individual or not. Previous research has found that most (95%) persons attending NEPs have Wi-Fi enabled on their phones (44). The data were then processed by Kepler Analytics, and automatically visualised on a secure cloud-based Dashboard.

Data collected in Fortitude Valley from 9 August 2016 to 30 June 2018, and from 19 October 2016 to 30 June 2018 in Cairns, were analysed for the current report. These data were analysed to calculate the monthly average of hourly foot traffic counts in Fortitude Valley and Cairns. There are periodic hours where no unique mac addresses were recorded due to the sensor pausing to upload data or being unplugged for maintenance; these hours have been excluded from the analysis.

5.5.   ID SCANNER DATA

ID scanning data provides information on the number of people attempting to enter a venue over the course of the night. The data captured include the time at which the patron's identification was scanned, the scanner that performed the scan and the associated venue of the scanner, as well as a flag that indicates when a person with a banning order (venue, police or court order) had his or her ID scanned in an attempt to gain access to a venue. Thus, this dataset provides another form of information regarding NEP attendance patterns and changes in drinking culture, along with any impact on business due to the implementation of the Policy.

As of 1 July 2017, under the Policy, ID scanners are mandatory after 10pm in late trading venues (trading after midnight) located in SNPs. While all venues in SNPs (trading after midnight) are required to have ID scanners in place, the units have been popular in licensed venues outside SNPs and across Australia for over five years. A wide range of venues around the country have been using them since 2007 (45-47).

The researchers have been in contact with one of the major ID scanner suppliers, Scantek©, and negotiated access to de-identified unit records. OLGR scanning records were also obtained; these contain records from both Scantek and QikID. Due to problems with OLGR data from 1 July to 30 September 2017, Scantek© data alone were used during that period. OLGR data were then used for the period 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018 (see Appendix 1 for the differences between Scantek and OLGR data). Therefore, de-identified, unit record data from both Scantek© and OLGR were obtained to assess dynamic population flows in SNPs.

Given that data were not available prior to the implementation of the TAFV in 2016, the data is only useful as a marker of longer-term trends from the implementation of ID scanners, and cannot be used as an indicator of the TAFV Policy's impact.

5.6.   PRECINCT MAPPING

Precinct mapping documents the nature of business occurring in nightlife district areas. The aim of this analysis is to document changes in five SNPs (Fortitude Valley, Cairns, Surfers Paradise, Toowoomba, and Townsville) in 1) venue size, diversity and density over time; 2) cultural and live music performances, over time (particularly in Fortitude Valley); 3) the number and range of venues open throughout each Saturday night up until legislated closing times; 4) actual venue opening hours, both opening and closing earlier, relative to licences; 5) the number and type of businesses closing down and opening up; and 6) queues of patrons outside venues with ID scanners.

In the case of questions 3 and 4, the aim is to investigate whether there have been changes in specific categories of venues, such as whether the number and trading patterns of various venue types (e.g. clubs, small bars, restaurants, pubs etc.) have changed.

To answer question 5 we mapped the total distribution of venues, and their distribution by venue type, in each SNP.

5.6.1. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The data collection involved daytime and night-time walkthrough audits of street-level businesses in the precinct. Precinct mapping took place in the following SNPs:

- Cairns
- Fortitude Valley (Brisbane)
- West End and South Bank (Brisbane)
- Surfers Paradise
- Toowoomba
- Townsville

First, at the beginning of the study, in mid-2016, we began by constructing a baseline map of each SNP (noting that the West End and South Bank area is not an SNP) using OLGR licensing data to produce a list of licensed businesses within the boundary of the SNP. These maps plotted each licensed night-time trading businesses (including venues, restaurants, food outlets, bars or performance spaces) in the precinct. Comparing the 2016 and 2018 maps enables an analysis of changes in venue mix and density, diversity of entertainment options and cultural performances, and mix of food and beverage offerings.

A daytime walkthrough was then undertaken to identify all venues in each SNP, and this was cross checked with OLGR data. During these initial daytime walkthroughs, in mid-2016, a complete video record was made of every shopfront in the precinct. In Fortitude Valley this daytime walkthrough also recorded daytime and night-time traders without liquor licenses in the precinct, such as cafes, art galleries, boutiques and other retailers. The Fortitude Valley daytime walkthrough was repeated again in mid-2018. The purpose of this analysis was to investigate whether the mix of daytime and night-time trade in the Fortitude Valley SNP had changed, including non-licensed shopfront retailers.

Following this, night-time audits were conducted on Saturday nights approximately every six months throughout the period of the study. Over the two-year period five night-time audits were undertaken. Table 1 outlines the dates of each audit.

Table 6: Night time audits in 2016-2018

Site	1st night	2nd night	3rd night	4th night	5th night
Fortitude Valley	24/7/2016	1/4/2017	28/10/2017	17/2/2018	28/7/2018
West End	13/8/2016	6/5/2017	16/9/2017	10/3/2018	14/7/2018
Surfers Paradise	30/7/2016	30/7/2017	16/12/2017	17/3/2018	4/8/2018
Toowoomba	20/8/2016	4/3/2017	2/12/2017	31/3/2018	18/8/2018
Townsville	24/7/2016	25/2/2017	2/9/2017	3/3/2018	28/7/2018
Cairns	30/7/2016	4/3/2017	16/9/2017	10/3/2018	4/8/2018

Each night-time walkthrough was conducted by two researchers. Researchers walk a route that takes them along each street and past each shopfront in the precinct. They do the first loop at 10pm, and then repeat the loops at 12am, 2am and 4am. This means that each venue is observed as open or closed at some time in the two-hour window for each loop.

For each night-time trading business in the precinct the researchers record if the venue is open or closed; if a queue is visible outside the venue; and a qualitative description of the predominant activity at the venue (e.g. pub, live music, clubbing, dining, cocktails, street or fast food). In the 2018 audits, researchers also recorded if there is an ID scanner being used at the venue. The researchers also took a photograph of the street front of each venue once per night to make a pictorial record of the activity outside the venue.

Research assistants coded their observations on a spreadsheet, with one sheet used for each of the 10pm, 12am, 2am and 4am loops of the precinct, and precinct name, date and time recorded on each street. A single unique name was given to each venue, with these names and corresponding addresses cross-checked against venue websites and Google™ Maps. The audit observations about the predominant activity at the venue were then cross-checked with licensing data and observation of the venue's marketing material to determine the primary forms, or mix, of consumption activities at the venue.

The timing of the walkthroughs was varied to avoid seasonal variations such as the Christmas and New Year period. Special events, weather and seasonal patterns may affect audits. For example the October 2017 audit in Fortitude Valley coincided with the Valley Fiesta weekend, which brings large crowds to this SNP for free concerts in the precinct malls, and may affect the opening times of some

venues in the precinct. Furthermore, several venues in the precinct applied for an extended trade permit on this weekend.

During the study, the researchers found it difficult to make reliable qualitative judgments about venue capacity in all SNPs. For example, in smaller SNPs like Cairns and Townsville the smaller volume of patrons and venues makes it possible to enter venues and talk to security to make a judgment about capacity. However, in large and dense SNPs like Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise, this has not proven feasible because there are too many venues to enter, and many cannot be reliably observed from the street.

5.7.   LIVE MUSIC DATA

To examine trends of live and recorded music use in Queensland over time, and the impact of the Policy on live music venues and performances, data were obtained from the Australasian Performing Right Association (APRA AMCOS). The Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society Limited (AMCOS) is a society that collects and distributes royalties on behalf of members (i.e. writers, music publishers and composers) for the reproduction of their work. In order for musicians to claim royalties for their music (or the music of others) and their performances, individual artists or bands enter their performances into an APRA AMCOS data portal. APRA AMCOS provided data relating to live music performances occurring in Queensland for the 2001 to 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018). As a result, only two years of data are available following the Policy measures introduced in 2016, and only one year of data is available following the introduction of mandatory ID scanners on 1 July 2017.

As musicians type all performance-related information into the free text boxes on the portal, all data first required extensive cleaning to correct any spelling or other entry errors. Data cleaning was performed using Stata 14.0. First, the names of venues and suburbs were cleaned. Google™ was used as a search engine to find each venue and confirm the correct spelling. All venues' addresses were then cross-checked against official venue websites and/or Google™ Maps, and each venue's longitude and latitude co-ordinates were added using co-ordinates listed by Google™ Maps.

A live performance is considered an 'in person' performance of musical works, and the musical works may be original, or written by another writer. The performer may be a band, soloist, DJ, orchestra, or any other type of ensemble, including cover bands. As long as there is an 'in person' performance of a musical work, it is considered a 'live' performance. A live music 'venue' is considered a business which utilises live music, where the licensee is the owner or operator of the business, and not a promoter. Venues were categorised into four categories: venue, festival, street, or other. The number of performances for each venue per financial year was categorised from 0-15, increasing in

increments of 10. For example, a venue with no live performances was coded as "<10," a venue with 50 performances was coded as "51-60" and a venue with 151 performances was coded as "150+." Analyses of these data included counts of overall live music performances and the associated venues where performances occurred.

Using these data, maps showing the number of live music performances per year in selected SNPs (Fortitude Valley, Brisbane City, Cairns, and Surfers Paradise) were created using ArcGIS® software by Esri. First, the World Street Map was added as a base-map to provide location context. All SNP precinct boundaries were then defined using resources from the Queensland Police. The venue-related data were then imported and geographically constrained to Queensland's SNPs.

5.8. OBSERVATIONS IN AND AROUND LICENSED ESTABLISHMENTS

In addition to conducting patron interviews and precinct mapping, researchers collected structured venue observational data inside venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP and West End. The observations provide an additional source of information about nightlife venues' culture, the type of entertainment provided, physical characteristics, crowd density, and compliance with liquor legislation. Observations were conducted by members of the research team on a quarterly basis in two-week blocks (on Friday and Saturday nights) within specified venues in Fortitude Valley and West End, inside and within the immediate surrounding areas of selected licensed premises. Data collected were a modified version of material from previous work by the team (2, 19).

Information collected as part of the observations included:

1. The number of patrons in the establishment and patron characteristics
2. Patron movement (entering and exiting licensed premises)
3. Crowding around alcohol service areas and service times
4. Patron interactions (with one another, establishment staff and security personnel)
5. Patron level of intoxication (and whether intoxicated patrons were still served)
6. Signs of patron drug use
7. The use of promotions by establishments (e.g., $2 shots)
8. The occurrence and nature of aggressive/violent incidents; and
9. The presence of strategies designed to reduce alcohol-related offending (e.g., high visibility policing, security managers at taxi ranks).

Pairs of researchers carried out sessions of structured observations. Where possible, male/female pairs were assigned to look like normal patrons socialising, and wore clothing consistent with the venue's dress code and usual patron attire. Both researchers completed observation checklists independently,

without consulting each other about what they were recording. Each set of data were treated as an independent session of observation for the purpose of analysis.

Observations were conducted on four overnight occasions during the project. Observations were conducted on 26-27 November 2016, 22-23 July 2017, 25-26 November 2017 and 24-25 March 2018.

5.8.1. OBSERVATIONS PROCEDURE

The sample for the observations was made up of venues licensed to serve alcohol for consumption on their premises with either a hotel or nightclub licence, and located within the Fortitude Valley SNP.

Each observation period lasted approximately four hours, with varying start times from 10pm to 6am, depending on trading hours. Shifts lasted approximately 4 hours, and teams remained in one venue for the 4 hours before moving to a second venue for a subsequent 4 hour shift. The team remained in one venue for the whole shift, allowing them time to maintain a sense of the venue dynamics and changes throughout the night.

Observations were conducted as unobtrusively as possible to blend into the setting. Researchers were given extensive safety training, as well as training on how to covertly complete the observation checklists. Each hour, observers completed a number of observation checklists on their iPhones or iPod Touch devices, thus appearing as though they were using their mobile phone. Checklists took ten to fifteen minutes to complete, with the researchers putting their iPod Touch on the table or in their bag every few minutes, so as to ensure they did not appear uncharacteristically focused on their phone for a long period of time. Researchers carried an information card detailing the aims and scope of the research in the unlikely event that patrons or staff might approach them with anger or suspicion, but these were not required during the project.

Each session of observation involved completing eight separate forms (the first completed on an hourly basis; the latter three completed where relevant to events within the venue):

- Standard hourly form—involving questions about patron characteristics, venue characteristics, patron alcohol consumption patterns, observations of patron intoxication, signs of patron drug use, drinks purchase, staff and bar characteristics, safe transport options, crowd control and venue characteristics.
- Entry practices form— involving questions about 'proof of age', time spent waiting to enter, patrons being turned away at the door and monitoring of entrance by staff.

- Closing practices form—involving questions about time of closing, time alcohol serving ceased, other bar and venue characteristics at closing and patron alcohol consumption behaviour at closing.

- Drug use form—involving questions about particular groups of people who were exhibiting signs of drug use such as how many people in the group, their gender and age, what signs of drug use were noticed, and what behaviours they were engaging in. This form was only completed if there were groups of drug users in the venue, and repeated hourly if these groups continued using drugs in the venue.

- Physically aggressive incident form—involving questions about specific incidents of physical aggression. This form was only completed if there were specific incidents of physical aggression and was completed at the time of the incident. Questions were asked about the nature of the incident, the number and characteristics of people involved, where in the venue it occurred, signs of alcohol and/or drug involvement in the incident, and details of how the incident was resolved.

- Sexually aggressive incident form—involving questions about specific sexually aggressive incidents or unwanted sexual attention. This form was only completed if there were specific incidents of sexual aggression; it was completed at the time of the incident. Questions were asked about the nature of the incident, the number and characteristics of people involved, where in the venue it occurred, signs of alcohol and/or drug involvement in the incident, and details of how the incident was resolved.

- Verbally aggressive incident form—involving questions about specific incidents of verbal aggression such as arguments. This form was only completed if there were specific incidents of verbal aggression; it was completed at the time of the incident. Questions were asked about the nature of the incident, the number and characteristics of people involved, where in the venue it occurred, signs of alcohol and/or drug involvement in the incident, and details of how the incident was resolved.

- Additional bar/level form—involving questions about staff and bar characteristics. This form was only completed if there were an additional bar/s or level/s of the venue.

All forms had a number of fields where free text could be added. Observers were encouraged to use these forms as much as possible to identify behaviours that might not be captured by the structured checklist, for example, problems with gaining entry, specific incidents of intoxication or other behaviour, and security staff practices.

Observers used the 'noticeable' signs of intoxication from OLGR Guidelines (see Appendix 5), including such as slurring words, lack of coordination and incoherent or muddled speech (48).

Metrics for patron intoxication were defined as follows:

- Slight level of intoxication = 1 sign of intoxication on average
- Medium level of intoxication = 2 signs of intoxication on average
- High level of intoxication = 3 signs of intoxication on average

Three or more signs of intoxication was considered too intoxicated to remain at the venue.

5.8.2. LIMITATIONS OF VENUE OBSERVATIONS

It is important to consider the limitations with using covert observations to measure venue patron behaviour. Each venue was typically observed for four hours, meaning that some practices may not have been observed because they occurred after observers had left the venue. These limitations were minimised by observing the venues on multiple occasions, and staggering the times of observation for each venue across the study period. Also, the best estimate of patron and venue characteristics was used, rather than an actual count. Further, judgement of alcohol and drug intoxication is far from an exact science. While observers received extensive training on how to assess intoxication, not all patrons exhibit intoxication in the same way, and therefore the numbers represented are informed estimates. Despite the inherent subjectivities associated with observational research, such designs remain the best method for understanding the way social practices and environmental elements shift over the course of the evening in licensed venues (49)

The observations conducted in July 2017 and March 2018 time periods are not directly comparable in the same way that those conducted during November 2016 and November 2017 are, therefore limiting inference that can be drawn for those two "off-peak" timeslots. Where observations numbers are low, data must be interpreted with caution. Lastly, the same venues were not repeatedly observed at each timepoint, limiting the ability to reliably compare between timepoints within the venue. However, the array of venues observed allowed for a comprehensive survey of Fortitude Valley and West End.

5.9. SCHOOL EDUCATION CAMPAIGN EVALUATION

The Department of Education and Training (DET), in partnership with Queensland Curriculum and Assessment Authority (QCAA), developed the *Alcohol and other drugs education program*. The program provided via a website (http://education.qld.gov.au/curriculum/alcohol-drug-education/ index.html) was accessible to schools from October 2014. Queensland's Prep – Year 12 curriculum, assessment and reporting framework requires all Queensland schools to provide the Australian Curriculum: Health and Physical Education in Prep to Year 10. Alcohol and other drugs is a focus area of this curriculum. Additionally, Queensland state schools are required to provide health and wellbeing education, either as part of the delivery of the Australian Curriculum or as part of the

school's pastoral care program. The Department of the Education developed the Alcohol and other drug education program as an optional resource for schools to use in meeting their obligation under the curriculum. Schools have the ability to tailor the program, based on their individual needs.

Data were obtained from The Queensland DET to determine the level of usage of the drug education campaign. The number of 'access hits' of the alcohol and drug education program website were examined from October 2014 to June 2018. The number of visits included visits to: the homepage of the program website; the content overview page; and the program guidelines document, across year levels 7 to 12.

There were a number of limitations in the analysis of the drug education and intervention campaign that should be noted. Firstly, there was no means to determine the use of internal content pages, beyond the homepage, content overview, and program guidelines, limiting our knowledge on the level of engagement with content. Further, there was no way to determine how long the user accessed the site on each visit, or if schools accessed downloadable materials in hardcopy, which were then used on multiple subsequent occasions. It is also not possible to determine how the program may have been implemented.

5.10. KEY STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS

A particularly informative element of previously successful projects in this area (e.g., DANTE) has been key stakeholder interviews (2). They enable substantial insight into potential benefits and side-effects of policy which are not apparent from other data sources (50).

Key stakeholder interviews were conducted with 66 carefully selected individuals for the purpose of developing a comprehensive picture of impacts of the legislative changes. The sampling frame includes five people from five key sectors of government policy makers, hotel licensees (or the hotels association), police, licensing personnel and relevant local council employees. Researchers contacted key representatives from these organisations between 1 February and 6 August 2018 and invited them to participate in an interview, or asked them to nominate some alternative appropriate informants. People were also interviewed if they had contacted the research team or the Queensland government regarding the evaluation and expressed interest in being interviewed.

Following verbal consent to take part, an appropriate interview time was organised. The majority of interviews were conducted by Prof Miller or an RA over the phone and recorded digitally with consent.

Key informant interviews were semi-structured in nature, and any emergent themes or issues brought up by the interview questions were explored. Questions were presented across four domains; 1.

Awareness of and attitudes to the 'Tackling Alcohol-fuelled policy' interventions; 2. Current liquor legislation; 3. Current local issues (e.g. barriers to implementation of late night alcohol restrictions, perceptions of impact, recommendations for improvement) and 4. The effects of the policy change (licensees only). Health workers were also asked about numbers of alcohol-related injuries being treated.

Key informant interviews were de-identified, transcribed, and analysed using thematic analysis (identifying common themes in textual data), in line with our previous work (51).

5.11. FACEBOOK EVENT DATA

Facebook is often the primary social media communication tool for most businesses, as it allows advertised events to not only reach their intended 'followers', but to also reach a larger community beyond those who specifically follow a venue's page. In order to estimate the amount of weekly events across financial years we examined the listed Facebook events of eleven live music venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP (Black Bear Lodge, Crowbar, Ric's Bar, The Brightside, The Foundry, The Tivoli, The Triffid, The Zoo, Woolly Mammoth, New Globe Theatre (closed April 2018) and Oh Hello (Closed August 2018)) and three night clubs (The Family, The Met, The T.B.C Club). These venues were chosen as they are represented in the live music key informant interviews. An additional six venues were also randomly selected: Alfred & Constance, Cloudland, Osbourne Hotel (formally Fringe Bar), Prohibition, The Flying Cock, and The Press Club.

Every event listed retrospectively from the 2017-18 financial year was extracted from each of the venues' Facebook pages. Listed events that were marked as cancelled as well as financial years that did not have adequate data points were excluded. While there are some limitations to the use of this data, Facebook event data provide an overview of the number of events held by each venue.

5.11.1. LIMITATIONS OF FACEBOOK EVENT DATA

While the aim of this research was to predominantly investigate the number of live music events across venues, due to the method utilised there may be additional event types in the data (e.g., theme nights, event linked to sporting events, and food related events).

In addition, there were occasions when certain venues, particularly night clubs, advertised multiple events on the same night; advertising one event earlier in the night, and secondary "after party" event later in the evening. These are counted as two separate events. The data do not include cancelled events, therefore we cannot tell if the venues had more planned events that did not run. As limited venues had retained cancelled events in their listed Facebook events, it is possibly that some venues

deleted the events that did not take place. We are also unable to determine the success of the events (i.e., number of patrons attending, profit made), simply that they were an advertised event.

Lastly, some venues had minimal data and may have been using a different way to advertise before Facebook (e.g., hardcopy advertisements, flyers, magazines). In 2015 Facebook updated their events pages making it more user friendly and accessible to a wider community[5], this may provide an explanation to why the majority of venues had minimal data pre 2014-15.

5.12. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION DATA

Alcohol sales data supplied by the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) is received from Queensland liquor licence holders. Data include sales made to retailers and directly to the public, but does not include those made between wholesalers. Substantial gaps in alcohol sales data exist from 2011-2014, therefore, only data from 2014-2018 will be analysed. There are vast limitations in these data. The provision of sales data by holders of a producer/wholesaler license, wine producer license, or wine merchant license in Queensland at the end of each reporting period is mandated by the *Liquor Act 1992* and *Wine Industry Act* 1994 and subordinate legislation made under those Acts. Several licensees did not respond to requests for data, however any non-responsive wholesalers were anticipated to only represent a very small portion of all sales. In addition, a percentage of returned data does not include adequate detail to determine where the liquor was distributed and to whom (e.g. 0.04% for alcoholic soda sales to 5.02% for cask fortified wine sales). Another limitation is that smaller licensed venues may purchase their liquor from retailers rather than wholesalers, in which case the final point of sale cannot be determined.

5.13. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The economic evaluation is designed to estimate costs and benefits of the policy intervention in Queensland in the short- and middle-term. The financial impacts associated with the policy were examined by using a pre- and post-intervention analysis to identify the costs and benefits.

The potential costs of the policy intervention include the loss/change in revenue of affected late night licensed premises, the loss/change in sales for alcohol producers and wholesalers, the costs to industry and government of implementing and policing the restriction, and the loss/change of local government

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[5] https://www.wired.com/2015/11/inside-facebook-events-updates/

revenue. The potential benefits include reductions in violence and injuries, savings in health care costs, income gained by non-alcohol businesses, and benefits to government costs from reduced late-night policing. It should be recognised that a reduction in drinking, particularly for heavy drinkers, will also result in gains in overall health status, thus reducing costs for health care and of lost productivity in the longer term, but these are not included in this analysis. The estimated costs and benefits of the intervention over 2016 and 2017/2018 will be computed to the present values in 2018 using the current 2% inflation rate (52).

The approach for conducting the cost-benefit analysis is summarised as below:

1) Identify all impacts of the policy for each stakeholder;
2) Quantify the impacts of the policy on stakeholders;
3) Value the aggregate effects of the policy intervention, and;
4) Assess the cost and benefits of the policy to society.

5.14. DATA ANALYSIS

All statistical analyses were conducted using appropriate software (e.g., Stata 15.0, SPSS v25).

5.14.1. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Administrative data were collected from multiple sources and combined for cross-validation and interpretation purposes. Triangulation is a widely used method of data synthesis which is based on the premise that one can be more confident with a result if different methods lead to the same result (53). If an investigator uses only one method, the temptation is strong to believe in the findings., and if an investigator uses only two methods, the results may well clash (54). By using multiple sources to get at the answer to one question, the hope is that two or three sources will produce similar answers, or if three clashing answers are produced, the investigator knows that the question needs to be reframed, methods reconsidered, or both (55). The method has proved particularly popular in the monitoring of substance use and related trends (56-58).

High-alcohol hours (HAH; 8pm-6am, Friday and Saturday nights) were examined for emergency department (ED), ambulance call out, and police assault and call-out data. To adjust for potential population changes and changes in data coding or administrative practices, we use ratios of events in high alcohol hours to events in low alcohol hours (LAH) where possible. This is to control for systemic factors and to focus on events most likely to be impacted by the policy interventions (late night, weekend events). For ED and ambulance call out data, HAH rates per low alcohol hours (LAH) were calculated; that is, a ratio of HAH to LAH were examined for the report. Queensland-specific

LAH were used, as determined from the National Alcohol Indicators Project (1). LAH was defined as total number of cases/attendances within the following days and times: Monday 6am-2pm, Tuesday 10am-2pm, Wednesday 6am-2pm, Thursday 6am-2pm and Friday 6am-10am. The association of policy interventions and ambulance call-out was examined in three categories of HAH: 8pm-11:59pm Friday and Saturday nights, 12am and 2:59am Saturday and Sunday mornings and 3am-5:59am Saturday and Sunday mornings.

There were insufficient cases within LAH for this to be used as a denominator for police assault data. Therefore, rates per 100,000 Local Government Area (LGA) population were used for police assault data. Population data were obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. However, count data were used for areas that were likely to include high numbers of tourists (Airlie Beach, Broadbeach, Cairns, Fortitude Valley, Mackay, Sunshine Coast, and Surfers Paradise). Where offense numbers within each category were low, trends were examined for an aggregate measure (i.e., serious assault + common assault + public nuisance (violent). Lastly, the correlation between police tasking data and serious and common assault during HAH were examined for SNPs where tasking data were available (Cairns, Fortitude Valley, Sunshine Coast, Surfers Paradise, and Toowoomba).

Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) time series modelling was used to test the impact of the Policy. Where clear seasonal trends were in the data, seasonal ARIMA models (SARIMA) were used. Unit root tests of stationarity and Box-Ljung Q tests were used throughout. ARIMA models were not conducted for each SNP, rather they were run for the five key SNPs. For the purposes of analyses, we have identified three separate intervention points: 1) July 2016 when the initial trading hours restrictions were implemented, 2) February 2017 when the use of extended trading permits was halved from 12 to 6 per year, and 3) July 2017 when mandatory ID scanners were introduced. For each outcome, models test the independent effects of each of these interventions as well as the cumulative effects of all three. It is important to note that previous studies have identified that similar legislative interventions, such as those implemented in Newcastle, Australia, can have up to an 18 month lag effect (2, 11). Given the closely staged introduction of measures in Queensland, it may not be possible to determine which intervention had an impact, and how much the impact was delayed, but the project can document the impact of the overall intervention to 12 months after the third intervention point (1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018) and account for seasonal fluctuations.

5.14.2.   PATRON INTERVIEWS AND FOLLOW-UP SURVEY

The data collected from patron interviews and follow-up surveys were analysed based on frequency counts. Group differences (such as different venues, time periods, or differences between sites), and demographic differences (such as gender and age) were explored using bivariate statistical methods.

Chi-square analysis was used to examine frequencies of groups; additionally Pearson's product-moment correlation was used to examine the relationship between variables. Non-parametric variables were compared using the Mann-Whitney test, and the relationship between non-parametric variables was examined using Spearman's rank correlation.

5.14.3. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Interviews were entered into N-Vivo 11, a qualitative data analysis software program. Responses from key informants were analysed primarily based on questionnaire structure and subsequent analysis of narratives using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis (or 'narrative analysis') is an inductive design where, rather than approach a problem with a theory already in place, the researcher identifies and explores themes which arise during analysis of the data (54). Where available, narratives offering opposing viewpoints were also presented (59).

6. RESULTS

6.1. POLICE ASSAULT, AMBULANCE CALL-OUT, HOSPTIAL ADMISSIONS, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT, AND ID SCANNER DATA

Police assault data (serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent)) were examined for 8pm-6am Friday and Saturday nights (high-alcohol hours). In order to more clearly see trends in the police data the graphs present quarterly rates. However, all ARIMA models were conducted using monthly data.

Ambulance call-outs during HAH (Friday and Saturday, 8pm-6am) were examined from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2018. There were a total of 4,704,406 ambulance call-outs between 1 July 2011 and 30 June 2018. Among them, there were 458,759 ambulance call-outs during HAH and 104,498 of those were identified within the categories designated more likely to be alcohol-related (see Methods chapter).

Statewide population hospital admission rates for 16-65 year olds were examined for July 2009 to June 2018. In addition, the number of admissions at two major Brisbane hospitals were investigated: Royal Brisbane and Princess Alexandra hospitals. Statewide data on emergency department presentations between January 2009 and June 2018 were also analysed. Sub-analyses focussed specifically on injuries relating to possible fights (head and hand injuries – ICD-10 S02 and S62), on presentations for young men (aged 18-40) and presentations at the two major hospitals likely to receive presentations for injuries occurring in Fortitude Valley (Royal Brisbane and Princess Alexandra).

State wide and SNP level QPS call out data during high-alcohol hours, for specific call-out codes (see methods chapter), were examined for the period January 2012 to June 2018. The state-wide trend is presented as a rate per 10,000 population, whereas each SNP is presented as a count of the number of call-outs.

ID scanner data were obtained from Scantek © for July 2017 to June 2018, but minimum scanning data were also obtained from by OLGR October 2017 to June 2018. Therefore, Scantek data were used for 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2017 and OLGR data were used for the period from October 2017 to June 2018. The number of people entering venues was examined across all SNPs during HAH.

6.1.1.1.   POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

In order to provide a more detailed picture of the rate of offences, for state level trends HAH were further broken into 8pm-midnight Friday/Saturday, midnight-3am Friday/Saturday, and 3am-6am Friday/Saturday. As shown in Figure 7, the rate of serious assault in Queensland decreased after early 2016 during 3am-6am. However, there was also small, but significant increases in the rate of serious assaults during 8pm-midnight post-July 2016 and for the incremental effect of the policy (see Table 7).

Figure 7: Rate of serious assault during HAH per 100,000 population, Queensland

Table 7: ARIMA models for serious assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA (1,1,1)	0.19*	0.01, 0.37	0.12	-0.08, 0.32	0.04	-0.17, 0.26	0.10*	0.01, 0.20
12am-2:59am ARIMA (2,1,0) SARIMA (2,1,0,6)	0.01	-0.29, 0.32	0.05	-0.35, 0.45	-0.11	-0.48, 0.26	-0.01	-0.27, 0.24
3am-5:59am ARIMA (2,0,0)	-0.13*	-0.21, -0.05	-0.15*	-0.26, -0.04	-0.14*	-0.27, -0.02	-0.06*	-0.09, -0.02
8pm-5:59am ARIMA (2,1,0) SARIMA (2,1,0,12)	-0.09	-0.45, 0.27	-0.29	-1.00, 0.41	-0.14	-0.69, 0.42	-0.27	-0.62, 0.09

Note. *p<.05

As shown in Figure 8, the rate of common assault in Queensland declined across the time period for all three HAH categories. ARIMA modelling indicated small, but significant increases in the rate of common assaults during 8pm-midnight and midnight-3am for the incremental effect of the policy (seeTable 8).

Figure 8: Rate of common assault during HAH per 100,000 population, Queensland

Table 8: ARIMA models for common assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA (0,1,2)	0.12	-0.02, 0.25	0.13	-0.04, 0.30	0.16	-0.01, 0.33	0.10*	0.04, 0.15
12am-2:59am ARIMA (1,1,1)	0.06	-0.11, 0.22	0.17*	0.03, 0.31	0.13	-0.05, 0.30	0.07*	0.02, 0.12
3am-5:59am ARIMA (4,0,0)	-0.09	-0.24, 0.07	-0.08	-0.30, 0.14	-0.06	-0.22, 0.09	-0.05	-0.11, 0.02
8pm-5:59am ARIMA (2,1,0) SARIMA (3,1,0,4)	-0.07	-0.77, 0.63	-0.15	-0.71, 0.41	0.05	-0.73, 0.83	-0.09	-0.43, 0.24

Note. *p<.05

As shown in Figure 9, the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences in Queensland remained relative stable across the time period for all three HAH categories. ARIMA modelling indicated that while there was a small, but significant increase in public nuisance (violent) offences during 8pm-midnight, there was a significant decline during 3am-6am (see Table 9).

Figure 9: Rate of public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 population, Queensland

Table 9: ARIMA models for public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA (0,0,0)	0.12*	0.05, 0.19	0.12*	0.03, 0.20	0.16*	0.07, 0.26	0.05*	0.02, 0.08
12am-2:59am ARIMA (3,0,0)	-0.12	-0.36, 0.12	-0.08	-0.37, 0.21	-0.07	-0.44, 0.30	-0.04	-0.15, 0.07
3am-5:59am ARIMA (0,0,4)	-0.32*	-0.49, -0.15	-0.32*	-050, 0.13	-0.28	-0.61, 0.04	-0.13*	-0.20, -0.06
8pm-5:59am ARIMA (3.0,0)	-0.32	-0.78, 0.13	-0.25	-0.72, 0.23	-0.09	-0.75, 0.57	-0.11	-0.29, 0.08

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

Figure 10 shows the trajectory of alcohol-related call-outs and demonstrates a subtle rising trend over time and a pattern of random fluctuation with some periodicity showing comparatively more cases in the summer than in winter months. The pattern illustrates an increasing trend after the first two implementation time-points of the legislation and then a relatively stationary trend after the third time point.

Figure 10 and Figure 11 illustrate the trend of HAH/LAH rate alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Queensland. The point rates for HAH: nights were higher than other HAH categories.

Figure 10: Number of alcohol-related call-outs during HAH, Queensland July 2011-June 2018

Figure 11: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs, Queensland July 2011- June 2018

The ARIMA modelling process found a significant decrease in call-outs during each HAH category relative to LAH Table 10.

Table 10: Effects of three policy interventions on the ambulance call-outs during HAH, state-wide

Model parameters	July 2016 Coef.	July 2016 95% CI	February 2017 Coef.	February 2017 95% CI	July 2017 Coef.	July 2017 95% CI	Full Model Coef.	Full Model 95% CI
8pm-11:59pm (ARIMA (1,0,1))	-0.01*	-0.03, -0.00	-0.01	-0.03, 0.00	-0.01	-0.03, 0.01	-0.01*	-0.01, 0.00
12am-2:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.03*	-0.04, -0.00	-0.03*	-0.05, -0.00	-0.03	-0.05, 0.00	-0.01*	-0.02, -0.00
3am-5:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.05**	-0.22, -0.01	-0.01*	-0.02, -0.03	-0.01	-0.02, 0.00	-0.01*	-0.01, -0.00

Note. * p <0.05, ** p <0.001, all models were stationary and Q-test could not reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation at the specified lag

6.1.1.3. HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS

6.1.1.3.1. ALCOHOL INTOXICATION ADMISSIONS

The rate of alcohol intoxication admissions (ICD 10 codes F10.0 and F10.1) among 16-65 year olds slowly increased over the time period (see Figure 12). ARIMA modelling demonstrated an approaching significant (p=0.057) decline after the introduction of the policy (see Table 11); Due to this approaching significant finding, an expected linear trend line based on values pre-July 2016 is presented on the figure.

Figure 12: **Monthly rate of alcohol intoxication hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland**

Table 11: **ARIMA models for alcohol intoxication hospital admissions, Queensland**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1) SARIMA (0,1,1,12)	0.27	-0.06, 0.59	0.28	-0.09, 0.66	-0.48	-0.98, 0.01	0.06	-0.17, 0.29

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.2.   SKULL AND FACIAL BONE FRACTURES

The rate of skull and facial bone fracture admissions (ICD 10 codes S02.0 to S02.9) among 16-65 year olds remained stable over the time period (see Figure 13). ARIMA modelling demonstrated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 12).

Figure 13: **Monthly rate of skull and facial fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland**

Table 12: **ARIMA models for skull and facial fracture hospital admissions, Queensland**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,0,0)	0.01	-0.04, 0.05	0.01	-0.04, 0.06	-0.03	-0.12, -0.05	-0.001	-0.02, 0.02

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.3. OCULAR FLOOR FRACTURES

Figure 14 shows the rate of ocular floor fracture admissions (ICD 10 code S02.3) among 16-65 year olds demonstrated a relatively stable pattern over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated a small, but significant decline in the rate of admissions for each policy intervention variable (see Table 13).

Figure 14: **Monthly rate of ocular floor fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland**

Table 13: **ARIMA models for ocular floor fracture hospital admissions, Queensland**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.02*	-0.03, -0.02	-0.02*	-0.04, -0.01	-0.03*	-0.05, -0.02	-0.01*	-0.0016, -0.0017

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.4. MANDIBLE FRACTURES

Figure 15 shows the rate of mandible fracture admissions (ICD 10 code S02.6) among 16-65 year olds demonstrated fluctuations over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant impact of the intervention variables (see Table 14).

Figure 15: **Monthly rate of mandible fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland**

Table 14: **ARIMA models for mandible fractures hospital admissions, Queensland**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (1,0,0)	-0.02	-0.05, 0.02	-0.02	-0.5, 0.02	-0.03	-0.09, 0.02	-0.01	-0.02, 0.01

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.5.   NASAL BONE FRACTURES

The rate of nasal bone fracture admissions (ICD 10 code S02.2) among 16-65 year olds steadily remained stable over the time period (see Figure 16). ARIMA modelling demonstrated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 15).

Figure 16: **Monthly rate of nasal bone fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland**

Table 15: **ARIMA models for nasal bone fractures hospital admissions, Queensland**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.02	-0.01, 0.04	0.03	-0.03, 0.05	-0.01	-0.02, 0.05	-0.001	-0.01, 0.02

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.6.   HAND AND WRIST FRACTURES

Figure 17 shows the rate of hand and wrist fracture admissions (ICD codes S62.0 to S62.8) among 16-65 year olds demonstrated a small increase over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 16).

Figure 17: **Monthly rate of hand and wrist fracture hospital admissions among 18-40 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland**

Table 16: **ARIMA models for hand and wrist fracture hospital admissions, Queensland**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (3,1,0) SARIMA (3,1,0,12)	0.02	-0.16, 0.21	0.02	-0.18, 0.22	-0.06	-0.25, 0.13	-0.01	-0.13, 0.12

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.7.   INTRACRANIAL INJURY

Figure 18 shows the rate of intracranial injury admissions (ICD codes S06.0 to S06.9) among 16-65 year olds demonstrated a small increase between 2012 to 2013, after which it remained relatively stable. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 17).

Figure 18: Monthly rate of intracranial injury hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland

Table 17: ARIMA models for intracranial injury hospital admissions, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1) SARIMA (0,1,1,12)	0.08	-0.30, 0.47	0.05	-0.44, 0.54	-0.08	-0.29, 0.14	0.03	-0.20, 0.26

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.8.   TOTAL INJURIES

Figure 19 shows the rate of skull and facial fractures, hand and wrist fractures, plus intracranial injury admissions among 16-65 year olds demonstrated a slow increase from 2012 to 2013. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 18).

Figure 19: Monthly rate of skull and facial fractures, hand and wrist fractures, and intracranial injury hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland

Table 18: ARIMA models for skull and facial fractures, hand and wrist fractures, and intracranial injury hospital admissions, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (1,0,0) SARIMA (1,0,0,12)	0.22*	0.02, 0.42	0.19	-0.02, 0.41	0.05	-0.23, 0.33	0.08	-0.01, 0.16

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.3.9. SELF-HARM/INJURY

The rate of self-injury/harm admissions (ICD 10 codes X70 to X84) demonstrated an increase over the time period (see Figure 20). ARIMA modelling demonstrated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 19).

Figure 20: Monthly rate of self-harm/injury hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds per 10,000 population, Queensland

Table 19: ARIMA models for self-harm hospital admissions, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1) SARIMA (0,1,1,12)	0.06	-0.03, 0.16	-0.02	-0.08, 0.04	-0.03	-0.18, 0.13	0.01	-0.03, 0.05

Note. *p<.05

6.1.1.4.1.   ALL INJURY/POISONING PRESENTATIONS

Figure 21 shows the raw series for total ED presentations for injuries or poisonings for the three different time periods under analysis (different parts of Friday and Saturday nights).

Figure 21: Monthly count of injury and poisoning-related ED presentations, Friday and Saturday nights, Queensland

Time-series models examining the impact of the policy interventions on presentations in each of these three time periods are presented in Table 20. As discussed above, the models use data series based on the ratio of the high alcohol hours presentations to low alcohol hours presentations to try to adjust for any underlying factors that might bias our results.

Table 20: ARIMA models for injury/poisoning ED presentations

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA(2,1,1) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	-0.45	-1.46, 0.56	0.42	-1.15, 1.99	0.28	-1.65, 2.21	0.11	-0.82, 1.05
12am-2:59am ARIMA(2,1,2) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	0.63	0.27, 0.98*	0.45	-0.13, 1.03	0.08	-0.57, 0.74	0.24	0.03, 0.44*
3am-5:59am ARIMA(2,1,1) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	0.01	-0.54, 0.57	0.05	-0.67, 0.76	0.08	-0.81, 0.97	0.06	-0.37, 0.50

The only significant associations identified were for presentations between midnight and 2:59am. These models identified a small *increase* in ED presentations for these time periods with the introduction of the initial policy (0.63, 027-0.98). These effects were significant when the three policies were entered into the same model, although they were reduced.

6.1.1.4.2. ALL INTOXICATION PRESENTATIONS

Figure 22 shows trends in monthly presentations for alcohol intoxication across the study period.

Figure 22: Monthly count of intoxication-related ED presentations, Friday and Saturday nights, Queensland

Again, the time-series models (presented in Table 21) use a ratio of high alcohol hours to low alcohol hours rather than the raw series. In these models, there were no significant effects for any of the policies for intoxication related presentations during any of the three high alcohol hours periods examined.

Table 21: ARIMA models for intoxication-related ED presentations, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA(0,0,0), SARIMA (1, 0, 0, 13)	-15.6	-65.3, 34.2	-14.9	-84.6, 54.8	-8.32	-76.7, 60.1	-5.6	-28.6, 17.4
12am-2:59am ARIMA(0,0,0)	-14.1	-74.4, 46.1	-10.4	-72.1, 51.3	-21.3	-109.5, 67.0	-5.8	-30.3, 18.6
3am-5:59am ARIMA(1,1,1) SARIMA(1,0,0,7)	-2.2	-76.3, 71.9	2.1	-84.3, 88.4	3.5	109.5, 116.5	0.3	-32.0, 32.7

YOUNG MALE INJURY/POISONING PRESENTATIONS

The majority of alcohol-related harms in the night-time economy are experienced by young men (2). With this in mind, we conducted sub-analyses on the same set of diagnoses for presentations involving men aged between 18 and 40.

Figure 23 shows the raw data series for injury and poisoning presentations for men aged 18 to 40. These series follow broadly similar patterns to those presented earlier for the whole population.

Figure 23: Monthly count of injury and poisoning-related ED presentations in men aged 18-40 years, Friday and Saturday nights, Queensland

Time series models (again using the ratio of high/low alcohol hours) found no significant impact of any of the policy intervention points on ED presentations for young men (Table 22).

Table 22: ARIMA models for injury/poisoning ED presentations in males aged 18-40, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA(2,1,1) SARIMA(1,1,0,12)	0.85	-1.47, 3.18	-0.34	-2.19, 1.50	-0.43	-3.80, 2.93	0.17	-1.28, 1.61
12am-2:59am ARIMA(2,1,2) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	1.18	-0.06, 2.42	0.07	-1.59, 1.72	-0.57	-2.61, 1.47	0.11	-0.76, 0.98
3am-5:59am ARIMA(2,1,1) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	0.29	-0.75, 1.34	-0.08	-1.13, 0.96	-0.64	-1.66, 0.39	-0.11	-0.64, 0.42

YOUNG MALE INTOXICATION PRESENTATIONS

As with the injury/poisoning presentations, specific sub-analyses were conducted for intoxication presentations for men aged 18-40. Figure 24 shows the monthly intoxication-related presentations for young men during the three high alcohol hour periods.

Figure 24: Monthly count of alcohol intoxication-related ED presentations in men aged 18-40 years, Friday and Saturday nights, Queensland

Again, time-series models using the ratio of high:low alcohol hours presentations found no significant impact of any of the intervention points on intoxication presentations (Table 23).

Table 23: ARIMA models for intoxication-related ED presentations in males aged 18-40 years, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA(1,0,1)	-0.26	-0.64, 0.12	-0.03	-0.61, 0.55	-0.11	-0.56, 0.33	-0.09	-0.26, 0.08
12am-2:59am ARIMA(1,0,0) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	-0.28	-0.74, 0.18	-0.19	-0.68, 0.30	-0.23	-0.86, 0.39	-0.11	-0.31, 0.09
3am-5:59am ARIMA(2,1,1) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	-0.15	-0.51, 0.22	-0.02	-0.38, 0.35	-0.10	-0.69, 0.50	-0.05	-0.22, 0.12

6.1.1.4.4.   HAND AND HEAD INJURIES

We conducted specific sub-analyses on injuries likely to relate to assaults – injuries of the head and hands. The raw data series of monthly presentations for the whole state during Friday and Saturday nights are presented in Figure 25.

Figure 25: Monthly count of hand and head injury presentations, Friday and Saturday nights, Queensland

Time-series models were again developed using a ratio of these presentations to a denominator of total injury/poisoning presentations during low alcohol hours. None of the policy intervention points were significantly associated with a change in the time series (Table 24).

Table 24: ARIMA models for hand and head injuries ED presentations, Queensland

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-5:59am ARIMA(2,1,1) SARIMA(1,0,0,12)	0.01	-0.28, 0.30	-0.02	-0.23, 0.18	0.02	-0.15, 0.18	0.001	-0.11, 0.11

6.1.1.5. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 26 shows the state wide trend for call-outs during HAH. The rate of call-outs appear to begin to increase from early 2016.

Figure 26: Monthly rate of high-alcohol hour police call-outs per 10,000 population, Queensland

<table>
<tr><td>6.1.1.6.</td><td>ID SCANNER DATA</td></tr>
</table>

6.1.1.6.1.   NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES[6]

The total number of people across all sites who were scanned when entering a licensed venue within HAH was examined from July 2017 to June 2018 (see Figure 27), and then by month (see Figure 28).

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[6] Note that while the terminology 'number of people' has been used, this represents the number of ID scans and each scan does not represent a single person. For example, a person could exit and re-enter a venue, which entails re-scanning of their ID.

Figure 27: The number of people entering a licensed venue across all sites for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

As seen in Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30 the number of scans steadily increased from 8pm to 9pm, with a large increase in the number of scans from 9pm to 10pm. The number of scans per hour peaked at 12am for the total time period, and across all months. There was a sharp decline in the number of scans after 12am, until 3am and a gradual decrease in scans until 6am. The highest number of scans across the night occurred in the month of December 2017 at 11pm ($n = 232,995$).

Figure 28: The number of people entering a licensed venue across all sites, by month and time of entry

Figure 29: The number of people entering a licensed venue for the total evaluation period, by time of entry and SNP where there were more than 100,000 persons.

Figure 30: The number of people entering a licensed venue for the total evaluation period, by time of entry and SNP where there was less than 100,000 persons.

Across the entire evaluation period, Fortitude Valley had the highest number of people entering venues for all hours, followed by Surfers Paradise and Brisbane SNPs. Ipswich consistently had the lowest number of patrons throughout the night. Each SNP will be explored in detail in the following sections. Figure 31 to Figure 33 highlight the number of entries into licensed venues across all sites by month. Trends across all months were similar across all sites, with peaks in December. Fortitude Valley consistently had the highest number of entries per month, followed by Surfers Paradise.

Figure 31: The number of people entering licensed venues across all sites by month of entry

Figure 32: The number of people entering a licensed venue across all sites, by month of entry and SNP, where there were under 50,000 persons

Figure 33: The number of people entering a licensed venue across all sites, by month of entry and SNP, where there more more than 50,000 persons

Figure 34 shows the average number of entries across each day of the week for all hours and for all sites. As expected, the number of entries is highest on Friday and Saturday nights.

Figure 34 The average number of scans across each night of the week for all hours and all sites

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

The total number of males and females across all sites who were scanned when entering a licensed venue within HAH was examined from July 2017 to June 2018 (see Figure 35), and then by month (for females Figure 36, see, and for males see Figure 37).

Figure 35: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue across all sites for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

As seen in Figure 36 and Figure 37, the number of scans steadily increased from 8pm to 9pm, with a large increase in the number of scans from 9pm to 10pm. The number of scans per hour peaked at 11pm for the total time period, and across all months. There was a sharp decline in the number of scans after 12am, until 3am and a gradual decrease in scans until 6am. For females, the highest number of scans across the night occurred in the month of June 2018 at 11pm (n = 98,206). For males, the highest number of scans across the night occurred in the month of December 2017 at 11pm (n = 140,005).

Figure 36: The number of females entering a licensed venue across all sites, by month and time of entry

Figure 37: The number of males entering a licensed venue across all sites, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 38 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 12am (n = 1,261,023). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 686,433). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 38: The number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites, by age group and time of entry

6.1.1.6.2. BANNING ORDERS

Complete banning data were only available across all sites from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018. During this time, a total of 14,795 banned patrons were detected (Table 25). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=13,741; 92.9%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=828; 5.6%) and by the courts (n=226; 1.5%). Female banned patrons were detected on 1,779 occasions (12% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 10,718 occasions (72.4% of all bans detected). The remaining bans did not have a gender listed (n=2,298), but include 2,139 licensee bans, 105 QPS bans, and 54 court bans. Those is the 18-24 year old age group were the most often banned patrons detected (n = 9,225), with those in oldest group the least likely.

Table 25: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	9,894	92.3%	665	6.2%	159	1.5%
Female	1,708	96%	58	3.3%	13	0.7%
Age Groups						
18-24	8,535	92.5%	572	6.2%	118	1.3%
25-34	4,438	93.5%	215	4.5%	95	2.0%
35-44	621	93.5%	34	5.1%	9	1.4%
45-54	108	90.7%	7	5.9%	4	3.4%
55-98	20	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY

6.1.2.1.   POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

In Fortitude Valley, across the entire time period, Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences, followed by Saturdays (Figure 39).

Figure 39: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Fortitude Valley

In order to provide a more detailed picture of the count of offences, for Fortitude Valley trends for HAH were further broken into 8pm-midnight Friday/Saturday, midnight-3am Friday/Saturday, and 3am-6am Friday/Saturday. As shown in Figure 40, the count of serious assault in Fortitude Valley declined from 2016 in all three HAH categories. ARIMA modelling indicated significant declines in the count of serious assaults during 8pm-midnight and 3am-6am (see Table 26).

Figure 40: Count of serious assault during HAH, Fortitude Valley

Table 26: ARIMA models for serious assault during HAH, Fortitude Valley

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.26	-0.80, 0.28	-1.02*	-1.86, -0.18	-1.00*	-1.99, -0.01	-0.28	-0.57, 0.02
12am-2:59am ARIMA (0,0,1)	-0.47	-1.69, 0.75	-0.86	-2.56, 0.85	-1.19	-3.17, 0.80	-0.31	-0.92, 0.29
3am-5:59am ARIMA (0,0,0)	-1.57*	-2.64, -0.50	-1.93*	-3.36, -0.50	-1.73*	-3.36, -0.10	-0.70*	-1.17, -0.23
8pm-5:59am ARIMA (1,0,0)	-2.24*	-4.23, -0.26	-3.79*	-6.28, -1.30	-3.86*	-6.76, -0.95	-1.28*	-2.18, -0.38

Note. *p<.05

As shown in Figure 41, the count of common assault in Fortitude Valley declined from approximately 2015. ARIMA modelling indicated significant decline in the count of common assaults during 3am-6am (see Table 27).

Figure 41: Count of common assault during HAH, Fortitude Valley

Table 27: ARIMA models for common assault during HAH, Fortitude Valley

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA (0,0,1)	-0.52	-1.07, 0.03	-0.58	-1.26, 0.10	-0.49	-1.30, 0.32	-0.21	-0.45, 0.02
12am-2:59am ARIMA (2,1,0)	-0.70	-8.67, 7.27	1.80	-6.32, 9.92	2.00	-1.38, 5.37	1.09	-1.36, 3.53
3am-5:59am ARIMA (1,0,0)	-1.27 *	-2.30, -0.25	-1.04	-2.30, 0.23	-0.64	-2.10, 0.82	-0.42*	-0.83, -0.01
8pm-5:59am ARIMA (2,1,0)	-0.10	-8.74, 8.55	2.01	-5.54, 9.57	3.50	-1.18, 8.18	1.89	-1.83, 5.60

Note. *$p<.05$

As shown in Figure 42, the count of public nuisance (violent) offences in Fortitude Valley showed some increase since 2016 for 8pm-midnight and 12am-3am, but a decline during 3am-6am. ARIMA modelling indicated that while there was a small increase in public nuisance (violent) offences during 8pm-midnight and 12am-3am, there was a significant decline during 3am-6am (see Table 28).

Figure 42: Count of public nuisance (violent) assault during HAH, Fortitude Valley

Table 28: ARIMA models for public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Fortitude Valley

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm ARIMA (0,0,0)	1.41*	0.76, 2.06	1.18*	0.47, 1.88	1.35*	0.59, 2.12	0.53*	0.27, 0.79
12am-2:59am ARIMA (0,1,1)	3.04*	0.76, 5.32	2.07	-1.10, 5.24	2.67*	0.39, 4.94	1.16*	0.22, 2.10
3am-5:59am ARIMA (1,0,0)	-1.66	-3.70, 0.39	-2.55*	-4.75, -0.34	-1.85	-4.14, 0.46	-0.81*	-1.56, -0.06
8pm-5:59am ARIMA (0,1,1)	1.64	-2.69, 5.98	-3.89	-10.50, 2.72	0.55	-4.55, 5.66	-0.53	-2.93, 1.86

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.1.1. POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for Fortitude Valley from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 43 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of serious assaults in the

Fortitude Valley SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no correlation between tasking and serious assault (r = 0.13, p=.659).

Figure 43: Police tasking compared to count of serious assault during HAH, Fortitude Valley

Figure 44 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of common assaults in the Fortitude Valley SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no correlation between tasking and common assault (r = 0.22, p=.447).

Figure 44: Police tasking compared to count of common assault during HAH, Fortitude Valley

6.1.2.1.2. QUEENSLAND COMPARISON SITES FOR FORTITUDE VALLEY

SOUTH BRISBANE (SOUTHBANK), WEST END, AND WOOLLOONGABBA

As shown in Figure 45, the rate of serious assault in South Brisbane, West End, and Woolloongabba remained relatively stable across the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of serious assault (see Table 29).

Figure 45: Rate of serious assault during HAH per 100,000 people, South Brisbane (Southbank), West End, and Woolloongabba

Figure 46 demonstrates the rate of common assault in South Brisbane, West End, and Woolloongabba remained relatively stable across the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of common assault (see Table 29).

Figure 46: Rate of common assault during HAH per 100,000 people, South Brisbane (Southbank), West End, and Woolloongabba

As shown in Figure 47, the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences in South Brisbane, West End, and Woolloongabba showed a very small decline in late-2013, after which it remained stable. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences (see Table 29).

Figure 47: Rate of public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, South Brisbane (Southbank), West End, and Woolloongabba

Table 29: ARIMA models for assault during HAH per 100,000 people, South Brisbane (Southbank), West End, and Woolloongabba

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
Serious assault ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.04	-0.10, 0.03	-0.05	-0.13, 0.04	-0.04	-0.18, 0.09	-0.02	-0.05, 0.02
Common assault ARIMA (2,1,1) SARIMA (2,1,0,12)	0.03	-0.15, 0.21	-0.02	-0.15, 0.12	0.01	-0.21, 0.21	0.01	-0.09, 0.10
Public nuisance (violent) ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.03	-0.09, 0.04	-0.03	-0.10, 0.03	-0.03	-0.10, 0.04	-0.01	-0.03, 0.01

RED HILL, PADDINGTON, AND KELVIN GROVE

The number of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences were minimal for each year in Red Hill, Paddington, and Kelvin Grove. Table 30 provides the number of offences within these suburbs by offence, and the total number of all three offences types. Due to low numbers, no further analyses were conducted.

Table 30: Number of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences during HAH, Red Hill, Paddington, and Kelvin Grove

	Serious assault n	Common assault n	Public nuisance (violent) n	Total n
2009	2	2	2	6
2010	3	2	1	6
2011	3	0	2	5
2012	1	2	1	4
2013	2	4	2	8
2014	1	2	2	5
2015	2	2	0	4
2016	4	6	3	13
2017	3	1	2	6
2018	0	0	1	1

EATONS HILL AND BRENDALE

The number of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences were minimal for each year in Eatons Hill and Brendale. Table 31 shows the number of offences within these suburbs by offence, and the total number of all three offences types. Due to low numbers, no further analyses were conducted.

Table 31: Number of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences during HAH, Eatons Hill and Brendale

	Serious assault *n*	Common assault *n*	Public nuisance (violent) *n*	Total *n*
2009	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0
2011	11	6	11	28
2012	14	18	11	43
2013	8	1	7	16
2014	9	7	4	20
2015	8	3	8	19
2016	7	1	4	12
2017	15	5	8	28
2018	3	1	8	12

LOGAN CENTRAL

The number of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences were minimal for each year in Logan Central. Table 32 shows the number of offences within these suburbs by offence, and the total number of all three offences types. Due to low numbers, no further analyses were conducted.

Table 32: Number of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences during HAH, Logan Central

	Serious assault *n*	Common assault *n*	Public nuisance (violent) *n*	Total *n*
2009	7	2	1	10
2010	2	2	3	7
2011	2	6	0	8
2012	4	4	1	9
2013	2	4	2	8
2014	0	2	1	3
2015	2	6	4	12
2016	3	4	1	8
2017	8	4	0	12
2018	1	0	0	1

6.1.2.2.   AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAH/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 48) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. In general, the data points related to the HAH of 12am-2:59am Saturday and Sunday nights were higher than other HAH ratios. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was March 2013. Overall, the data do not suggest any upward or downward trends.

Figure 48: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Fortitude Valley during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

The modelling process found the ARIMA (0,0,0) term provided the best fit for all HAHs in each policy intervention and overall model (Table 33). There was no significant impact of the legislation on the trend in call-outs.

Table 33: Effects of three policy interventions on the ambulance call-outs during HAH, Fortitude Valley

Model parameters	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full Model	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.15	-0.59, 0.27	-0.12	-0.56, 0.33	0.13	-0.60, 0.34	-0.06	-0.21, 0.10
12am-2:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.36	-0.98, 0.26	-0.34	-1.09, 0.39	-0.40	-1.30, 0.49	-0.15	-0.42, 0.13
3am-5:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.71	-1.74, 0.32	-0.66	-1.76, 0.45	-0.59	-1.81, 0.64	-0.27	-0.64, 0.10

Note. All models were stationary and Q-test could not reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation at the specified lag.

6.1.2.3.1. ALCOHOL INTOXICATION ADMISSIONS

The count of alcohol intoxication admissions (ICD 10 codes F10.0 and F10.1) among 16-65 year olds at two major Brisbane hospitals demonstrated an increase from approximately 2012 (see Figure 49). ARIMA modelling demonstrated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 34). To visualise the downward trend beginning February 2017, a forecast trend line based on pre-July 2016 counts is presented in the figure.

Figure 49: **Monthly count of alcohol intoxication hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane**

Table 34 ARIMA models for alcohol intoxication hospital admissions, Brisbane

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (5,1,0) SARIMA (4,1,0,4)	25.43	-28.59, 79.45	-5.62	-58.60, 47.35	-12.09	-130.59, 106.42	6.54	-27.55, 40.65

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.2.   SKULL AND FACIAL BONE FRACTURES

The count of skull and facial bone fracture admissions (ICD 10 codes S02.0 to S02.9) among 16-65 year olds at Royal Brisbane and Princess Alexandra hospitals declined from 2012 to 2015, after which it remained stable (see Figure 50). ARIMA modelling demonstrated a temporary, significant increase after February 2017. However, the count returned to pre-intervention levels after this point (see Table 35).

Figure 50: Monthly count of skull and facial fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 35: **ARIMA models for skull and facial fracture hospital admissions, Brisbane**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	-4.89	-39.69, 29.91	25.09*	9.87, 40.30	-26.65	-87.05, 33.76	-1.89	-10.38, 6.60

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.3.   OCULAR FLOOR FRACTURES

Figure 51 shows the number of ocular floor fracture admissions (ICD 10 code S02.3) among 16-65 year olds within two major Brisbane hospitals demonstrated a decline from approximately 2013. ARIMA modelling indicated a significant decline in the count of admissions after each policy intervention variable (see Table 36). To illustrate the decreasing count of ocular floor fractures, an expected linear trend based on pre-July 2016 count is presented on the figure.

Figure 51: Monthly count of ocular floor fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 36: **ARIMA models for ocular floor fractures hospital admissions, Brisbane**

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (1,0,0)	5.07*	-9.04, -1.11	-5.58*	-10.93, -0.23	-6.00*	-10.87, -1.13	-2.34*	-4.09, -0.59

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.4.   MANDIBLE FRACTURES

Figure 52 shows the count of mandible fracture admissions (ICD 10 code S02.6) among 16-65 year olds demonstrated fluctuations throughout the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant impact of the intervention variables (see Table 37).

Figure 52: Monthly count of mandible fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 37: ARIMA models for mandible fractures hospital admissions, Brisbane

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (2,0,0)	-3.41	-10.09, 3.26	-1.99	-7.14, 3.16	-7.02	-17.35, 3.31	-1.73	-4.21, 0.75

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.5.   NASAL BONE FRACTURES

The number of nasal bone fracture admissions (ICD 10 code S02.2) among 16-65 year olds at Royal Brisbane and Princess Alexandra hospitals fluctuated over the time period (see Figure 53). ARIMA modelling demonstrated no significant impact of the policy intervention variables (see Table 38).

Figure 53: Monthly count of nasal bone fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 38: ARIMA models for nasal bone fractures hospital admissions, Brisbane

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	-7.94	-21.63, 5.74	4.75	-2.62, 12.12	-1.42	-8.57, 5.73	-0.62	-4.46, 3.23

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.6.   HAND AND WRIST FRACTURES

Figure 54 shows the count of hand and wrist fracture admissions (ICD codes S62.0 to S62.8) among 16-65 year olds at two major Brisbane hospitals demonstrated a small increase from 2015. ARIMA modelling indicated a significant increase in the count of these admissions with each intervention point (see Table 39).

Figure 54: Monthly count of hand and wrist fracture hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 39: ARIMA models for hand and wrist fracture hospital admissions, Brisbane

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (1,0,0)	10.12*	5.79, 14.46	11.12*	6.30, 15.96	8.71*	1.73, 15.67	4.10*	2.44, 5.76

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.7.   INTRACRANIAL INJURY

Figure 55 shows the rate of intracranial injury admissions (ICD codes S06.0 to S06.9) among 16-65 year olds at two major Brisbane hospitals demonstrated fluctuations over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated a significant increase in intracranial admissions post February 2017, however, this was followed by an equally large significant decrease post July 2017 (see Table 40). To contextualise the significant changes in intracranial injury count, an expected linear trend based on pre-July 2016 count is presented on the figure.

Figure 55: Monthly count of intracranial injury hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 40: ARIMA models for intracranial injury hospital admissions, Brisbane

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	-2.01	-28.10, 24.07	25.89*	3.17, 48.61	-25.68*	-42.39, -8.98	-1.04	-11.84, 9.76

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.8. TOTAL INJURIES

Figure 56 shows the count of skull and facial fractures, hand and wrist fractures, plus intracranial injury admissions among 16-65 year olds at two major Brisbane hospitals demonstrated fluctuations over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated a significant increase in these injuries admissions post February 2017, however, this was followed by an equally large significant decrease post July 2017 (see Table 41). To contextualise the significant changes in total injury count, an expected linear trend based on pre-July 2016 count is presented on the figure.

Figure 56: Monthly count of skull and facial fractures, hand and wrist fractures, and intracranial injury hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 41: ARIMA models for skull and facial fractures, hand and wrist fractures, and intracranial injury hospital admissions, Brisbane

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	-1.68	-58.62, 55.25	47.90*	11.80, 84.01	-42.57*	-73.56, -11.57	-.01	-14.24, 14.22

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.3.9.   SELF-HARM/INJURY

The number of self-injury/harm admissions (ICD 10 codes X70 to X84) at two major Brisbane hospitals demonstrated an increase from about 2015 (see Figure 57). ARIMA modelling demonstrated a significant temporary increase after July 2016, followed by a subsequent decline (see Table 42). To contextualise the changes in self-harm count, an expected linear trend based on pre-July 2016 count is presented on the figure.

Figure 57: Monthly count of self-harm hospital admissions among 16-65 year olds, Brisbane

Table 42: ARIMA models for self-harm hospital admissions, Brisbane

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1) SARIMA (0,1,1,12)	16.17*	1.41, 30.93	-9.66	-21.06, 1.74	-11.18	-24.82, 2.46	-1.56	-13.28, 10.16

Note. *p<.05

6.1.2.4. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT ATTENDANCES – PRINCESS ALEXANDRA AND ROYAL BRISBANE HOSPITALS

Given initial findings from the police analyses of a significant reduction in assaults in the Fortitude Valley SNP, we ran specific models for the two hospitals most likely to see injury presentations related to harm experienced in the Valley SNP. Trends for intoxication, total injury and head/hand injury presentations are included in Figure 58.

Figure 58: Monthly count of ED presentations, Friday and Saturday nights, Princess Alexandra and Royal Brisbane Hospitals

Again, there were no significant intervention effects for any of these outcomes in the two major Brisbane hospitals examined (Table 43). All models were conducted on series using low-alcohol-hours as the denominator (note that the denominator for the head/hand injuries was total injuries during low alcohol hours).

Table 43: ARIMA models for injury and intoxication ED presentations in major Brisbane hospitals

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-5:59am, all injuries and poisonings ARIMA(3,1,2) SARIMA(1,1,1,12)	1.40	-3.20, 6.01	1.10	-3.39, 5.59	-0.91	-5.66, 3.84	1.20	-1.84, 4.24
8pm-5:59am, head and hand injuries ARIMA(2,1,2) SARIMA(1,1,0,12)	0.25	-0.68, 1.17	0.25	-0.70, 1.20	0.25	-0.62, 1.12	0.30	-0.28, 0.88
8pm-5:59am, intoxication and related ARIMA(0,0,0)	-0.57	-1.27, 0.13	-0.46	-1.32, 0.39	-0.43	-1.46, 0.61	-0.20	-0.49, 0.09

6.1.2.5. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 59 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in Fortitude Valley. The number of call-outs increased across the time period. There was no significant change after the introduction of the policy (see Table 44).

Figure 59: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Fortitude Valley

Table 44: ARIMA models for count of police call-outs during HAH, Fortitude Valley

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (2,1,0) SARIMA (1,1,0,6)	-3.06	-18.80, 24.92	0.26	-13.35, 0.78	-6.61	-13.73, 26.95	5.02	-8.19, 18.23

*Note. * p<.05*

6.1.2.5.1. POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for Fortitude Valley from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 60 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of call-outs in the Fortitude Valley SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and call-outs (r = -.02, p=.898).

Figure 60: Police tasking compared to count of call-outs during HAH, Fortitude Valley

6.1.2.6. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.2.6.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 61 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Fortitude Valley from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 12am (n = 878,966). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 84,970 entries at 12am (see Figure 62).

Figure 61: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Fortitude Valley for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 62: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Fortitude Valley, by month and time of entry

Figure 63 shows the number of entries into licensed venues across all sites by month. The peak number of entries occurred in December (n = 344,297).

Figure 63: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Fortitude Valley, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 64 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Fortitude Valley by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 12am (n = 523,845), and the peak time for female entry at also at 12am (n = 354,852. January was the month with the highest number of entries for both males (Figure 66) and females (Figure 65).

Figure 64: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Fortitude valley for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 65: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Fortitude Valley, by month and time of entry

Figure 66: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Fortitude Valley, by month and time of entry

Figure 67 shows the average number of entries across each day of the week for all hours. As expected, the number of entries is highest on Friday and Saturday nights.

Figure 67 The average number of venue entries across all days of the week and all hours for Fortitude Valley

Age Groups

Figure 68 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 12am (n = 528,706). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all

hours, and also had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 268,958). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 68: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Fortitude Valley, by age group and time of entry

6.1.2.6.2.   BANNING ORDERS

In Fortitude Valley from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 5,845 banned patrons were detected (Table 45). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=5,530; 94.6%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=240; 4.1%) and by the courts (n=75; 1.3%). Female banned patrons were detected on 799 occasions (13.7% of all bans detected) and male bans were detected on 4,756 occasions (81.4% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 3,823).

Table 45: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Fortitude Valley

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	4,468	93.9%	218	4.6%	70	1.5%
Female	782	97.9%	14	1.8%	3	0.4%
Age Groups						
18-24	3,615	94.6%	155	4.1%	53	1.4%
25-34	167	94.8%	71	4.2%	18	1.1%
35-44	252	94.4%	11	4.1%	4	1.5%
45-54	39	92.9%	3	1.3%	-	-
55-98	6	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.3. AIRLIE BEACH

6.1.3.1.   POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

In Airlie Beach SNP, across the entire time period, early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/early Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences (total of all three offense types; Figure 69).

Figure 69: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Airlie Beach CBD

Due to low numbers of offences, all three offence types were summed to form an overall count in the Airlie Beach SNP. As shown in Figure 70, the count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences in the Airlie Beach SNP slowly increased from 2009 to 2015, after which there was a small decline.

Figure 70: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Airlie Beach CBD

6.1.3.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 71) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 71: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Airlie Beach during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.3.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Only data for 2018 were available for Airlie Beach. During 2018, there were two call-outs in February, two in March, five in April, three in May, and four in June.

6.1.3.4. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.3.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 72 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Airlie Beach from October 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 12am (n = 49,464). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 6,102 entries at 12am (see Figure 73).

Figure 72: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Airlie Beach for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 73: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Airlie Beach, by month and time of entry

Figure 74 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Airlie Beach by month. The peak was in December (n = 21,023)

Figure 74: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Airlie Beach, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 75 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Airlie Beach by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 12 am (n = 31,183), and the peak time for female entry at 12am (n = 18,104). December was the month with the highest number of entries for both males (Figure 77) and females (Figure 78).

Figure 75: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Airlie Beach for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 76: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Airlie Beach, by month and time of entry

Figure 77: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Airlie Beach, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 78 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at

12am (n = 22,105). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 20,262).

Figure 78: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Airlie Beach, by age group and time of entry

6.1.3.4.2.　BANNING ORDERS

In Airlie Beach from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 391 banned patrons were detected (Table 46). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=352; 90%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=32; 8.2%) and by the courts (n=7; 1.8%). Female banned patrons were detected on 26 occasions (6.6% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 189 occasions (48.3% of all bans detected). The 18-24 year old age group had the highest number of bans detected (n = 243).

Table 46 Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Airlie Beach

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	167	88.4%	18	9.5%	4	2.1%
Female	21	80.8%	2	7.7%	3	11.5%
Age Groups						
18-24	215	88.5%	22	9.1%	6	2.5%
25-34	107	92.2%	9	7.8%	-	-
35-44	22	95.7%	-	-	1	4.3%
45-54	6	85.7%	1	14.3%	-	-
55-98	2	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.4. BRISBANE CBD

6.1.4.1.   POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/early Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Brisbane CBD (Figure 79). There was also a peak early Friday mornings.

Figure 79: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Brisbane CBD

As shown in Figure 80, the rate of serious assault in the Brisbane CBD began to decline from 2013, with a temporary increase post-July 2016.

Figure 80: Rate of serious assault during HAH per 100,000 population, Brisbane CBD

As shown in Figure 81, the rate of common assault in the Brisbane CBD began declined from 2011 to 2016, after which there was an increase.

Figure 81: Rate of common assault during HAH per 100,000 population, Brisbane CBD

As shown in Figure 82, the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Brisbane CBD remained relatively stable across the time period.

Figure 82: Rate of public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 population, Brisbane CBD

6.1.4.1.1. BRISBANE CASINO

In order to isolate the impact of the Treasury Casino and Hotel on the number of police-recorded offences in the Brisbane CBD SNP, the number of offences occurring in the area including, and immediately surrounding, the casino was examined (see Figure 83). During from 2009-2018, during HAH, 13.96% (n=85) of all serious assaults, 16.16% (n=58) of common assaults, and 10.69% (n=77) of public nuisance (violent) offenses were recorded in the Brisbane SNP were in the casino area.

Figure 83: Area coded as 'casino' within the Brisbane SNP

Source: Google Maps

In and around the casino, across the entire time period, midnight to early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/early Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences (total of all three offense types; Figure 84).

Figure 84: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, area coded as 'casino' within the Brisbane SNP

6.1.4.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 85) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 85: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Brisbane during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.4.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 86 shows the trend for the count of call-outs during HAH in the Brisbane CBD; the number of call-outs began to increase from 2016 onwards.

Figure 86: Monthly count of high alcohol hour police call-outs, Brisbane CBD

6.1.4.4.   ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.4.4.1.   NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 87 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Brisbane from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 10pm (n = 247,914). June was the busiest month, with a peak of 28,287 entries at 10pm (see Figure 88).

Figure 87: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Brisbane for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 88: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Brisbane, by month and time of entry

Figure 89 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Brisbane by month. The peak entries was in December (n = 96,174).

Figure 89: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Brisbane, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 90 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Brisbane by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 10pm (n = 143,193), and the peak time for female entry at 10pm (n = 103,815). June was the month with the highest number of entries for both males (Figure 92) and females (Figure 91).

Figure 90: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Brisbane for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 91: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Brisbane, by month and time of entry

Figure 92: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Brisbane, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 93 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue in Brisbane for each hour of entry, by age group. 25-34 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 10pm (n

=100,977). The 18-24 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 10pm (n = 86,833). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 93: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Brisbane, by age group and time of entry

6.1.4.4.2.   BANNING ORDERS

In Brisbane from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 1,404 banned patrons were detected (Table 47). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=1,323; 94.2%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=60; 4.3%) and by the courts (n=21; 1.5%). Female banned patrons were detected on 155 occasions (11% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 1,141 occasions (81.3% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 770).

Table 47: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Brisbane

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	1,073	94%	51	4.5%	17	1.5%
Female	151	97.4%	4	2.6%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	728	94.5%	38	4.9%	4	0.5%
25-34	503	93.5%	18	3.3%	17	3.2%
35-44	89	96.7%	3	3.3%	-	-
45-54	3	75%	1	25%	-	-

6.1.5. BROADBEACH CBD

6.1.5.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Broadbeach CBD (Figure 94).

Figure 94: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Broadbeach CBD

As shown in Figure 95, the count of serious assault in the Broadbeach CBD showed a small decline from 2013, with a temporary increase post-July 2017.

Figure 95: Count of serious assault during HAH, Broadbeach CBD

As shown in Figure 96, the count of common assault in the Broadbeach CBD showed an increase from 2015 to 2018.

Figure 96: Count of common assault during HAH, Broadbeach CBD

As shown in Figure 97, the count of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Broadbeach CBD declined from 2014 to 2016, but demonstrated a subsequent increase.

Figure 97: Count of public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Broadbeach CBD

6.1.5.1.1.   BROADBEACH CASINO

In order to isolate the impact of The Star Gold Coast on the number of police-recorded offences in the Broadbeach SNP, the number of offences occurring in the area including, and immediately surrounding, the casino was examined (see Figure 98). From 2009-2018, during HAH, 23.23% (n=59) of all serious assaults, 32.06% (n=42) of common assaults, and 3.26% (n=12) of public nuisance (violent) offenses were recorded in the Broadbeach SNP were in the casino area.

Figure 98: Area coded as 'casino' within the Broadbeach SNP

Source: Google Maps

In and around the casino, across the entire time period, midnight to early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/early Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences (total of all three offense types; Figure 99).

Figure 99: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, area coded as 'casino' within the Broadbeach SNP

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 100) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. In general, the data points related to HAH 12am-2:59am Saturday and Sunday nights were higher than the other HAH ratios. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was May 2014. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 100: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Broadbeach during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.5.3.   POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 101 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in Broadbeach. While there were a few fluctuations in the number of call-outs, the trend remained relatively stable.

Figure 101: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Broadbeach CBD

6.1.5.4.1.   NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 102 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Broadbeach from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 54,029). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 6,370 entries at 11pm (see Figure 103).

Figure 102: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Broadbeach for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 103: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Broadbeach, by month and time of entry

Figure 104 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Broadbeach by month. The peak was in October (n = 24,191)

Figure 104: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Broadbeach, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 105 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Broadbeach by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 11pm (n = 31,283), and the peak time for female entry at 10pm (n = 22,634). September has the highest number of female entries, and October had the highest number of male entries.

Figure 105: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Broadbeach for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 106: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Broadbeach, by month and time of entry

Figure 107: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Broachbeach, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 108 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at

11pm (n = 23,927). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 21,672). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 108: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Broadbeach, by age group and time of entry

6.1.5.4.2.   BANNING ORDERS

In Broadbeach from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 307 banned patrons were detected (Table 48). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=259; 84.4%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=43; 14%) and by the courts (n=5; 1.6%). Female banned patrons were detected on 23 occasions (7.5% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 186 occasions (60.6% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 168).

Table 48 Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Broadbeach

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	154	82.8%	30	16.1%	2	1.1%
Female	22	95.7%	1	4.3%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	136	81%	28	16.7%	4	2.4%
25-34	106	89.1%	12	10.1%	1	0.8%
35-44	14	82.4%	3	17.6%	-	-
45-54	1	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.6. BUNDABERG CBD

6.1.6.1.   POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/early Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Bundaberg CBD (Figure 109).

Figure 109: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Bundaberg CBD

As shown in Figure 110, rate of serious assault in the Bundaberg SNP remained stable across the time period.

Figure 110: Rate of serious assault during HAH per 100,000, Bundaberg CBD

As shown in Figure 111, rate of common assault in the Bundaberg SNP remained stable across the time period.

Figure 111: Rate of common assault during HAH per 100,000, Bundaberg CBD

As shown in Figure 112, rate of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Bundaberg SNP began to decline from 2015.

Figure 112: Rate of public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000, Bundaberg CBD

6.1.6.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 113) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was March 2015. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 113: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Bundaberg during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.6.3.   ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.6.3.1.   NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 114 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Bundaberg from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 43,824). October was the busiest month, with a peak of 4,943 entries at 11pm (see Figure 115).

Figure 114: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Bundaberg for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 115: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Bundaberg, by month and time of entry

Figure 116 below shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Bundaberg by month. The peak was in October (n = 14,284).

Figure 116: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Bundaberg, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 117 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Bundaberg by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 12am (n = 25,007) and the peak time for female entry at 11pm (n = 19,163). October was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 117: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Bundaberg for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 118: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Bundaberg, by month and time of entry

Figure 119: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Bundaberg, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 120 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 11pm (n = 28,766). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 12,346). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

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
Figure 120: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Bundaberg, by age group and time of entry

6.1.6.3.2.   BANNING ORDERS

In Bundaberg from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 219 banned patrons were detected (Table 49). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=183; 83.6%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=20; 9.1%) and by the courts (n=16; 7.3%). Female banned patrons were detected on 33 occasions (15.1% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 186 occasions (84.9% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 140).

Table 49: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Bundaberg

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	154	82.8%	16	8.6%	16	8.6%
Female	29	87.9%	4	12.1%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	119	85%	20	14.3%	1	0.7%
25-34	61	80.3%	-	-	15	19.7%
35-44	3	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.7.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/early Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Cairns CBD (Figure 121). There was also a peak early Friday mornings.

Figure 121: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Cairns CBD

As shown in Figure 122, the count of serious assault in the Cairns SNP declined at the end of 2013, after which it remained relatively stable. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the count of serious assault (see Table 50).

Figure 122: Count of serious assault during HAH, Cairns CBD

As shown in Figure 123, the count of common assault in the Cairns SNP demonstrated a steady decline over time. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the count of common assault (see Table 50).

Figure 123: Count of common assault during HAH, Cairns CBD

Figure 124 shows that the count of public nuisance (violent) in the Cairns SNP decreased approximately early 2014, after which it remained stable. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences (see Table 50).

Figure 124: Count of public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Cairns CBD

Table 50: ARIMA models for assault during HAH, Cairns

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**
Serious assault ARIMA (0,1,1)	0.32	-2.11, 2.75	0.76	-1.40, 2.91	0.60	-1.32, 2.52	0.24	-0.70, 1.19
Common assault ARIMA (0,1,1)	0.16	-1.46, 1.78	0.70	-0.85, 2.24	0.88	-0.21, 1.98	0.25	-0.36, 0.85
Public nuisance (violent) ARIMA (0,1,1)	0.22	-3.15, 3.59	0.65	-3.50, 4.80	-0.16	-4.83, 4.51	0.12	-1.44, 1.67

6.1.7.1.1.   POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for Cairns from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 125 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of serious assaults in the Cairns SNP. A

Pearson's correlation demonstrated a significant inverse relationship between tasking and serious assault (r = -0.68, p=.008), indicating that as tasking increases, the count of serious assaults decreases.

Figure 125: Police tasking compared to count of serious assault during HAH, Cairns CBD

Figure 126 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of common assaults in the Cairns SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated a significant inverse relationship between tasking and common assault (r = -0.73, p=.003), indicating that as tasking increases, the count of common assaults decreases.

Figure 126: Police tasking compared to count of common assault during HAH, Cairns CBD

6.1.7.1.2.   CAIRNS CASINO

In order to isolate the impact of The Reef Hotel Casino on the number of police-recorded offences in the Cairns SNP, the number of offences occurring in the area including, and immediately surrounding, the casino was examined (see Figure 127). From 2009-2018, during HAH, 10.67% (n=35) of all serious assaults, 3.52% (n=8) of common assaults, and 2.08% (n=15) of public nuisance (violent) offenses were recorded in the Cairns SNP were in the casino area.

Figure 127: Area coded as 'casino' within the Cairns SNP

Source: Google Maps

In and around the casino, across the entire time period, midnight to early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/early Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences (total of all three offense types; Figure 128).

Figure 128: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, area coded as 'casino' within the Cairns SNP

NOOSA HEADS AND NOOSAVILLE

Figure 129, Figure 130, and Figure 131 shows the count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences in Noosa Heads and Noosaville. There was no significant impact of the intervention points on the count of these three offence types in Noosa (see Table 51).

Figure 129: Count of serious assault during HAH, Noosa Heads and Noosaville

Figure 130: Count of common assault during HAH, Noosa Heads and Noosaville

Figure 131: Count of public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Noosa Heads and Noosaville

Table 51: ARIMA models for assault during HAH, Noosa Heads and Noosaville

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
Serious assault ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.12	-0.62, 0.39	0.02	-0.52, 0.56	0.19	-0.39, 0.77	-0.001	-0.19, 0.19
Common assault ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.01	-0.33, 0.31	0.08	-0.26, 0.42	0.26	-0.10, 0.62	0.03	-0.09, 0.15
Public nuisance (violent) ARIMA (0,1,1)	0.07	-0.52, 0.65	0.18	-0.61, 0.98	0.08	-0.79, 0.96	0.04	-0.23, 0.32

6.1.7.2.   AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 132) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. In general, the data points related to HAH 12am-2:59am Saturday and Sunday nights were higher than the other HAH ratios. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was March 2014. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 132: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Cairns during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

The modelling process found the ARIMA (0,0,0) term provided the best fit for all HAHs in each policy intervention and in the overall model (Table 52). There was no significant impact of the legislation on the trend in call-outs.

Table 52: Effects of three policy interventions on the ambulance call-outs during HAH, Cairns

Model parameters	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full Model	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm (ARIMA (0,0,0))	0.05	-0.33, 0.42	0.03	-0.36, 0.41	0.09	-0.31, 0.49	0.02	-0.11, 0.15
12am-2:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.38	-0.77, 0.01	-0.37	-0.80, 0.06	-0.31	-0.76, 0.14	-0.14	-0.29, 0.00
3am-5:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.28	-1.01, 0.45	-0.23	-0.99, 0.52	-0.19	-0.97, 0.58	-0.10	-0.35, 0.15

Note. All models were stationary and Q-test could not reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation at the specified lag.

6.1.7.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 133 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in Cairns. While there was a decline in the number of call-outs after July 2017, this was not significant (see Table 53).

Figure 133: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Cairns CBD

Table 53: ARIMA models for count of police call-outs during HAH, Cairns

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.14	-3.41, 3.13	-1.83	-5.43, 1.78	-4.27	-9.09, 0.55	-0.71	-2.10, 0.69

*Note. * p<.05*

6.1.7.3.1. POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for Cairns from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 134 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of call-outs in the Cairns SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated a significant positive relationship between tasking and call-outs (r = .42, p=.006), indicating that as tasking increases, the number of call-outs increase.

Figure 134: Police tasking compared to count of call-outs during HAH, Cairns

6.1.7.4.   ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.7.4.1.   NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 135 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Cairns from October 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 114,872). June was the busiest month, with a peak of 14,142 entries at 11pm (see Figure 136).

Figure 135: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Cairns for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 136: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Cairns, by month and time of entry

Figure 137 below shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Cairns by month. The peak number of entries occurred in December (n = 52,696).

Figure 137: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Cairns, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 138 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Cairns by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 11pm (n = 73,745), and the peak time for female entry at 10pm (n = 53,811). June was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 138: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Cairns for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 139: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Cairns, by month and time of entry

Figure 140: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Cairns, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 141 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue in Cairns for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 11pm (n = 65,434). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 11pm (n = 42,637). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 141: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Cairns, by age group and time of entry

6.1.7.4.2. BANNING ORDERS

In Cairns from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 426 banned patrons were detected (Table 54). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=379; 89%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=39; 9.2%) and by the courts (n=8; 1.9%). Female banned patrons were detected on 54 occasions (12.7% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 369 occasions (86.6% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year old age group were the most often detected for a ban (n = 261).

Table 54 Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Cairns

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	326	88.3%	35	9.5%	8	2.2%
Female	52	96.3%	2	3.7%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	227	87%	28	10.7%	6	2.3%
25-34	138	92%	10	6.7%	2	1.3%
35-44	10	90.9%	1	9.1%	-	-
45-54	4	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.8.1.1.   GLADSTONE CBD

Across the entire time period, Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Gladstone CBD (Figure 142).

Figure 142: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Gladstone CBD

Due to low numbers of offences, all three offence types were summed to form an overall rate in the Gladstone SNP. As shown in Figure 143, the rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences in the Gladstone SNP peaked in 2012-2014, after which there was a decline. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of these three offence types combined (see Table 55).

179

Figure 143: Rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Gladstone CBD

Table 55: ARIMA models for serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Gladstone CBD

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	0.001	-7.02, 7.02	-0.24	-6.55, 6.08	0.40	-6.37, 7.16	0.04	-3.21, 3.30

6.1.8.1.2.   GLADSTONE NON-SNP AREAS

Gladstone non-SNP areas were also examined to see if there was displacement of offences from the Gladstone SNP. The non-SNP area includes the following suburbs: Gladstone (where designated non-SNP); West Gladstone; South Gladstone; Barney Point; Clinton; Kin Kora; Telina; Sun Valley; Toolooa; New Auckland; Kirkwood; Glen Eden.

Due to low numbers of offences, all three offence types were summed to form an overall rate in the Gladstone non-SNP areas. As shown in Figure 144, the rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences in the Gladstone non-SNP areas remained relatively stable across

the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of these three offence types combined (see Table 56).

Figure 144: Rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Gladstone non-SNP areas

Table 56: ARIMA models for serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Gladstone non-SNP areas

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
Serious assault ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.30	-1.74, 1.14	-0.68	-2.80, 1.43	-0.16	-2.91, 2.59	-0.16	-0.91, 0.59

6.1.8.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 145) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 145: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Gladstone during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.8.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Only data for the latter part of 2017 and for 2018 were available for Gladstone (see Table 57); there was no clear pattern in the number of call-outs per month.

Table 57: Number of HAH call-outs in Gladstone

Month and year	Number of call-outs
November 2017	2
December 2017	6
January 2018	2
February 2018	1
March 2018	8
April 2018	4
May 2018	8
June 2018	11

6.1.8.4.1.   NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 146 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Gladstone from October 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 29,147). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 3,327 entries at 11pm (see Figure 147).

Figure 146: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Gladstone for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 147: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Gladstone, by month and time of entry

Figure 148 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Gladstone by month. The peak was in December (n = 12,900).

Figure 148: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Gladstone, by month of entry

Gender

Figure 149 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Gladstone by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 11pm (n = 17,470), and the peak time for female entry at 11pm (n = 11,677). December was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 149: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Gladstone for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 150: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Gladstone, by month and time of entry

Figure 151: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Gladstone, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 152 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 11pm (n = 18,340). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all

hours, and had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 7,014). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 12am.

Figure 152: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Gladstone, by age group and time of entry

6.1.8.4.2. BANNING ORDERS

In Gladstone from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 288 banned patrons were detected (Table 58). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=288; 92%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=14; 4.5%) and by the courts (n=11; 3.5%). Female banned patrons were detected on 48 occasions (15.3% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 265 occasions (84.7% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 201).

Table 58 Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Gladstone

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	245	92.5%	14	5.3%	6	2.3%
Female	43	89.6%	-	-	5	10.4%
Age Groups						
18-24	191	95%	8	4%	2	1%
25-34	76	86.4%	6	6.8%	6	6.8%
35-44	14	100%	-	-	-	-
45-54	6	66.7%	-	-	3	33.3%
55-98	1	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.9. INNER WEST BRISBANE (INC. CAXTON STREET)

6.1.9.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, late-night Fridays, Saturday mornings, late-night Saturdays/Sunday mornings, and late-night Sunday/Monday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in Inner West Brisbane (Figure 153).

Figure 153: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Inner West Brisbane

As shown in Figure 154, the rate of serious assault in the Inner West Brisbane demonstrated no clear trends over time.

Figure 154: Rate of serious assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Inner West Brisbane

As shown in Figure 155, the rate of common assault in the Inner West Brisbane remained relatively stable over time.

Figure 155: Rate of common assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Inner West Brisbane

As shown in Figure 156, the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Inner West Brisbane remained stable across the evaluation period.

Figure 156: Rate of public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Inner West Brisbane

6.1.9.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 157) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent were March 2013 and May 2014. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 157: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Inner West Brisbane during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.9.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 158 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in the Inner West Brisbane SNP. The number of call-outs demonstrated a small decline from 2016, after which there was some fluctuation.

Figure 158: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Inner West Brisbane

6.1.9.4.   ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.9.4.1.   NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 159 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 10pm (n = 44,588). June 2018 was the busiest month, with a peak of 6,637 entries at 10pm (see Figure 160).

Figure 159: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 160: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane, by month and time of entry

Figure 161 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Inner West Brisbane month. The peak number of entries occurred in June (n = 18,161).

Figure 161: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 162 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Inner West Brisbane by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 10pm (n = 29,606), and the peak time for female entry at 10pm (n = 14,755). June was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 162: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 163: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane, by month and time of entry

Figure 164: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane, by month and time of entry

Figure 165 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane for each hour of entry, by age group. 25-34 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 10pm (n = 18,496). The 18-24 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 10pm (n = 10,756). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 165: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Inner West Brisbane, by age group and time of entry

6.1.9.4.2.   BANNING ORDERS

In Inner West Brisbane from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 401 banned patrons were detected (Table 59). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=373; 93.0%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=15; 3.7%) and by the courts (n=13; 3.2%). Female banned patrons were detected on 10 occasions (2.5% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 99 occasions (24.7% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 168).

Table 59: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Inner West Brisbane

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	93	93.9%	4	4%	2	2%
Female	10	100%	-	-	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	154	91.7%	5	3%	9	5.4%
25-34	191	95%	6	3%	4	2%
35-44	21	87.5%	3	12.5%	-	-
45-54	4	80%	1	20%	-	-
55-98	3	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.10. IPSWICH CBD

6.1.10.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, Saturday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in Ipswich (Figure 166).

Figure 166: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Ipswich

Due to low numbers of offences, all three offence types were summed to form an overall rate in the Ipswich SNP. As shown in Figure 167, the rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences in the Ipswich SNP showed a continued decline from 2011.

Figure 167: Rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Ipswich CBD

6.1.10.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 168) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was April 2012. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 168: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Ipswich during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.10.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Only data for the latter part of 2017 and for 2018 were available for Ipswich (see Table 60). There was a peak in the number of call-outs during November and December 2017.

Table 60: Number of HAH call-outs in Ipswich

Month and year	Number of call-outs
July 2017	1
August 2017	0
September 2017	2
October 2017	7
November 2017	14
December 2017	12
January 2018	4
February 2018	2
March 2018	6
April 2018	7
May 2018	3
June 2018	6

6.1.10.4. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.10.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 169 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Ipswich from July 2017 – June 2018. Of note, there was no data available for August and September in 2017. The peak entry time was at 10pm (n = 4,714). November was the busiest month, with a peak of 1,271 entries at 10pm (see Figure 170).

Figure 169: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Ipswich for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 170: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Ipswich, by month and time of entry

Figure 171 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Ipswich by month. The peak number of entries occurred in November (n = 4,325).

Figure 171: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Ipswich, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 172 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Ipswich by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 10pm (n = 2,534), and the peak time for female entry at 10pm (n = 2,180). November was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 172: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Ipswich for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 173: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Ipswich, by month and time of entry

Figure 174: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Ipswich, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 175 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 10pm (n = 2,648). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 10pm (n = 1,343). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 175: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Ipswich, by age group and time of entry

6.1.10.4.2. BANNING ORDERS

In Ipswich from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 49 banned patrons were detected (Table 61). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=39; 79.6%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=9; 18.4%) and by the courts (n=1; 2%). Female banned patrons were detected on 2 occasions (4.1% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 47 occasions (95.9% of all bans detected).

Table 61: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Ipswich

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	38	80.9%	8	17%	1	2.1%
Female	1	50%	1	50%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	22	78.6%	5	17.9%	1	3.6%
25-34	16	80%	4	20%	-	-
35-44	1	100%	-	-	-	-

Across the entire time period, Saturdays from midnight to 6am, and Sundays midnight to 6am recorded the highest number of offences in Mackay (Figure 176).

Figure 176: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Mackay CBD

As shown in Figure 177, the count of serious assault in the Mackay SNP declined from 2009 to 2014, but subsequently increased to 2017. There was a decline from mid-2017.

Figure 177: Count of serious assault during HAH, Mackay CBD

As shown in Figure 178 the count of common assault in the Mackay SNP declined from 2013, after which it remained stable.

Figure 178: Count of common assault during HAH, Mackay CBD

As shown in Figure 179, the count of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Mackay SNP declined from 2013, after which it remained stable.

Figure 179: Count of public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Mackay CBD

6.1.11.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 180) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was June 2013. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 180: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Mackay during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.11.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Only data for 2018 were available for Mackay. During 2018, there were five call-outs in February, seven in March, five in April, four in May, and six in June.

6.1.11.4. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.11.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 181 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Mackay from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 74,913). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 9,892 entries at 11pm (see Figure 182).

Figure 181: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Mackay for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 182: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Mackay, by month and time of entry

Figure 183 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Mackay by month. The peak was in December (n = 43,925).

Figure 183: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Mackay, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 184 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Mackay by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 11pm (n = 42,671), and the peak time for female entry at 11pm (n = 31,764). December was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 184: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Mackay for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 185: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Mackay, by month and time of entry

Figure 186: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Mackay, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 187 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 11pm (n = 44,282). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 19,153).

Figure 187: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Mackay, by age group and time of entry

6.1.11.4.2. BANNING ORDERS

In Mackay from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 610 banned patrons were detected (Table 62). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=570; 93.4%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=27; 4.4%) and by the courts (n=13; 2.1%). Female banned patrons were detected on 38 occasions (6.2% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 245 occasions (40.2% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 451).

Table 62: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Mackay

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	223	91%	18	7.3%	4	1.6%
Female	37	97.4%	1	2.6%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	420	93.1%	22	4.9%	9	2.0%
25-34	123	93.9%	5	3.8%	3	2.3%
35-44	18	94.7%	-	-	1	5.3%
45-54	9	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.12.1.1. ROCKHAMPTON CBD

Across the entire time period, Saturdays from midnight to 6am, and Sundays midnight to 6am recorded the highest number of offences in the Rockhampton CBD (Figure 188).

Figure 188: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Rockhampton CBD

Due to low numbers of offences, all three offence types were summed to form an overall rate in the Rockhampton SNP. Figure 189 demonstrates that the rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences in the Rockhampton SNP showed a decline over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of these three offence types combined (see Table 63).

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
Figure 189: Rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Rockhampton CBD

Table 63: ARIMA models for serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Rockhampton CBD

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	-3.42	-9.35, 2.51	0.31	-4.69, 5.31	0.58	-5.72, 6.87	-0.54	-2.95, 1.88

6.1.12.1.2. ROCKHAMPTON NON-SNP AREAS

Rockhampton non-SNP areas were also examined to see if there was displacement of offences from the Rockhampton SNP. The non-SNP area includes the following suburbs: Rockhampton (where designated non-SNP); Wandal; West Rockhampton; Allenstown; The Range; Depot Hill; Berserker; Koongal; Kawana; Frenchville; Norman Gardens.

Due to low numbers of offences, all three offence types were summed to form an overall rate in the Rockhampton non-SNP areas. As shown in Figure 190, the rate of serious assault, common assault,

and public nuisance (violent) offences in the Rockhampton non-SNP areas increase during 2017-2018. ARIMA modelling indicated a significant increase in these three offence types combined post July 2016, post February 2017, and for the full policy implementation (see Table 64).

Figure 190: Rate of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Rockhampton non-SNP areas

Table 64: ARIMA models for serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Rockhampton non-SNP areas

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,0,0)	2.32*	0.76, 3.87	2.18*	0.43, 3.93	1.02	-1.18, 3.22	0.95*	0.37, 1.54

In order to further investigate where the increase in offenses began, a Joinpoint analysis was conducted for Rockhampton non-SNP areas. This analysis showed that the increase in offenses began during quarter one of 2016, prior to the introduction of the TAFV policy. The increase is at a rate of approximately 12% per quarter.

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 191) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was September 2013. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.


Figure 191: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Rockhampton during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.12.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 192 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in Rockhampton. The number of call-outs demonstrated a small decline across the entire time period.

Figure 192: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Rockhampton

6.1.12.4. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.12.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 193 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Rockhampton from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 44,194). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 6,421 entries at 11pm (see Figure 194).

Figure 193: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Rockhampton for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 194: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Rockhampton, by month and time of entry

Figure 195 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Rockhampton by month. The peak was in December (n = 22,730).

Figure 195: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Rochhampton, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 196 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Rockhampton by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 11pm (n = 23,609), and the peak time for female entry at 11pm (n = 20,197). December was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 196: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Rockhampton for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 197: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Rockhampton, by month and time of entry

Figure 198: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Rockhampton, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 199 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 11pm (n = 26,472). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 11,606).

Figure 199: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Rockhampton, by age group and time of entry

6.1.12.4.2. BANNING ORDERS

In Rockhampton from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 1,118 banned patrons were detected (Table 65). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=1,081; 96.7%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=19; 1.7%) and by the courts (n=18; 1.6%). Female banned patrons were detected on 48 occasions (4.3% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 505 occasions (45.2% of all bans detected). The 18-24 year old age group had the highest number of bans detected (n = 614).

Table 65: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Rockhampton

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	504	99.8%	-	-	1	0.2%
Female	48	100%	-	-	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	598	97.4%	13	2.1%	3	0.5%
25-34	427	96%	6	1.3%	12	2.7%
35-44	33	91.7%	-	-	3	8.3%
45-54	5	100%	-	-	-	-
55-98	2	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.13.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, late-night Fridays/Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Sunshine Coast SNP (Figure 200).

Figure 200: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Sunshine Coast

As shown in Figure 201, the count of serious assault in the Sunshine Coast SNP remained relatively stable from 2013 onwards.

Figure 201: Count of serious assault during HAH, Sunshine Coast

As shown in Figure 202, the count of common assault in the Sunshine Coast SNP remained relatively stable from 2012 onwards.

Figure 202: Count of common assault during HAH, Sunshine Coast

As shown in Figure 203, the count of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Sunshine Coast SNP demonstrated some increase from 2015.

Figure 203: Count of public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Sunshine Coast

6.1.13.1.1. POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for the Sunshine Coast from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 204 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of serious assaults in the Sunshine Coast SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and serious assaults (r = -14, p=.645).

Figure 204: Police tasking compared to count of serious assault during HAH, Sunshine Coast

Figure 205 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of common assaults in the Sunshine Coast SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated a significant positive relationship between tasking and common assaults ($r = 0.58$, p=.031), indicating as tasking increases the count of common assault increases.

Figure 205: Police tasking compared to count of common assault during HAH, Sunshine Coast

6.1.13.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 206) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one was January 2016. Overall, the data do not suggest any upwards or downward trends.

Figure 206: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Sunshine Coast during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

6.1.13.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 207 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in the Sunshine Coast. The number of call-outs demonstrated a small decline in the lead up to the implementation of the policy, after which there was some increase.

Figure 207: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Sunshine Coast

6.1.13.3.1.   POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for the Sunshine Coast from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 208 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of call-outs in the Sunshine Coast. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and call-outs (r = .13, p=.418).

Figure 208: Police tasking compared to count of call-outs during HAH, Sunshine Coast

6.1.13.4. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.13.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 209 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 143,463). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 15,750 entries at 11pm (see Figure 210).

Figure 209: The number of people entering a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 210: The number of people entering a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast, by month and time of entry

Figure 211 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in the Sunshine Coast by month. The peak was in December (n = 55,462).

Figure 211: The number of people entering a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 212 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in the Sunshine Coast by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 11pm (n = 78,981), and the peak time for female entry at 11pm (n = 64,308). December was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 212: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 213: The number of females entering a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast, by month and time of entry

Figure 214: The number of males entering a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 215 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue across all sites for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at

11pm (n = 82,173). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 11pm (n = 34,351). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 215: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in the Sunshine Coast, by age group and time of entry

6.1.13.4.2.   BANNING ORDERS

In the Sunshine Coast from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 1,155 banned patrons were detected (Table 66). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=1,118; 96.8%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=24; 2.1%) and by the courts (n=13; 1.1%). Female banned patrons were detected on 140 occasions (12.1% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 723 occasions (62.63% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 733).

Table 66: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for the Sunshine Coast

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	694	96%	20	2.8%	9	1.2%
Female	139	99.3%	1	4.2%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	707	96.5%	19	2.6%	7	1%
25-34	352	97.2%	4	1.1%	6	1.7%
35-44	53	100%	-	-	-	-
45-54	6	85.7%	1	14.3%	-	-

6.1.14.   SURFERS PARADISE CBD

6.1.14.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, late-night Fridays/Saturday mornings and late-night Saturday/Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Surfers Paradise SNP (Figure 216).

Figure 216: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Surfers Paradise CBD

As shown in Figure 217, the count of serious assault in the Surfers Paradise SNP declined over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the count of serious assault (see Table 67).

Figure 217: Count of serious assault during HAH, Surfers Paradise

As shown in Figure 218, the count of common assault in the Surfers Paradise SNP declined over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the count of common assault (see Table 67).

Figure 218: Count of common assault during HAH, Surfers Paradise

Figure 219 demonstrates the count of public nuisance (violent) offences increased across the time period in the Surfers Paradise SNP. ARIMA modelling indicated rates of public violence (nuisance) significantly increased post July 2016 and continued to increase across the implementation of the policy (as indicated by the Full Policy coefficient); see Table 67.

Figure 219: Count of public nuisance (violent) during HAH, Surfers Paradise

Table 67: ARIMA models for assault during HAH, Surfers Paradise

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
Serious assault ARIMA (0,1,1)	-0.67	-2.96, 1.63	1.01	-0.92, 2.93	0.22	-1.92, 2.35	0.18	-0.64, 1.01
Common assault ARIMA (1,0,0)	-0.85	-1.97, 0.27	-0.43	-1.70, 0.83	-0.04	-1.45, 1.37	-0.21	-0.64, 0.22
Public nuisance (violent) ARIMA (0,1,1) SARIMA (0,1,0,12)	-9.26*	-14.57, -3.94	-4.90	-12.13, 2.34	10.41	-4.06, 24.90	-5.60	-9.87, -1.33

Police tasking data were available for Surfers Paradise from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 220 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of serious assaults in the Surfers Paradise SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and serious assaults (r = -0.19, p=.512).

Figure 220: Police tasking compared to count of serious assault during HAH, Surfers Paradise

Figure 221 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of common assaults in the Surfers Paradise SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated a significant positive relationship between tasking and common assaults (r = 0.61, p=.020), indicating as tasking increases the count of common assault increases.

Figure 221: Police tasking compared to count of common assault during HAH, Surfers Paradise

AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 222) shows pattern of random fluctuations. In general, the data points related to HAH of 12am-2:59am Saturday and Sunday were higher than other HAH ratios. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent ones in July 2013 and January 2012. Overall, the data seems follow a linearly decreasing trend.

Figure 222: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Surfers Paradise during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

The modelling process found the ARIMA (1,0,1) and ARIMA(0,0,0) terms provided the best fit for HAHs in each policy intervention and overall models (Table 68). The predicted values for the policy intervention in July 2017 suggested a significant decline during 12am-2:59am. In addition, predicted values for full models suggested a significant decline HAHs 12am-2:59am and 3am-5:59am respectively.

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Table 68: Effects of three policy interventions on the ambulance call-outs during HAH, Surfers Paradise

Model parameters	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full Model	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm (ARIMA (1,0,1))	-0.11	-0.30, 0.09	-0.19	-0.43, 0.05	0.23	-0.54, 0.71	-0.07	-0.16, 0.02
12am-2:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.24	-0.43, 0.05	-0.23	-0.43, 0.03	-0.32*	-0.57, -0.08	-0.10*	-0.18, -0.03
3am-5:59am (ARIMA (1,0,1))	-0.21	-0.51, 0.08	-0.21	-0.49, 0.07	-0.21	-0.51, 0.09	-0.09*	-0.17, -0.00

Note. *p < 0.05, all models were stationary and Q-test could not reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation at the specified lag.

6.1.14.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 223 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in Surfers Paradise. The number of call-outs significantly increased after February 2017 (see Table 69).

Figure 223: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Surfers Paradise

Table 69: ARIMA models for count of police call-outs during HAH, Surfers Paradise

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	2.33	-5.23, 9.90	8.97*	5.17, 12.77	-5.28	-16.26, 5.70	2.84*	1.16, 4.52

*Note. * p<.05*

6.1.14.3.1.   POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for Surfers Paradise from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 224 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of call-outs in the Surfers Paradise SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and call-outs (r = -.03, p=.856).

Figure 224: Police tasking compared to count of call-outs during HAH, Surfers Paradise

6.1.14.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 225 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 12am (n = 361,882). March was the busiest month, with a peak of 38,875 entries at 11pm (see Figure 226).

Figure 225: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 226: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise, by month and time of entry

Figure 227 below highlights the number of entries into licensed venues in Surfers Paradise by month. The peak number of entries occurred in March (n = 154,940).

Figure 227: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 228 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Surfers Paradise by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the

peak time for male entry at 12am (n = 217,171), and the peak time for female entry at 11pm (n = 148,866). March was the month with the highest number of entries for both males and females.

Figure 228: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 229: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise, by month and time of entry

Figure 230: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 231 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 11pm (n = 203,311). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 76,039). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.

Figure 231: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Surfers Paradise, by age group and time of entry

6.1.14.4.2. BANNING ORDERS

In Surfers Paradise from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 1,405 banned patrons were detected (Table 70). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=1,171; 83.3%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=220; 15.7%) and by the courts (n=14; 1.0%). Female banned patrons were detected on 221 occasions (15.7% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on occasions 1,167 (83.1% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 917).

Table 70: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Surfers Paradise

	Licensee	**%**	**QPS**	**%**	**Courts**	**%**
Gender						
Male	960	82.3%	195	16.7%	12	1.0%
Female	198	89.6%	21	9.5%	2	0.9%
Age Groups						
18-24	740	80.7%	167	18.2%	10	1.1%
25-34	382	88%	48	11.1%	4	0.9%
35-44	36	87.8%	5	12.2%	-	-
45-54	10	100%	-	-	-	-
55-98	3	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.15.   TOOWOOMBA CBD

6.1.15.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, Saturdays from midnight to 6am, and late-night Saturdays/Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Toowoomba SNP (Figure 232).

Figure 232: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Toowoomba CBD

Figure 233 shows the rate of serious assault in the Toowoomba SNP demonstrated some decline in the latter part of the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated a significant decrease in the rate of serious assault post July 2016, post February 2017, and for the full policy implementation (see Table 71).

Figure 233: Rate of serious assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Toowoomba

As shown in Figure 234, the rate of common assault in the Toowoomba SNP remained relatively stable over the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of common assault (see Table 71).

Figure 234: Rate of common assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Toowoomba

As shown in Figure 235, the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Toowoomba SNP peaked across 2011-2013, after which there was a decline. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences (see Table 71).

Figure 235: Rate of public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Toowoomba

Table 71: ARIMA models for assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Toowoomba

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**	**Coef.**	**95% CI**
Serious assault ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.54*	-1.02, -0.06	-0.60*	-1.16, -0.04	-0.41	-1.06, 0.23	-0.21*	-0.41, -0.02
Common assault ARIMA (0,0,1)	-0.20	-0.80, 0.39	-0.17	-0.92, 0.58	-0.07	-0.92, 0.78	-0.07	-0.33, 0.19
Public nuisance (violent) ARIMA (0,1,1)	-0.06	-6.21, 6.08	0.87	-3.46, 5.20	0.64	-2.20, 3.48	0.38	-1.37, 2.12

6.1.15.1.1. POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for Toowoomba from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 236 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of serious assaults in the

Toowoomba SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and serious assaults (r = .21, p=.469).

Figure 236: Police tasking compared to count of serious assault during HAH, Toowoomba

Figure 237 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of common assaults in the Toowoomba SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and common assaults (r = .13, p=.659).

Figure 237: Police tasking compared to count of common assault during HAH, Toowoomba

6.1.15.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAHs/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 238) shows a pattern of random fluctuations. In general, the data points related to HAH of 12am-2:59am Saturday and Sunday night were higher than other HAH ratios. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent one in April 2017. Overall the data do not suggest any increasing or decreasing trend.

Figure 238: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Toowoomba during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

The modelling process found the ARIMA (1,0,1), SARIMA(1,0,1,3) and ARIMA (0,0,0) term provided the best fit for HAHs in each policy intervention and overall models (Table 72). The predicted values for policy interventions and the full model suggested a significant increase in the rates during 8pm-11:59pm.

Table 72: Effects of three policy interventions on the ambulance call-outs during HAH, Toowoomba

Model parameters	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full Model	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm (ARIMA (1,0,1))	0.21*	0.13, 0.29	0.30**	0.22, 0.37	0.41**	0.33, 0.49	0.10**	0.07, 0.12
12am-2:59am (ARIMA (1,0,1)) (SARIMA(1,0,1,3))	0.19	-0.05, 0.43	0.25	-0.02, 0.52	0.09	-0.56, 0.74	0.08	-0.02, 0.18
3am-5:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.06	-0.23, 0.12	0.40	-0.13, 0.21	-0.07	-0.28, 0.14	-0.01	-0.08, 0.06

Note. $*p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.001$, all models were stationary and Q-test could not reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation at the specified lag.

6.1.15.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 239 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in Toowoomba. The number of call-outs significantly began to decline from 2014; there were no significant changes after the policy introduction (see Table 73).

Figure 239: Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Toowoomba

Table 73: ARIMA models for count of police call-outs during HAH, Toowoomba

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,1,1)	-1.65	-7.01, 3.70	-0.02	-5.25, 5.20	2.58	-3.94, 9.10	0.22	-1.88, 2.31

*Note. * p<.05*

6.1.15.3.1. POLICE TASKING DATA

Police tasking data were available for Toowoomba from January 2015 to June 2018. Figure 240 shows tasking for non-administrative roles as compared to the count of call-outs in the Toowoomba SNP. A Pearson's correlation demonstrated no relationship between tasking and call-outs (r = .14, p=.373).

Figure 240: Police tasking compared to count of call-outs during HAH, Toowoomba

6.1.15.4. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.15.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 241 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Toowomba from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 11pm (n = 84,573). June was the busiest month, with a peak of 9,442 entries at 11pm (see Figure 242).

Figure 241: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 242: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba, by month and time of entry

Figure 243 below shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Toowoomba by month. The peak number of entries was in December (n = 34,796).

Figure 243: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 244 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Toowoomba by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 12am (n = 50,557), and the peak time for female entry at 11pm (n = 35,143). June was the month with the highest number of entries for females, and December was the highest for males.

Figure 244: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 245: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba, by month and time of entry


Figure 246: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 247 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 11pm (n = 54,958). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and also had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 21,067). All other age groups had a peak entry time of 10pm.


Figure 247: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Toowoomba, by age group and time of entry

6.1.15.4.2.   BANNING ORDERS

In Toowoomba from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 358 banned patrons were detected (Table 74). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=315; 88%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=36; 10.1%) and by the courts (n=7; 2%). Female banned patrons were detected on 25 occasions (7% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 203 occasions (56.7% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 172).

Table 74: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Toowoomba

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	187	92.1%	13	6.4%	3	1.5%
Female	23	92%	2	8%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	147	85.5%	22	12.8%	3	1.7%
25-34	119	92.2%	7	5.4%	3	2.3%
35-44	41	85.4%	7	14.6%	-	-
45-54	6	85.7%	-	-	1	14.3%u
55-98	2	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.16.   TOWNSVILLE CBD

6.1.16.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

Across the entire time period, Saturdays from midnight to 6am and late-night Saturdays/Sunday mornings recorded the highest number of offences in the Toowoomba SNP (Figure 248). There was also a peak on Wednesdays.

Figure 248: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, Townsville CBD

As shown in Figure 249, the rate of serious assault in the Townsville SNP declined early in the time period, then remained relatively stable. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of common assault (see Table 75).

Figure 249: Rate of serious assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Townsville

As shown in Figure 250, the rate of common assault in the Townsville SNP declined across the time period. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of common assault (see Table 75).

Figure 250: Rate of common assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Townsville

Figure 251 demonstrates the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences in the Townsville SNP declined in the first half of the time period, after which it remained relatively stable. ARIMA modelling indicated no significant effect of the intervention on the rate of public nuisance (violent) offences (see Table 75).

Figure 251: Rate of public nuisance (violent) during HAH per 100,000 people, Townsville

Table 75: ARIMA models for assault during HAH per 100,000 people, Townsville

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
Serious assault ARIMA (0,0,0)	-0.10	-0.85, 0.64	-0.09	-0.94, 0.76	-0.03	-0.91, 0.86	-0.03	-0.32, 0.25
Common assault ARIMA (0,1,1)	0.44	-0.26, 1.13	0.74	-0.008, 1.49	0.55	-0.17, 1.27	0.26	-0.001, 0.52
Public nuisance (violent) ARIMA (0,1,1) SARIMA (0,1,1,6)	0.83	-2.38, 4.04	0.30	-1.63, 2.22	-0.39	-6.48, 5.70	0.34	-1.32, 2.01

6.1.16.1.1. TOWNSVILLE CASINO

In order to isolate the impact of The Ville Resort-Casino on the number of police-recorded offences in the Townsville SNP, the number of offences occurring in the area including, and immediately

surrounding, the casino was examined (see Figure 252). From 2009-2018, during HAH, 0.91% (n=3) of all serious assaults, 3.81% (n=9) of common assaults, and 0.96% (n=7) of public nuisance (violent) offenses were recorded in the Townsville SNP were in the casino area.

Figure 252: Area coded as 'casino' within the Townsville SNP

Source: Google Maps

In and around the casino, across the entire time period, early Saturday mornings and late-night Saturdays recorded the highest number of offences (total of all three offense types; Figure 253).

Figure 253: Count of serious assault, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) by day of week and hour, area coded as 'casino' within the Townsville SNP

6.1.16.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS

The time-series plot of the monthly rate of HAH/LAH of ambulance call-outs (Figure 254) shows a pattern of random fluctuations and seasonality. In general, the data points related to HAH of 12am-2:59am Saturday and Sunday nights were higher than other HAH ratios. There were some data points with extreme values; the most prominent in February 2012 and 2013. Overall, the data do not suggest any increasing or decreasing trends.

Figure 254: Rate of monthly alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in Townsville during HAH, July 2011 - June 2018

The modelling process found the ARIMA (0,0,0) and SARIMA(1,0,1,3) terms provided the best fit for HAHs in each policy intervention and overall models (Table 76). There was no significant impact of the legislation on the trend in call-outs.

Table 76: Effects of three policy interventions on the ambulance call-outs during HAH, Townsville

Model parameters	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full Model	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
8pm-11:59pm (ARIMA (0,0,0))	0.13	-0.37, 0.63	0.19	-0.33, 0.71	0.37	-0.18, 0.92	0.08	-0.10, 0.27
12am-2:59am (ARIMA (0,0,0))	-0.48	-1.35, 0.40	-0.44	-1.65, 0.78	-0.50	-2.28, 1.29	-0.19	-0.65, 0.27
3am-5:59am (ARIMA (1,0,1)) (SARIMA (1,0,1,3))	-0.35	-0.92, 0.22	-0.30	-1.12, 0.53	-0.33	-1.21, 0.55	-0.15	-0.45, 0.15

Note. All models were stationary and Q-test could not reject the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation at the specified lag.

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6.1.16.3. POLICE CALL-OUTS

Figure 255 shows the trend for call-outs during HAH in Townsville. The number of call-outs remained relatively stable across the time period (see also Table 77).

Figure 255: **Monthly count of high-alcohol hour police call-outs, Townsville**

Table 77: ARIMA models for count of police call-outs during HAH, Townsville

	July 2016		February 2017		July 2017		Full policy	
	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI	Coef.	95% CI
ARIMA (0,0,0)	2.09	-0.05, 4.22	0.75	-1.99, 3.49	1.42	-1.53, 4.36	0.60	-0.34, 1.55

*Note. * p<.05*

6.1.16.4. ID SCANNER DATA

6.1.16.4.1. NUMBER OF PERSONS ENTERING VENUES

Figure 256 shows the number of persons who entered a licensed venue in Townsville from July 2017 – June 2018. The peak entry time was at 12am (n = 150,952). December was the busiest month, with a peak of 15,327 entries at 12am (see Figure 257).

Figure 256: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Townsville for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

**Figure 257: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Townsville, by month and time of entry**

Figure 258 shows the number of entries into licensed venues in Townsville by month. The peak number of entries was in December (n = 60,134).

Figure 258: The number of people entering a licensed venue in Townsville, by month of entry

VENUE ENTRY BY AGE AND GENDER

Gender

Figure 259 shows the number of males and females who entered venues in Townsville by hour of entry. There was a consistently higher number of males entering venues across all hours, with the peak time for male entry at 12 am (n = 88,213), and for female entry at 12am (n = 62,723). June was the month with the highest number of entries for females, and December for males.

Figure 259: The number of males and females entering a licensed venue in Townsville for the total evaluation period, by time of entry

Figure 260: The number of females entering a licensed venue in Townsville, by month and time of entry

Figure 261: The number of males entering a licensed venue in Townsville, by month and time of entry

Age Groups

Figure 262 shows the number of persons entering a licensed venue in Townsville for each hour of entry, by age group. 18-24 year olds had the highest level of entries across all hours, with a peak at 12am (n = 95,318). The 25-34 year old age group had the next highest number of entries across all hours, and had a peak entry time of 12am (n = 38,142).

Figure 262: The number of persons entering a licensed venue in Townsville, by age group and time of entry

6.1.16.4.2. BANNING ORDERS

In Townsville from 1 October 2017 to 30 June 2018, a total of 794 banned patrons were detected (Table 78). The majority of these had received licensee bans (n=760; 95.7%), followed by bans issued by QPS (n=30; 3.8%) and by the courts (n=4; 0.5%). Female banned patrons were detected on 157 occasions (19.8% of all bans detected), and male bans were detected on 637 occasions (80.2% of all bans detected). Those aged in the 18-24 year group were detected most often (n = 536).

Table 78: Number of bans by type, gender, and age group for Townsville

	Licensee	%	QPS	%	Courts	%
Gender						
Male	608	95.4%	25	3.9%	4	0.6%
Female	152	96.8%	5	3.2%	-	-
Age Groups						
18-24	516	96.3%	20	3.7%	-	-
25-34	220	94.4%	9	3.9%	4	1.7%
35-44	14	93.3%	1	6.7%	-	-
45-54	9	100%	-	-	-	-
55-98	1	100%	-	-	-	-

6.1.17. BAN ON SALE OF RAPID INTOXICATION DRINKS AFTER MIDNIGHT

As part of the TAFV policy, in July 2016 a ban on the sale of rapid intoxication, high alcohol-content drinks after midnight was introduced. The restriction targeted highly concentrated drinks that could be consumed rapidly in order to try and combat unsafe drinking patterns which may lead to the occurrence of violence. The ban was introduced alongside a restriction on trading hours which limited the ability of researchers to determine the unique impact of the ban. However, five SNPs were identified where venues already did not trade later than the new regulations permitted. As such, these SNPs were isolated in order to determine the impact of the drinks restriction (see Table 79).

Table 79: Safe night precincts affect solely by ban on rapid intoxication drinks

SNP	Number of venues affected by ban
Bundaberg CBD	7
Caloundra	3
Ipswich CBD	1
Maroochydore	6
Mooloolaba	4

An ARIMA time series analysis was used to estimate the influence of the drinks restrictions on the number of serious assaults per month

The analysis found no significant change in monthly serious assaults during HAH after the introduction of the ban on rapid intoxication drinks (ARIMA(0,0,1), Q=30.93, p=.85; Figure 263).

Figure 263: Number of serious assaults in safe night precincts affected solely by the ban on rapid intoxication drinks

6.1.1. SUMMARY OF ARCHIVAL DATA

6.1.1.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA

For each SNP, the majority of offences were recorded late-night Saturdays or early morning Sundays, indicating the likelihood that the pattern of offending may be primarily driven by increased drinking on Saturday nights. Significant reductions in the rate and count of serious assaults after the policy introduction were found in Fortitude Valley and Toowoomba. There were also significant declines in common assault and public nuisance (violent) offences during 8pm-midnight and 3am-6am in Fortitude Valley. In Surfers Paradise, there was a significant decline in the number of public nuisance (violent) offences post July 2016.

When examining state-wide trends, significant declines in serious assaults were found during the 3am-6am time period, however, this was associated with some significant increases in offences during 8pm-midnight Friday and Saturday nights.

Associations between police tasking data and serious assault and common assault were examined where possible. A significant association was found between tasking and serious assaults in Cairns, where increased tasking was associated with a decline in both serious and common assaults. However, we also found a significant positive relationship between tasking and common assault in the Sunshine Coast and Surfers Paradise; that is, as tasking increased so did the number of police-recorded common assaults per quarter. It may be that the relationship seen in Cairns is indicative of police on the street acting as a deterrent. The relationship in the Sunshine Coast and Surfers Paradise may indicate that the police are able to act upon cases of common assault more efficiently.

The implementation of the rapid intoxication drinks ban was not associated with a reduction in the number of serious assaults per month. However, the SNPs examined are relatively small and these findings may not reflect trends in larger inner city SNPs. Trials should be conducted in larger SNPs with appropriate controls in place in order to be able to evaluate the unique impact of the ban.

Comparison sites within Queensland (i.e., non-SNP areas) were included in this chapter, and interstate comparison sites are covered in a separate chapter alongside ED and ambulance comparison data. The only significant change in assault trends were found for the Rockhampton non-SNP area; a significant increase in the combined rate of serious assaults, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences post introduction of the policy was found. This may indicate a displacement effect from the Rockhampton SNP area; however, the increase in offenses began prior to the introduction of the policy and there was no corresponding significant decrease in offences in the Rockhampton SNP.

6.1.1.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUT DATA

Ambulance call-outs demonstrated a significant decline in the ratio of HAH:LAH call-outs after the introduction of the policy, statewide, in each HAH category (8pm-midnight; midnight-3am; 3am-6am). There were also significant declines across all SNPs combined during midnight-3am and 3am-6am. Within Surfers Paradise, there was also a significant decline in call-outs during midnight-3am and 3am-6am after the introduction of the policy. However, there was a small increase in the ratio of HAH:LAH call-outs in Toowoomba during 8pm-midnight.

6.1.1.3. HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS DATA

Statewide, alcohol intoxication admissions demonstrated an approaching significant downward trend after the July 2017 time point of the policy. There was also a significant reduction in the rate of ocular fractures. When looking at the number of admissions at two major hospitals in Brisbane, the Royal Brisbane and Princess Alexandra hospitals, there was a significant decline in the number of ocular

floor fracture admissions after each policy intervention point. While there was a significant increase in the number of hand and wrist fracture admissions at these two hospitals, the increase in the number of admissions began at the start of 2015. There was a temporary, significant increase in skull and facial fractures, self-harm/injury, and intracranial injuries, however, these are likely to represent normal fluctuations.

6.1.1.4. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT DATA

We found very little evidence that the three policy intervention points were associated with changes in key measures of alcohol-related harm as measured by emergency department presentations. These findings suggest that any impacts of the interventions were too locally specific to be detected across broader harm indicators like ED presentations, which incorporate harms from the broader community (especially from private settings). It is worth noting though that evaluations of other, similar policies in Sydney demonstrated measurable reductions in ED presentations (60), so the broad lack of impact in Queensland is surprising.

6.1.1.5. POLICE CALL-OUT DATA

The number of police call-outs during HAH statewide demonstrated some increase from 2016 onwards. When looking at the five SNP of interest, there was a non-significant decline in call-outs in Cairns after the introduction of the policy. There was no significant change in the number of call-outs in Fortitude Valley, Toowoomba, or Townsville after the introduction of the policy. There was a significant increase in the number call-outs in Surfers Paradise after February 2017.

There also appeared to be an increase in the number of reported noise disturbances in non-SNP areas from February 2017, however, there was no corresponding increase in the revised call-out types. There was no discernible change in the number of youth party disturbances in non-SNP areas across the time period.

When correlating tasking data with call-out data, only one SNP demonstrated a significant relationship; in Cairns, as the number of call-outs increased the tasking hours also increased.

6.1.1.6. ID SCANNER DATA

The ID scanner data shows that venue entries are the highest on Friday and Saturday nights between 10pm and 12am, and that there is typically a greater proportion of males compared to females attending venues with SNPs. This was consistent across all sites. Further, males, compared to females, were more likely to be issued a banning notice and more likely to attempt to enter a venue while having an active banning. In the all SNPs, licensee bans were the most common banning notice,

followed by police bans, and then court bans. Finally, those aged 18-24 were far more likely to be detected as having a ban by the ID scanner compared to all other age groups.

6.2. ADDITIONAL ID SCANNER DATA

6.2.1. ID SCANNER PILOT STUDY

Queensland Police Service (QPS) supplied information from Fortitude Valley and Cairns on criminal cases which involved the use of ID scanners to identify offenders since implementation. Twenty cases were identified in Fortitude Valley and three were identified in Cairns. As the data collection was not systematic and relied on retrospective questioning of officers, these data were considered informative, but an underestimate. QPS and the research team negotiated a pilot trial whereby QPS prospectively collected information on all cases in Fortitude Valley in which ID scanners were used. In a single month, four cases were identified: one rape, two sexual assaults, and one aggravated bodily harm. Although only pilot in nature, and given the data collection should be further systematised, this information points to a substantial public benefit of ID scanners related to solving crimes, and also facilitates more rapid passage through courts; reducing cost to the community.

6.2.2. ESTIMATED TIME BETWEEN SCANS

Of all the scans across all sites, 91.27% of were done using Scantek scanners and 8.73% were conducted using QikID; however, this varies by SNP. For instance, 51.13% of scans in Inner West Brisbane, 99.77% of scans in Rockhampton, and 35.88% of scans in Mackay are using QikID.

The average time taken to complete an ID scan during HAH across all sites and by SNP was also estimated (see Table 80 and Figure 264). Estimated scan times are the time taken from the beginning of one scan to the beginning of the next scan; that is, times represent scan-to-scan rather than the start to finish of one completed scan. Therefore, it is impossible to determine if scan time is representative of how fast people were coming to the door or representative of scanning issues. When the maximum time between scans was allowed to be up to 10 minutes, the average scan time across all sites was 29 seconds (9.0 million records). When the maximum time between scans was reduced to one minute, the average time between scans was 15 seconds (8.1 million records). Table 80 shows the distribution of time intervals for those scans under 1 minute. While imperfect, the data helps understand how long most scans are taking when people are steadily streaming into a venue.

Table 80: Average time between scans during HAH, for all sites and by SNP

SNP	Up to 1 minute between scans M (SE)	Up to 1 minute between scans n	Up to 10 minutes between scans M (SE)	Up to 10 seconds between scans n
All SNP areas[a]	15.07 (0.001)	8,170,078	28.94 (0.002)	9,003,712
Airlie Beach	20.17 (0.011)	156,047	33.57 (0.014)	174,962
Brisbane CBD	17.04 (0.005)	742,933	37.50 (0.007)	857,958
Broadbeach CBD	17.19 (0.010)	183,465	35.12 (0.013)	209,386
Bundaberg CBD	14.68 (0.011)	116,044	32.63 (0.016)	129,828
Cairns CBD	14.26 (0.006)	450,143	25.84 (0.007)	489,116
Fortitude Valley CBD	13.59 (0.002)	3,148,954	25.49 (0.003)	3,418,178
Gladstone CBD	18.18 (0.014)	91,904	45.57 (0.020)	109,290
Inner West Brisbane (including Caxton Street)	17.93 (0.013)	103,108	50.35 (0.020)	127,882
Ipswich CBD[b]	17.86 (0.037)	13,109	51.75 (0.057)	16,171
Mackay CBD	18.84 (0.008)	297,974	38.27 (0.011)	343,531
Rockhampton CBD	19.16 (0.011)	145,824	35.82 (0.015)	163,860
Sunshine Coast (Caloundra, Maroochydore, and Mooloolaba)	15.87 (0.006)	472,478	27.48 (0.007)	514,739
Surfers Paradise CBD	15.13 (0.003)	1,420,855	26.48 (0.004)	1,546,549
Toowoomba CBD	14.55 (0.007)	290,098	30.49 (0.010)	320,604
Townsville CBD	14.72 (0.005)	537,142	25.79 (0.007)	581,658

Note. [a]Scan times between 1 minute and 10 minutes were recorded for 833,634 records (9%), but it is impossible to determine if this was just how fast people were coming to the door, or represented scanning issues.

[b]August and September 2017 Scantek data missing

Figure 264: Time between scans during HAH across all SNPs

6.3. COMPARISON SITES

Ambulance, emergency department, and police data were compared to both Queensland and interstate comparison sites. Police data for the Queensland comparison sites are presented in the police assaults chapter. Comparison sites were chosen based on population and number of licensed venues. Table 81 lists the comparison sites for five SNPs.

Table 81 SNP comparison sites

Queensland sites	Comparison sites
Cairns	St Kilda (Victoria)
	Noosa Heads/Noosaville
Fortitude Valley	Perth (CBD + Northbridge)
	West End (Brisbane)
Surfers Paradise	Melbourne (Chapel St, Victoria)
Toowoomba	Geelong (Victoria)
	Greater Newcastle (New South Wales)
Townsville	Adelaide (CBD, South Australia)
	Greater Newcastle (New South Wales)

For each comparison site presented here, a ratio between the count of cases in the Queensland SNP to count in the comparison site was calculated. A value of one indicates that the number of cases are the

same in both the SNP and comparison site. A value over one demonstrates a higher number of cases in the SNP relative to the comparison site, where as a value less than one indicates a lower number of cases in the SNP relative to the comparison site.

6.3.1. LIMITATIONS OF COMPARISON SITES

There are a number of limitations to the use of comparison sites, which need to be considered when interpreting the data. While comparison sites were chosen to best match the Queensland sites on number of licensed venues and population, there may be other demographic (e.g., age), social (e.g., policy), or environmental (e.g., outlet density) factors that are not accounted for.

The data used may also not be equivalent between jurisdictions. For instance, ambulance call-out data had to be used for all Queensland sites and this is compared to attendance in other jurisdictions. Also, police-recorded assaults differ; some jurisdictions provide a total count, rather than by category, and other jurisdictions do not provide counts of common assault. Where there are clear changes or fluctuations in the number of cases in a Queensland site relative to the comparison site, we do not know if the count increased in the Queensland site or if the count decreased in the comparison site. Further, statewide ED presentation data are being compared to specific cities and sites in other jurisdictions, therefore, only trends can be examined rather than the absolute ratio.

Furthermore, administrative systems in different jurisdictions have markedly different counting rules or other systemic differences that make comparisons difficult. This can relate to issues such as thresholds for recording an offence and counting rules for multiple offences in single incidents in police data systems and to rules around admission thresholds in hospital emergency departments (e.g. in Victoria a four hour stay in an ED was treated as a hospital admission until 2012/13, but not subsequently).

6.3.1. FORTITUDE VALLEY COMPARISON SITES

6.3.1.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA - PERTH

Figure 265 shows the count of police recorded assaults (serious and common) in Fortitude Valley relative to assaults in Perth. While there are some fluctuations over time, the overall trend appears to be relatively stable, with a temporary spike in the ratio of serious assaults during February 2017 and a temporary spike in the ratio of common assaults in July 2016.

Figure 265: Ratio of count of assaults during HAH in Fortitude Valley compared to Perth

6.3.1.2.   AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS - WEST END

The ratio of ambulance call-outs in Fortitude Valley compared to West End demonstrated a decline over time (see Figure 266). While the number of call-outs in Fortitude Valley were approximately four times higher at the start of the series, by mid-2018 the number of call-outs in Fortitude Valley was only slightly higher to that in West End (as indicated by the series fluctuating around 1-1.5).

Figure 266: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Fortitude Valley compared to ambulance call-outs in West End

6.3.1.3. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS – PERTH

Figure 267 shows the ratio of ambulance call outs in Fortitude Valley relative to attendances in Perth.

There appears to be a decline over time, with both areas having similar numbers of ambulance cases by mid-2018.

Figure 267: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Fortitude Valley compared to ambulance attendances in Perth

6.3.1.4.   EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PRESENTATIONS – PERTH

Figure 268 shows the ratio of ED injury presentations in Fortitude Valley (Princess Alexandra and

The Royal Brisbane hospitals) relative to presentations in Perth. While there are some fluctuations,

the ratio appears stable over time.

Figure 268: Ratio of count of ED injury presentations during HAH in Fortitude Valley compared Perth

Figure 269 shows the ratio of ED intoxication presentations in Fortitude Valley (Princess Alexandra and The Royal Brisbane hospitals) relative to presentations in Perth. It must be noted that the numbers in the Perth ED were very low. As such, there were a number of months where there were no presentations in Perth, meaning that the ratio was undefined in those months (n=11). While there are some fluctuations, the ratio appears stable over time.

Figure 269: Ratio of count of ED intoxication presentations during HAH in Fortitude Valley compared Perth

6.3.2. CAIRNS COMPARISON SITES

6.3.2.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA – ST KILDA (VICTORIA)

Figure 270 shows the count of police recorded assaults (serious + common) in Cairns relative to assaults in St Kilda. While there are some fluctuations over time, the overall ratio appears to be relatively stable.

Figure 270: Ratio of count of assaults during HAH in Cairns compared to St Kilda

6.3.2.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS – NOOSA HEADS/NOOSAVILLE

Figure 271 shows the ratio of ambulance call-outs in Cairns relative to call-outs in Noosa Heads/Noosaville. The pattern demonstrated some fluctuation over time, however, the overall ratio is relatively stable.

Figure 271: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Cairns compared to ambulance call-outs in Noosa Heads/Noosaville

Figure 272 shows the ratio of ambulance call outs in Cairns relative to attendances in St Kilda. The ratio was relatively stable over time, however there was a peak in early 2017, with more cases in Cairns relative to St Kilda.

Figure 272: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Cairns compared to ambulance attendances in St Kilda

6.3.2.4. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PRESENTATIONS – ST KILDA (VICTORIA)

Figure 273 shows the ratio of ED injury presentations in Cairns relative to presentations in St Kilda

(The Alfred hospital). While there are some fluctuations, the ratio appears stable over time.

Figure 273: Ratio of count of ED injury presentations during HAH in Cairns compared St Kilda

Figure 274 shows the ratio of ED intoxication presentations in Cairns relative to presentations in St Kilda (The Alfred hospital). There are some fluctuations over time, with the ratio appearing to decline.

Figure 274: Ratio of count of ED intoxication presentations during HAH in Cairns compared St Kilda

6.3.3. SURFERS PARADISE COMPARISON SITES

6.3.3.1. POLICE ASSAULT DATA - CHAPEL STREET (MELBOURNE, VICTORIA)

Figure 275 shows the count of police recorded assaults (serious + common) in Surfers Paradise relative to assaults in Chapel Street, Melbourne. There are some fluctuations over time, with a temporary increase between late 2013 and mid-late 2015.

Figure 275: Ratio of count of assaults during HAH in Surfers Paradise compared to Chapel Street, Victoria

6.3.3.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS – CHAPEL STREET (MELBOURNE, VICTORIA)

The ratio of ambulance call-outs in Surfers Paradise compared to Chapel Street, Melbourne demonstrated a decline over time (see Figure 276). While the number of call-outs in Fortitude Valley were approximately three times higher at the start of the series, by mid-2017 the number of call-outs in both areas were approximately the same (as indicated by the series fluctuating around one).

Figure 276: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Surfers Paradise compared to ambulance attendances in Chapel Street, Victoria

6.3.3.3.   EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PRESENTATIONS – CHAPEL STREET (MELBOURNE, VICTORIA)

Figure 277 shows the ratio of ED injury presentations in Surfers Paradise (Gold Coast and Robina Hospitals) relative to presentations in Chapel Street, Melbourne (The Alfred hospital). The ratio appears to be increasing over time.

Figure 277: Ratio of count of ED injury presentations during HAH in Surfers Paradise compared Chapel St, Victoria

Figure 278 shows the ratio of ED intoxication presentations in Surfers Paradise relative to presentations in Chapel St, Melbourne (The Alfred hospital). While there are some fluctuations over time, the ratio appears relatively stable.

Figure 278 Ratio of count of ED intoxication presentations during HAH in Surfers Paradise compared Chapel St, Victoria

6.3.4. TOOWOOMBA COMPARISON SITES

6.3.4.1.   POLICE ASSAULTS DATA – GEELONG (VICTORIA)

Figure 279 shows the count of police recorded assaults (serious + common) in Toowoomba relative to assaults in Geelong, Victoria. There are some fluctuations over time, however, the ratio remained relatively stable.

Figure 279: Ratio of count of assaults during HAH in Toowoomba compared to Geelong, Victoria

6.3.4.2. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS – GEELONG (VICTORIA)

Figure 280 shows the count of ambulance call-outs in Toowoomba relative to the count of attendances in Geelong, Victoria. While there are some fluctuations over time, with a peak around March 2013 and May 2017, the ratio remained relatively stable.

Figure 280: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Toowoomba compared to ambulance attendances in Geelong, Victoria

6.3.4.3. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PRESENTATIONS – GEELONG (VICTORIA)

Figure 281 shows the ratio of ED injury presentations in Toowoomba relative to presentations in Geelong. ICD-10 codes were not provided with Geelong data, therefore, the count of injury is based on coding of the free-text diagnosis field. Further, Geelong data were only available from 2010 onwards. The ratio appears to be stable over time.

Figure 281: Ratio of count of ED injury presentations during HAH in Toowoomba compared Geelong, Victoria

Figure 282 shows the ratio of ED intoxication presentations in Toowoomba relative to presentations in Geelong. ICD-10 codes were not provided with Geelong data, therefore, the count of intoxication is based on coding of the free-text diagnosis field. While there are some fluctuations over time, the ratio appears relatively stable.

Figure 282: Ratio of count of ED intoxication presentations during HAH in Toowoomba compared Geelong, Victoria

6.3.4.4.   POLICE ASSAULTS DATA – NEWCASTLE (NEW SOUTH WALES)

Figure 283 shows the count of police recorded assaults common in Toowoomba relative to common assaults in Newcastle and the count of serious assaults in Toowoomba relative to cases of actual bodily harm in Newcastle. There are some fluctuations over time, however, the ratio remained relatively stable for both types of assaults.

Figure 283: Ratio of count of assaults during HAH in Toowoomba compared to Newcastle, New South Wales

6.3.4.5. AMBULANCE CALL-OUTS – NEWCASTLE (NEW SOUTH WALES)

Figure 284 shows the count of ambulance call-outs in Toowoomba relative to the count of attendances in Newcastle, New South Wales. While there are some fluctuations over time, the ratio remained relatively stable.

Figure 284: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Toowoomba compared to ambulance attendances in Newcastle, New South Wales

6.3.4.6.   EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PRESENTATIONS – NEWCASTLE (NEW SOUTH WALES)

Figure 285 shows the ratio of ED injury presentations in Toowoomba relative to presentations in Newcastle, New South Wales. While there are some fluctuations, the ratio appears to be stable over time.

Figure 285: Ratio of count of ED injury presentations during HAH in Toowoomba compared Newcastle, New South Wales

Figure 286 shows the ratio of ED intoxication presentations in Toowoomba relative to presentations in Newcastle. While there are some fluctuations over time, the ratio appears relatively stable.

Figure 286: Ratio of count of ED intoxication presentations during HAH in Toowoomba compared Newcastle, New South Wales

6.3.5. TOWNSVILLE COMPARISON SITES

6.3.5.1. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA – NEWCASTLE (NEW SOUTH WALES)

Figure 287 shows the count of police recorded assaults common in Townsville relative to common assaults in Newcastle and the count of serious assaults in Townsville relative to cases of actual bodily harm in Newcastle. There are some fluctuations over time, with a small increase in the ratio of serious assaults from early 2016. The ratio for common assault remained relatively stable.

Figure 287: Ratio of count of assaults during HAH in Townsville compared to Newcastle

The ratio of ambulance call-outs in Townsville compared to Newcastle, New South Wales demonstrated some seasonal variation, but was relatively stable over time (see Figure 288).

Figure 288: Ratio of count of ambulance call-outs during HAH in Townsville compared to ambulance attendances in Newcastle, New South Wales

Figure 289 shows the ratio of ED injury presentations in Townsville relative to presentations in Newcastle, New South Wales. The ratio appears to be declining from 2013 onwards.

Figure 289: Ratio of count of ED injury presentations during HAH in Townsville compared Newcastle, New South Wales

Figure 290 shows the ratio of ED intoxication presentations in Townsville relative to presentations in Newcastle. There are some fluctuations in the ratio over time.

Figure 290: Ratio of count of ED intoxication presentations during HAH in Townsville compared Newcastle, New South Wales

6.3.5.4. POLICE ASSAULTS DATA – ADELAIDE (SOUTH AUSTRALIA)

Figure 291 shows the count of police recorded assaults (serious + common) in Townsville relative to assaults in Adelaide. There are some fluctuations over time, with a decline in the ratio from 2009 to 2014, followed by a subsequent increase to June 2018.

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
Figure 291: Ratio of count of assaults during HAH in Townsville compared to Adelaide

6.3.5.5. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT PRESENTATIONS – ADELAIDE (SOUTH AUSTRALIA)

Figure 292 shows the ratio of ED injury presentations in Townsville relative to presentations in Adelaide, South Australia. The ratio appears to temporarily increase from 2013 to 2105, after which is declines again.

Figure 292: Ratio of count of ED injury presentations during HAH in Townsville compared Adelaide, South Australia

Figure 293 shows the ratio of ED intoxication presentations in Townsville relative to presentations in Adelaide. There are some fluctuations in the ratio over time, however, the ratio remains relatively stable.

Figure 293: Ratio of count of ED intoxication presentations during HAH in Townsville compared Adelaide, South Australia

6.3.6. SUMMARY

The ratio of ambulance data cases in Fortitude Valley to West End declined over the time period to a point where there were a slightly higher number of call-outs in Fortitude Valley than West End. A similar pattern was found for Fortitude Valley compared to Perth; from 2016 onwards the ratio fluctuated around 0.5 to 1.5. Further, the ratio between Surfers Paradise and Chapel Street, Melbourne, demonstrated an ongoing decrease. Ratios for the remaining ambulance data, police data, and ED data demonstrated relatively stable ratios over time with random peaks and fluctuations.

6.4.   POLICE BANNING

Figure 294 presents the monthly count of court, police, and total banning orders (consisting of court, police and civil banning orders combined) in Queensland, from January 2015 to June 2018. Police-imposed banning orders are utilised in and around licensed premises, and can exclude the person for a designated area for an initial period of 10 days up to three months. A court banning order can be issued where an offence involving violence or threats of violence has occurred in a licensed premises or in the vicinity of a licensed premises and a court deems the order necessary to protect the good order of the licensed premises and surrounding area and the safety of those in the vicinity of the licensed premises. These orders are usually for longer periods of up to one year in duration, or one

year after the end of a term of imprisonment or operational period of suspended imprisonment if either of those penalties have been imposed for the same offence.

Figure 294: Banning orders in Queensland from January 2015-June 2018 (by type)

The figure demonstrates a relatively stable trend of court banning orders across the time series, with police banning orders, and therefore the total number of banning orders, showing a marked decline between January 2015 and July 2017 and a notable increase in 2018. Table 82 presents the annual count of banning orders in Queensland, from 2015 to the end of June, 2018. The number of half-yearly total banning orders ranged from a high of 2,324 in the first half of 2015 to a low of 1,757 in the first half of 2017.

Table 82: Annual count banning orders by type

Type of banning order	1/1/2015 – 30/6/2015	1/7/2015 – 31/12/2015	1/1/2016 – 30/6/2016	1/7/2016 – 31/12/2016	1/1/2017 – 30/6/2017	1/7/2017 – 31/12/2017	1/1/2018 – 30/6/2018
Police banning notice	2,126	1,806	2,035	1,769	1,666	1,905	2,079
Court banning order	185	148	103	79	89	49	135
Civil banning order	13	2	2	0	2	0	0
Total	2,324	1,956	2,140	1,848	1,757	1,954	2,214

Table 83 presents the annual count of police banning orders issued in 15 of Queensland's SNPs from January 2015 to June 2018. There was a total of 14,193 orders issued across the precincts in the time series, with half-yearly totals ranging from a high of 2,126 in the first half of 2015 to a low of 1,666 in

the first half of 2017. There was a mixed pattern of increases to and decreases of these orders across individual precincts with overall trends showing a consistent rise in police banning orders in the 12 months leading to June 2018 after a marked decline in orders across the second half of 2016 and first half of 2017.

Table 83: Annual count police banning orders by SNP

Safe Night Precinct	1/1/2015-30/6/2015	1/7/2015-31/12/2015	1/1/2016-30/6/2016	1/7/2016-31/12/2016	1/1/2017-30/6/2017	1/7/2017-31/12/2017	1/1/2018-30/6/2018	*Total*
Airlie Beach CBD	92	59	56	70	51	107	77	579
Brisbane CBD	228	156	145	127	94	151	116	1,075
Broadbeach CBD	72	31	26	44	71	69	69	412
Bundaberg CBD	39	36	79	55	53	43	45	376
Cairns CBD	182	98	250	152	180	167	247	1,330
Fortitude Valley	490	534	640	402	351	369	375	3,261
Gladstone CBD	59	36	19	12	21	16	65	274
Inner West Brisbane	56	32	38	29	28	39	40	274
Ipswich CBD	32	23	25	34	20	15	5	173
Mackay CBD	98	120	103	124	124	122	161	974
Rockhampton CBD	84	28	49	52	42	34	59	372
Sunshine Coast	132	126	94	63	86	83	113	771
Surfers Paradise CBD	477	425	375	397	265	368	397	2,791
Toowoomba CBD	28	26	30	53	75	90	83	433
Townsville CBD	57	76	106	155	205	232	227	1,098
Total	2,126	1,806	2,035	1,769	1,666	1,905	2,079	14,193

Note. The 'Total' column on the right-hand side is indicative of all banning orders, i.e. police banning orders, court banning orders, and civil banning orders.

6.5.   COURTS DATA

Courts data were examined for case finalisations including at least one charge of serious assault, common assault, and/or drunkenness. Approximately one percent of cases involve assault and/or serious assault offences that were committed more than five years prior to finalisation in court, with offences dating back to June 1988.

6.5.1. SERIOUS ASSAULT CASES

Between January 2009 and September 2018, there were 3449 cases finalised in Queensland Courts that included at least one charge of serious assault, and resulted in a guilty outcome. The mean time to case finalisation from time of offence was 9.8 months ($SD = 12.9$). Approximately one percent of cases were finalised in court five or more years after the serious assault offence(s) occurred, with offences dating back to 1998. As shown in Figure 7, the number of cases finalised in court that included a serious assault or assault charge have generally been declining since 2009, with a slight recent increase in serious assault cases. As a proportion of all cases finalised in court (see Figure 2), the proportion of all finalised court cases that included a charge of serious assault or assault charge has fluctuated since 2009 (range= 2.8% – 13.9%). The general trend suggests that the proportion of serious assault cases dropped between 2012 and 2016, but has since increased (following the introduction of key policy strategies) to exceed 10% in 2018. Combined with recent trends evidence in Figure 295, this suggests that the increase in recent court cases for serious assaults was not necessarily related to an increase in overall court case finalisations.

6.5.2. COMMON ASSAULT CASES

Between January 2009 and September 2018, there were 2582 cases finalised in Queensland Courts that included at least one charge of common assault, and resulted in a guilty outcome. The mean time to case finalisation from time of offence was 6.9 months ($SD = 16.3$). Approximately one percent of cases were finalised in court five or more years after the assault offence(s) occurred, with offences dating back to 1989. As shown in Figure 296, the number of finalised court cases including an assault charge decreased from 2009 to 2015, with little significant change beyond seasonal fluctuations since the introduction of the policy in 2016. The proportion of cases including a common assault charge has slightly increased since February 2017.

Figure 295: Monthly count of court case finalisations that included a serious assault/assault charge

Figure 296: Monthly proportion of court case finalisations that included a serious assault/assault charge

6.5.3. DRUNKENNESS CASES

Between January 2009 and September 2018, there were 9722 cases finalised in Queensland Courts that included at least one charge of drunkenness, and resulted in a guilty outcome. The mean time to case finalisation from time of offence was 0.4 months ($SD = 2.0$). As shown in Figure 297, the number of cases finalised including a charge of drunkenness increased five-fold between 2012 and 2014, with more than 40% of all cases finalised in 2014 including a drunkenness charge (see Figure 298). The proportion of drunkenness charges to all cases finalised dropped significantly in 2015 and have hovered around 15% since late 2015. The number of drunkenness charges appear to have

dropped since the introduction of the policy in July 2016, to reach the lowest recorded figures since 2009.

Figure 297: Monthly count of court case finalisations that included a drunkenness charge

Figure 298: Monthly proportion of court case finalisations that included a drunkenness charge

6.6. CRASH DATA

Blood alcohol content (BAC) is not routinely recorded at crash sites, making it an unreliable measure as to whether alcohol was involved (36). To rectify this, a "surrogate" measure based on data from crashes that occurred during alcohol-related hours was used. Data provided by Queensland

Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) from 2009-2017 were investigated. Population rates were calculated using statewide and local government area population data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Importantly, the data provided only included year of crash, and further detail was not provided. This means that we are unable to conduct ARIMA models, or correctly identify any impact of the policies which were implemented at mid-year timepoints.

6.6.1. STATEWIDE TRENDS

Since 2009, the number of crashes statewide during alcohol-related hours has decreased steadily (see Figure 299). An ARIMA model (0,1,1) indicated no significant impact of the policy at each intervention point.

Figure 299: Number of crashes statewide during alcohol-related hours per year, 2009-2017

High alcohol hours occur from 8pm to 6am on Friday and Saturday nights. The rate of crashes statewide during high alcohol hours has also declined since 2009, following a similar trend to crashes in all alcohol-related hours (see Figure 300)

Figure 300: Number of crashes statewide during high alcohol hours (Fridays and Saturdays 8pm - 6am)

6.6.2. SEVERITY OF CRASH

Figure 301 displays the rate of crashes state-wide which occurred during alcohol-related hours by severity per year. From 2009-2017, the majority of crashes which occurred during alcohol-related hours have resulted in medical treatment, whilst fewer have resulted in fatalities. All four categories of crash severity have decreased since 2009.

Figure 301: Number of crashes state-wide during alcohol-related hours by severity per year, 2009-2017

6.6.3. SUMMARY

Since 2009, the rate of crashes during alcohol-related hours has declined state-wide. Most crashes which occurred during alcohol-related hours have resulted in medical treatment, while fewer have resulted in fatalities. Although alcohol-related hours are a reliable source for investigating the contribution of alcohol in crashes, there are limitations. One obvious limitation is that the measure is only an estimation. It is unlikely that all crashes that occurred during these hours involved alcohol. Further, due to the time of day, crashes during alcohol-related hours could be influenced by a variety of factors such as driver fatigue and drug use.

6.7. CORONIAL DATA

6.7.1. LIMITATIONS OF CORONIAL DATA

6.7.1.1. PRIMARY/SECONDARY SUBSTANCE CONTRIBUTION TO EXTERNAL DEATHS

A substance is considered to have a primary contribution to a death where:

- Pharmaceutical drug toxicity is noted within the primary, Mechanism" and, Object" coding fields, or

- Aspiration of gastric contents is noted in the primary, Mechanism" and, Object" coding fields and pharmaceutical drug toxicity was noted in the secondary "Mechanism" and, Object" coding fields.

A substance is considered to have a secondary contribution to death where:

- Another external mechanism (such as a vehicle incident, a fall or drowning) is noted within the primary (and, where required, secondary), Mechanism" and, Object" coding fields, and

- Pharmaceutical drug toxicity is noted within the secondary or tertiary, Mechanism" and, Object" coding fields

Additionally, if the death is noted as being contributed to by a pharmaceutical substance, all drugs identified are recorded. For example, where, oxycodone toxicity" is noted in the cause of death and methadone is also identified, both substances are recorded in the relevant, Drug field.

6.7.1.2. ALCOHOLIC DISEASE-RELATED DEATHS

The NCIS code, Alcoholic Disease" refers to illnesses stemming from chronic alcohol use, such as cirrhosis of the liver and alcoholic cardiac disease. These deaths may be coded as, Natural Cause(s) " deaths, and do not necessarily involve a blood alcohol concentration. The majority of deaths where chronic alcohol use was contributory, or potentially contributory, are not likely to be reported to a coroner. As such, deaths solely attributable to chronic alcohol use have not been included in this report. All deaths included in this report are considered to be due to, External Cause(s).

6.7.1.3. INTENT CLASSIFICATION

The determination of the, intent‟ of a deceased person is subject to the individual determination of the coroner investigating each fatality. In some cases, a statement as to intent will not be made by the coroner. In these instances, only where the mechanism of death (for example, hanging or car exhaust gassing) is highly indicative of an intentional act, or where a suicide note was present, will the death be coded as "Intentional Self-Harm" on the NCIS? The non-standard nature of intent determination may influence the classification of deaths which are identified in this report.

6.7.1.4. CASES CONTAINED ON THE NCIS

Only those deaths deemed to be, reportable‟ following investigation by a coroner are contained on the NCIS. The NCIS does not contain cases which were reported to a coroner in the first instance and were later found to not be, reportable‟ or where a medical cause of death certificate was issued by a qualified medical practitioner. As a result, the number of cases identified in this report does not necessarily reflect the number of cases contained in the Local Case Management Systems of each relevant Coroner's Office.

6.7.1.5. ONLY CLOSED CASES INCLUDED

Only cases that are closed on the NCIS following coronial investigation are included in this dataset. Therefore, it is possible cases of relevance may still be under coronial investigation and not included in this report. For more information about NCIS case closure statistics, please refer to the NCIS Website.

6.7.1.6. QUALITY ASSESSMENT OF CLOSED CASES

The NCIS Unit conducts a quality assessment of the coding associated with cases that have been closed. While every effort is made to quality review closed cases in a timely manner, there may be a delay between the case being closed and the completion of the quality review. It cannot be guaranteed that all cases included in this report have been quality assessed.

6.7.2. RESULTS

Table 84 presents total alcohol related fatalities by sex from 2005 to 2018 per financial year. There were 2,525 deaths of relevance identified where the deceased died as a result of external causes involving alcohol. From 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2018, an average of 194.1 deaths of relevance were reported per financial year. It is clear from 2005 to 2018 that there are more men in Queensland who die from alcohol related external causes per year than women.

Table 84: Alcohol-related fatalities by sex of the deceased and financial year of notification

Sex	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	Total
Male	48	53	75	114	103	85	110	163	244	231	213	304	187	1930
Female	21	15	28	37	21	34	36	60	73	63	87	72	48	595
Total	69	68	103	151	124	119	146	223	317	294	300	376	235	2525

Alcohol related fatalities from 2005 to 2018 by age range is presented in Table 85. Age range between 31 – 40 years and 41 – 50 years had consistently more alcohol related deaths from 2008/09 to 2017/18, peaking in 2016/17 at 106 fatalities aged between 41 – 50 years old. However caution is advised when interoperating figures as it only includes closed cases.

Table 85: Alcohol-related fatalities by age range of the deceased and financial year of notification

Age range [years]	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	Total
<21	5	1-3	-	8	1-3	1-3	12	19	21	20	12	16	14	132
21 - 30	11	18	20	29	18	20	26	35	56	44	56	61	39	433
31 - 40	18	15	32	32	36	27	39	56	71	71	71	91	57	616
41 - 50	17	12	21	50	42	33	36	51	88	68	69	106	58	651
51 - 60	14	11	22	18	17	25	23	37	52	64	56	63	39	441
61 - 70	1-3	9	4	9	6	8	8	16	19	21	22	30	17	172
71 - 80	1-3	1-3	4	1-3	1-3	1-3	1-3	8	5	6	13	7	9	63
81 - 90	-	-	-	1-3	1-3	-	-	1-3	5	-	1-3	1-3	1-3	13
91 and above	-	-	-	-	-	1-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1-3
Unknown	-	-	-	1-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1-3
Total	69	68	103	151	124	119	146	223	317	294	300	376	235	2525

Table 86 presents alcohol related fatalities by different intent type. Intentional self-harm and unintentional deaths are the two most common causes of death where alcohol is related. However from 2013/14 to 2017/18 there has been reduction in alcohol-related deaths associated with assaults, however this observation might be premature due to the low percentage of cases still under investigation from 2016 to 2018.

Table 86: Alcohol-related fatalities by intent type and financial year of notification

Intent type	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	Total
Unintentional	49	40	66	99	95	80	97	120	154	149	143	169	87	1348
Intentional Self- Harm	8	24	33	49	26	34	36	87	151	131	146	205	148	1078
Assault	5	1-3	1-3	1-3	1-3	5	8	11	7	7	8	1-3	-	60
Undetermined Intent	1-3	1-3	1-3	1-3	-	-	1-3	4	5	6	1-3	1-3	-	26
Legal Intervention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1-3	1-3	-	-	1-3
Unlikely to be Known	5	1-3	-	-	-	-	1-3	1-3	-	-	-	-	-	11
Total	69	68	103	151	124	119	146	223	317	294	300	376	235	2525

Note. For more information about intent type, please see the NCIS Coding Manual.

NCIS provides an online database indicating the number of open and closed cases per year which is provided in Table 87. Only cases that are closed on the NCIS are included in this report. As of 1 February 2019, 57.6% of all cases reported to a Queensland coroner between 1 July 2017 and 30 June 2018 were closed on the NCIS. Caution is advised when interpreting figures for the 2017/18 financial year.

Table 87: Case closure figures by year of notification and case status

Year of notification	Closed cases	Open cases	Total cases	% Closed cases
2000	8,274	19	8,293	99.80%
2001	18,472	221	18,693	98.80%
2002	18,018	315	18,333	98.30%
2003	18,246	226	18,472	98.80%
2004	18,939	365	19,304	98.10%
2005	18,366	74	18,440	99.60%
2006	17,331	259	17,589	98.50%
2007	19,220	430	19,650	97.80%
2008	21,392	485	21,877	97.80%
2009	21,730	633	22,363	97.20%
2010	20,273	508	20,781	97.60%
2011	20,162	610	20,772	97.10%
2012	20,289	557	20,846	97.30%
2013	20,512	850	21,362	96.00%
2014	20,993	1,290	22,283	94.20%
2015	21,117	1,979	23,096	91.40%
2016	19,865	3,142	23,007	86.30%
2017	13,964	10,585	24,549	56.90%
2018	5,965	18,581	24,546	24.30%
2019	1	300	301	0.30%
Total	343,128	41,429	384,557	89.20%

Note. Table 87 accessed on: http://www.ncis.org.au/about-the-data/operational-statistics/

6.7.3. SUMMARY

Only cases that are closed on the NCIS following coronial investigation are included in this dataset. Therefore, it is possible cases of relevance may still be under coronial investigation and not included in this report. It is clear that more men die from alcohol-related deaths than women. Based on the currently available data, there appears to be a reduction in alcohol-related deaths associated with assaults in the 2016/17 and 2017/18 financial years and, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no deaths in and around safe night precincts since January 2016.

6.8. TRANSPORT DATA

A range of transport data were sourced from all possible providers. This section presents analyses of secure taxi rank, public transport (light and heavy rail, bus and ferry fares), and Uber pickup and

drop-off data. The arrival of Uber has heralded substantial changes in the way people arrive and depart SNPs in Queensland and Australia. The introduction of Uber in Queensland in October 2012, and its legalisation in September 2016, means that specific individual datasets such as taxi ranks or public transport data do not paint the overall picture accurately. Media reports suggest a substantial uptake of the service by 2015. In 2015, of the 2.5 million Uber rides caught in Brisbane, 300,000 were people heading home after midnight on a Friday or Saturday night from the city's entertainment precincts. Fewer than 10 per cent of these riders were tourists to the city. (https://www.smh.com.au/business/uber-chalks-up-25-million-rides-in-brisbane-in-just-18-months-20151021-gkf1lk.html).

6.8.1. COMBINED TRANSPORT BOARDINGS

A total number of passenger boardings including light and heavy rail, ferry or bus using a 'Go' card or paper and manual counts, secure taxi rank fares and Uber pickups per hour on Friday and Saturday nights from 8pm to 6am are recorded in Fortitude Valley, West End, Brisbane city and Surfers Paradise between 2013 and 2018 (financial years). Presented in Figure 302, it is clear over time, there are consistent hourly trends seen in the times when patron typically board transport in Fortitude Valley, spiking on Friday and Saturday nights at 9pm and then decreasing into the early hours of Saturday and Sunday morning. Clear spikes are evident at 3am on Sunday mornings, peaking at 6,857 in 2013/14, and on Friday nights at 9pm, peaking at 23,394 in 2013/14.

Figure 302: Total HAH boardings per hour in Fortitude Valley from 2013/14 to 2017/18 (financial year)

Figure 303 displays a clear decrease in passengers boarding between 8pm and 6am on both Friday and Saturday nights in Surfers Paradise. The total number of passenger boardings peaked on Saturday nights at 8pm, with the highest amount of passengers recorded at a total of 28,022 at 8pm in 2017/18. This spike in 2017/18 may be explained by the temporary increase in Surfers Paradise's population due to The 2018 Commonwealth Games.

Figure 303: Total HAH boardings per hour in Surfers Paradise from 2013/14 to 2017/18 (financial year)

The total number of passenger boardings per hour from 2013 to 2018 in West End is displayed in Figure 304. There is a consistent pattern of patrons boarding public transport in West End across the years, spiking at 8pm on Fridays and 10pm on Saturdays. A noticeable decrease in boardings is evident into the early hours of Saturday and Sunday morning.

Figure 304 Total HAH boardings per hour in West End from 2013/14 to 2017/18 (financial year)

Figure 305 presents passenger boardings in Brisbane City per hour from 2013 to 2018. The total number of passengers boarding trains in Brisbane City peaked in 2013/14 at 9pm on Friday nights, at 208,752 patrons. Patron boarding records consistently reduced between 8pm and 6am on Friday and Saturday nights each year.

Figure 305**: Total HAH boardings per hour in Brisbane City from 2013/14 to 2017/18 (financial year)**

6.8.2. COMBINED TRANSPORT ALIGHTINGS

This section provides results of analyses of combined Uber drop-off data and public transport alightings data, including light and heavy rail, ferry and bus using a 'Go Card' excluding paper and manual counts which are not available. Uber drop-off data are routinely recorded in Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast and Cairns. Uber drop-off data have been provided for Fortitude Valley and the Gold Coast from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2018. Uber drop off data were provided for the Sunshine Coast from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2018, and for Cairns from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018. Public transport data records are collected by passengers using a tapping a 'Go Card' which can be used on all TransLink trains (including Airtrain), bus and ferry in Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast (including Broadbeach, Main Beach, Miami, Mermaid Beach, Palm Beach, South Port and Surfers Paradise) and Sunshine Coast (only Maroochydore). Combined data to identify total Uber drop-offs and public transport data alighting in each location is shown in Figure 306 for Friday and Saturday nights from 8:00pm to 6:00am (HAH). While these combined transport data do not provide a precise measure of the numbers of people arriving in each location, they do provide a valuable source of information regarding the numbers of people arriving per year using different modes of transport. A limitation to these data is that the number of passengers per Uber drop-off is not recorded, as these data only record a single count for each Uber car stopping in each location during HAH. Figure 306 presents total combined transport arrivals in Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast and Cairns for the four financial years between 2014 and 2018. It is clear that in Fortitude Valley and the Gold Coast there is a steady increase in patrons entering these locations over time, and there is a slight increase in patrons entering the Sunshine Coast between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2018.

Figure 306: The combined number of Uber drop-off data and public transport alightings in high alcohol in Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast and Cairns by financial year

To provide a further estimate of patrons departing Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast and Cairns, transport data including Uber pickups, boarding data of bus, trains, ferries, light rail, paper and manual counts and secure taxi rank fares on Friday and Saturday nights from 8:00pm to 6:00am (HAH) were combined and presented in Figure 307. Uber routinely records fare pick-up data in Fortitude Valley and the Gold Coast from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2018, Sunshine Coast from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2018 and in Cairns from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018. Public transport boarding data of bus, trains, ferries, light rail, paper and manual counts in Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast (including Broadbeach, Main Beach, Miami, Mermaid Beach, Palm Beach, South Port and Surfers Paradise) and Sunshine coast (only Maroochydore) were provided. The Department of Transport & Main Roads (TMR) routinely records secure taxi rank information and statistics for Queensland. Secure taxi rank fare data were obtained for Queensland across four locations (Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast, Cairns) for June 1 2014 to 30 June 2018 operating on Friday and Saturday nights from approximately 11:00pm to 6:00am. Figure 307 presents an estimate of the number of people departing each location per financial year on a Friday or Saturday night between 8:00pm to 6:00am (HAH). When looking at the combined transport data there appears to be an increase in the number of patrons located in and departing Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast and the Sunshine Coast each financial year.

Figure 307: The combined number of HAH Uber pick-ups, public transport boardings and taxi rank fares in Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast and Cairns by financial year

To provide a further estimate of the number of people arriving and departing in Fortitude Valley, transport data were obtained from the Department of Transport and Main Roads, Queensland Transport, and Uber Australia. Three modes of transportation were examined, including:

22. Boarding and Alighting data of bus, trains, ferries, light rail, paper and manual counts on Friday and Saturday nights from 8:00pm to 6:00am (HAH)
23. Secure taxi rank fares on Friday and Saturday from approximately 10:00pm to 4:00am
24. Uber pickups and drop-offs on Friday and Saturday nights from 8:00pm to 6:00am (HAH)

As a case example, Figure 308 presents the number of patrons arriving in Fortitude Valley during HAH using combined data from Uber drop-offs, public transport alightings of bus, train, ferries, and light rail, by financial year from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2018.This figures shows an apparent increase in the number of patrons arriving Fortitude Valley by these transport services each year.

Figure 308: The number of HAH public transport alightings and Uber drop-offs in Fortitude Valley by financial year

Figure 309 presents a combined number of public transport boardings of bus, train, ferries, and light rail, secure rank taxi fares and Uber pick-ups for patrons leaving Fortitude Valley. The total number of patrons using all forms of public transport who are located and choose to depart Fortitude Valley appears to increase from July 2014 to June 2018.

Figure 309: The total number of HAH public transport boardings, secure taxi rank fares and Uber pick-ups in Fortitude Valley by financial year

Figure 310 shows a monthly breakdown of patrons arriving in Fortitude Valley by public transport and Uber between July 2014 and July 2018. This figure shows a steady increase in patrons arriving in Fortitude Valley over time, peaking in September 2017 at 47,092.

Figure 310: The total number of HAH alighting and Uber drop-offs in Fortitude Valley by month per financial year

Figure 311 presents total number of boardings of all bus, trains, ferries and light rail, secure taxi rank fares and Uber pick-up data to indicate an approximate number of patrons departing Fortitude Valley from 2014 to 2018. An overall slight increase from July 2014 to September 2017 is seen, peaking at 90,936, with fluctuating decreasing rates then seen from October 2017 to July 2018.

Figure 311: The total number of HAH boardings, Uber pickups and secure taxi rank fares in Fortitude Valley by month per financial year

6.8.3. SUMMARY

With the introduction of Uber in 2015, and subsequent legal approval in October 2016, nightlife patrons have embraced the new transport system and more than half of the patrons interviewed (see Patron Interviews chapter) now report using Uber to get home. This compares to other studies

conducted pre-Uber in other cities, which showed that 49% of interviewees across five cities reported catching a taxi home, compared to 18% in the current study Public Transport. However it is clear that there is an overall increase in the amount of patrons entering and leaving Fortitude Valley, Gold Coast and the Sunshine coast over time.

6.9.   LICENSED VENUE DATA

Licensed venue data will report three major elements:

1. The current and historical numbers of liquor licenses across Queensland
2. The number of new license approvals across Queensland
3. The number of extended trading permits granted, not approved or withdrawn

6.9.1. TYPES OF LIQUOR LICENCES

Table 88 provides details of each type of liquor licence available in Queensland.

Table 88: Liquor licence types

Licence Type	Definition
Commercial hotel	Allows selling of alcohol for consumption either on or off the premises
Commercial other—bar	Main business activity is selling liquor for consumption on licensed premises with a maximum seating capacity of 60 patrons
Commercial other—industrial canteen	Main function of the business is selling liquor in remote industrial locations to employees and their guests
Commercial other—producer/wholesaler	Main function of the business is either, or both: production and wholesale sale of liquor on the licensed premises and wholesale sale of liquor (to other licensees) on the licensed premises.
Commercial other—subsidiary off premises	When selling liquor for off-premises consumption is a secondary function of the business
Commercial other—subsidiary on-premises	When selling liquor for on-premises consumption is a secondary function of the business (e.g., cafes, motels, vessels, function centres)
Commercial special facility	Applies to casinos, airports, convention centres and other tourism businesses, excluding sporting facilities
Community club	Applies to non-proprietary clubs (e.g. sporting clubs, RSL clubs and ethnic clubs)
Community other	Allows for limited trading periods and applies to non-proprietary clubs that are also incorporated associations (such as charities) or unincorporated associations with an individual to hold the licence on the association's behalf
Nightclub (introduced 2015/16)	Main function of the business is to provide entertainment. The person presenting the entertainment must be physically present while entertainment is being provided
Wine merchant	Allows the licensee to conduct business that contributes to the Queensland wine industry in a substantial way, such as using Queensland fruit to make wine on another premise, or blending different wines to create a unique wine in the state
Wine producer	A wine producer licence allows the licensee to operate a vineyard or winery

Note. https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/hospitality-tourism-sport/liquor-gaming/liquor/licensing/applications/types

6.9.2. CURRENT AND HISTORICAL NUMBER OF LICENCES

Table 89 reports the total number of liquor licences operating across Queensland since 2013. It demonstrates that there has been an increase in the overall number of licences every financial year.

Table 89: Total number of liquor licences operating across Queensland

Licence Type	30/06/13 - 30/06/14	30/06/14 - 30/06/15	30/06/15 - 30/06/16	30/06/16 - 30/06/17	30/06/17 - 30/06/18
Commercial hotel	1306	1309	1322	1351	1359
Detached bottle shop[a]	802	807	812	814	822
Commercial other—bar	50	53	67	77	84
Commercial other—industrial canteen	67	46	38	34	36
Commercial other—producer/wholesaler	192	214	233	257	228
Commercial other—subsidiary off premises	82	79	82	95	110
Commercial other—subsidiary on-premises	3851	4111	4343	4719	5020
Commercial special facility	110	110	104	97	94
Community club	919	909	896	887	877
Community other	451	446	446	436	429
Nightclub	×	×	76	78	77
Wine merchant	13	13	15	16	18
Wine producer	147	142	138	138	140

Note. x = prior to the introduction of nightclub license category
[a] Detached bottle shops are always associated with a commercial hotel license

Table 90 to

Table **93** report the licence numbers by type and SNP over time. The Nightclub licence type was created in 2015 and licences were moved from the Subsidiary on-premises category. The number of liquor licenses from 2013/14 to 2017/18 financial years are presented by four main licence types within each SNP and the across the rest of the state.

Between 2013 and 2017, most SNPs saw growth in major categories such as hotels or Subsidiary on-premises and were mostly stable in minor categories such as wine producers or community clubs. The number of licenses for commercial hotels remained relatively stable in SNPs across time (Table 90). From 2016/17 to 2017/18, there was a small decline in the number of commercial licenses in five SNPs, while the number of licenses increased in Fortitude Valley, Cairns, Brisbane CBD, and the rest of the state during this period.

Table 90: Number commercial hotels licenses in SNPs per financial year

SNP/Region	Commercial hotel				
	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Airlie Beach CBD	5	5	5	5	5
Brisbane CBD	32	35	36	35	36
Broadbeach CBD	4	4	3	3	3
Bundaberg CBD	7	7	7	7	6
Cairns CBD	15	16	14	15	16
Fortitude Valley	28	34	37	36	39
Gladstone CBD	4	4	4	4	4
Inner West Brisbane	12	12	12	12	11
Ipswich	12	12	13	12	12
Mackay CBD	13	13	11	12	12
Rockhampton CBD	14	15	16	16	14
Sunshine Coast	9	8	9	10	9
Surfers Paradise CBD	13	14	14	15	14
Toowoomba CBD	13	12	13	14	14
Townsville CBD	21	19	17	17	17
Rest of state	1102	1099	1113	1108	1113

Table 91 indicates that the number of bar licenses remain relatively stable, although there is an increasing trend in the number of bar licenses in Fortitude Valley over time.

Table 91: Number of bar licenses in SNPs per financial year

SNP/Region	Bar				
	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Airlie Beach CBD	0	0	0	0	1
Brisbane CBD	6	6	6	6	7
Broadbeach CBD	0	0	0	1	1
Bundaberg CBD	0	0	0	0	0
Cairns CBD	2	2	4	6	6
Fortitude Valley	7	6	11	12	15
Gladstone CBD	0	0	0	0	0
Inner West Brisbane	2	2	2	3	2
Ipswich	0	0	0	0	1
Mackay CBD	0	0	0	0	0
Rockhampton CBD	0	0	0	0	1
Sunshine Coast	0	0	1	1	1
Surfers Paradise CBD	1	1	1	1	1
Toowoomba CBD	0	0	0	0	0
Townsville CBD	1	0	1	2	2
Rest of state	31	36	41	42	43

In 2015/16 licenses were removed from the Subsidiary on-premise category to form the nightclub licence type (Table 93). This led to an artificial decline in Subsidiary on-premise licenses from 2014/15 to 2015/16, particularly in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise (Table 92). There was a general increase in Subsidiary on-premise licenses across SNPs from 2016/17 to 2017/18.

Table 92: Number of subsidiary on-premise licenses in SNPs per financial year

SNP/Region	Subsidiary on-premises[7]				
	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Airlie Beach CBD	25	27	24	24	23
Brisbane CBD	134	148	155	161	168
Broadbeach CBD	67	67	67	66	67

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[7] Numbers of Subsidiary on-premises licences decreased in 2015/16 because of the creation of the new Nightclub licence and venues transferring to that classification

SNP/Region	Subsidiary on-premises[7]				
	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Bundaberg CBD	12	12	15	15	14
Cairns CBD	139	135	135	144	149
Fortitude Valley	89	91	71	73	74
Gladstone CBD	9	9	8	8	8
Inner West Brisbane	13	14	13	15	15
Ipswich	11	10	10	10	10
Mackay CBD	35	38	35	36	34
Rockhampton CBD	11	31	32	16	19
Sunshine Coast	103	109	120	119	131
Surfers Paradise CBD	119	120	114	118	122
Toowoomba CBD	21	24	21	24	26
Townsville CBD	59	60	54	55	54
Rest of state	3004	3216	3482	3770	4033

Table 93: Number of nightclub licenses in SNPs per financial year

SNP/Region	Nightclub				
	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Airlie Beach CBD	x	x	4	3	3
Brisbane CBD	x	x	6	6	5
Broadbeach CBD	x	x	3	3	2
Bundaberg CBD	x	x	0	0	0
Cairns CBD	x	x	5	3	3
Fortitude Valley	x	x	17	19	18
Gladstone CBD	x	x	1	1	1
Inner West Brisbane	x	x	1	1	1
Ipswich	x	x	0	0	1
Mackay CBD	x	x	1	2	2
Rockhampton CBD	x	x	1	1	1
Sunshine Coast	x	x	2	2	2
Surfers Paradise CBD	x	x	12	12	14
Toowoomba CBD	x	x	3	3	3
Townsville CBD	x	x	7	6	5
Rest of state	x	x	13	11	12

Note. x = license category did not exist at this time

Table 94 reports the number of new licences that were approved by type and region over time. Between 2013 and 2018, most regions have seen a continued increase in new licence approvals in major categories including hotels and Subsidiary on-premises and were mostly stable in minor categories such as wine producers and community clubs. A sharp increase in new licence approvals was observed in 2015 with the introduction of the Nightclub license type.

Table 94: Distribution of new liquor licences by region

		Licence type									
Year	Region	Commercial hotel	Bar	Producer/ wholesaler*	Subsidiary off premises*	Subsidiary on-premises*	Community club	Community other	Night Club	Other[b]	Total
2013/2014	City of Brisbane	6	12	14	2	148	0	2	x	2	186
	City of Gold Coast	0	1	4	1	81	0	4	x	0	91
	South-East Queensland[a]	3	0	3	0	66	2	3	x	1	78
	Darling Downs South West	4	0	0	0	16	0	0	x	5	25
	Wide Bay Burnett	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	x	0	3
	Central Queensland	2	0	0	0	14	0	0	x	1	17
	Mackay, Isaac and Whitsunday	0	0	0	0	13	0	2	x	0	15
	North Queensland	0	0	1	1	17	0	1	x	0	20
	Far North Queensland	0	1	1	1	21	1	0	x	1	26
2014/2015	City of Brisbane	9	4	15	3	152	0	0	x	2	185
	City of Gold Coast	3	1	8	0	70	0	3	x	0	85
	South-East Queensland[a]	4	3	7	2	93	2	1	x	1	113
	Darling Downs South West	0	1	2	0	12	0	0	x	4	19
	Wide Bay Burnett	0	0	1	0	13	0	1	x	0	15
	Central Queensland	1	0	1	1	18	0	1	x	2	24
	Mackay, Isaac and Whitsunday	1	0	1	0	15	0	0	x	0	17

Year	Region	Licence type									Total
		Commercial hotel	Bar	Producer/ wholesaler*	Subsidiary off premises*	Subsidiary on-premises*	Community club	Community other	Night Club	Other[b]	
	North Queensland	0	0	0	0	19	0	1	x	0	20
	Far North Queensland	3	1	0	1	21	0	0	x	1	27
2015/2016	City of Brisbane	15	9	16	1	170	1	1	35	3	251
	City of Gold Coast	3	0	5	1	117	2	2	21	0	151
	South-East Queensland[a]	1	2	14	8	114	1	0	7	3	150
	Darling Downs South West	3	0	1	1	11	0	2	4	4	26
	Wide Bay Burnett	0	0	1	0	19	0	2	3	0	25
	Central Queensland	0	2	0	0	16	2	0	2	0	22
	Mackay, Isaac and Whitsunday	0	1	0	0	9	0	0	6	0	16
	North Queensland	0	1	1	1	22	0	1	7	0	33
	Far North Queensland	1	2	2	1	27	0	1	9	0	43
2016/2017	City of Brisbane	6	5	22	11	196	0	1	1	1	243
	City of Gold Coast	1	1	6	4	122	0	1	0	0	135
	South-East Queensland[a]	2	1	10	1	104	4	4	0	5	131
	Darling Downs South West	2	0	0	1	23	0	1	0	3	30
	Wide Bay Burnett	0	1	1	0	15	1	0	0	1	20
	Central Queensland	2	0	1	0	16	0	0	0	0	19

		Licence type									
Year	Region	Commercial hotel	Bar	Producer/ wholesaler*	Subsidiary off premises*	Subsidiary on-premises*	Community club	Community other	Night Club	Other[b]	Total
	Mackay, Isaac and Whitsunday	1	0	0	0	13	0	0	1	0	15
	North Queensland	0	1	0	1	11	0	0	0	1	14
	Far North Queensland	2	3	2	1	40	0	0	0	0	48
2017/2018	City of Brisbane	14	8	16	8	199	1	3	0	1	250
	City of Gold Coast	3	2	9	5	112	2	0	2	0	135
	South-East Queensland[a]	1	2	15	3	125	1	1	0	4	152
	Darling Downs South West	0	0	1	0	18	0	3	0	4	26
	Wide Bay Burnett	0	0	2	2	19	0	0	0	2	25
	Central Queensland	0	1	4	0	13	0	0	0	2	20
	Mackay, Isaac and Whitsunday	3	1	0	0	5	0	1	0	1	11
	North Queensland	1	1	2	0	14	0	0	0	1	19
	Far North Queensland	2	0	6	3	33	0	2	0	2	48

Note. [a]Excluding City of Brisbane and City of Gold Coast. [b]Other includes industrial canteen, commercial special facility, wine merchant and wine producer.

*Commercial other licence principal activity. x = prior to the introduction of nightclub license category

6.9.3. EXTENDED TRADING PERMITS

Table 95 reports the number of temporary extended trading permits granted by year and SNP. It highlights the very substantial increase in the number of applications in Brisbane, Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise in 2016 after the trading hours restrictions were introduced, but before the 2017 tightening of access to extended trading permits (ETPs). While 2017 and 2018 numbers are substantially reduced, it is clear that there remains a substantial number of ETPs being granted, which ultimately means there are many nights in which SNPs are not effectively closed at 3am. For example, with 151 ETPs awarded in 2017, this effectively means on average there are almost three venues serving alcohol until 5am every weekend. This suggests that there is little likelihood of major cultural change to earlier drinking/entertainment hours, just that people who want to be out later might need to hunt around to find a venue.

Table 95: Temporary extended trading permit applications approved by SNP 2009 – 2018

SNP	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Airlie Beach CBD	6	15	4	8	23	12	13	43	13	2
Brisbane CBD	28	57	24	36	62	67	40	172	48	30
Broadbeach CBD	3	4	3	5	4	10	4	40	7	31
Bundaberg CBD	2	11	8	5	2	5	3	2	4	1
Cairns CBD	36	50	59	37	55	87	104	91	14	8
Caloundra	1	1	5	5	4	4	4	8	6	0
Fortitude Valley	25	34	36	52	85	124	77	413	101	32
Gladstone CBD	6	15	14	11	7	6	23	28	8	4
Inner West Brisbane	19	40	33	36	38	50	36	78	51	32
Ipswich CBD	1	3	16	11	7	5	6	12	3	0
Mackay CBD	5	44	36	28	50	33	22	31	4	2
Maroochydore	1	0	3	1	17	24	5	0	2	0
Mooloolaba	2	1	1	0	1	3	1	4	4	1
Rockhampton CBD	13	10	12	13	3	20	19	68	7	6
Surfers Paradise CBD	23	27	22	35	22	36	41	245	52	39
Toowoomba CBD	8	14	8	10	7	7	10	45	19	11
Townsville CBD	35	53	54	31	25	39	40	100	23	17
Rest of State	633	1049	1217	1068	985	1156	1038	1024	698	308

Figure 312 shows the total amount of extended trading permit applications approved across all SNPs between 2009 and 2018. Total approvals steadily increased between 2009 and 2015, before a sharp increase in 2016, followed by a steep decline in 2017.

Figure 312: Total extended trading permit approvals issued across all SNPs by year

Table 96 reports the number of temporary extended trading permits that were not approved, or were cancelled, withdrawn or deemed invalid, by year and SNP. It highlights a substantial increase in permit withdrawals in 2017, most notably in Fortitude Valley where 44 permits were withdrawn.

Table 96: Extended trading permits not approved or withdrawn by SNP 2009 – 2018

SNP	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Airlie Beach CBD										
Withdrawn									8	
Brisbane CBD										
Refused									4	
Invalid									1	
Cancelled									1	
Withdrawn	1	8	2	1	2	3	2	1	10	1
Broadbeach CBD										
Refused									2	
Invalid									2	
Withdrawn								5	5	1
Bundaberg CBD										
Withdrawn				1						
Cairns CBD										
Refused									1	2

SNP	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Cancelled									3	
Withdrawn				2	2				3	1
Fortitude Valley										
Cancelled								1	3	0
Withdrawn		6	5		5	1	2	8	44	7
Gladstone CBD										
Refused	4									
Cancelled									4	
Withdrawn									1	
Inner West Brisbane										
Cancelled									3	
Withdrawn				1			1	2	18	6
Ipswich CBD										
Withdrawn				4			1			
Mackay CBD										
Cancelled									1	
Withdrawn						2			2	1
Maroochydore										
Withdrawn							1			
Rockhampton										
Refused									2	
Withdrawn	1		4						6	4
Surfers Paradise										
Refused		3	1						6	1
Cancelled									1	
Withdrawn		5	1	3	2	3		4	6	
Toowoomba										
Withdrawn		1	3	1				1	1	
Townsville										
Refused	2								3	1
Withdrawn				2	1		6	1	4	1
Rest of Qld										
Refused			5		4				16	8
Invalid		2							2	
Cancelled				1					23	
Withdrawn	23	29	37	15	40	34	45	55	70	23

6.9.4. ENFORCEMENT DATA

Investigation enforcement outcomes data were obtained from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2018 from the
Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation annual statistical report available online. These data reports
annual state wide figures of enforcement actions prosecutions and infringement notices under the

Queensland Liquor Act distributed to venues by OLGR. Total number of premises, offences and fines were presented per financial year for all SNPs compared to the rest of Queensland in Table 97. Additional data obtained from the OLGR supplied total number of Liquor Act prosecutions including fined and convicted breaches of alcohol service to an intoxicated adult, alcohol service to a minor and Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA) certification offences. The total number of convicted prosecutions relating to the three above offences are presented in Table 98.

Table 97: Investigation enforcement outcomes—prosecution

Financial Year / Region		Premises	Offences	Fines
2014/15	SNPs	2	5	$2,500
	Rest of state	7	19	$92,400
	Total	9	24	$94,900
2015/16	SNPs	1	3	$12,705
	Rest of state	5	8	$14,392
	Total	6	11	$27,097
2016/17	SNPs	2	4	$7,000
	Rest of state	9	50	$129,080
	Total	11	54	$136,080
2017/18	SNPs	6	53	$105,000
	Rest of state	3	13	$41,500
	Total	9	66	$146,500

Table 98: Liquor Act convicted prosecutions

Financial Year	Alcohol service to unduly intoxicated adult	Alcohol service to minor	RSA certification breach	Total per FY
2013/14	1	0	0	1
2014/15	9	0	0	9
2015/16	5	1	1	7
2016/17	8	0	0	8
2017/18	3	1	1	5

6.9.5. INFORMATION FROM OLGR

OLGR provided information on the following three components of the TAFV policy:

1. Increased compliance activity by liquor licensing officers
2. Increased licence fees for high risk venues
3. Publishing information on liquor licensing, compliance and enforcement activity

We have provided their response to each point below.

6.9.5.1. INCREASED COMPLIANCE ACTIVITY BY LIQUOR LICENSING OFFICERS TO ADDRESS ALCOHOL-FUELLED VIOLENCE.

Funding for increased compliance staff since 2014-15 has enabled the OLGR to substantially increase its inspection activity at licensed premises, both State-wide and within SNPs. In 2017-18, the OLGR completed 5,556 liquor inspections State- wide, 2,719 in SNPs. This was a 32% increase State-wide and 121.4% increase within SNPs compared to 2013-14 (ie prior to the additional funding - first year of funding was while LNP were in Government and was assigned as part of the Safe Night Out Strategy).

The funding is temporary at this point, due to expire on 30 June 2018, though the OLGR will be making a budget bid for extension of funding for 12 months pending consideration of the TAFV Evaluation. A loss of funding will result in inspection numbers decreasing back to 2013-14 levels or quite possibly lower due to compliance officer commitments around the operation of SNP local boards.

The OLGR is unable to quantify the impact that increased compliance activity has had on alcohol related violence and it is understood that attribution of the contribution of any individual Government initiative to TAFV harm minimisation outcomes will be challenging even for the QUANTEM team. However increased compliance activity and the associated licensee engagement and general visible presence of OLGR compliance officers is considered to be a positive driver of licensee compliance.

During the period of additional funding the OLGR has made significant enhancements to its risk based liquor compliance plan. The plan includes overt and covert inspections to monitor compliance with responsible service of alcohol (RSA), provision of safe environments and other licensee and staff member obligations. Venues are targeted for inspection as a result of inherent, specific and emerging risks. Licensed venues that have an inherently higher risk resulting from the type of licence and/or hours of trade are subject to a minimum number of comprehensive inspections during the financial year e.g. presently:

- Adult entertainment venues are subject to a minimum of four inspections per year,
- Venues permanently licensed to sell liquor beyond 2am are subject to a minimum of two inspections per year, and
- Venues that are permanently licensed to sell liquor beyond midnight, but not beyond 2am, are subject to a minimum of one inspection per year (with the exception of restaurants and cafes).

The compliance plan includes a range of programs that target venues based on specific and emerging risks. Factors considered in determining venues to be included in these programs may include:

- Compliance history;

- Complaints from the general public;

- Information received in police incident reports;

- localised knowledge of issues;

- relative impact on harm or amenity indicated by information received in police incident reports;

- relative risk of particular legislative obligations not being met, having regard to both likelihood and consequence;

- concentration of licensed premises and/or risk of harm or amenity concerns in a particular locality;

- beneficial contribution to multi-agency or whole of government strategies or initiatives;

- initiatives, commitments and priorities of Government.

In meeting the objectives of the inspection programs, compliance officers are assigned to work a number of shifts (in accordance with a roster) where teams are deployed predominately after hours and on weekends to undertake priority liquor inspection activities.

The additional funding has enabled many more of these shifts to be worked as not only do the additional staff work an allotted number of shifts, in locations where the additional staff are based pre-existing staff have been allotted a greater number of shifts. This has been possible because the significant day time responsibilities are shared across a larger workforce.

Inspection times and locations are generally targeted to coincide with busy periods of trade and consequently higher levels of violence and industry non-compliance. The OLGR has developed advanced analytical tools to assist in targeting and prioritising venues for inspection across the state under various programs. As well as assisting to identify which venues to target, the tools provide valuable information on what the focus of the inspection should be and the days and times when the risks are the greatest.

6.9.5.1.1. BARRIERS FACED/LESSONS LEARNT

Perhaps the most significant barriers faced have related to being able to take high end enforcement action in instances of persons being served liquor while they are unduly intoxicated or being allowed to consume liquor in these circumstances.

As part of the TAFV initiative and the SNOS initiative of the former Government, the OLGR has been able to increase its focus and efforts around responsible service of alcohol, including compliance with obligations to not serve persons who are unduly intoxicated or allow such a person to consume liquor.

Enablers for this have included the increase in compliance officers and legislative changes aimed to make obligations around service to/consumption by unduly intoxicated persons clearer.

While the legislative changes have proved to be of some assistance, there remains significant difficulties for regulators (OLGR and QPS) wishing to prove the relevant offences to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt. This is largely the result of the onus sitting with the regulator to:

- prove that the signs of undue intoxication which may have been visible/audible to a compliance officer and/or visible on CCTV footage were seen by person/s who served the person liquor or allowed the person to consume liquor.

- the relevant provisions place no positive onus upon the licensee and their employees/agents to take reasonable steps to ensure that an accurate assessment is made of a person/s state of intoxication. In effect, the less attentive a person is, the less likely it could be proven they served an unduly intoxicated person;

- when it comes to consumption by a person who is unduly intoxicated, unless the employee/agent has directly engaged with the patron while the patron is showing the signs of undue intoxication, there is no ability to attribute an offence to any individual. In effect, the less interaction that is had with patrons, the less likely any blame can be attributed to an individual for a person being able to consume liquor while unduly intoxicated;

- in terms of the licensee themselves (generally a corporate entity and therefore not physically present), at least for a first offence an easy defence can be created by providing some level of training to staff and having then sign off on this - regardless of how the staff then operate in practice.

- disprove that the indicia of undue intoxication were not the result of something other than liquor or drugs, e.g. physical impairment, when the OLGR are often not in a position to identify and interview the patron as an OLGR officer was not present at the time of the service/consumption occurring.

- there is no positive onus on the licensee/employee/agent to satisfy themselves that signs of undue intoxication are not a result of factors other than liquor/drugs, e.g. physical or mental impairment. Even-though a reasonable person might assume that a person frequenting a liquor venue and is showing indicia of intoxication would be showing these sings due to consumption of liquor/drugs, the legislation does not operate in this way and the onus is on the prosecution to prove that liquor/drugs were the cause. In an unsuccessful prosecution brought by OLGR, one argument put by the alleged offender at interview and later by defence counsel in court was that the alleged unduly intoxicated patron was always showing certain indicia when at the premises. No steps had been taken by the party being prosecuted to check with the patron

concerned whether there was a reason other than liquor/drugs for the indicia of undue intoxication. The prospect that a person regularly frequenting licensed premises might 'always' display indicia of intoxication because they are attending the premises while intoxicated was of no assistance to OLGR in this case.

While it is accepted that it is the role of a regulator to prove offences have occurred, ideally legislation would place a greater onus on the licensee and their employees/agents to take proactive steps to confirm patrons are fit to be served liquor and to be able to demonstrate that they assessed the person as being fit to be served or to consume as the case may be.

Another challenge for the OLGR has related to the temporary nature of the funding for additional compliance officers. Due to employment uncertainty the turnover of compliance officers on the temporary contacts has been high, resulting in the need for numerous recruitment processes over the duration of the initiative and considerable cost, in terms of lost productivity, as new officers are trained.

6.9.5.2. INCREASED LICENCE FEES FOR HIGH RISK VENUES

The (now) Government's 2015 General Election Commitments included that licensing fees for high-risk venues would be increased.

We understand the commitment was considered by Government to have been delivered on 1 July 2015 through the making of Liquor Amendment Regulation (No. 1) 2015 (Amendment Regulation). The Amendment Regulation prescribed new fee amounts in the Liquor Regulation 2002 for the new nightclub licence type.

The nightclub licence type was established by the Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Amendment Act) to recognise that this type of venue represents greater risk of alcohol-related harm than other subsidiary on-premises licence types and therefore poses greater community impact and regulation costs to Government. Prior to the creation of the nightclub licence, nightclubs operated under a subsidiary on-premises licence (entertainment) with an application fee of $1,211 and a base annual licence fee of $605.30. However, at the time the Government took office relevant fees for the new night club licence had not been prescribed. Accordingly, the Amendment Regulation increased the base annual fee for nightclub venues· from $605.30 to $3388.00 from 1 July 2015, to reflect the high risk nature of these venues.

It is the Government's policy to levy fees in order to recover costs incurred in relation to the regulatory services provided. The current application and licence fee structure under the Liquor Act was approved in 2008 following a Regulatory Impact Statement and Draft Public Benefit Test finalised during that

same year. The annual liquor licence fee system, introduced following this process, adopts a risk-based approach designed to ensure licensees contribute fairly and appropriately, on a risk-based scale, to the on-going costs of monitoring and regulating the liquor industry in Queensland.

6.9.5.3. PUBLISHING INFORMATION ON LIQUOR LICENSING, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

This commitment was met by enhancing information published in the OLGR's annual statistical reports. Data by risk category was first included within the 2015 - 16 Annual Statistical Report. This meant the number of compliance inspections, investigations and their outcomes were categorised into venues within and outside of safe night precincts who traded:

- with an adult entertainment permit
- after 3am
- from 1am - 3am
- midnight to 1am
- up to and including midnight

This dataset was changed from 'risk category' to 'site closing time' in the 2016 - 17 and 2017 - 18 annual statistical reports as a result of reduced trading hours implemented on 1 July 2016. This meant data were categorised into venues within and outside of safe night precincts who traded:

- up to midnight
- post-midnight to 2am
- post 2am

Where possible, comparative figures from the previous financial year have been provided in each report.

6.9.6. SUMMARY

The introduction of the TAFV policy did not have an impact on the number of licensed venues within SNPs or across the rest of the state. Notably, there was no impact on the number of key license types within entertainment districts (i.e., pubs, bars, and nightclubs). The use of ETPs undermined the initial implementation of the policy, however this was reduced (although not eliminated) in the subsequent two years. There were few instances of successful convictions regarding breaches of the Liquor Act (specifically, service to intoxicated patrons) each financial year.

6.10. SAFE NIGHT PRECINCT OPERATIONAL GRANTS

SNP boards can apply for grant funding of up to 250,000AUD per year for each SNP from the Queensland state government. Twenty-nine grants have been approved since the inception of the

program, worth over 1.5 million AUD in funding. The details of the grants for each SNP are outlined below.

In 2015 a late night service bus was funded in Airlie beach for $50,000. The initiative commenced its first service on 18 December 2015 with the last service running on 26 March 2015. The Airlie beach SNP has also received $89,990 for roaming security and a communications campaign. The initiative encompassed the employment of city safe ambassadors, purchasing marketing materials, insurance, and administration costs. The initiative commenced on 6 July 2018 and is currently still operating as of August 2018.

The Broadbeach SNP board received $26,796 in funding for an inter-venue radio network in 2017. The initiative commenced on 31 October 2017 and as of August 2018 is still in operation.

The Bundaberg SNP board received $27,273 in March of 2016 to provide security services for a taxi rank. The program was later extended, for $45,454, to run until January 2019. The Bundaberg SNP board received $90,909 in funding to upgrade and expand a CCTV network in conjunction with the Bundaberg Regional Council. The installation of cameras commenced in September 2016. The Bundaberg SNP board received funding for two communications campaigns on December 2016, both of which concluded in December 2017. The first was an educational campaign funded for $18,182. The second was a *One Punch Can Kill campaign* funded for $20,158. A radio network was also established in December of 2016 for $17,127. The Bundaberg SNP board received $27,027 for a variable message board trailer. The project commenced in November 2017 and is ongoing as of August 2018. The Bundaberg SNP received $8,164 of funding for a responsible service of alcohol training and education program for youth (15-18 years of age). The first round was completed on September 12 2017.

The Cairns SNP board received $50,000 for taxi marshals and security guards that commenced work on September 23 2016. This initiative was entered three times until November 18 2018, and included the addition of a taxi rank controller. The extensions added $200,000 of additional funding. The Cairns SNP board received $4,500 in funding to consult the Just Let it Go Foundation in March 2018.

The Fortitude Valley SNP board received $250,000 of funding for the *Just Let It Go, Stop the Violence* anti-violence communications campaign. This was funded from December 2016 to December 2017.

The Gladstone SNP board received $89,141 of funding for a CCTV upgrade, as of August 2018 arrangements to install these cameras are ongoing. The Gladstone SNP board also received $9,090 of

funding for an anti-violence campaign. Request for payment authorised in July 2018. As of August 2018, there are no reports on the commencement or success of the initiative.

The Mackay SNP board hired an administration support officer for an unknown amount of time for an unknown amount of money.

The Rockhampton SNP board received $100,000 worth of funding to improve the CCTV network in their SNP, as of June 2018 this is still ongoing. The Rockhampton SNP board received $13,543 to partially fund an inter-venue radio network. The initiative anticipated to commence 31 August 2018.

The Sunshine Coast SNP board received $71,545 of funding for Roaming security officers and media and marketing campaign from August 2017, which was later extended for $35,891 to conclude on March 2018. An additional $49,600 grant was received in June 2017 for roaming security officers and media. Roaming security officers and another media marketing campaign were funded from January 2018 to 31 March 2018. Both sets of roaming security guards were further funded for $90,721.

The Surfers Paradise SNP board received $65,988 of funding for an inter-venue radio network which commenced on October 2017. The Surfers Paradise board received a further $86,178 worth of funding for the implementation of street security which commenced May 19 2018.

The Toowoomba SNP board received $15,677 in funding for a taxi marshal, security service, and toilet cleaning service. This initiative was approved on January 25 2016 and creased on December 31 2016.

6.10.1.   RESULTS

As shown in Table 99 only one analysis found a significant change in monthly serious assaults during HAH; a significant increase in the number of serious assaults in the Sunshine Coast SNP. This result should be interpreted with caution as the result could be partially attributable to a single time point at the end of the period analysed.

Table 99: ARIMA time series analysis of safe night precinct operational grants influence on serious assaults during high alcohol hours, from January 1 2019 to June 30 2018

Initiative	Coef.	95% CI
Airlie Beach (0,0,0)		
Late night bus service	-.58	-1.79, .64
Broadbeach (0,0,0)		
Radio network	.01	-1.17, 1.19
Bundaberg (0,0,0)		
Security services	.79	-.23, 1.82
CCTV	-1.33	-3.46, .79
Communications campaigns	.10	-1.57, 1.77
Radio network	.68	-1.96, 3.31
Variable message trailer	1.79	-2.91, 6.49
Education campaign	-.94	-5.35, 3.46
Cairns		
Security and taxi rank imitative	.24	-2.01, 2.50
Fortitude Valley (1,1,0)		
Communications campaign	-5.56	-13.24, 2.12
Sunshine Coast (0,1,1)		
Roaming security and communications campaign 1	-.19	-2.19, 1.82
Roaming security and communications campaign 2	2.22*	.07, 4.37
Surfers Paradise (0,0,1)		
Inter-radio network	-1.42	-4.42, 1.57
Toowoomba (0,0,0)		
Taxi, security, and cleaning services	-.76	-2.66, 1.13

Note. * *p*<.05; figures in parentheses indicate the ARIMA model parameters

6.10.2. SUMMARY

The current findings indicate that none of the funding SNP boards received in operational grants significantly decreased the occurrence of serious assaults within SNP boundaries. This is particularly concerning as the purpose of SNP boards is to provide a safe space for the community and to address their safety concerns. SNP boards have now accumulated over $1.5 million in government grant funding, however, they have not had a demonstrable impact on the number of serious assaults within the precinct. The funding process for SNP board initiatives require a stronger emphasis on interventions with an empirical basis, and clear predefined measurable outcomes so that effectiveness can be independently evaluated.

6.11. PATRON INTERVIEWS

The following section presents patron demographics, levels of intoxication (BAC reading and patron's own BAC estimate), pre-drinking behaviour, drug consumption patterns, experience of aggression for patrons in SNPs (i.e., Fortitude Valley, Cairns and Surfers Paradise) and patrons' knowledge of government violence reductions campaigns in 2016. Results for patrons in West End are presented as a non-SNP comparison of Fortitude Valley. Full details of findings from West End field interviews are described in Appendix 2. Additional analyses of patrons past and planned behaviours on the night interviewed (i.e., hours spent drinking/partying, where they are going after the interview and planned method home) are detailed in Appendix 3. Signs of intoxication are presented in Appendix 4 patrons' perceived impact of Policy is outlined in Appendix 6 and perceived level of safety in Appendix 7.

6.11.1.   SAMPLE

Across three sites (Cairns, Fortitude Valley, and Surfers Paradise), the sample consisted of patrons attending licensed venues (bars, pubs, and nightclubs) located within the SNPs – the main entertainment precincts of the respective city. Patrons were also interviewed at West End, which was employed as a non-SNP comparison site (see Table 1). The interviewers approached a total of 5,928 potential interviewees. A total of 4,452 people agreed to be interviewed, an overall response rate of 75.10%. Interviews with a high portion of missing data, where key variables of interest were missing were removed. The following analyses includes 4,401 participants: 60.5% from Fortitude Valley ($N = 2664$), 25% from Cairns ($N = 1100$), 6.6% from Surfers Paradise ($N = 291$) and 7.9% from West End ($N = 346$). Almost equal numbers of patrons participated in the full interview (49.2%) and the brief interview (50.8%). A further 438 participants from Fortitude Valley ($n = 380$) and West End ($n = 58$) completed an online follow-up survey, with an 84.3% completion rate.

6.11.2.   PATRON DEMOGRAPHICS

6.11.2.1. CAIRNS

In Cairns, 1,100 interviews were completed (25% of all patron interviews) from August 2016 to May 2018. A total of 458 patrons (41.6%) participated in the full interview, while 642 (58.4%) responded to the brief interview. There was no significant difference in the sex ($\chi^2 = 2.10$, $p = .147$) or age of

participants who participated in the brief versus full interview ($z = -.05$, $p = .964$; $r = .02$ $p = .625$; Table 100)[8].

Table 100: Participants' sex and age in Cairns by interview type (brief/full)

	Total	Brief	Full
Variable	**$n = 1100$**	**$n = 642$**	**$n = 459$**
Male, n (%)	631 (57.4)	380 (59.2)	251 (54.8)
	$n = 1086$	$n = 637$	$n = 449$
Median age (range)	23 (18-67)	23 (18-65)	23 (18-67)

Note. Age missing for 14 cases.

More than half (57.4%) of the overall sample was male, with a median age of 23 years (range 18-67 years). Males were significantly older (*Mdn* = 23.5) than female participants (*Mdn* = 23.0; $z = -2.41$, $p = .016$).

Figure 313 below presents the number of interviews that were undertaken across the evening. Notably, only 18 (1.6%) participants were interviewed before 10pm and one participant (0.1%) after 3:59am.

Figure 313: Number of interviews completed in Cairns by time (hours)

6.11.2.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY

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[8] Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to assess differences in skewed variables.

A total of 2,664 participants were interviewed in Fortitude Valley from June 2016 to June 2018, which was 60.5% of all patron interviews. There were similar numbers of patrons that participated in the full interview (47.3%, $n = 1,260$), compared to the brief interview (52.7%, $n = 1,404$). There was a significant difference in the number of females and males who participated in the brief or full interview, with males being significantly more likely to participate in the brief interview, compared to females ($\chi^2 = 20.85$, $p < .001$). There was no significant difference in the age of participants who participated in the brief interview versus the full interview ($z = -.90$, $p = .369$; $r = .02$ $p = .364$; Table 101).

Table 101: Participants' sex and age in Fortitude Valley by interview type (brief/full)

	Total	Brief	Full
Variable	$n = 2663^a$	$n = 1404$	$n = 1260$
Male, n (%)	1515 (56.9)	**857 (61.0)**	**658 (52.3)**
	$n = 2649$	$n = 1399$	$n = 1250$
Median age (range)	21 (18-72)	21 (18-60)	21 (18-72)

Note.[a]Sex was missing for 1 case. Age was missing for 15 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

More than half (56.9%) of the overall sample was male, with a median age of 21 years (range 18-72 years). Males were significantly older (*Mdn* = 21.0) than female participants (*Mdn* = 21.0; $z = -6.04$ $p < .001$).

Figure 314 below presents the number of interviews that were undertaken across the evening. Interviews most commonly took place from 12am-12:59am ($n = 747$). Notably, only one participant was interviewed before 10pm, 100 participants from 4am to 4:59am (3.8%) and four participants from 5am (0.2%).

Figure 314: Number of interviews completed in Fortitude Valley by time (hours)

WEST END COMPARISON

Three hundred and forty-six patrons were interviewed in West End (see Appendix 2). Over 60% (n = 221) of the West End sample was male, with a median age of 25 years (range = 18-69 years). There was no significant difference in the average age of female (Mdn = 25.0) versus male participants (Mdn = 25.0; z = -96, p = .339) in West End. In West End, participants were significantly more likely to complete the full interview (76.6%, n = 265), compared to participants in Fortitude Valley (47.3%, n = 1,260; χ^2 = 105.12, p < .001). There were significantly more males that participated in patron interviews in West End (63.3%), compared to the proportion of male participants in Fortitude Valley (56.9%; χ^2 = 5.14, p = .023) and the median age of participants in West End was significantly older (Mdn = 25.0) than patrons interviewed in Fortitude Valley (Mdn = 21.0; z = -13.45 p < .001). Interviews in Fortitude Valley predominately took place between the hours of from 10pm until 4:59am[9], whereas interviews in West End predominately occurred between the hours of 10pm-1:59am[10].

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[9] One participant was interviewed between 9pm and 9:59pm and four participants were interviewed between 5am and 5:59am

[10] Four interviews were conducted between 8pm and 9:59pm

6.11.2.3. SURFERS PARADISE

There were 291 patrons that were interviewed in Surfers Paradise from September 2016 to May 2018. Approximately sixty-two percent of patrons ($n = 181$) participated in the full interview, while 110 (37.8%) responded to the brief interview. There was no significant difference in the sex ($\chi^2 = 2.32$, $p = .128$) or age ($z = -.13$ $p = .896$, $r = .02$, $p = .682$; Table 102)[11] of participants who participated in the brief or full interview.

Table 102: Participants' sex and age in Surfers Paradise by interview type (brief/full)

	Total	Brief	Full
Variable	**$n = 291$**	**$n = 110$**	**$n = 181$**
Male, n (%)	158 (54.3)	66 (60.0)	92 (50.8)
	$n = 288$	$n = 110$	$n = 178$
Median age (range)	20 (18-56)	20 (18-56)	20 (18-46)

Note. Age was missing for 3 cases.

Fifty-three percent of the overall sample was male, with a median age of 20 years (range 18-56). Males were significantly older (*Mdn* = 21.0) than female participants (*Mdn* = 19.0; $z = -3.74$, $p < .001$).

The number of interviews completed by hour is presented in Figure 315. Of note, only one participant was interviewed prior to 10pm.

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[11] Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to assess differences in skewed variables.

Figure 315: Number of interviews completed Surfers Paradise by time (hours)

6.11.3. LEVELS OF INTOXICATION (BAC READING AND ESTIMATE)

Of patrons who participated in the brief or full interview, 3,876 (88.05%) recorded a BAC reading[12]. BAC estimates[13] were also provided from 2,236 (50.8%) of patrons.

6.11.3.1. CAIRNS

Of patrons who had completed the brief or full interview in Cairns, 964 patrons (87.6%) completed BAC readings[14] and 828 patrons (75.3%) provided an estimated BAC reading[15]. The median and range of patrons' BAC readings and BAC estimates are presented across each age group in Table 103. There was a significant difference in median BAC reading between different age groups, $\chi^2(4) = 39.90$, $p < .001$ and the median BAC estimate between age groups, $\chi^2(4) = 13.33$, $p = 010$[16].

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[12] BAC readings above .30 ($n = 61$) were excluded due to error in entry or breathalyser.
[13] BAC estimates above .40 ($n = 72$) were excluded.
[14] This excluded BAC readings above .30 which excluded due to error in entry or breathalyser calibration
[15] This excluded BAC readings above .40 and patrons who indicated that they were unsure of BAC reading
[16] Kruskal-Wallis H tests were conducted to assess differences in skewed variables when there were more than two independent groups

Table 103: BAC reading and estimates among participants in Cairns by age groups

Age groups						
Variable	**Total**	**18-19**	**20-24**	**25-29**	**30-39**	**40+**
BAC reading [a]						
n	951	212	349	184	129	77
Median (range)	**.087 (.000-.289)**	**.067 (.000-.280)**	**.080 (.000-.272)**	**.098 (.000-.289)**	**.106 (.000-.289)**	**.094 (.000-.272)**
Estimated BAC reading [b]						
n	821	180	299	165	108	69
Median* (range)	**.070 (.000-.400)**	**.060 (.000-.400)**	**.070 (.000-.321)**	**.080 (.000-.250)**	**.070 (.000-.210)**	**.080 (.000-.400)**

Note. [a] Age groups were missing 13 cases. [b] Age groups were missing 7 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$)

The median and range of BAC readings and estimates across males and females are presented in Table 104. There was no significant difference in median BAC reading ($z = -1.73$, $p = .084$) among male and female participants. However, males were found to have significantly higher BAC estimates compared to females ($z = -2.15$, $p = .032$).

Table 104: BAC reading and estimate among participants in Cairns by sex

Variable	**Total**	**Male**	**Female**
BAC reading			
n	964	560	404
Median (range)	.087 (.000-.289)	.088 (.000-.289)	.084 (.000-.261)
BAC estimate			
n	828	481	347
Median (range)	.070 (.000-.400)	**.080 (.000-.321)**	**.070 (.000-.400)**

Note. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$)

Figure 316 presents the BAC distribution for patrons by hour of interview[17]. The median BAC generally increased throughout the night. There was an increase in the BAC of patrons until 12am, with a slight decline at 1am, before peaking at a median BAC of .101.

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[17] Outliers were excluded from figure. Median BAC levels from 9pm-10pm should be interpreted with caution given the low number of interviews conducted in this timeframe ($n = 13$)

Figure 316: BAC distribution by interview hour - Cairns

BAC level was categorised into four BAC thresholds: .000 (no alcohol detected), .001 to .049 (low BAC), .050 to .100 (moderate BAC) and more than .100 (high BAC). There was no significant difference in BAC thresholds across sex ($\chi^2(3) = 1.37$, $p = .712$; Table 105).

Table 105: BAC thresholds by sex - Cairns

	BAC groups				
Sex	**.000**	**.001-.049**	**.050-.100**	**>.100+**	**Total**
Male, *n* (%)	77 (13.8)	84 (15.0)	156 (27.9)	243 (43.4)	560 (100.0)
Female, *n* (%)	64 (15.8)	66 (16.3)	108 (26.7)	166 (41.1)	404 (100.0)
Total, *n* (%)	141 (14.6)	150 (15.6)	264 (27.4)	409 (42.4)	964 (100.0)

Figure 317 shows the percentage of participants in Cairns within each BAC threshold by interview hour[18] ($N = 964$). Generally, the percentage of participants with high BAC readings within each hour increased, with a small decline at 1am-2:59am and 3am-3:59am. The percentage of patrons with no detection of alcohol consumption per hour decreased over the evening, except for the increase from

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[18] 9pm to 9:59pm should be interpreted with caution given the small number of interviews at this time (*n* = 13).

9pm-9:59pm to 10pm-10:59pm. The frequency of low and moderate BAC readings was relatively stable across interview hour, with an increase in moderate BAC and a decline in low BAC at 3am.

Figure 317: Participant percentage within BAC thresholds by interview hour – Cairns (*N* = 964)

Figure 318 presents the BAC distribution trends by month and year of interview[19]. The median BAC was predominately in the moderate range (i.e., .050 - .100), with the exception of October 2016 (i.e., a median BAC of .114) and December 2016 (i.e., a median BAC of .111). Trends appeared relatively stable across time, with some fluctuation across months. Trends across age and sex are not presented due to low numbers by month.

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[19] Outliers were excluded from figure. August 2016 was excluded given the small sample size (*n* = 1)

Figure 318: BAC distribution by month and year of interview – Cairns (*N* = 963)

6.11.3.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY

A total of 2,359 patrons in Fortitude Valley (88.6%) of patrons who participated in the brief or full interview) completed BAC readings[20] and 978 patrons (36.4%) provided an estimated BAC reading[21]. The median and range of patrons' BAC readings and BAC estimates are presented across each age group in Table 106. There was a significant difference in median BAC reading between different age groups, $\chi^2(4) = 38.20$, $p < .001$. However, no significant difference was found in the median BAC estimate between age groups, $\chi^2(4) = 6.92$, $p = .140$.

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[20] This excluded BAC readings above .30 which excluded due to error in entry or breathalyser calibration
[21] This excluded BAC estimates above .40 and patrons who indicated that they were unsure of BAC reading.

Table 106: BAC reading and estimates among participants in Fortitude Valley by age groups

		Age groups				
Variable	**Total**	**18-19**	**20-24**	**25-29**	**30-39**	**40+**
BAC reading [a]						
n	2348	731	1031	337	162	87
Median (range)	.077 (.000-.300)	**.066 (.000-.258)**	**.080 (.000-.300)**	**.086 (.000-.271)**	**.083 (.000-.245)**	**.094 (.000-.238)**
Estimated BAC reading [b]						
n	971	329	403	135	61	43
Median (range)	.070 (.000-.400)	.060 (.000-.400)	.070 (.000-.370)	.068 (.000-.250)	.050 (.000-.370)	.080 (.000-.300)

Note. [a] Age groups were missing 11 cases. [b] Age groups were missing 7 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$)

The median and range of BAC readings and estimates across males and females are presented in Table 107. Males had a significantly higher median BAC reading ($z = -2.28$, $p = .023$) and BAC estimate ($z = -2.31$, $p = .021$) compared to females.

Table 107: BAC reading and estimate among participants in Fortitude Valley by sex

Variable	**Total [a]**	**Male**	**Female**
BAC reading			
n	2358	1350	1008
Median (range)	.077 (.000-.300)	**.080 (.000-.300)**	.075 (.000-.250)
BAC estimate			
n	977	521	456
Median (range)	.070 (.000-.400)	**.070 (.000-.400)**	.060 (.000-.300)

Note. [a] Sex was missing 1 case. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$)

Figure 319 shows the BAC distribution for patrons by hour of interview[22]. A slight increasing trend occurred in the median BAC trend throughout the evening. The median BAC was in the moderate range throughout the evening, ranging from .069 at 11pm-11:59pm and .081 at 4am-4:459am.

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[22] Outliers were excluded from figure. 10pm-10:59pm (*n* = 8 cases) and 5am-5:59am (*n* = 4 cases) was also excluded due to the small sample size

Figure 319: BAC distribution by interview hour – Fortitude Valley

BAC level was categorised into four BAC groups: .000 (no alcohol detected), .001 to .049 (low BAC), .05 to .100 (moderate BAC) and more than .100 (high BAC). There was a significant difference in BAC groupings across sex ($\chi^2(3) = 10.11$, $p = .018$), where a higher portion of females had low (20.9%) or moderate (35.6%) BAC readings comparative to males (17.4% and 33.6% respectively) and a higher proportion of males had a high BAC reading (35.9%), compared to females (30.2%; Table 108).

Table 108: BAC thresholds by sex – Fortitude Valley

	BAC groups				
Sex [a]	**.000**	**.001-.049**	**.050-.100**	**>.100+**	**Total**
Male *n* (%)	**178 (13.2)**	**235 (17.4)**	**453 (33.6)**	**484 (35.9)**	1350 (100.0)
Female *n* (%)	**134 (13.3)**	**211 (20.9)**	**359 (35.6)**	**304 (30.2)**	1008 (100.0)
Total *n* (%)	311 (13.2)	446 (18.9)	812 (34.7)	788 (33.4)	2358 (100.0)

Note. [a] Sex was missing 1 case. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$)

Figure 320 shows the percentage of participants in Fortitude Valley within each BAC threshold groups by interview hour[23]. There is a large proportion of moderate and high BAC readings from

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[23] 10pm-10:59pm (*n* = 8) and 5am-5:59am (*n* = 4) were excluded from figure given small sample size

patrons per hour throughout the evening. The portion of patrons with low BAC readings and no alcohol detected gradually declined throughout the evening.

Figure 320: Participant percentage within BAC thresholds by interview hour – Fortitude Valley (*N* = 2,359)

Figure 321 presents the BAC distribution trends by month and year of interview[24]. The median BAC was consistently moderate in range (i.e., .050-.100). Trends appeared relatively stable across time, with some fluctuation across months. Monthly BAC distribution by sex is shown in Figure 322[25]. Again, trends appear relatively stable across time for both males and females.

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[24] Outliers were excluded from figure
[25] Outliers were excluded from figure

Figure 321: BAC distribution by month and year of interview – Fortitude Valley (*N* = 2358)

Figure 322: BAC distribution across month and year of interview by sex – Fortitude Valley

WEST END COMPARISON

In West End, 293 patrons completed BAC readings (84.7%), and 211 patrons (61.0%) provided an estimated BAC reading (see Appendix 2 for further details). Patrons in Fortitude Valley had a significantly higher median BAC reading (*Mdn* = .077; *z* = -2.04, *p* = .042) and BAC estimate (*Mdn* =

.070; z = -2.17, p = .030) than participants in West End (BAC reading Mdn = .065; BAC estimate Mdn = .060). The distribution of BAC reading by site across month and year is presented in Figure 323[26]. As indicated prior, the median BAC in Fortitude Valley was consistently moderate in range (i.e., .050 - .100), whereas the median BAC reading in West End fluctuated from .000 (no detection of alcohol consumption) to a moderate BAC range (peaking at .084 in June 2017). Notably, only nine monthly timepoints[27] were available in West End, compared to 23 timepoints in Fortitude Valley.

Figure 323: BAC distribution in Fortitude Valley and West End by month and year of interview

6.11.3.3. SURFERS PARADISE

Of patrons who had completed the brief or full interview in Surfers Paradise, 260 patrons (89.3%) completed BAC readings[28] and 219 patrons (75.3%) provided an estimated BAC reading[29]. Medians across each age group are presented in Table 109.

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[26] Outliers were excluded from figure
[27] West End June 2018 was excluded from the figure as there were less than 10 cases (n = 9)
[28] This excluded BAC readings above .30 which excluded due to error in entry or breathalyser calibration
[29] This excluded BAC estimates above .40 and patrons who indicated that they were unsure of BAC reading

Table 109: BAC reading and estimates among participants in Surfers Paradise by age groups

	Age groups [a]					
Variable	**Total**	**18-19**	**20-24**	**25-29**	**30-39**	**40+**
BAC reading						
n	257	109	108	24	14	2
Median [b] (range)	.086 (.000-.290)	.077 (.000-.290)	.090 (.000-.220)	.092 (.000-.222)	.095 (.000-.280)	.081 (.000-.162)
Estimated BAC reading						
n	216	88	90	22	14	2
Median [b] (range)	.070 (.000-.300)	.070 (.000-.290)	.065 (.000-.300)	.080 (.000-.250)	.063 (.000-.170)	.045 (.000-.090)

Note. [a] Age groups were missing 3 cases. [b] Significant tests were not undertaken as there were <5 cases in 40+ years group.

The median and range of BAC readings and estimates across males and females are presented in Table 110. Male participants had a significantly higher median BAC reading ($z = -2.64$, $p = .008$) compared to female participants. However, there was no significant difference between the estimated BAC of males and females ($z = -1.20$, $p = .229$).

Table 110: BAC reading and estimate among participants in Surfers Paradise by sex

Variable	**Total**	**Male**	**Female**
BAC reading			
n	260	139	121
Median (range)	.086 (.000-.290)	**.095 (.000-.290)**	.071 (.000-.250)
BAC estimate			
n	219	119	100
Median (range)	.070 (.000-.300)	**.070 (.000-.300)**	.060 (.000-.290)

Note. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Figure 324 shows the BAC distribution for patrons by hour of interview[30]. The was some fluctuation in the median BAC across time, with a decline in the median BAC at 12am-12:59am and 2am-2:59am, before increasing again at 3am-3:59am. The median BAC was in the moderate range throughout the evening, ranging .067 at 2am-2:59am and .093 at 3am-3:459am.

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[30] Outliers were excluded from figure. The hours 9pm-9:59pm and 4am-4:59am were excluded due to the small number of cases (*n* = 8 cases)

Figure 324: BAC distribution by interview hour – Surfers Paradise

BAC level was categorised into four BAC groups: .000 (no alcohol detected), .001 to .049 (low BAC), .050 to .100 (moderate BAC) and more than .100 (high BAC). There was no significant difference in BAC groupings across sex ($\chi^2(3) = 4.07$, $p = .254$; Table 111).

Table 111: BAC thresholds by sex – Surfers Paradise

Sex	BAC groups				
	.000	.001-.049	.050-.100	>.100+	Total
Male, *n* (%)	20 (14.4)	17 (12.2)	38 (27.3)	64 (46.0)	139 (100.0)
Female, *n* (%)	24 (19.8)	20 (16.5)	35 (28.9)	42 (34.7)	121 (100.0)
Total, *n* (%)	44 (16.9)	37 (14.2)	73 (28.1)	106 (40.8)	260 (100.0)

Figure 325 shows BAC threshold groups by interview hour[31]. Unlike other SNPs, the percentage of participants with no alcohol detected per hour increased throughout the evening, and the proportion of patrons with a high or moderate BAC declined throughout the evening until 2am.

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[31] 9pm-10pm (*n* = 1), 10pm-11pm (*n* = 5) and 4am-5am (*n* = 7) were excluded from this figure given the low numbers of participants who record a BAC reading at this time

Figure 325: Participant percentage within BAC thresholds by interview hour – Surfers Paradise (*N* = 260)

Figure 326 presents the BAC distribution by month and year[32]. There appeared to be a small decline in the median BAC in March and May 2017. The median BAC then increased in July 2017, followed by a predominately declining trend until May 2018. Given the low numbers of BAC readings per month, the median BAC was not examined across age or sex.

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[32] Outliers were excluded from figure

Figure 326: BAC distribution by month and year of interview – Surfers Paradise (*N* = 260)

6.11.4.   PRE-DRINKING BEHAVIOUR

Across all SNPs, 83.7% of participants reported drinking alcoholic beverages prior to attending the precinct (i.e. pre-drinking).

6.11.4.1. CAIRNS

The majority of participants (77.4%) reported pre-drinking before their current night out (i.e. consuming alcohol before attending licensed venues/'going out'[33]; see Table 112). There was no statistically significant difference in the reporting of pre-drinking between male and female participants ($\chi^2 = 1.44$, $p = .230$). However, male participants did consume significantly greater amounts of alcohol when pre-drinking compared to female participants ($z = -5.43$, $p < .001$). A 5x2 chi-square analysis showed people from younger age groups were significantly more likely to report

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[33] Pre-drinking was missing for 96 cases.

pre-drinking ($\chi^2(4) = 12.67$, $p = .013$) and a Kruskal-Wallis H test revealed that younger people also consumed high quantities of pre-drinks than older patrons ($\chi^2(4) = 20.65$, $p < .001$).

Table 112: Pre-drinking behaviours by sex and age in Cairns

Variable n (%)		Pre-drink [a] n (%)	Pre-drinks Consumed [a] Median (range)
Sex			
Male	($n = 570$)	449 (78.8)	**5 (0-40)**
Female	($n = 434$)	328 (75.6)	**3 (0-24)**
Total	($n = 1004$)	777 (77.4)	4 (0-40)
Age [b]			
18-19	($n = 222$)	**181 (81.5)**	**4 (0-33)**
20-24	($n = 357$)	**284 (79.6)**	**4 (0-40)**
25-29	($n = 200$)	**150 (75.0)**	**4 (0-23)**
30-39	($n = 130$)	**100 (76.9)**	**3 (0-25)**
40+	($n = 86$)	**55 (64.0)**	**2 (0-24)**

Note. [a] Pre-drinking was missing for 96 cases. [b] Age groups were missing 9 cases. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

The number of pre-drinks consumed was categorised into five thresholds: > 0-2 standard drinks, > 2-4 standard drinks, > 4-6 standard drinks, > 6-8 standard drinks and > 8 standard drinks. There was a significant difference in pre-drinking thresholds across sex ($\chi^2(4) = 49.98$, $p < .001$; Table 113), with 29% of males reporting that they had consumed more than 8 standard pre-drinks, compared to just approximately 13% of females.

Table 113: Pre-drinking thresholds by sex - Cairns

Sex	Pre-drinking thresholds					
	> 0-2 drinks	> 2-4 drinks	> 4-6 drinks	> 6-8 drinks	> 8 drinks	Total
Male, n (%)	**64 (14.3)**	**95 (21.2)**	**108 (24.1)**	**52 (11.6)**	**130 (29.0)**	449 (100.0)
Female, n (%)	**89 (27.1)**	**100 (30.5)**	**53 (16.2)**	**43 (13.1)**	**43 (13.1)**	328 (100.0)
Total, n (%)	153 (19.7)	195 (25.1)	161 (20.7)	95 (12.2)	173 (22.3)	777 (100.0)

Note. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Pre-drinking by alcohol consumption patterns are presented in Table 114. Participants who reported engaging in pre-drinking were more likely to engage in heavier alcohol consumption patterns. Specifically, those who reported pre-drinking versus those who had not recorded a higher BAC ($z = -8.11$, $p < .001$) and a reported a higher BAC estimate ($z = -8.46$, $p < .001$). Further, participants who

had been pre-drinking had been drinking/partying for longer than participants who did not report pre-drinking (z = -4.44, p < .001) and consumed a greater quantity of energy drinks (z = -2.75, p = .006).

Table 114: Pre-drinking by current night alcohol consumption in Cairns

Variable	Total [a]	Pre-drink	
		Yes	No
BAC reading			
n	888	696	192
Median (range)	.087 (.000-.289)	**.095 (.000-.280)**	**.045 (.000-.289)**
BAC estimate			
n	753	570	183
Median (range)	.070 (.000-.400)	**.080 (.000-.400)**	**.050 (.000-.250)**
Hours drinking/partying			
n	991	768	223
Median (range)	4 (0-34)	**4.5 (0-34)**	**4 (0-14)**
Qty energy drinks consumed [b]			
n	342	249	93
Median (range)	0 (0-10)	**0 (0-10)**	**0 (0-6)**

Note. [a] Sample who responded to alcohol consumption and pre-drinking variables. [b] Full interview variable only. Bolded values indicate statistically significant (p < .05).

Table 115 presents pre-drinking across self-reported risky and harmful behaviour. Participants were significantly more likely to report consuming energy drinks on the night interviewed (χ^2 = 6.36, p = .012). A Fisher's exact[34] test revealed participants who reported pre-drinking were significantly more likely to report driving while intoxicated in the past three months (p = .012). However, participants who reported pre-drinking were not more likely to engage in other risk behaviours compared to participants who reported no alcohol consumption prior to going out. Specifically, participants who reported pre-drinking were not significantly more likely to report:

- Consumption of illicit drugs pre-interview (χ^2 = 2.11, p = .147).
- Refusal of service (χ^2 = 3.41, p = .068) at a licensed venue in the past three months, while intoxicated

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[34] When the observed or expected cell count was < 5 cases, Fisher's exact tests were conducted. Significant Fisher's exact tests are reported (p < .05)

- Refusal of entry ($\chi^2 = .70$, $p = .403$) into a licensed venue in the past three months, while intoxicated

- Being ejected from a licensed venue in the past three months ($\chi^2 = 2.5$, $p = .114$)

- An experience of alcohol-related injury or accident in the past three months ($\chi^2 = 2.94$, $p = .087$)

- An experience of any aggression in the past three months ($\chi^2 = .68$, $p = .410$)

Table 115: Pre-drinking by consumption patterns and risk behaviour in Cairns

Variable (*n*) [a]	Pre-drink		
	Total *n* (%)	Yes *n* (%)	No *n* (%)
Consumed illicit drugs (*n* = 926)	114 (12.3)	94 (13.2)	20 (9.4)
Experienced aggression or unwanted sexual attention in the past 3 months (*n* = 884)	388 (43.9)	301 (44.7)	87 (41.4)
Suffered an alcohol-related injury or accident [b] (*n* = 866)	104 (12.0)	87 (13.0)	17 (8.5)
Full interview variables			
Consumed energy drinks (*n* = 342)	101 (29.5)	**83 (33.3)**	**18 (19.4)**
Damaged property [b] (*n* = 350)	10 (2.9)	6 (2.4)	4 (4.1)
Drove a vehicle [b] (*n* = 353)	39 (11.0)	**35 (13.6)**	**4 (4.2)**
Refused service at venue [b] (*n* = 354)	45 (12.7)	38 (14.7)	7 (7.4)
Refused entry at venue [b] (*n* = 348)	38 (10.9)	30 (11.8)	8 (8.6)
Ejected from venue [b] (*n* = 347)	42 (12.1)	35 (13.8)	7 (7.5)

Note. [a] (*n*) = sample who responded to consumption, harm or offending variable and pre-drinking variable. [b] Experienced in the past three months while intoxicated. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Figure 327 presents the percentage of self-reported pre-drinking by sex across month and year. The total rate of pre-drinking fluctuated across time decreasing from 86.4% in September 2016 to 68% in November 2016. There was a general incline in the total rate of pre-drinking by month from November 2016 to November 2017, though a decline in the months of April 2017 and July 2017 were evident. The total rate of pre-drinking decreased until March 2018, rising again in April 2018. Similar trends were seen in males and females, yet males self-reported pre-drinking appeared to fluctuate less, with the exception of a sharp decline in pre-drinking rate in March (48.4%). These trends should be interpreted with caution and only provide an indication of whether participants reported pre-drinking,

not the quantity of pre-drinks consumed. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors.

Figure 327: Frequency of pre-drinking in males and females across time – Cairns

Figure 328 presents the quantity of pre-drinks by month and year of interview[35]. The median quantity of pre-drinks consumed showed some fluctuation over time, with a low of 2.0 pre-drinks in July 2017 and a peak of 6.0 pre-drinks in April 2018. There was a broader range[36] of pre-drinks consumed in June 2017, with patrons reporting the consumption of 0-23 pre-drinks. Again, trends should be interpreted with caution and are not presented across age and sex due to low numbers of participants per month.

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[35] Outliers were excluded from figure. August 2016 (*n* = 3) and May 2018 (*n* = 21) were also excluded given the small sample size.
[36] Refers to non-outlier range

Figure 328: Quantity of pre-drinks by month and year of interview – Cairns (*N* = 1,004)

6.11.4.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY

The majority of participants (85.7%) reported pre-drinking during their current night out (i.e. consuming alcohol before attending licensed venues/'going out'[37]; see Table 116). There was a significant difference in the reporting of pre-drinking between male and female participants (χ^2 = 5.68, p = .017), with females being more likely to pre-drink than males. However, male participants consumed significantly greater amounts of alcohol when pre-drinking compared to female participants (z = -7.08, p < .001). People from younger age groups were significantly more likely to report pre-drinking ($\chi^2(4)$ = 42.97, p < .001) and consumption of a higher quantity of pre-drinks compare to older patrons ($\chi^2(4)$ = 46.12, p < .001).

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[37] Pre-drinking was missing for 78 cases.

Table 116: Pre-drinking behaviours by sex and age in Fortitude Valley

Variable n (%)		Pre-drink [a] n (%)	Pre-drinks Consumed [a] Median (range)
Sex			
Male	(*n* = 1467)	**1236 (84.3)**	**6 (0-40)**
Female	(*n* = 1118)	**979 (87.6)**	**5 (0-25)**
Total	(*n* = 2585)	2215 (85.7)	5 (0-40)
Age [c]			
18-19	(*n* = 807)	**715 (88.6)**	**6 (0-40)**
20-24	(*n* = 1126)	**989 (87.8)**	**5 (0-30)**
25-29	(*n* = 377)	**302 (80.1)**	**5 (0-30)**
30-39	(*n* = 174)	**135 (77.6)**	**4 (0-25)**
40+	(*n* = 88)	**63 (71.6)**	**2 (0-22)**

Note. [a] Pre-drinking missing for 78 cases. [b] Sex was missing 1 case. [c] Age was missing 14 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

The number of pre-drinks consumed was categorised into five thresholds: > 0-2 standard drinks, > 2-4 standard drinks, > 4-6 standard drinks, > 6-8 standard drinks and > 8 standard drinks. There was a significant difference in pre-drinking thresholds across sex ($\chi^2(4) = 119.41$, $p < .001$; Table 117), with 36.8% of males reporting that they had consumed more than 8 standard pre-drinks, compared to just under 17% of females.

Table 117: Pre-drinking thresholds by sex – Fortitude Valley

Sex [a]	Pre-drinking thresholds					
	> 0-2 drinks	> 2-4 drinks	> 4-6 drinks	> 6-8 drinks	> 8 drinks	Total
Male, *n* (%)	**136 (11.0)**	**186 (15.0)**	**269 (21.8)**	**190 (15.4)**	**455 (36.8)**	1236 (100.0)
Female, *n* (%)	**170 (17.4)**	**230 (23.5)**	**249 (25.4)**	**166 (17.0)**	**164 (16.8)**	979 (100.0)
Total, *n* (%)	306 (13.8)	416 (18.8)	518 (23.4)	356 (16.1)	619 (27.9)	2215 (100.0)

Note. [a] Sex was missing 1 case. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Self-reported pre-drinking was examined across engagement in risky and harmful behaviours (Table 118) and alcohol consumption variables (Table 119). Overall, participants who reported pre-drinking before attending licensed venues/'going out' were more likely to engage in heavier alcohol consumption patterns and risk behaviours than patrons who did not report pre-drinking. Specifically, those who reported pre-drinking were found to:

- Record a higher BAC ($z = -13.18$, $p < .001$)

- Report a higher BAC estimate ($z = -8.59$, $p < .001$)

- Report partying/drinking for a longer duration ($z = -7.73$, $p < .001$)

- Be more likely to consume drugs pre-interview ($\chi^2 = 19.66$, $p < .001$)

- Be more likely to have been involved in any aggressive behaviours or experience unwanted sexual attention in and around licensed venues in the last three months ($\chi^2 = 4.36$, $p = .037$)

- Be more likely to report that they had been refused service at a licensed venue in the past three months, whilst intoxicated ($\chi^2 = 7.96$, $p = .005$)

- Be more likely to report that they had been refused entry at a licensed venue in the past three months, whilst intoxicated ($\chi^2 = 12.24$, $p < .001$)

- Be more likely to report that they had been ejected from venues while intoxicated in the past three months ($\chi^2 = 3.95$, $p = .047$),

- Be more likely to report alcohol-related injury or accident in the past three months ($\chi^2 = 4.21$, $p = .040$)

- Be more likely to report drive while intoxicated in the past three months ($\chi^2 = 5.46$, $p = .020$)

Participants who reported pre-drinking were not more likely to have consumed energy drinks ($\chi^2 = .89$, $p = .346$), or to have consumed a greater quantity of energy drinks ($z = -1.07$, $p = .284$), or committed property damage in the past three months ($\chi^2 = 2.25$, $p = .133$).

Table 118: Pre-drinking by current night alcohol consumption patterns in Fortitude Valley

Variable	Total [a]	Pre-drink	
		Yes	No
BAC reading			
n	2292	1978	314
Median (range)	.077 (.000-.300)	**.082 (.000-.300)**	**.023 (.000-.255)**
BAC estimate			
n	956	805	151
Median (range)	.070 (.000-.400)	**.070 (.000-.370)**	**.030 (.000-.400)**
Hours drinking/partying			
n	2554	2190	364
Median (range)	5 (0-40)	**5 (0-36)**	**4 (0-40)**
Qty energy drinks consumed [b]			
n	928	782	146
Median (range)	0 (0-10)	0 (0-10)	0 (0-5)

Note. [a] Sample who responded to alcohol consumption and pre-drinking variables. [b] Full interview variable only. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Table 119: Pre-drinking by consumption patterns and risk-behaviour in Fortitude Valley

Variable (*n*) [a]	Pre-drink		
	Total	Yes	No
	n (%)	*n* (%)	*n* (%)
Consumed illicit drugs (*n* = 2427)	275 (11.3)	**260 (12.5)**	**15 (4.3)**
Experienced aggression or unwanted sexual attention in the past 3 months (*n* = 2201)	1204 (54.7)	**1043 (55.6)**	**161 (49.4)**
Any alcohol-related injuries or accidents [b] (*n* = 2008)	296 (14.7)	**263 (15.4)**	**33 (10.9)**
Full interview variables			
Consumed energy drinks (*n* = 928)	252 (27.2)	217 (27.7)	35 (24.0)
Damaged property [b] (*n* = 971)	32 (3.3)	30 (3.7)	2 (1.3)
Drove a vehicle [b] (*n* = 944)	105 (11.1)	**97 (12.1)**	**8 (5.5)**
Refused service at venue [b] (*n* = 968)	133 (13.7)	**123 (15.1)**	**10 (6.5)**
Refused entry at venue [b] (*n* = 964)	162 (16.8)	**151 (18.6)**	**11 (7.1)**
Ejected from venue [b] (*n* = 937)	121 (12.9)	**109 (13.9)**	**12 (7.9)**

Note. [a] (*n*) = sample who responded to consumption, harm or offending variable and pre-drinking variable. [b] Experienced in the past three months while intoxicated. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Figure 329 presents the percentage of participants who reported pre-drinking prior to their night out by sex across time. The total rate of pre-drinking across time appeared relatively stable, ranging from a monthly low of 78.9% in March 2017 to a high of 91.1% in April 2018. The appeared to greater fluctuation in the frequency of pre-drinking by sex. In females, there was a peak of 100% in November 2016, before declining to 69.6% in March 2017. Thereafter there appeared to be a slightly increasing trend, with some fluctuation. These trends should be interpreted with caution and only provide an indication of whether participants reported pre-drinking, not the quantity of pre-drinks consumed. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors.

Figure 329: Frequency of pre-drinking across time– Fortitude Valley

Figure 330 presents the quantity of pre-drinks by month and year of interview[38]. The median quantity of pre-drinks consumed showed some fluctuation over time, with a median number of pre-drinks per month ranging from 4 to 6 standard drinks.

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[38] Outliers were excluded from figure.

Figure 330: Quantity of pre-drinks by month and year of interview – Fortitude Valley (*N* = 2,586)

WEST END COMPARISON

The percentage of patrons that reported pre-drinking on the night interviewed in Fortitude Valley (85.7%, *n* = 2,216) was significantly higher than the portion of participants who reported pre-drinking in West End (63.0%, *n* = 211; χ^2 = 108.83, *p* < .001). Participants in Fortitude Valley also reported a significantly higher median number of pre-drinks (*Mdn* = 5) compared patrons in West End (*Mdn* = 2; *z* = -10.11, *p* < .001). The percentage of participants who reported pre-drinking across Fortitude Valley and West End are compared by sex and age in Table 120. Females and males in Fortitude Valley were significantly more likely than females and males in West End to report pre-drinking on the night interviewed (χ^2 = 82.34, *p* < .001; χ^2 = 38.07, *p* < .001; respectively). Participants across all age groups in Fortitude Valley, except patrons aged 40+ years, were significantly more likely to report pre-drinking than patrons in West End.

Table 120: Frequency of pre-drinking across Fortitude Valley and West End by gender and age

Variable n (%)	Consumed Pre-drinks		χ^2 (df, N)
	Fortitude Valley n = 2586	West End n = 335	
Sex [a]			
Male	**1236 (84.3)**	**141 (66.8)**	**38.07 (1, 1678)**
Female	**979 (87.6)**	**70 (56.5)**	**82.34 (1, 1242)**
Age [b]			
18-19	715 (88.6)	15 (78.9)	-
20-24	**989 (87.8)**	**85 (64.9)**	**49.68 (1, 1257)**
25-29	**302 (80.1)**	**61 (67.8)**	**6.38 (1, 467)**
30-39	**135 (77.6)**	**34 (49.3)**	**18.70 (1, 243)**
40+	63 (71.6)	14 (60.9)	0.99 (1, 111)
TOTAL	**2215 (85.7)**	**211 (63.0)**	**108.83 (1, 2921)**

Note. [a] Sex was missing 1 case. [b] Age groups were missing 17 cases. [c] Chi-square analyses were not conducted as some observations were < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Figure 331 displays the percentage of pre-drinking in participants from Fortitude Valley ($N = 2,586$) and West End ($N = 335$) across time. The frequency of pre-drinking in patrons from Fortitude Valley is consistently higher than West End and remains relatively stable over time. More fluctuation is evident in the percentage of pre-drinking in West End by month, with the bi-monthly percentage ranging from 39.4% to 86.7%. A decline in pre-drinking appeared to occur from April 2017 to March 2018, before peaking in June 2018. Trends over time in West End should be interpreted with caution, given the limited sample size and timepoints available. For further details of pre-drinking in West End see Appendix 2.

Figure 331: Percentage of patrons who reported pre-drinking by month in Fortitude Valley and West End

The quantity of pre-drinks by month and year of interview[39] in West End and Fortitude Valley is presented in Figure 332. Again, caution needs to be taken when examining West End over time, given the small sample size ($N = 335$[40]) and the limited number of time points. However, the median number of pre-drinks consumed is lower than Fortitude Valley, except for January 2018, where the median number of drinks reaches 7.

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[39] Outliers were excluded from figure.
[40] A limited number of responses were available in February 2018 ($n = 16$) and June 2018 ($n = 15$) and results should be interpreted with caution

Figure 332: Quantity of pre-drinks in Fortitude Valley and West End by month and year of interview

6.11.4.3. SURFERS PARADISE

The majority of participants (87.7%) in Surfers Paradise reported pre-drinking during their current night out (i.e. consuming alcohol before attending licensed venues/'going out'[41]; see Table 121). There was no statistically significant difference in the reporting of pre-drinking between male and female participants ($\chi^2 = .50$, $p = .481$). However, male participants did report consuming significantly greater amounts of alcohol when pre-drinking, compared to female participants ($z = -3.79$, $p < .001$).

Table 121: Pre-drinking behaviours by sex and age in Surfers Paradise

Variable n (%)		Pre-drink n (%)	Pre-drinks Consumed Median (range)
Sex			
Male	(n = 146)	130 (89.0)	**6 (0-25)**
Female	(n = 131)	113 (86.3)	**5 (0-20)**
Total	(n = 277)	243 (87.7)	6 (0-25)

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[41] Pre-drinking was missing for 14 cases.

Variable n (%)		Pre-drink n (%)	Pre-drinks Consumed Median (range)
Age [a]			
18-19	(n =116)	100 (86.2)	6 (0-23)
20-24	(n = 116)	104 (89.7)	6 (0-25)
25-29	(n = 22)	21 (95.5)	5.5 (0-20)
30-39	(n = 18)	15 (83.3)	6.5 (0-25)
40+	(n = 3)	1 (33.3)	0 (0-3)

Note. [a] Chi-square analyses were not undertaken as there was <5 cases in the 40+ age group. Pre-drinking was missing for 18 cases. Age groups were missing 2 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

The number of pre-drinks consumed was categorised into five thresholds: > 0-2 standard drinks, > 2-4 standard drinks, > 4-6 standard drinks, > 6-8 standard drinks and > 8 standard drinks. There was a significant difference in pre-drinking thresholds across sex ($\chi^2(4) = 17.96$, $p = .001$; Table 122), with almost 45% of males reporting that they had consumed more than 8 standard pre-drinks, compared to 29.3% of females.

Table 122: Pre-drinking thresholds by sex – Surfers Paradise

Sex	Pre-drinking thresholds					
	> 0-2 drinks	> 2-4 drinks	> 4-6 drinks	> 6-8 drinks	> 8 drinks	Total
Male, n (%)	**12 (9.2)**	**17 (13.1)**	**29 (22.3)**	**14 (10.8)**	**58 (44.6)**	130 (100.0)
Female, n (%)	**14 (12.4)**	**32 (28.3)**	**31 (27.4)**	**12 (10.6)**	**24 (29.3)**	113 (100.0)
Total, n (%)	26 (10.7)	49 (20.2)	60 (24.7)	26 (10.7)	82 (33.7)	243 (100.0)

Note. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Self-reported pre-drinking was examined across engagement in risky and harmful behaviours (Table 123) and alcohol consumption variables (Table 124). Participants who reported pre-drinking before attending licensed venues/'going out' were more likely to engage in heavier alcohol consumption patterns. Specifically, those who reported pre-drinking versus those who had not:

- Recorded a higher BAC ($z = -3.70$, $p < .001$)
- Reported a higher BAC estimate ($z = -3.25$, $p = .001$)
- Reported partying/drinking for a longer duration ($z = -4.32$, $p < .001$)

However, participants who reported pre-drinking were not more likely to differ on the quantity of energy drinks consumed ($z = -.16$, $p = .876$) or likelihood of being involved in any aggressive behaviours or experiencing unwanted sexual attention in and around licensed venues in the last three months ($\chi^2 = .05$, $p = .826$).

Table 123: Pre-drinking behaviour by current night alcohol consumption in Surfers Paradise

Variable	Total [a]	Pre-drink	
		Yes	No
BAC reading			
n	250	220	30
Median (range)	.085 (.000-.290)	**.091 (.000-.290)**	**.005 (.000-.250)**
BAC estimate			
n	212	184	28
Median (range)	.070 (.000-.300)	**.070 (.000-.300)**	**.010 (.000-.290)**
Hours drinking/partying			
n	272	240	32
Median (range)	5 (0-24)	**5 (.5-24)**	**3.25 (0-9.5)**
Qty energy drinks consumed [b]			
n	147	130	17
Median (range)	0 (0-5)	0 (0-5)	0 (0-5)

Note. [a] Sample who responded to alcohol consumption and pre-drinking variables. [b] Full interview variable only. Bolded values indicate statistical significance (*p* < .05).

Table 124: Pre-drinking behaviours by consumption patterns and risk behaviour in Surfers Paradise

Variable (*n*) [a]	Pre-drink		
	Total	Yes	No
	n (%)	*n* (%)	*n* (%)
Consumed illicit drugs (*n* = 269)	68 (25.3)	64 (27.1)	4 (12.1)
Experienced aggression or unwanted sexual attention in the past 3 months (*n* = 258)	150 (58.1)	132 (57.9)	18 (60.0)
Any alcohol-related injuries or accidents [b] (*n* = 241)	40 (16.6)	39 (18.3)	1 (3.6)
Full interview variables			
Consumed energy drinks [c] (*n* = 147)	39 (26.5)	34 (26.2)	5 (29.4)
Damaged property [b] (*n* = 151)	5 (3.3)	5 (3.7)	0 (0.0)
Drove a vehicle [b] (*n* = 148)	20 (13.5)	20 (15.0)	0 (0.0)
Refused service at venue [b] (*n* = 137)	16 (11.7)	16 (13.0)	0 (0.0)
Refused entry at venue [b] (*n* = 134)	22 (16.4)	21 (17.5)	1 (7.1)
Ejected from venue [b] (*n* = 134)	10 (7.5)	9 (7.5)	1 (7.1)

Note. [a] (*n*) = sample who responded to consumption, harm or offending variable and pre-drinking variable. [b] Experienced in the past three months while intoxicated. [c] Chi-square analysis was not undertaken as the expected count was less than < 5 cases. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases.

Figure 333 presents the frequency of self-reported pre-drinking by sex across time. Total frequency of pre-drinking fluctuated from 77.8% in January 2017 to 91.7% in September 2016. The frequency of pre-drinking in females declined from September 2016 to Jan 2017, with a general increase until

September 2017, then a decline until February 2018. The frequency of pre-drinking in males appeared to increase until May 2017, with a slight decline until September 2017, before stabilising. These trends should be interpreted with caution and only provide an indication of whether participants reported pre-drinking, not the quantity of pre-drinks consumed. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors.

Figure 333: Frequency of pre-drinking by month and year – Surfers Paradise

Figure 334 details the quantity of pre-drinks by month and year of interview[42]. The median quantity of pre-drinks consumed ranged from 4.5 in February 2018 to 7 pre-drinks in May 2017 and July 2017. An increase in the median number of pre-drinks occurred in November 2016, followed by a decline in January 2017. There was then an increase in the median number of pre-drinks consumed from March 2017 to July 2017, followed by a decline in September 2017 to February 2018. Again, these trends should be interpreted with caution, given the small sample size.

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[42] Outliers were excluded from figure.

Figure 334: Quantity of pre-drinks by month and year of interview – Surfers Paradise (*N* = 277)

6.11.5.   DRUG CONSUMPTION PATTERNS

6.11.5.1. CAIRNS

Almost 15% (*n* = 151) of the participants in Cairns reported using substances other than alcohol during their current night out (prior to interview). Just under 12% of participants (*n* = 120) reported using illicit or pharmaceutical drugs during their current night out. A small number of participants (*n* = 82, 7.5%) refused to answer interview questions about other substance use, and interviewers reported that three of these participants (<1%) appeared to be intoxicated.

Table 125 presents the percentage of drug use by type across males and females. Males were significantly more likely to report illicit drug use compared to females (χ^2 = 5.32, *p* = .021). However, there was no significant difference between the number of males and females who reported ecstasy (χ^2 = .27, *p* = .601) and cannabis use (χ^2 = 3.49, *p* = .062).

Table 125: Self-reported substance use during the night of the interview by sex – Cairns

Drug [a]	Total N = 1018 n (%)	Male n = 579 n (%)	Female n = 439 n (%)
Ecstasy	36 (3.5)	22 (3.8)	14 (3.2)
Cocaine	9 (0.9)	7 (1.2)	2 (0.5)
Methamphetamine	11 (1.1)	6 (1.0)	5 (1.1)
Pharmaceutical stimulants	1 (0.1)	1 (0.2)	0 (0.0)
Ketamine	1 (0.1)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.2)
LSD	1 (0.1)	0 (0.0)	1 (0.2)
GHB	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Benzodiazepines	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Opiates	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Cannabis	33 (3.2)	24 (4.1)	9 (2.1)
Mephedrone	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Polydrug use	8 (0.8)	7 (1.2)	1 (.02)
Other	8 (0.8)	5 (0.9)	3 (0.7)
ANY illicit/pharmaceutical drug [b]	120 (11.8)	**80 (13.8)**	**40 (9.1)**

Note. [a] Unavailable for 82 cases. [b] ANY illicit/pharmaceutical drug includes participants who indicated illicit drug use but did not specify drug. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with ≤5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

The percentage of self-reported use of pharmaceutical stimulants and illicit drugs on the night interviewed is presented by month (Figure 335[43]; $N = 1018$). The percentage of self-reported illicit drug consumption dropped from 12.5% in September to 3.9% in October 2016, rising again in November 2016 to 17.6%. There was some fluctuation in the monthly drug consumption rate from December 2016 to April 2018, with declines in April (9.0%), July (7.1%) and November 2017 (7.3%), and April 2018 (6.5%). The percentage of self-reported drug consumption increased in the months of February (17.3%), June (14.9%) and October 2017 (12.2%), and January to March 2018 (12.2-13.0%).

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[43] August 2016 ($n =2$) and May 2018 ($n = 18$) were excluded from figure given small sample size

Figure 335: Percentage of self-reported illicit or pharmaceutical drug consumption by month – Cairns

Table 126 shows reported aggressive incidents, experiences of unwanted sexual attention, harms and offending behaviour in and around licensed venues in the three months prior to the interview according self-report of illicit drugs on the night of interview. A Fisher's exact test indicated that participants who reported driving while under the influence of alcohol in the past three months were significantly more likely to report illicit drug consumption on the night they were interviewed ($p = .002$).

Table 126: Aggression, harm, and offending in the past three months according to self-report illicit drug use on the night of the interview – Cairns

| Variable (*n*)[a] | Illicit drug use | | | |
	Total *n* (%)	Yes *n* (%)	No *n* (%)	χ^2 (df = 1)
Experienced aggression in or around licensed venue in the past three months				
Any aggression or unwanted sexual attention (*n* = 889)	395 (44.4)	47 (44.3)	348 (44.4)	0.00
Physical (*n* = 842)	218 (25.9)	31 (30.7)	187 (25.2)	1.38
Verbal (*n* = 845)	243 (28.8)	26 (26.0)	217 (29.1)	.042
Unwanted sexual attention (*n* = 833)	196 (23.5)	20 (20.0)	176 (24.0)	0.79
Any alcohol related injuries or accidents [b] (*n* = 875)	106 (12.1)	12 (11.4)	94 (12.2)	0.05
Full interview:				
Risk or offending while under the influence of alcohol [b]				
Property damage (*n* = 319)	9 (2.8)	1 (2.7)	8 (2.8)	-
Drove a vehicle [c] (*n* = 324)	34 (10.5)	10 (27.0)	24 (8.4)	-
Refused service at venue [c] (*n* = 326)	42 (12.9)	6 (16.2)	36 (12.5)	-
Refused entry at venue [c] (*n* = 317)	35 (11.0)	6 (16.2)	29 (10.4)	-
Ejected from venue [c] (*n* = 320)	37 (11.6)	6 (17.1)	31 (10.9)	-

Note. [a] (*n*) = sample who responded to harm and offending variable and illicit drug consumption [b] Involvement in the past three months. [c] Chi-square analysis was not undertaken as the expected count was less than < 5 cases. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases.

DRUG SWABS

One hundred and twenty-eight participants in Cairns were invited to be tested for the use of amphetamine, methamphetamine, cocaine, opiates, and cannabis via a saliva drug swab. The majority of respondents (*n* = 97, 75.8%) agreed to the test. Among participants who completed drug swabs, over 30% returned a positive result. Most commonly participants tested positive for amphetamines (15.5% of participants tested, *n* = 15). Table 127 lists the prevalence of positive drug test findings for respondents according to sex. Male and female participants did not significantly differ in the detection of amphetamines (χ^2 = 1.53, *p* = .215) or any drug type (χ^2 = .07, *p* = .788).

Table 127: Positive drug swabs by sex – Cairns

Drug N = 97 [a]	Positive swab result		
	Total n (%)	Male n (%)	Female n (%)
Amphetamine	15 (15.5)	6 (11.3)	9 (20.5)
Methamphetamine	6 (6.2)	2 (3.8)	4 (9.1)
Cocaine	4 (4.1)	3 (5.7)	1 (2.3)
Opiates	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Cannabis	13 (13.4)	10 (18.9)	3 (6.8)
ANY	30 (30.9)	17 (32.1)	13 (29.5)

Note. [a] Total sample that were invited and agreed to complete drug swab. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases.

Of the 120 participants who self-reported illicit drug use, 34 completed a drug swab (55.9% tested positive for any drug). Table 128 presents the self-report responses of participants regarding the use of illicit drugs prior to interview according to positive drug swab results for each drug type. Given the low numbers, a chi-square analysis was only conducted on the self-report of any illicit drug and the identification of any positive drug swab. Patrons were significantly more likely to obtain a positive drug swab if they also had self-reported illicit drug use (χ^2 = 14.83, p < .001).

Table 128: Drug swab result by self-reported drug use pre-interview – Cairns

Drug swab N = 92 [a]	Self-reported drug use [b] Yes/No n	Positive Drug Result n (%)
Methamphetamine	Yes (n = 5)	0 (0.0)
	No (n = 87)	6 (6.9)
Cocaine	Yes (n = 4)	3 (75.0)
	No (n = 88)	0 (0.0)
Opiates	Yes (n = 0)	-
	No (n = 92)	0 (0.0)
Cannabis	Yes (n = 8)	3 (37.5)
	No (n = 84)	9 (10.7)
ANY	Yes (n = 34)	**19 (55.9)**
	No (n = 58)	**10 (17.2)**

Note. [a] Total sample that were invited and agreed to complete drug swab. [b] Self-reported drug use was missing 5 cases that self-reported drug use. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance (p < .05).

Just over 13% (*n* = 329) of patrons in Fortitude Valley reported using substances other than alcohol during their current night out (prior to interview). Over 11% of participants (*n* = 288) reported using illicit or pharmaceutical drugs during their current night out. Approximately 6% of participants (*n* = 165) refused to answer interview questions about other substance use, and an additional seven participants (<1%) who refused to answer the interview question about substance use also appeared intoxicated.

Table 129 presents the percentage of drug use by type across males and females. Males were found to be significantly more likely to report ecstasy (χ^2 = 11.22, *p* = .001), cocaine (χ^2 = 7.68, *p* = .006), cannabis (χ^2 = 11.33, *p* = .001), polydrug use (χ^2 = 11.15, *p* = .001) and any drug use (χ^2 = 23.04, *p* < .001) compared to females. However, there was no significant difference between the number of males and females who reported methamphetamine use (χ^2 = 2.43, *p* = .119). A Fisher's exact test indicated that there was a significant difference in the number of males and females that reported using LSD (*p* = .013).

Table 129: Self-reported substance use during the night of the interview by sex – Fortitude Valley

Drug [a]	Total N = 2498 n (%)	Male n = 1423 n (%)	Female n = 1075 n (%)
Ecstasy	123 (4.9)	**88 (6.2)**	**35 (3.3)**
Cocaine	35 (1.4)	28 (2.0)	7 (0.7)
Methamphetamine	39 (1.6)	27 (1.9)	12 (1.1)
Pharmaceutical stimulants	6 (0.2)	5 (0.4)	1 (0.1)
Ketamine	3 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	1 (0.1)
LSD	9 (0.4)	**9 (0.6)**	**0 (0.0)**
GHB	1 (0.0)	1 (0.1)	0 (0.0)
Benzodiazepines	3 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	1 (0.1)
Opiates	2 (0.1)	2 (0.1)	0 (0.0)
Cannabis	98 (3.9)	**72 (5.1)**	**26 (2.4)**
Mephedrone	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Polydrug Use	47 (1.9)	**38 (2.7)**	**9 (0.8)**
Other	6 (0.2)	5 (0.4)	1 (0.1)
ANY illicit/pharmaceutical drug [b]	288 (11.5)	**202 (14.2)**	**86 (8.0)**

Note. [a] Unavailable for 165 cases. [b] ANY illicit/pharmaceutical drug includes participants who indicated illicit drug use but did not specify drug. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken when there was <5 cases per observation. Bolded values indicate statistical significance (*p* < .05).

The percentage of self-reported pharmaceutical stimulants and illicit drug use on the night interviewed is presented by month (Figure 336; N = 2499). Self-reported illicit drug consumption appeared to gradually decline from June 2016 to October 2016. Thereafter, there was a gradually increasing trend until April 2017, followed by a decline in May 2017 and an increase in June 2017, to a peak of 18.3%. Subsequently, there was a general decline until January 2018, with a rise again in February 2018 and June 2018.

Figure 336: Percentage of self-reported illicit or pharmaceutical drug consumption by month – Fortitude Valley

Table 130 shows reported aggressive incidents, experiences of unwanted sexual attention, harms and offending behaviour in and around licensed venues in the three months according to self-reported illicit drugs on the night interviewed. Patrons who reported experiencing any form of aggression or unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues (χ^2 = 8.04, p = .005), or alcohol-related injury in the past three months (χ^2 = 10.21, p = .001) were significantly more likely to report illicit drug use on the night they were interviewed. Participants who reported being refused service (χ^2 = 6.97, p = .008) or entry (χ^2 = 18.75, p < .001) into a licensed venue, or being ejected from a licensed venue (χ^2 = 14.78, p < .001) while under the influence of alcohol in the past three months were also significantly more likely to report illicit drug consumption. A Fisher's exact test indicated that participants who reported damaging property while intoxicated in the past three months were significantly more likely to report illicit drug consumption on the night they were interviewed (p = .007).

Table 130: Aggression, harm, and offending in the past three months according to self-report illicit drug use on the night of the interview – Fortitude Valley

Variable (n)[a]	Illicit drug use			
	Total n (%)	Yes n (%)	No n (%)	χ^2 (df = 1)
Experienced aggression in or around licensed venue in the past three months				
Any aggression or unwanted sexual attention around licensed venues (2113)	1154 (54.6)	**154 (63.1)**	**1000 (53.5)**	**8.04**
Physical (n = 2002)	556 (27.8)	76 (32.6)	480 (27.1)	3.09
Verbal (n = 1991)	670 (33.7)	88 (38.3)	582 (33.0)	2.48
Unwanted sexual attention (n = 1966)	684 (34.8)	89 (39.6)	595 (34.2)	2.54
Any alcohol related injuries or accidents [b] (n = 1923)	289 (15.0)	**49 (22.3)**	**240 (14.1)**	**10.21**
Full interview				
Risk or offending while under the influence of alcohol [b]				
Property damage [c] (n = 936)	31 (3.3)	9 (8.2)	22 (2.7)	-
Drove a vehicle (n = 919)	106 (11.5)	16 (14.8)	90 (11.1)	1.29
Refused service at venue (n = 927)	126 (13.6)	**23 (21.9)**	**103 (12.5)**	**6.97**
Refused entry at venue (n = 927)	156 (16.8)	**34 (31.5)**	**122 (14.9)**	**18.75**
Ejected from venue (n = 896)	117 (13.1)	**26 (25.0)**	**91 (11.5)**	**14.78**

Note. [a] (n) = sample who responded to harm and offending variable and illicit drug consumption. [b] Involvement in the past three months. [c] Chi-square analysis was not undertaken as the expected count was less than < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

DRUG SWABS

A total of 317 participants in Fortitude Valley were invited to be tested for the use of methamphetamine, cocaine, opiates, and cannabis via a saliva drug swab. Approximately two-thirds of respondents (n = 210, 66.2%) agreed to take the test. Among participants who completed drug swabs, approximately 25% returned a positive result (n = 53). Most commonly participants tested positive for amphetamines (15.8% of participants tested, n = 33). Table 131 lists the prevalence of positive drug test findings for respondents according to sex. Male and female participants did not significantly differ in the detection of methamphetamine ($\chi^2 = .950$, $p = .330$), amphetamine ($\chi^2 = 2.24$, $p = .135$) or any drug type ($\chi^2 = 1.93$, $p = .165$).

Table 131: Positive drug swabs by sex – Fortitude Valley

Drug N = 210 [a]	Positive swab result		
	Total *n* (%)	Male *n* (%)	Female *n* (%)
Amphetamine	33 (15.8)	23 (19.0)	10 (11.4)
Methamphetamine	19 (9.1)	13 (10.7)	6 (6.8)
Cocaine	11 (5.3)	7 (5.8)	4 (4.5)
Opiates	2 (1.0)	1 (0.8)	1 (1.1)
Cannabis	13 (6.2)	9 (7.4)	4 (4.5)
ANY	53 (25.4)	35 (28.9)	18 (20.5)

Note. [a] Total sample that were invited and agreed to complete drug swab. Sex was missing for 1 case. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases.

Of the 288 participants who self-reported illicit drug use, 73 completed a drug swab (57.5% tested positive for any drug). Table 132 presents the self-report responses of participants regarding the use of illicit drugs prior to interview according to positive drug swab results for each drug type. Given the low numbers, a chi-square analysis was only conducted on the self-report of any illicit drug and the identification of methamphetamine, cannabis and any positive drug swab. Patrons were significantly more likely to obtain a positive result of cannabis use ($\chi^2 = 25.16$, $p < .001$), or any a positive drug swab ($\chi^2 = 58.86$, $p < .001$) if they also had self-reported illicit drug use. A Fisher's exact test revealed that participants who self-reported methamphetamine use were significantly more likely to obtain a positive methamphetamine drug swab ($p = .001$).

Table 132: Drug swab result by self-reported drug use pre-interview – Fortitude Valley

Drug swab N = 210 [a]	Self-report drug use [b] Yes/No	Positive Drug Result *n* (%)
Methamphetamine	Yes (*n* = 14)	**6 (42.9)**
	No (*n* = 190)	**13 (6.8)**
Cocaine	Yes (*n* = 12)	9 (75.0)
	No (*n* = 192)	2 (1.0)
Opiates	Yes (*n* = 0)	-
	No (*n* = 204)	2 (1.0)
Cannabis	Yes (*n* = 23)	**7 (30.4)**
	No (*n* = 181)	**6 (3.3)**
ANY	Yes (*n* = 73)	**42 (57.5)**
	No (*n* = 131)	**11 (8.4)**

Note. [a] Total sample that were invited and agreed to complete drug swab. [b] Self-reported drug use was missing 6 cases that self-reported drug use. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken when observations or expect count is < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

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The self-reported consumption of illicit or pharmaceutical drugs on the night interviewed was not significantly different in West End (12.7%, n = 42), compared to Fortitude Valley (11.5%, n = 288; χ^2 = 0.41, p = .522). The most commonly reported drugs consumed at both sites was cannabis (Fortitude Valley = 3.9%; West End = 6.1%) and ecstasy (Fortitude Valley = 4.9%; West End = 3.0%). There was no significant difference in the percentage of participants who completed a saliva drug swab in Fortitude Valley (7.9%) and West End (5.5%; χ^2 = 2.51, p = .113). There was also no significant difference in the portion of participants who obtained a positive drug swab (χ^2 = 0.37, p = .545), with 25.2% swabs revealing positive results in Fortitude Valley and 31.6% in West End.

Figure 337 presents the percentage of participants who self-reported illicit and pharmaceutical drugs in Fortitude Valley and West End by month. The portion of patrons reporting illicit drug consumption in Fortitude Valley and West End was similar across time, with the exception of October 2017 where the percentage of participants in West End rose to 37.5%. These trends should be interpreted with caution, particularly given the small sample size and limited timepoints available in West End. Further details of drug consumption in West End is presented in Appendix 2.

Figure 337: Percentage of patrons who reported consuming illicit or pharmaceutical drugs by month in Fortitude Valley and West End

6.11.5.3. SURFERS PARADISE

Over 25% (n = 73) of the participants in Surfers Paradise reported using illicit or pharmaceutical drugs during their current night out (prior to being interviewed). A small number of participants (n = 8, 2.7%) refused to answer interview questions about other substance use, and the interviewers reported that two of these participants (<1%) appeared to be intoxicated. Table 133 presents the

percentage of drug use by type across males and females. There was no significant difference in the number of males and females that reported any drugs use ($\chi^2 = 3.43$, $p = .064$), or ecstasy use on the night they were interviewed ($\chi^2 = .04$, $p = .850$). A Fisher's exact test found that there was a significant difference in the number of males and females that reported polydrug ($p = .024$), cocaine ($p = .002$) and cannabis use ($p = .049$) on the night they were interviewed.

Table 133 Self-reported substance use during the night of the interview by sex – Surfers Paradise

Drug [a]	Total N = 283 n (%)	Male n = 152 n (%)	Female n = 131 n (%)
Ecstasy	51 (18.0)	28 (18.4)	23 (17.6)
Cocaine	14 (4.9)	**13 (8.6)**	**1 (0.8)**
Methamphetamine	4 (1.4)	3 (2.0)	1 (0.8)
Pharmaceutical stimulants	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Ketamine	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
LSD	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
GHB	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Benzodiazepines	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Opiates	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Cannabis	18 (6.4)	**14 (9.2)**	**4 (3.1)**
Mephedrone	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Polydrug use	13 (4.6)	**11 (7.2)**	**2 (1.5)**
Other	1 (0.4)	1 (0.7)	0 (0.0)
ANY illicit/pharmaceutical drug	73 (25.8)	46 (30.3)	27 (20.6)

Note. [a] Unavailable for 8 cases. [b] ANY illicit/pharmaceutical drug includes participants who indicated illicit drug use but did not specify drug. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken when there was <5 cases per observation.

The percentage of self-reported pharmaceutical stimulants and illicit drug use on the night interviewed is presented by month (Figure 338; $N = 283$). Self-reported illicit drug consumption appeared to gradually decline over time until January 2017 and then increased in March 2017 with a peak of 36.4%. Subsequently, there was a general decline until February 2018, with an increase in the months of September 2017 and May 2018. These trends should be treated with caution given the small sample size and limited timepoints available.

Figure 338: Percentage of self-reported illicit or pharmaceutical drug consumption by month – Surfers Paradise

Table 134 shows reported aggressive incidents, experiences of unwanted sexual attention, harms and offending behaviour in and around licensed venues in the three months prior to the interview according self-report of illicit drugs on the night of interview. People who reported experiencing physical aggression in the past three months were significantly more likely to report illicit drug use (χ^2 = 4.28, p = .039). A Fisher's exact test indicated that participants who reported damaging property while intoxicated in the past three months were significantly more likely to report illicit drug consumption on the night they were interviewed (p = .040). Fisher's exact tests also revealed that participants who were refused service (p = .023) or entry (p < .001) into a licensed venue were significantly more likely to report illicit drug consumption on the night they were interviewed.

Table 134: Aggression, harm, and offending in the past three months according to self-report illicit drug use on the night of the interview – Surfers Paradise

| Variable (n)[a] | Total n (%) | Illicit drug use | | |
		Yes n (%)	No n (%)	χ^2 (df = 1)
Experienced aggression in or around licensed venue in the past three months				
Any aggression or unwanted sexual attention (n = 262)	152 (58.0)	44 (65.7)	108 (55.4)	2.17
Physical (n = 252)	79 (31.3)	**26 (41.9)**	**53 (27.9)**	**4.28**
Verbal (n = 249)	97 (39.0)	31 (49.2)	66 (35.5)	3.73
Unwanted sexual attention (n = 243)	93 (38.3)	24 (39.3)	69 (37.9)	0.04
Any alcohol related injuries or accidents (n = 246)	40 (16.3)	13 (21.7)	27 (14.5)	1.70
Full interview:				
Risk or offending while under the influence of alcohol [b]				
Property damage (n = 150)	6 (4.0)	4 (10.3)	2 (1.8)	-
Drove a vehicle (n = 147)	21 (14.3)	8 (21.1)	13 (11.9)	1.92
Refused service at venue [c] (n = 136)	15 (11.0)	8 (22.9)	7 (6.9)	**-**
Refused entry at venue [c] (n = 133)	20 (15.0)	12 (36.4)	8 (8.0)	**-**
Ejected from venue (n = 133)	10 (7.5)	5 (15.2)	5 (5.0)	-

Note. [a] (n) = sample who responded to harm and offending variable and illicit drug consumption. [b] Involvement in the past three months. [c] Chi-square analysis was not undertaken as the expected count was less than < 5 cases. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with ≤5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

DRUG SWABS

Forty-three participants in Surfer Paradise were invited to be tested for the use of methamphetamine, cocaine, opiates, and cannabis via a saliva drug swab. Most respondents (n = 34, 79.1%) agreed to the test. Of participants who completed the drug swab, 29.4% returned a positive result. Table 135 lists the prevalence of positive drug test findings for these respondents according to sex.

Table 135: Positive drug swabs by sex – Surfers Paradise

Drug N = 34 ᵃ	Positive swab result		
	Total *n* (%)	Male *n* (%)	Female *n* (%)
Amphetamine	3 (8.8)	2 (11.1)	1 (6.3)
Methamphetamine	8 (23.5)	4 (22.2)	4 (25.0)
Cocaine	1 (2.9)	1 (5.6)	0 (0.0)
Opiates	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
Cannabis	3 (8.8)	2 (11.1)	1 (6.3)
ANY	10 (29.4)	6 (33.3)	4 (25.0)

Note. ᵃ Total sample that were invited and agreed to complete drug. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases.

Of the 73 participants who self-reported illicit drug use, 11 completed a drug swab (81.8% tested positive for any drug). Table 136 presents the self-report responses of participants regarding the use of illicit drugs prior to interview according to positive drug swab results for each drug type. Given the low numbers, chi-square analyses were not conducted. A Fisher's exact test revealed that participants who self-reported illicit drug use were significantly more likely to obtain positive drug swab for any drug ($p < .001$).

Table 136: Drug swab result by self-reported drug use pre-interview – Surfers Paradise

Drug swab N = 32 ᵃ	Self-report drug use ᵇ Yes/No	Positive Drug Result *n* (%)
Methamphetamine	Yes (*n* = 1)	1 (100.0)
	No (*n* = 31)	7 (22.6)
Cocaine	Yes (*n* = 3)	1 (33.3)
	No (*n* = 29)	0 (0.0)
Opiates	Yes (*n* = 0)	-
	No (*n* = 32)	0 (0.0)
Cannabis	Yes (*n* = 2)	0 (0.0)
	No (*n* = 30)	3 (10.0)
ANY	Yes (*n* = 11)	**9 (81.8)**
	No (*n* = 21)	**1 (4.8)**

Note. ᵃ Total sample that were invited and agreed to complete drug swab. ᵇ Self-reported drug use was missing 2 cases that self-reported drug use. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

6.11.6.   EXPERIENCES OF AGGRESSION AND HARM

6.11.6.1. CAIRNS

Forty-four percent ($n = 423$) of patrons from Cairns reported that they had been involved in verbal or physical aggression, or experienced unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues in the three months prior to being interviewed (herein referred to as the experience of any aggression). Verbal (28.3%, $n = 259$) incidents were reported to be the most common type of aggression experienced by participants during the three months prior to the interview, followed closely by physical incidents (26.1%, $n = 238$) and unwanted sexual attention (23.3%, $n = 210$).

Table 137 lists the prevalence of each type of aggression among patrons, according to sex. Females were significantly more likely to report having experienced any type of aggression ($\chi^2 = 4.28$, $p = .038$) and unwanted sexual attention ($\chi^2 = 60.28$, $p < .001$) in or around a licensed venue in the past three months; however, there were no significant differences between males and females reported involvement in verbal ($\chi^2 = .71$, $p = .400$) or physical ($\chi^2 = 1.82$, $p = .177$) aggression.

Table 137 also presents the percentages of participants who reported being involved in aggressive behaviours or having experienced unwanted sexual attention during the past three months by age. Age groups varied significantly in their involvement in any incidents ($\chi^2(4) = 55.46$, $p < .001$). Younger patrons were significantly more likely to report experiencing physical aggression ($\chi^2(4) = 26.30$, $p < .001$), verbal aggression ($\chi^2(4) = 26.15$, $p < .001$) and unwanted sexual attention ($\chi^2(4) = 32.99$, $p < .001$) in the past three months, compared to older patrons.

Table 137: Self-reported involvement in aggression by sex and age Cairns

Variable n (%)	Physical N = 913 [a]	Verbal N = 914 [a]	Unwanted Sexual attention N = 903 [a]	Any N = 961 [a]
Sex				
Male	147 (27.7)	155 (29.4)	**69 (13.6)**	**225 (41.1)**
Female	91 (23.8)	104 (26.9)	**141 (35.6)**	**198 (47.8)**
Total	238 (26.1)	259 (28.3)	**210 (23.3)**	**423 (44.0)**
Age [b]				
18-19	**70 (35.2)**	**76 (37.4)**	66 (33.5)	**124 (57.1)**
20-24	**99 (30.7)**	**105 (32.8)**	89 (27.3)	**175 (51.8)**
25-29	**35 (17.9)**	**42 (21.5)**	33 (17.6)	**70 (34.0)**
30-39	**20 (16.7)**	**26 (21.7)**	16 (13.6)	**38 (30.9)**
40+	**14 (18.9)**	**10 (13.7)**	6 (8.3)	**16 (21.6)**

The frequency of participants who reported experiencing verbal and physical aggression and unwanted sexual attention by month is presented in Figure 339. There was in fluctuation in the percentage of participants who reported experiencing all aggressive incidents by month. The rates of all three forms of aggression appeared to increase in February 2017, followed by a declining trend until May 2017. Rates of physical and verbal aggression increased again in June 2017 and January to February 2018, whereas, unwanted sexual attention appeared more stable over this timeframe. These trends should be interpreted with caution and only provide an indication of whether the participant reported experiencing aggression, not the number of occurrences. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors.

Figure 339: Percentage of participants who reported experiencing aggression in the past three months by month - Cairns

Participants who completed the full interview also indicated if they had been involved in other alcohol-related incidents, risky behaviours and offending in the past three months. Table 138 presents the number and percentage of other incidents and risky behaviours across sex. There was no significant difference in the number of males and females that reported driving while under the influence (χ^2 = 3.39, *p* = .066), or experiencing alcohol-related injury (χ^2 = .110, *p* = .740) in the past three months. However, males were significantly more likely to report being ejected from a licensed

venue ($\chi^2 = 6.44$, $p = .011$) and refused service ($\chi^2 = 10.99$, $p = .001$) and entry ($\chi^2 = 5.11$, $p = .024$) in license venue in the past three months.

Table 138: Experience of harm of risky behaviours by sex – Cairns

Experience of harm or risky behaviour in the past three months (n) [a]	Total n (%)	Male n (%)	Female n (%)
Committed property damage while intoxicated [b] ($n = 363$)	11 (3.0)	8 (4.1)	3 (1.8)
Driven a vehicle while intoxicated ($n = 368$)	40 (10.9)	27 (13.6)	13 (7.6)
Refused service at licensed venue ($n = 370$)	49 (13.2)	**37 (18.7)**	**12 (7.0)**
Refused entry to licensed service ($n = 361$)	40 (11.1)	**28 (14.6)**	**12 (7.1)**
Ejected from licensed venue ($n = 363$)	45 (12.4)	**32 (16.5)**	**13 (7.7)**
Experienced alcohol-related injury or accident [c] ($n = 947$)	114 (12.0)	63 (11.7)	51 (12.4)

Note. [a] Sample who responded to risk and offending variable. [b] Chi-square analyses were not undertaken as there was <5 cases. [c] Included in the full and brief interview. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Figure 340 presents the percentage of participants who reported experiencing one or more alcohol-related injuries or accidents in the past three months over time ($N = 945$[44]). There appeared to be some fluctuation over time, with the monthly percentage ranging from 16.9% in January 2018 to 6.3% in February 2018. These trends should be interpreted with caution and only provide an indication of whether the participant reported experiencing an alcohol-related injury or accident, not the number of occurrences. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors.

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[44] August 2016 ($n = 2$) and May 2018 ($n = 23$) were excluded due to small sample size

Figure 340: Percentage of participants who reported experiencing in alcohol-related injury in or around licensed venues in the past three months over time – Cairns

6.11.6.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY

More than half (55.2%, $n = 1,240$) of patrons in Fortitude Valley reported that they had been involved in a form of verbal aggression, physical aggression or experienced unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues in the three months prior to the interview. Unwanted sexual attention (35.3%, $n = 740$) and verbal aggression (33.9%, $n = 721$) were reported to be the most common types experienced by participants during the three months prior to the interview, followed closely by reports of involvement in physical aggression (28.7%, $n = 613$).

Table 139 lists the prevalence of each type of aggression according to sex. Females were significantly more likely to report having experienced any type of aggression ($\chi^2 = 30.40$ $p < .001$) and unwanted sexual attention ($\chi^2 = 234.80$, $p < .001$) in or around a licensed venue in the past three months; however, there were no significant differences between males and females self-reported involvement in verbal ($\chi^2 = 2.12$, $p = .145$) or physical ($\chi^2 = 3.31$, $p = .069$) aggression.

Table 139 also presents the percentage of participants who reported being involved in aggressive behaviours or having experienced unwanted sexual attention during the past three months by age. Overall, younger participants were significantly more likely to report experiencing any type of aggression ($\chi^2(4) = 84.08$, $p < .001$) in the past three months, compared to older participants. Younger patrons were significantly more likely to report experiencing physical aggression ($\chi^2(4) = 30.37$, $p < .001$), verbal aggression ($\chi^2(4) = 32.32$, $p < .001$) and unwanted sexual attention ($\chi^2(4) = 57.36$, $p < .001$) in the past three months, compared to older patrons.

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Table 139: Self-reported involvement in aggression by sex and age – Fortitude Valley

Variable n (%)	Physical N = 2135 [a]	Verbal N = 2126 [a]	Unwanted Sexual attention N = 2097 [a]	Any N = 2248 [a]
Sex [b]				
Male	361 (30.3)	418 (35.2)	**235 (20.6)**	**623 (50.0)**
Female	251 (26.7)	303 (32.2)	**504 (52.7)**	**616 (61.6)**
Total	612 (28.7)	721 (33.9)	739 (35.3)	1239 (55.1)
Age [c]				
18-19	**227 (33.9)**	**255 (37.8)**	**286 (42.9)**	**451 (63.6)**
20-24	**273 (29.9)**	**331 (36.7)**	**330 (36.9)**	**555 (57.7)**
25-29	**74 (22.7)**	**90 (27.5)**	**85 (26.8)**	**156 (45.7)**
30-39	**22 (15.3)**	**29 (20.1)**	**25 (18.0)**	**50 (33.6)**
40+	**15 (20.3)**	**15 (20.0)**	**12 (16.4)**	**23 (29.5)**

Note. [a] Sample who responded to harm variable. [b] Sex missing for 1 case in physical, unwanted sexual attention and any aggression. [c] Age groups missing 7 cases in physical, 4 in verbal, 6 in unwanted sexual aggression and 9 in any aggression. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

The frequency of participants who reported experiencing verbal and physical aggression, and unwanted sexual attention in the past three months by over time is presented in Figure 341. The trends of all aggressive incidents appeared to fluctuate each month, with a decline in August 2016, followed by an increase in rates September 2016 and a decline until November 2016. The percentage of physical and verbal aggression appeared showed a gradual incline from April 2017 to November 2017 followed by a decline in December 2017. Unwanted sexual attention declined in May 2017, followed by an increase until December 2017. Rates of unwanted sexual attention declined after December 2017 until February 2018. All rates of aggression peaked in May 2018, followed by a decline in June 2018. These trends should be interpreted with caution and only provide an indication of whether the participant reported experiencing aggression, not the number of occurrences. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors.

Figure 341: Percentage of participants who reported experiencing aggression in the past three months – Fortitude Valley

Participants who completed the full interview also indicated if they had been involved in other alcohol-related incidents, risky behaviours and offending in the past three months. Table 140 presents the number and percentage of other incidents and risky behaviours across sex. Males were at a higher risk of engaging in risky and offending behaviours, including committing property damage while intoxicated ($\chi^2 = 14.45$, $p < .001$) and driving while under the influence ($\chi^2 = 17.99$, $p = < .001$) in the past three months. Males were also more likely to be ejected from a licensed venue ($\chi^2 = 13.66$, $p < .001$), and be refused service ($\chi^2 = 13.15$, $p < .001$) and entry ($\chi^2 = 36.21$, $p < .001$) into a licensed venue in the past months. Notably, the results for committing property damage should be treated with caution, given the small sample size. In contrast, females were significantly more likely to report experiencing an alcohol-related injury or accident in the past three months ($\chi^2 = 4.17$, $p = .041$).

Table 140: Experience of harm of risky behaviours by sex – Fortitude Valley

Experience of harm or risky behaviour in the past three months (*n*) [a]	Total *n* (%)	Male *n* (%)	Female *n* (%)
Committed property damage while intoxicated (*n* = 992)	35 (3.5)	**29 (5.7)**	**6 (1.2)**
Driven a vehicle while intoxicated (*n* = 969)	112 (11.6)	**79 (15.8)**	**33 (7.1)**
Refused service at licensed venue (*n* = 990)	134 (13.5)	**88 (17.4)**	**46 (9.5)**
Refused entry to licensed service (*n* = 985)	165 (16.8)	**121 (23.6)**	**44 (9.3)**
Ejected from licensed venue (*n* = 959)	125 (13.0)	**83 (17.0)**	**42 (8.9)**
Experienced alcohol-related injury or accident [b] (*n* = 2056)	303 (14.7)	**152 (13.3)**	**151 (16.5)**

Note. [a] Sample who responded to risk and offending variable. [b] Included in the full and brief interview. Sex was missing 1 case. Bolded values indicate statistical significance (*p* < .05).

Figure 342 shows the percentage of participants who reported experiencing one or more alcohol-related injuries or accidents in the past three months over time ($N = 2,056$). The percentage of alcohol-related injuries fluctuated over time with a low of 3.7% in March 2017. The rates of alcohol-related injuries appeared to be higher during the months of November 2016 (23.1%), May 2017 (21.2%) and April 2018 (23.9%). These trends should be interpreted with caution and only provide an indication of whether the participant reported experiencing an alcohol-related injury or accident, not the number of occurrences. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors. Notably, the number of patrons who participated each month varied and a higher proportion of patrons were interviewed in June ($n = 346$) and July 2016 ($n = 432$), comparative to other months.

Figure 342: Percentage of participants who reported experiencing in alcohol-related injury in or around licensed venues in the past three months over time – Fortitude Valley

WEST END COMPARISON

The rate of aggressive, harmful and risky behaviours in the past three months were compared across Fortitude Valley and West End NEPs (Table 141). Patrons in Fortitude Valley were significantly more likely to report experiencing unwanted sexual attention ($\chi^2 = 4.17$, $p < .001$), and physical ($\chi^2 = 13.18$, $p < .001$), verbal ($\chi^2 = 9.34$, $p = .002$) and any form of aggression ($\chi^2 = 16.10$, $p < .001$) in the past three months. There was also a significantly higher portion of participants in Fortitude Valley who reported being refused entry ($\chi^2 = 6.56$, $p = .010$), service ($\chi^2 = 6.81$, $p = .009$), and being ejected from a license venue ($\chi^2 = 8.39$, $p = .004$) in the past three months while under the influence of alcohol.

Table 141: Experience of harm or risky behaviour by site

Experience of harm or risky behaviour in the past three months	Total n (%)	Fortitude Valley n (%)	West End n (%)	χ^2 (df, N)
Physical aggression in past 3 months	668 (27.5)	**613 (28.7)**	**55 (18.6)**	**13.18 (1, 2430)**
Verbal aggression in past 3 months	793 (32.8)	**721 (33.9)**	**72 (24.9)**	**9.34 (1, 2415)**
Unwanted sexual attention in past 3 months	803 (33.7)	**740 (35.3)**	**63 (22.0)**	**20.10 (1, 2384)**
Experienced any aggression in the past 3 months	1371 (53.7)	**1240 (55.2)**	**131 (43.0)**	**16.10 (1, 2553)**
Any alcohol-related injuries or accidents in the past 3 months	343 (14.6)	303 (14.7)	40 (13.6)	.026 (1, 2350)
Damaged property [a][b]	45 (3.7)	35 (3.5)	10 (4.7)	0.64 (1, 1206)
Drove a vehicle [a][b]	138 (11.7)	112 (11.6)	26 (12.2)	0.07 (1, 1182)
Refused service at venue [a][b]	149 (12.4)	**134 (13.5)**	**15 (7.0)**	**6.81 (1, 1203)**
Refused entry at venue [a][b]	185 (15.5)	**165 (16.8)**	**20 (9.1)**	**6.56 (1, 1192)**
Ejected from venue [a][b]	137 (11.8)	**125 (13.0)**	**12 (5.9)**	**8.39 (1, 1164)**

Note. [a] Occurred in the past three months while under the influence of alcohol [b] Only included in the full survey. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Figure 343 displays the percentage of participants who reported experiencing any form of aggression (i.e., unwanted sexual attention, and physical and verbal aggression) in Fortitude Valley ($N = 2,247$) and West End ($N = 305$) across time. The experience of any aggression in Fortitude Valley fluctuated over time, ranging from 39.3% in November 2016 to 80% in May 2018. Generally, lower rates of any aggression were reported in patrons from West End, particularly in the months of February 2017 (23.9%), August 2017 (25.0%) and February 2018 (33.3%). Again, monthly trends in West End should be treated with caution, given the limited timepoints and sample size.

Figure 343: Percentage of patrons who reported experiencing some form of aggression or unwanted sexual attention by month in Fortitude Valley and West End

6.11.6.3. SURFERS PARADISE

More than half ($n = 158$, 58.5%) of patrons interviewed in Surfers Paradise reported that they had been involved in a form of verbal aggression, physical aggression or experienced unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues in the three months prior to the interview. Verbal aggression (39.5%, $n = 101$) and sexual unwanted sexual attention (37.8%, $n = 94$) were reported to be the most common incidents experienced by participants in the past three months, with 31.7% ($n = 82$) of participants also reporting the experience of physical aggression.

Table 142 lists the prevalence of each type of aggression according to sex. Females were significantly more likely to report having experienced unwanted sexual attention ($\chi^2 = 34.82$, $p < .001$) in or around a licensed venue in the past three months. However, there were no significant differences between males and females reported involvement in verbal ($\chi^2 = .734$, $p = .392$), physical ($\chi^2 = 1.33$, $p = .249$), or any type of aggression ($\chi^2 = .654$ $p = .419$). Table 142 also presents the percentage of participants who reported being involved in aggressive incidents by age. Given the low numbers of participants in older age groups, chi-square analyses were not examined.

Table 142: Self-reported involvement in aggression by sex and age – Surfers Paradise

Variable n (%)	Physical N = 259 [a]	Verbal N = 256 [a]	Unwanted Sexual attention N = 249 [a]	Any N = 270 [a]
Sex				
Male	48 (34.8)	57 (41.9)	**25 (19.8)**	81 (56.3)
Female	34 (28.1)	44 (36.7)	**69 (56.1)**	77 (61.1)
Total	82 (31.7)	101 (39.5)	94 (37.8)	158 (58.5)
Age [b]				
18-19	39 (37.9)	48 (48.5)	53 (52.5)	76 (69.7)
20-24	37 (34.3)	44 (40.4)	34 (33.3)	66 (58.4)
25-29	5 (20.8)	8 (33.3)	4 (18.2)	11 (45.8)
30-39	1 (5.3)	1 (5.3)	1 (5.3)	3 (15.8)
40+	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (50.0)	1 (50.0)

Note. [a] Sample who responded to harm variable. [b] Age groups were missing 3 cases. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

The frequency of aggression by type was not examined across time, due to the constraints of a smaller sample size. Given this, the overall rate of any form of aggression (i.e., physical or verbal aggression, or unwanted sexual attention) experienced in the past three months is presented in Figure 344 ($N = 270$). There was a decline in the monthly rate from September to November 2016, before increasing in January 2017. Subsequently, there was a general decline in the monthly percentage of any aggression until October 2017, before a steady increase until May 2018. These findings must be interpreted with caution due to the limited time points available and small sample size.

Figure 344: Percentage of participants who reported experiencing aggression in the past three months – Surfers Paradise

Participants who completed the full interview also indicated if they had been involved in other alcohol-related incidents, risky behaviours and offending in the past three months. Table 143 presents the number and percentage of other incidents and risky behaviours across sex. There was no significant difference in the number of males and females that reported driving while under the influence ($\chi^2 = 0.70$, $p = .404$) or being refused service at a licensed venue ($\chi^2 = 1.33$, $p = .249$) or experiencing alcohol-related injury ($\chi^2 = 0.10$, $p = .757$) in the past three months. However, males were significantly more likely to report being refused entry ($\chi^2 = 9.56$, $p = .002$) into a licensed venue while under the influence of alcohol in the past three months. Given the low number of cases comparing males and females, these findings should be interpreted with caution.

Table 143: Experience of harm of risky behaviours by sex – Surfers Paradise

Experience of harm or risky behaviour in the past three months (n) [a]	Total n (%)	Male n (%)	Female n (%)
Committed property damage while intoxicated ($n = 155$)	6 (3.9)	4 (5.4)	2 (2.5)
Driven a vehicle while intoxicated ($n = 152$)	21 (13.8)	12 (16.2)	9 (11.5)
Refused service at licensed venue ($n = 141$)	16 (11.3)	10 (14.5)	6 (8.3)
Refused entry to licensed service ($n = 138$)	22 (15.9)	**17 (26.2)**	**5 (6.8)**
Ejected from licensed venue ($n = 138$)	11 (8.0)	8 (12.3)	3 (4.1)
Experienced alcohol-related injury or accident [b] ($n = 253$)	42 (16.6)	21 (15.9)	21 (17.4)

Note. [a] Sample who responded to risk and offending variable. [b] Included in the full and brief interview. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Figure 345 presents the percentage of alcohol-related injury or accident in or around licensed venues in the past three months over time ($N = 253$). The monthly rate declined from September to November 2016. There was then a gradual monthly increase until May 2017, followed by a steady decline until October 2017. The rate then increased until May 2018. These trends should be interpreted with caution given the small sample size and only provide an indication of whether the participant reported experiencing an alcohol-related injury or accident, not the number of occurrences. Trends do not account for possible seasonality or other mitigating factors.

Figure 345: Percentage of participants who reported experiencing in alcohol-related injury in or around licensed venues in the past three months over time – Surfers Paradise

6.11.7. KNOWLEDGE OF GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGNS

The following section presents patrons' knowledge of government violence reduction media campaigns in 2016 across SNPs (i.e., Cairns, Fortitude Valley, and Surfers Paradise).

6.11.7.1. CAIRNS

Participants' knowledge of government violence reduction campaigns from 2016 onwards is presented by sex and age in Table 144. Most commonly participants were aware of the One Punch campaign (21.4%; $n = 193$). A significantly higher portion of males had knowledge of the Danny Green campaign (5.4%) compared to females (2.5%; $\chi^2 = 4.54$, $p = .033$). Given the low numbers of participants in older age groups, chi-square analyses were not examined across age groups and knowledge of campaigns.

Table 144: Knowledge of government violence reduction campaigns by sex and age – Cairns

Variable n (%)		Knowledge of government campaigns [a]			
		Danny Green campaign	One punch campaign	General/vague knowledge	Other media campaign/s
Sex					
Male	(*n* = 397)	**27 (5.4)**	106 (21.0)	0 (0.0)	26 (5.2)
Female	(*n* = 504)	**10 (2.5)**	87 (21.9)	0 (0.0)	28 (7.1)
Total	(*n* = 901)	37 (4.1)	193 (21.4)	0 (0.0)	54 (6.0)
Age [b]					
18-19	(*n* = 204)	7 (3.4)	45 (22.1)	0 (0.0)	7 (3.4)
20-24	(*n* = 320)	11 (3.4)	76 (23.8)	0 (0.0)	23 (7.2)
25-29	(*n* = 185)	8 (4.3)	29 (15.7)	0 (0.0)	15 (8.1)
30-39	(*n* = 119)	8 (6.7)	28 (23.5)	0 (0.0)	7 (5.9)
40+	(*n* = 70)	3 (4.3)	14 (20.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (2.9)

Note. [a] Knowledge of government campaigns missing 199 cases. [b] Age group were missing 3 cases. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistically significant (*p* <. 05).

6.11.7.2. FORTITUDE VALLEY

In Table 145, participants' knowledge of government violence reduction campaigns is presented by sex and age. Most commonly participants were aware of the One Punch campaign (33.1%; *n* = 403). A significantly higher portion of males had knowledge of the Danny Green campaign (6.9%) compared to females (4.3%; $\chi^2 = 3.90$, *p* = .048). Given the low numbers of participants in older age groups, chi-square analyses were not examined across age groups and knowledge of campaigns.

Table 145: Knowledge of government violence reduction campaigns by sex and age – Fortitude Valley

Variable n (%)		Danny Green campaign	One punch campaign	General/vague knowledge	Other media campaign/s
Knowledge of government campaigns [a]					
Sex					
Male	(n = 619)	**43 (6.9)**	191 (30.9)	19 (3.1)	67 (10.8)
Female	(n = 600)	**26 (4.3)**	212 (35.3)	18 (3.0)	49 (8.2)
Total	(n = 1219)	69 (5.7)	403 (33.1)	37 (3.0)	116 (9.5)
Age [b]					
18-19	(n = 428)	14 (3.3)	142 (33.2)	14 (3.3)	44 (10.3)
20-24	(n = 514)	32 (6.2)	170 (33.1)	12 (2.3)	45 (8.8)
25-29	(n = 166)	12 (7.2)	56 (33.7)	9 (5.4)	17 (10.2)
30-39	(n = 68)	7 (10.3)	26 (38.2)	0 (0.0)	6 (8.8)
40+	(n = 37)	2 (5.4)	10 (27.0)	2 (5.4)	4 (10.8)

Note. [a] Knowledge of government campaigns missing 424 cases. [b] Age groups were missing 6 cases. Chi-square analyses not conducted for < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

6.11.7.3. SURFERS PARADISE

Participants' knowledge of government violence reduction campaigns from 2016 is presented by sex and age in Table 146. Most commonly participants were aware of the One Punch campaign (33.6%; n = 72). There was no significant difference in the knowledge of government violence reduction campaigns across males and females. Given the low numbers of participants in older age groups, chi-square analyses were not examined across age groups and knowledge of campaigns.

Table 146: Knowledge of government violence reduction campaigns by sex and age – Surfers Paradise

Variable *n* (%)		Knowledge of government campaigns			
		Danny Green campaign	One punch campaign	General/vague knowledge	Other media campaign/s
Sex					
Male	(*n* = 114)	14 (12.3)	41 (36.0)	1 (0.9)	6 (5.3)
Female	(*n* = 100)	5 (5.0)	31 (31.0)	2 (2.0)	5 (5.0)
Total	(*n* = 214)	19 (8.9)	72 (33.6)	3 (1.4)	11 (5.1)
Age					
18-19	(*n* = 89)	4 (4.5)	27 (30.3)	0 (0.0)	6 (6.7)
20-24	(*n* = 87)	8 (9.2)	31 (35.6)	3 (3.4)	3 (3.4)
25-29	(*n* = 16)	3 (18.8)	5 (31.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)
30-39	(*n* = 17)	3 (17.6)	8 (47.1)	0 (0.0)	2 (11.8)
40+	(*n* = 3)	1 (33.3)	1 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)

Note. [a] Knowledge of government campaigns missing 77 cases. [b] Age groups were missing 2 cases. Chi-square analyses not conducted for < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

6.11.8.   SUMMARY OF TRENDS

More than half the sample across all SNPs (i.e., Cairns, Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise) were male (53-57%), and males that were interviewed in Cairns, Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise were significantly older than females. Approximately 51% of patrons participated in the brief interview, and 49% participated in the full interview. There was no significant difference in age or sex of participants who completed the full or brief interview in Cairns and Surfers Paradise; however, males were significantly more likely than females to complete the brief interview in Fortitude Valley. Participants in West End were significantly more likely to be male and to participate in the full interview, compared to participants in Fortitude Valley. There were also significantly more male participants in West End, compared to Fortitude Valley.

Self-reported intoxication, injuries and aggression trends over time were generally stable, but fluctuating. Similarly, the proportion of people pre-drinking was stable over time, as was the average amount they drank.

6.11.8.1. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION PATTERNS

The median BAC reading across all SNPs was in the moderate range (.077-.087). In Cairns and Fortitude Valley, there was a significant difference in the median BAC reading across age groups, with older age groups recording higher BAC readings. In Surfers Paradise, male participants recorded

significantly higher BAC readings than females. The median BAC of participants in Fortitude Valley (*Mdn* = .077) was significantly higher than participants in West End (*Mdn* = .065).

In Cairns and Fortitude Valley, the median BAC reading increased throughout the evening (as measured by interview hour). There was more fluctuation in median BAC by interview hour in Surfers Paradise, with the lowest BAC median by interview hour occurring at 2am (.067). Again, in Cairns and Fortitude Valley, the monthly median BAC appeared relatively stable over time with some fluctuations across months. There was more fluctuation in the bi-monthly median BAC in Surfers Paradise, with a small decline in the median BAC in March and May 2017; however, this may simply be due to small sample sizes in some months. The median BAC then increased in July 2017, followed by a predominately declining trend until May 2018.

The majority of participants across SNPs reported pre-drinking prior to their night in the precinct (77%-88%). Younger ages groups were significantly more likely to report pre-drinking than older groups in Cairns and Fortitude Valley, and male participants across the three SNPs reported consuming a larger quantity of pre-drinks before their night out in the precinct, compared to females. Participants in Fortitude Valley were significantly more likely to report pre-drinking and a higher consumption of pre-drinks than participants in West End.

Those who reported pre-drinking were more likely to engage in heavier alcohol consumption patterns across all three SNPs. In Fortitude Valley, participants who reported pre-drinking were also significantly more likely to experience some form of aggression or unwanted sexual attention and engage in risky and offending behaviours while under the influence of alcohol in the past three months than those who did not pre-drink.

6.11.8.2. DRUG CONSUMPTION

In Fortitude Valley, more than 11% of participants reported using illicit or pharmaceutical drugs during their current night out, with male participants being significantly more likely to report the consumption of illicit drug use than females. Males were also significantly more likely to report the consumption of ecstasy, cocaine, cannabis and polydrug use compared to females. There was no significant difference in the number of participants in Fortitude Valley and West End that reported illicit drug consumption. Participants in Fortitude Valley who reported illicit drug use were significantly more likely to report experiencing some form of aggressive or unwanted sexual attention in or around a licensed venue. They were also more likely to report risky or offending behaviour (i.e., damaging property, being refused entry or service at a licensed venue or being ejected from a licensed venue) compared to participants who had did not report illicit drug use. Of participants who completed a drug swab, approximately 25% returned a positive result.

In Cairns, almost 12% of participants reported using illicit or pharmaceutical substances during their current night out; male participants were significantly more likely to report consuming illicit drugs than females. Of participants that completed a drug swab, over 30% returned a positive result.

Over 25% of participants in Surfers Paradise reported using illicit or pharmaceutical drugs on the night they were interviewed, with males being significantly more likely to report illicit drug use compared to females. Participants who reported illicit drug use were significantly more likely to report experiencing physical aggression in or around licensed venues in the past three months. Of the small subsample of participants that completed a drug swab in Surfers Paradise, approximately 29% returned a positive result.

As with alcohol consumption, drug consumption trends generally showed a stable trend, with some fluctuations over the study period. There no obvious changes in the types of drugs self-reported over time.

6.11.8.3. AGGRESSIVE INCIDENTS AND SAFETY

More than 55% of participants in Fortitude Valley reported being involved in verbal aggression, physical aggression or unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues in the three months prior to the interview. Unwanted sexual (35.3%) and verbal (33.9%) aggression were the most common types of aggression participants reported being involved in. Females were significantly more likely to report being involved in unwanted sexual attention and any form of aggression than males. Younger people were also more likely to experience verbal and physical aggression and unwanted sexual attention than older participants. Participants in Fortitude Valley were at significantly great risk of experiencing all forms of aggression (i.e., unwanted sexual attention, physical aggression, verbal aggression and any form of aggression) compared to participants in West End.

In Cairns, 44% of participants reported being involved in verbal aggression, physical aggression, or unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues in the three months prior to the interview. There were similar rates of verbal (28.3%), physical (26.1%) and sexual (23.3%) aggression. Females were significantly more likely to report being involved in unwanted sexual attention and any type of aggression than males. Younger people were also more likely to experience verbal and physical aggression and unwanted sexual attention than older participants.

In Surfers Paradise, over 58% of participants reported being involved in verbal aggression, physical aggression or unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues in the three months prior to the interview. Verbal (39.5%) and sexual (37.8%) aggression were the most common types of aggression

participants reported being involved in. Females were significantly more likely than males to report being involved in unwanted sexual attention.

The rates of experiencing alcohol-related injury in the past three months ranged from 12% to 16.6% across SNPs and females in Fortitude Valley were significantly more likely to report experiencing an alcohol-related injury than males. As mentioned above, there were no substantive changes in the numbers of aggressive incidents reported by patrons interviewed over time.

6.11.9.   FOLLOW-UP SURVEY

6.11.9.1. SAMPLE

A total of 525 patrons participated in the online follow-up interview from March 2017 to June 2018. Participants who had completed less than 25% of surveys ($n = 72$ cases) were excluded from the analysis and one case from Fortitude Valley was excluded due to the patron being 17 years of age. An additional 14 surveys could not be matched to location. The final sample included fifty-eight patrons from West End[45] and 380 participants from Fortitude Valley[46] who completed the online survey[47].

6.11.9.2. PATRON DEMOGRAPHICS

Over 60% ($n = 229$) of participants who completed the follow-up survey in Fortitude Valley and 56.9% ($n = 33$) of participants in West End were female. There was no significant difference in the age of male ($Mdn = 21$) and female ($Mdn = 20$) participants in Fortitude Valley ($z = -0.75$, $p = .456$)[48] or West End (male $Mdn = 26$; female $Mdn = 28$; $z = -0.51$, $p = .609$). However, patrons in West End were significantly older ($Mdn = 27$) than patrons in Fortitude Valley ($Mdn = 20$; $z = -7.85$, $p < .001$). The distribution of age for patrons at Fortitude Valley and West End are detailed in Figure 346.

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[45] Three patrons from West End who partially completed the online survey were included in analysis
[46] 14 patrons from Fortitude Valley who partially completed online survey were included in analysis
[47] An additional 14 surveys could not be matched with data from initial interview
[48] Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to assess differences in skewed variables

Figure 346: Age distribution in Fortitude Valley and West End

REASON FOR GOING OUT

Participants reported their main motivation for going out on the night they were interviewed (Figure 347). Of responses ($n = 378$ participants from Fortitude Valley and $n = 58$ participants from West End), the most common reason to attend the night-time entertainment precinct (NEP) was to catch-up and socialise with friends (Fortitude Valley 46%; West End 56.9%), followed by attending a special event or celebration (e.g., birthday party; Fortitude Valley 26.2%; West End 15.5%).

Figure 347: Self-reported main reason for going out in the NEP[49]

MONEY SPENT

Participants were asked if they spent money "over the bar" in venues and nightclubs during their night out. Over 77% of participants in Fortitude Valley ($n = 294$) and 86% of participants in West End ($n = 49$) reported spending money over the bar on the night they were interviewed. A small number of participants in Fortitude Valley ($n = 11$; 2.9%) and West End ($n = 3$; 5.3%) could not remember how much they spent over the bar.

There was no significant difference in the average amount of money spent over the bar[50] in Fortitude Valley ($M = \$64.45$, $SD = \$60.95$; range = \$5.50-\$400.00) compared West End ($M = \$65.65$, $SD = \$45.70$; range = \$10.00-\$200.00; $t(320) = -0.13$, $p = .898$). An independent t-test revealed that males in Fortitude Valley spent significantly more over the bar ($M = \$74.75$, $SD = \$65.60$), compared to females ($M = \$58.30$, $SD = \$57.35$), $t(274) = -2.18$, $p = .030$. However, there was no significant

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[49] 2 cases missing for Fortitude Valley
[50] Amount spent rounded to the nearest cent

difference between the amount males (M = \$65.70, SD = \$45.45) and females (M = \$65.60, SD = \$46.95) spent at West End ($t(44)$ = -0.004, p = .997). There was also a small, positive correlation between age and the amount of money patrons in Fortitude Valley spent (r = 0.31, p < .001), indicating that participants who were older in age were more likely to spend more money over the bar. No correlation between age and amount spent was evident in patrons from West End (r = 0.02, p = .901).

PERCEIVED SAFETY AT LICENSED VENUES

Participants were asked to rate their perceived level of safety at the licensed venue they attended each hour on a scale from 0 'very unsafe' to 10 'very safe'. Participants predominately reported a median score of 10, 'very safe', each hour in they were in the precinct in both Fortitude Valley and West End. The safety rating declined slightly to a median of 9 from 11pm to 3am in Fortitude Valley and a median of 9 from 1am to 2am in West End.

GETTING HOME

In Fortitude Valley, males (29.8%) and females (27.1%) most commonly reported going home at 3am on the night they were interviewed. In West End, males also most commonly reported going home at 3am (24.0%), but more females reported leaving the precinct earlier at 2am (21.2%).

Table 147 shows participants' self-reported method of how they got home post-interview. The majority of participants in Fortitude Valley (51.3%) and West End (43.9%) reported getting an Uber home. Almost 17% of patrons in Fortitude Valley and over 10% of patrons in West End caught a taxi home. In West End, participants also commonly walked home (26.3%).

Table 147: Self-reported method of getting home across sites

Method of getting home	Fortitude Valley n (%)	West End n (%)
Catch a taxi	64 (16.9)	6 (10.5)
Drive a car or other vehicle	17 (4.5)	3 (5.3)
Lift with a partner, family member or friend	36 (9.5)	3 (5.3)
Uber	194 (51.3)	25 (43.9)
Ride a bike	1 (0.3)	-
Catch public transport	26 (6.9)	4 (7.0)
Courtesy bus	1 (0.3)	-
Walk	34 (9.0)	15 (26.3)
Other[a]	5 (1.3)	1 (1.8)

Note. [a]Other included multimode transportation (e.g., public transport and walk). Fortitude Valley was missing 2 cases; West End was missing 1 case.

PRE-DRINKS

Almost 81% of participants in Fortitude Valley (*n* = 307) and 48.3% of participants in West End (*n* = 28) reported consuming alcohol before attending licensed venues/'going out' on the night they were interviewed. This was a significant difference, with participants from Fortitude Valley being more likely to pre-drink than participants from West End (χ^2 = 29.58, *p* < .001).

Pre-drinking behaviours across age and gender in Fortitude Valley are presented in Table 148. There was a significant difference in the frequency of pre-drinking between male and female participants, with females being more likely to pre-drink than males (χ^2 = 13.86, *p* < .001). However, males in Fortitude Valley reported consuming significantly more pre-drinks than females (*z* = -3.61, *p* < .001) on the night they were interviewed. There was no significant difference in the usual quantity of drinks males and females consumed before going out (*z* = -0.50, *p* = .616).

Table 148: Pre-drinking behaviours by gender and age in Fortitude Valley

	Pre-drink *N = 380*	Qty consumed on night interviewed *N = 302*		Usual pre-drinks consumed *N = 375*	
Variable	***n* (%)**	***n***	**Median (range)**	***n***	**Median (range)**
Sex					
Male	**108 (71.5)**	106	**6 (1-16)**	146	5 (0-17)
Female	**199 (86.9)**	196	**5 (1-20)**	229	4 (0-15)
Age [a]					
18-19	125 (86.8)	123	5 (1-16)	143	5 (0-16)
20-24	124 (81.0)	122	6 (1-15)	151	5 (0-17)
25-29	32 (68.1)	31	6 (1-20)	46	3 (0-12)
30-39	18 (75.0)	18	1.5 (1-10)	24	2 (0-6)
40+	8 (66.7)	8	1.5 (1-4)	11	1 (0-4)
TOTAL	307 (80.8)	302	5 (1-20)	375	4 (0-17)

Note. [a] Chi-square analyses were not analysed for < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance (*p* < .05).

Pre-drinking behaviours of participants in West End are detailed in Table 149. There was no significant difference in the number of males and females that reported pre-drinking before their evening out in West End (χ^2 = 0.24, p = .621). There was also no significant difference in the quantity of pre-drinks consumed (*z* = -0.54, *p* = .592), or the usual quantity of drinks consumed before going out (*z* = -0.52, *p* = .604) across gender. Given the small sample size, statistical significance was not examined across age categories.

Table 149: Pre-drinking behaviours by gender and age in West End

	Pre-drink N = 58	Qty consumed on night interviewed N = 28		Usual pre-drinks consumed N = 55	
Variable	n (%)	n	Median (range)	n	Median (range)
Sex					
Male	13 (52.0)	13	5 (1-12)	23	3 (0-12)
Female	15 (45.5)	15	4 (1-10)	32	2.5 (0-8)
Age [a]					
18-19	-	-	-	-	-
20-24	8 (47.1)	8	2.5 (1-10)	17	3 (0-11)
25-29	12 (57.1)	12	5.5 (2-12)	19	4 (0-12)
30-39	6 (37.5)	6	4 (1-9)	15	1 (0-5)
40+	2 (50.0)	2	2.5 (1-4)	4	1 (0-3)
TOTAL	28 (48.3)	28	4 (1-12)	55	3 (0-12)

Note. [a] Chi-square analyses were not analysed for < 5 cases.

Participants who reported pre-drinking were asked the reasons for consuming alcohol prior to going out in the precinct. Participants most commonly reported the reasons that they consumed alcohol prior to going out was due to the price of drinks (Fortitude Valley = 78.5%; West End = 50.0%), followed by catching up with friends and socialising (Fortitude Valley = 48.5%; West End = 42.9%). Further details are presented in Figure 348[51].

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[51] Participants reported all the relevant reasons they engaged in pre-drinking and the reasons listed by participants were not mutually exclusive

Figure 348: Why participants consumed drinks prior to going out on the night interviewed

CONSUMPTION OF STANDARD ALCOHOLIC DRINKS IN PRECINCT

The median number of standard alcohol drinks consumed in the NEPs are presented by age and gender in Table 150. There was a significant difference in number of standard alcoholic drinks consumed by males and females in West End, where males (Mdn = 11.5) consumed significantly more drinks than females (6.5; z = -2.02, p = .042). In Fortitude Valley, there was no significant difference in the number of alcoholic drinks consumed between males and females (z = -1.53, p = .126) or across age categories ($\chi^2(4)$ = 4.30, p = .367). There was also no significant difference between the median number of drinks participants consumed on their evening out in Fortitude Valley, compared to patrons in West End (z = -0.42, p = .672).

Table 150: Average number of standard alcoholic drinks consumed across sites by age and gender

| Variable | Fortitude Valley (*N* = 343) | | West End (*N* = 56) | |
| | Qty of drinks | | Qty of drinks | |
	n	Median (range)	*n*	Median (range)
Sex				
Male	132	9 (0-31)	24	**11.5 (0-45)**
Female	211	8 (0-41)	32	**6.5 (0-31)**
Age[a]				
18-19	128	8 (0-35)	-	-
20-24	141	8 (0-41)	16	7 (0-18)
25-29	43	9 (0-25)	21	10.5 (2-45)

| Variable | Fortitude Valley (N = 343) | | West End (N = 56) | |
| | Qty of drinks | | Qty of drinks | |
	n	Median (range)	n	Median (range)
30-39	22	8 (0-33)	16	7 (0-31)
40+	9	9 (3-17)	3	12 (2-14)
TOTAL	343	8 (0-41)	56	8 (0-45)

Note. ªChi-square analyses were not analysed when there are <5 cases. 37 cases missing from Fortitude Valley and 2 cases missing from West End. Bolded values indicate statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Participants also reported the number of standard drinks they consumed per hour over the duration of their night out in the NEP. The descriptive statistics of standard drinks for each hour are presented for Fortitude Valley and West End in Table 151.

Table 151: Descriptive statistics of standard drinks consumed per hour by site

| Qty of standard drinks | Fortitude Valley | | | | | West End | | | | |
	n	M (range)	SD	Mdn	IQR	n	M (range)	SD	Mdn	IQR
Before 5pm	124	0.77 (0-7)	1.26	0	1	24	1.38 (0-6)	1.58	1	2
5pm to 6pm	135	1.06 (0-12)	1.48	1	2	25	1.20 (0-6)	1.44	1	2
6pm to 7pm	170	1.46 (0-6)	1.36	1	2	27	1.52 (0-4)	1.19	1	1
7pm to 8pm	208	2.02 (0-10)	1.73	2	2	40	1.79 (0-6)	1.33	1.75	1
9pm to 10pm	247	2.09 (0-10)	1.76	2	2	46	1.85 (0-8)	1.32	2	1
10pm to 11pm	277	1.95 (0-15)	1.75	2	2	47	1.65 (0-5)	1.24	1	1
11pm to 12am	297	1.44 (0-8)	1.42	1	2	46	1.58 (0-5)	1.16	1	1
12am to 1am	284	1.16 (0-8)	1.30	1	2	37	1.38 (0-6)	1.42	1	2
1am to 2am	237	0.93 (0-8)	1.29	1	1	26	1.44 (0-6)	1.36	1	1
2am to 3am	182	0.69 (0-10)	1.41	0	1	14	0.71 (0-3)	0.91	0.5	1
3am to 4am	127	0.21 (0-5)	0.66	0	0	8	0.13 (0-1)	0.35	0	0
4am to 5am	83	0.14 (0-3)	0.53	0	0	6	0 (0)	0	0	0
5am to 6am	73	0.03 (0-1.5)	0.21	0	0	6	0 (0)	0	0	0

The median number of standard drinks consumed per hour peaked at 2 drinks from 7pm to 11pm in Fortitude Valley and from 9pm to 10pm in West End (see Figure 349).

Figure 349: Median number of standard drinks consumed by hour across sites.

DRUG CONSUMPTION PATTERNS

Participants from Fortitude Valley ($n = 379$) and West End ($n = 58$) were asked if they had consumed illicit or pharmaceutical drugs (not prescribed to them) on their night out post-interview.

A small percentage of participants in Fortitude Valley (6.6%, $n = 25$) and West End (6.9%, $n = 4$) indicated that they had consumed illicit drugs, post-interview. Table 152 presents the frequency of drug consumption post-interview by drug type. In Fortitude Valley, the use of MDMA post-interview was most common (3.7%, $n = 14$), followed by cannabis use (2.6%, $n = 10$). In West End, patrons who reported drug use post-interview most commonly reported using cannabis (6.9%, $n = 4$). Two participants in Fortitude Valley who reported using illicit or pharmaceutical drugs preferred not to state which drugs they had consumed.

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Table 152: Self-reported consumption of illicit drugs post-interview

Type of Drug	Fortitude Valley n (%)	West End n (%)
Ecstasy	7 (1.8)	0 (0.0)
MDMA	14 (3.7)	0 (0.0)
Cocaine	3 (0.8)	0 (0.0)
Speed	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)
Ice	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)
Pharmaceutical stimulants	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)
Ketamine	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)
LSD	2 (0.5)	0 (0.0)
GHB	1 (0.3)	0 (0.0)
Benzodiazepines	0 (0.0)	2 (3.4)
Heroin/other opiates	0 (0.0)	2 (3.4)
Cannabis	10 (2.6)	4 (6.9)
Any drug	25 (6.6)	4 (6.9)

Note. Fortitude Valley was missing 1 case. Only illicit drugs that participants reported using post-interview are presented.

Of the 25 participants in Fortitude Valley that reported using drugs post-interview, 18 (72%) had also reported using illicit drugs during the initial interview. In West End, two participants who reported drug use post-interview also reported using illicit drugs when completing the field interview.

6.11.9.5. EXPERIENCE OF AGGRESSION AND HARM

Over 25% ($n = 101$) of participants in Fortitude Valley reported involvement in some form of aggression (verbal aggression or physical aggression) or unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed on the night they were interviewed. In West End, the rates of involvement in any form of aggression were significantly lower ($\chi^2 = 4.40$, $p = .036$), at just under 14%.

Table 153 lists the prevalence reported by type of aggression by site[52]. In Fortitude Valley, participants most commonly reported involvement in unwanted sexual attention, with almost 20% of

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[52] A small portion of participants reported that they preferred not to say if they had experience aggression across sites - Fortitude Valley: verbal aggression ($n = 5$), physical aggression ($n = 1$) and unwanted sexual attention ($n = 2$). West End: unwanted sexual attention ($n = 1$)

participants reporting this occurrence. Verbal aggression was the most commonly reported type of aggression in participants in West End (10.3%), which was a higher rate compared to Fortitude Valley (6.8%).

Table 153: Involvement in aggressive incidents on the night interviewed by site

Type of aggression	Fortitude Valley *n* (%)	West End *n* (%)
Verbal aggression	26 (6.8)	6 (10.3)
Physical aggression	22 (5.8)	1 (1.7)
Unwanted sexual attention	74 (19.5)	4 (7.0)
Any aggression	101 (26.6)	8 (13.8)

Note. Unwanted sexual attention was missing 1 case in Fortitude Valley and West End. Chi-square analyses were not undertaken on observations with < 5 cases. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Table 154 presents the prevalence of aggression type by age and gender in Fortitude Valley and West End; given the small sample size at West End, aggression type was not examined across age groups. In Fortitude Valley, females (28.4%) were significantly more likely to report being involved in unwanted sexual attention on the night they were interviewed, compared to males (6%; $\chi^2 = 28.90$, $p < .001$). Females in Fortitude Valley were also significantly more likely to report being involved in any type of aggression (34.5%) compared to males ($n = 22$; 14.6%; $\chi^2 = 18.52$, $p < .001$).

Table 154: Involvement in aggressive incidents on the night interview by age and gender across sites

Site/Variable		Verbal aggression n (%)	Physical aggression n (%)	Unwanted sexual attention n (%)	Any aggression n (%)
Fortitude Valley					
Sex					
Female	n = 229	13 (5.7)	17 (7.4)	**65 (28.4)**	**79 (34.5)**
Male	n = 151	13 (8.6)	5 (3.3)	**9 (6.0)**	**22 (14.6)**
Age [a]					
18-19 years	n = 144	10 (6.9)	13 (9.0)	40 (28)	53 (36.8)
20-24 years	n = 153	10 (6.5)	6 (3.9)	24 (15.7)	33 (21.6)
25-29 years	n = 47	0 (0.0)	2 (4.3)	5 (10.6)	6 (12.8)
30-39 years	n = 24	4 (16.7)	1 (4.2)	3 (12.5)	5 (20.8)
40+ years	n = 12	2 (16.7)	0 (0.0)	2 (16.7)	4 (33.3)
Total	N = 380	26 (6.8)	22 (5.8)	74 (19.5)	101 (26.6)
West End [a]					
Sex					
Female	n = 33	2 (6.1)	0 (0.0)	3 (9.1)	4 (12.1)
Male	n = 25	4 (16.0)	1 (4.0)	1 (4.2)	4 (16.0)
Total	N = 58	6 (10.3)	1 (1.7)	4 (7.0)	8 (13.8)

Note. [a] Chi-square analyses were not analysed when there were < 5 cases. Unwanted sexual attention was missing for 1 case in Fortitude Valley and West End. Bolded values indicate statistical significance ($p < .05$).

Given the low numbers, data for West End are not presented in the following analyses of aggressive incidents.

The median and range of participants alcohol consumption (i.e., the number of pre-drinks and alcoholic beverages consumed during night out) is presented by involvement in aggressive incidents in Table 155. There was no significant difference in the median number of alcoholic beverages consumed in participants who reported involvement in unwanted sexual attention, verbal, physical and any form of aggression during night out, compared to those who were not involved in the aggressive incident. Similarly, there was no significant difference in median number of pre-drinks consumed across participants involved in aggressive incidents, compared to participants who were not.

Table 155: Alcohol Consumption by involvement in aggression.

Involvement in aggression on night interviewed	Number of drinks [a][b]		Number of pre-drinks [c]	
	n	Median (range)	*n*	Median (range)
Verbal aggression				
Yes	18	9 (0-41)	16	5 (1-10)
No	325	8 (0-35)	286	5 (1-20)
Physical aggression				
Yes	18	9.5 (2-41)	17	6 (2-20)
No	325	8 (0-35)	285	5 (1-16)
Unwanted sexual attention				
Yes	69	8 (0-41)	60	5 (1-20)
No	274	8 (0-33)	241	5 (1-16)
Any aggression				
Yes	88	8 (0-41)	78	5 (1-20)
No	255	8 (0-33)	224	5 (1-16)

Note. [a] Number of drinks refers to standard alcoholic beverages consumed during night out in the precinct. [b] $N = 343$. [b] $N = 302$.

If participants reported involvement in verbal or physical aggression or unwanted sexual attention, they were asked to identify everyone involved in the altercation and who instigated the aggressive act. Figure 350 below presents who was involved (i.e., the interviewee, partner, stranger etc.) for each type of aggressive incident that occurred in Fortitude Valley. Aggressive incidents most commonly involved the interviewee (verbal 69.2%; physical 50%; unwanted sexual attention 79.7%) and strangers (verbal 50%; physical 68.2%; unwanted sexual attention 71.6%). A large portion of participants also indicated that verbal (38.5%) and physical (22.7%) aggression involved a close friend.

Figure 350: Who was involved in aggressive incidents – Fortitude Valley

Figure 351 details who Fortitude Valley participants identified as having instigated the aggressive incident on the night interviewed. Just under 90% of unwanted sexual attention incidents that occurred were instigated by a stranger. Similarly, physical (50%) and verbally aggressive incidents (50%) were most commonly instigated by strangers. Of interest, participants reported that they had instigated 13.6% of physical aggression, 11.5% of verbal aggression and 1.4% of unwanted sexual attention. This indicates that that involvement in aggressive incidents is capturing both victimisation and, to a lesser degree, perpetration of aggression.

Figure 351: Who instigated the aggressive incident – Fortitude Valley

Participants who had reported involvement in physical and verbal aggression and unwanted sexual attention on the night they were interviewed were asked to indicate where the incident took place. Figure 352 details the location the aggressive incidents occurred, either inside the licensed venue, outside the licensed venue, or other (i.e., specified multiple locations, inside unlicensed venues, or the Fortitude Valley mall)[53] for Fortitude Valley participants. Incidents of verbal aggression most commonly took place outside licensed venues (53.8%; $n = 14$), while involvement in unwanted sexual attention was most commonly reported to occur inside licensed venues (54.1%; $n = 40$). The majority of people who reported involvement in physical aggression did not specify where the incident took place (54.5%; $n = 12$); however, over 30% of incidents were also reported to occur within licensed venues ($n = 7$). These numbers should be interpreted with caution, given the small sample size and the high number of incidents where the location was not specified.

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[53] The mall is defined as other as it cannot be determined whether this refers to outside or inside the enclosed shopping area.

Figure 352: Where aggressive incident occurred – Fortitude Valley

The frequency of involvement in any type of aggression (i.e., physical aggression, sexual aggression and unwanted sexual attention) in Fortitude Valley on the night interviewed was examined by month and year (Figure 353). The percentage of patrons who reported experiencing any aggression showed some fluctuation over time, declining in May 2017, with a general increasing trend until January 2018, followed by a decline until April 2018. The percent of patrons who had experienced any aggression then increased in May 2018 with a small decline in June 2018. Again, these trends should be interpreted with caution given the small sample size and possible impact of seasonal trends.

Figure 353: Percentage of patrons who experienced any aggression by month – Fortitude Valley

Table 156 lists participants' experience of alcohol-related harms and involvement in alcohol-related risk behaviours that occurred on the night they were interviewed. In Fortitude Valley, participants most commonly reported being refused entry while intoxicated (5%) or experiencing an alcohol-related accident (5%). Only three people in West End reported experiencing alcohol-related harms or risky behaviours, two reported damaging someone's property (3.5%), and one participant reported experiencing an alcohol-related accident (1.8%) on the night they were interviewed.

Table 156: Experience of alcohol-related harms and involvement of risk behaviours while intoxicated

	Fortitude Valley		West End	
Risky behaviour	**N [a]**	**n (%)**	**N [a]**	**n (%)**
Refused entry to a licensed venue	378	19 (5.0)	57	0 (0.0)
Refused service at a licensed venue	377	7 (1.9)	57	0 (0.0)
Ejected from a licensed venue	375	15 (4.0)	57	0 (0.0)
Alcohol-related accidents	379	19 (5.0)	57	1 (1.8)
Damaged someone's property	379	6 (1.6)	57	2 (3.5)

Note. [a] N refers to respondents that answered risk-related variable

6.11.9.6. SUMMARY

The median age of participants who completed the follow-up surveys in Fortitude Valley was 20 years, with more females completing the survey than males (60.2%, $n = 229$). While female participants from West End were also more likely to complete follow-up surveys (56.9%, $n = 33$), the median age of participants was significantly older (27 years).

Most commonly, participants reported that they were in the precinct on the night interviewed to socialise with friends (Fortitude Valley 46%; West End 56.9%). Participants in Fortitude Valley were significantly more likely to report pre-drinking (80.8%) than participants from West End (48.3%). However, the most common reason participants engaged in pre-drinking was the same in West End and Fortitude Valley, due to the price of drinks. Of those that spent money out in the precinct on the night interviewed, the average amount of money spent over the bar was $64.45 in Fortitude Valley and $65.65 in West End. In Fortitude Valley, older participants were significantly more likely to spend more money over the bar than younger participants, though a higher portion of younger participants reported pre-drinking before attending the precinct.

There was no significant difference in the median number of drinks participants consumed in Fortitude Valley and West End. The median number of standard drinks consumed per hour peaked at two standard drinks from 7pm to 11pm in Fortitude Valley and from 9pm to 10pm in West End. Only

a small percentage of participants reported consuming illicit drugs post-interview across sites (Fortitude Valley 6.6%; West End 6.9%).

The frequency of involvement in any form of aggression (i.e., unwanted sexual attention and verbal or physical aggression) were significantly higher in Fortitude Valley, compared to West End. This was most apparent in participants who reported involvement in unwanted sexual attention (Fortitude Valley 19.5%; West End 7.0%). Females in Fortitude Valley appeared more vulnerable to involvement in any type of aggression, and this appeared to be driven by the high number of females who reported involvement in unwanted sexual attention on the night interviewed. In Fortitude Valley, aggressive incidents were mostly commonly instigated by a stranger and involved the participant. Verbally aggressive incidents were reported to most commonly occur outside of licensed venues, whereas, unwanted sexual attention and physical aggressive occurred more frequently inside licensed venues. Notably, these findings should be interpreted with caution, given the small sample and a high number of incidents where the location was not specified.

In Fortitude Valley, 4-5% of participants reported experiencing an alcohol-related accident, being refused entry, or ejected from a licensed venue on the night interviewed. In comparison, there was no report of being refused entry or ejection from a licensed venue in West End, and only one participant reported experiencing an alcohol-related accident.

Most participants reported getting an Uber home in Fortitude Valley (51.3%) and West End (43.9%) and commonly left the precinct between 2am to 3am.

6.12. VENUE OBSERVATIONS

The observations arm of the evaluation was primarily focussed on observing venue practices in response to the new legislation in Fortitude Valley, and in West End as a comparative non-SNP site.

6.12.1. VENUE ENTRY OBSERVATIONS

In total, 55 entry observations were recorded. Observers entered venues between 9pm and 2am, depending on the venue being observed.

Observers waited in line to enter on 29 occasions (53.7%) with a mean wait time of 5.3 minutes (range 0-15 minutes).

A door charge was applied to venues on 11 occasions (20.8%) with a mean charge of $15 (range $14-$20).

ID was checked on 44 entry occasions (80%). Of the 11 occasions when ID was not checked, four were after 12am midnight (Figure 354). On the occasion when ID was not checked, observers noted

that security were present and were monitoring venue entrances on all but three occasions – all at venues located in West End recorded prior to 12am midnight – and on these occasions, the entrances were also unmonitored by bar and wait staff.

Figure 354: Patron ID checking practice on venue entry

Patrons being turned away from the venue at entry was observed on five occasions. The reported reasons for denial of entry was twice for intoxication and three times for inappropriate dress.

6.12.2. HOURLY VENUE OBSERVATIONS

In total, 113 hourly Venue Observations were recorded. Observations were recorded in venues between 10pm and 3.30am (Figure 355). Because fewer than 5 observations were recorded after 3am, summary statistics for the hour 0300-0359 are not reported.

Figure 355: Number of observations recorded per hour

From the sample of venues that were observed, 12 had more than one bar service area. Some venues contained up to seven bar service areas split across three floors, and this could vary between nights with additional "pop-up" or rooftops bars depending on weather or special events. In total, 86 Extra Bar observations were recorded.

Data from hourly and extra bar observations are in Appendix 8.

6.12.3. PATRON AND BAR CHARACTERISTICS BY HOUR OF OBSERVATION

Figure 356, Figure 357 and, Figure 358 plot patron and bar staff characteristics by hour, between the hours of 10pm and 0259am.

Consistent with previous observational studies, metrics for patron intoxication (determined via a checklist of observable physiological intoxication symptoms and behaviours) increased steadily throughout the night and peak after 2am. Metrics for patron numbers and venue capacity remained relatively stable. Younger patrons (aged under 25) were more frequently reported during later hours.

Figure 356: Patron characteristics per hour

The average number of female bar staff reduced in later hours; however, the total number of bar staff increased over the same time period. The estimated age of bar staff and bar managers remained stable.

Figure 357: Bar staff numbers per hour

Figure 358: Estimated Bar Staff age per hour

6.12.4. PATRON AND BAR CHARACTERISTICS BY OBSERVATION SESSION

Analyses were conducted to compare metrics of patron characteristics, bar staff characteristics, and venue crowding across the three occasions of venue observation. Results from these comparisons are shown in Figure 359, Figure 360 and, Figure 361 and summarised in Appendix 8.

The percentage of patrons showing any signs of intoxication, percentage of venue capacity, and percentage of patrons estimated to be aged under 25 years all decreased during the off-peak observation sessions (July 2017 and March 2018) and recovered to November 2016 levels in the following November 2017 (Figure 359). A similar trend was observed with the total number of bar staff (Figure 360).

Alternately, the percentage of patrons who were male, percentage of patrons who were too intoxicated to remain in the venue, and the number of female bar staff remained stable between sessions and do not appear to change across dates of observation in the current data (Figure 359 and Figure 360).

Figure 359 Patron characteristics per session

Figure 360: Bar staff numbers per session

Figure 361: Estimated bar staff age per session

6.12.5. INTOXICATION AND CROWDING LEVEL BY OBSERVATION SESSION

Overall estimates of patron intoxication levels increased in subsequent observation sessions (Figure 362). Compared to November 2016, intoxication levels in November 2017 were rated as "high" more frequently (43.2% compared to 7.4%) and were rated as medium or low less frequently (47.4% compared to 63%, and 15.8% compared to 23.10%, respectively). Similarly, high intoxication was more frequently reported in March 2018 compared to Jul 2017.

Figure 362: Overall patron intoxication level per session

Similarly, crowding levels at main bars and "extra" bars was higher in November 2017 compared to November 2016, and higher in March 2018 compared to in July 2017 (Figure 363 and Figure 364).

Figure 363: Main bar crowding level per session

Figure 364: Extra bars crowding level per session

6.12.6. CLOSING PROCESS

Observers completed a Closing Practices form if they were in the venue during closing time. However, due a lack of data, these data are not presented.

6.12.7. INCIDENT REPORTS

Observers were also able to complete event-specific forms if they observed any incidents of illicit drug use, or any physical, verbal, or sexual aggressive incidents. However, due to a low number of reports of this kind, these data are not presented.

6.13. PRECINCT MAPPING

In this section we present the results from the Saturday night precinct audits in Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise, Townsville, Cairns and Toowoomba SNPs, and the nightlife area around comparison sites of West End and South Bank on the south side of Brisbane.

We also present results of the analysis of the mix of businesses, both day time and night time, trading in the Fortitude Valley precinct.

6.13.1. FORTITUDE VALLEY

Fortitude Valley is the largest SNP in terms of venues and patrons in Queensland. The SNP is located just north of the Brisbane CBD. Much of the nightlife is concentrated around the Brunswick Street

Mall in the south-west corner of the precinct (see Figure 365). The other key strip is the James Street precinct in the north-eastern fringe of the precinct which comprises lifestyle, retail, and dining and some bars and pubs. Just beyond the northern boundary of the precinct are emerging lifestyle retail, dining and bars around the Emporium development and in other developments in Newstead that include micro-breweries and a key live music venue.

Figure 365: Map of the Fortitude Valley SNP

6.13.1.1. NUMBER OF BUSINESSES OBSERVED OPEN ON SATURDAY NIGHT AUDITS

Table 157 and Figure 366 depict the number of businesses observed open in the Fortitude Valley SNP on the Saturday night audits. The data excludes convenience stores, but includes all others such as fast food, dining, bars, clubs, and pubs.

Below we examine in detail the types of venues observed open on each audit. We illustrate that the number and type of nightclubs, pubs, bars and live music venues that are open on Saturday nights remain stable. The discernible changes are the entry of some new venues (in most cases replacing a previous venue) and the 'irregular' late night trade of some venues who used extended trade permits when the legislation first came into effect or on special event nights like Valley Fiesta. The decline on the third and fourth audit did not appear to indicate a change in the trading pattern of particular business types, but rather chance or seasonal variation in a small number of venues across several categories.

Table 157: Count of Business observed open in Fortitude Valley SNP

	24/07/2016	01/04/2017	28/10/2017	17/02/2018	28/07/2018
10pm	84	90	79	76	98
12am	67	66	62	61	78
2am	58	55	41	43	64
4am	24	23	17	14	16

The increase in businesses open on the final audit on 28th of July 2018 is partly a consequence of a change to the method of observation. The Fortitude Valley SNP proved to be too large to monitor comprehensively by one team of two Research Assistants. This meant that on the earlier rounds they did not get around all the venues, or by the time they got to venues that were on the outer edges of the precinct they were already closed. For the final audit, four RAs worked in two teams. This meant that the precinct could be audited in less time, and resulted in businesses being observed earlier in each round.

Figure 366: Number of businesses trading in Fortitude Valley SNP on a Saturday night

The audits suggest that the number of venues open after 4am has decreased since 2017, but further examination indicates that the number of late trading venues in mid-2016 was inflated by the availability of extended-trade permits. On balance, the number of venues trading after 4am has remained relatively stable.

Appendix 9 document venues observed trading after 4am in Fortitude Valley on each of the five audits.

The audit on 28 October 2017 coincided with the Valley Fiesta. If we examine individual venues we can see that a number of them were open on that night that do not typically trade that late. These venues include Alfred & Constance, Crow Bar, Woolly Mammoth, Birdees, Famous and Our Place (see Appendix 9). Key informant interviews with venues indicate that they use extended trade permits when available for special events like the Valley Fiesta.

These venues were not observed open after 4am on any other audit. So, if we presume these six venues were open only because it was Valley Fiesta weekend, then it suggests that since mid-2017 there has been a reduction of 3-4 venues trading after 4am in the Valley SNP. The number of venues

observed trading after 4am on 24 July 2016 included several venues actively advertising that they were using a special permit to trade late. This included venues like RGs and Ric's that did not typically trade past 4am prior to the legislation and availability of special permits and were using the designated number of special permits each licensee was granted. This suggests that the number of venues trading after 4am during the first audit in 2016 were inflated by access to extended trade permits.

Figure 367 illustrates some promotions undertaken by venues on Facebook during 2016. In these posts the venues specifically use extended trade permits as a promotional tool, and are keen to inform patrons that the venues are not affected by the 'lock out' legislation.

Figure 367: Facebook posts by Fortitude Valley venues

Seven large multi-room or multi-level nightclubs and five adult entertainment clubs make up a consistent group of venues that trade after 4am in the Fortitude Valley SNP. Brunswick & Ann closed

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for renovation during 2018, and reopened as a late trading nightclub called Marquee Club in 2019. OMFG is a new adult entertainment club that opened up during 2018.

This demonstrates that the number and type of venues trading after 4am has remained relatively consistent from 2016 to 2018. Several clubs experimented with, or take advantage of, late trade after 4am around a special event (like Valley Fiesta) or at the beginning of the TAFV legislation when extended trade permits were more readily available. In key informant interviews several venues reported that they sought these extended trade permits less because they were more administratively difficult to get and only available on nights when other venues had them (and so they couldn't be used as a point of difference).

Once these special 'once off' late trading venues are removed from consideration, the underlying number of late trading clubs remains consistent. The slightly lower number of observations in the July 2018 final round are most possibly attributable to seasonal differences, there is nothing to suggest at this stage that Prohibition and The Beat are no longer opening after 4am, and Brunswick & Ann was temporarily closed for renovation and has since reopened as the Marquee Club.

Appendix 9 includes nightclubs open after 12am and after 2am on each audit. None of the nightclubs trading after 2am started closing earlier by 2018. Neither is there any change in the number of late-trading venues following the introduction of ID scanners in mid-2017. The venues that were not observed open on later rounds were all either closed for renovation or are now new venues. Brunswick & Ann closed for renovation and reopened as Marquee Bar. Hot Gossip closed and reopened as Famous. The Fringe closed and reopened as The Osbourne. Zuri closed and reopened as OMFG. TBC was not observed open on the final audit, but the club remains open and trading, so this observation is an anomaly. The Family closed in mid-2017, rebranded as EI8HT for one-off events and club nights, and then reopened as The Family in mid-2018.

The only significant nightclub closure during the period was Oh Hello, which closed in August 2018 after the final audits were complete. The reasons for the closure were not publicly declared, but industry news reported the closure is partly related to the owner's commitment to a large music festival. The venue remains empty in early 2019.

The venue sites where Sway and Alhambra were remain empty. These two nightclubs had closed about the time the study began in mid-2016. A club called The Mansion also closed about the time the study commenced and reopened as the mini-golf bar Holey Moley (it closes by midnight).

This indicates that the number of nightclubs open after 2am in Fortitude Valley has not changed from 2016 to 2018.

The same is true of bars, pubs, adult and bar and dining venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP. If they were trading after midnight, or after 2am, in 2016, they were still doing so in 2018, unless they had closed down permanently.

During the period of the study Alfred & Constance, a multi-purpose venue made up of multiple bars and late-night dining (Kwan Brothers and Alfredo's) went into receivership. While the main part of the Alfred & Constance venue has re-opened for trade, the attached late night dining establishments remain closed. This is a notable loss to the late night dining culture of the precinct.

Only one pub changed during the period of study. The Underdog Pub on Brunswick St closed, and the site was reopened as Netherworld. This venue is a pub selling craft beer, vegan food and offering two rooms of retro arcade and computer games. So, it adds to the cultural diversity of the precinct.

A similar finding for live music venues was noted (see Appendix 9 for details). This indicates that the trading pattern of live music venues did not change from 2016 to 2018. The change, noted in Table 7 above, in trade after 4am was due to Ric's using extended trade permits when the legislation first came into effect, and the exceptional use of late trading permits for Valley Fiesta weekend by Crow Bar and Woolly Mammoth.

The Zoo is not typically open after midnight. In February 2018 The Zoo publicly announced that they would change their license so that they were only open until midnight, in order to avoid using ID scanners. The Zoo reported at the time that the scanners cost money to operate that was not recouped from revenue after midnight, so it wasn't financially viable to have them. The venue also reported the impact the scanners had on weeknights, where they would need to close by 10pm to avoid the cost of having to operate them (see 61, 62). Live music venues such as Black Bear Lodge, Crow Bar, Ric's, The Foundry and The Brightside, and to some extent The Woolly Mammoth, trade late because they have a multi-faceted business model where live original music performance takes up the early part of the evening, while after midnight the venue becomes a nightclub.

In the section below we present data on the mix of businesses in the Fortitude Valley SNP from 2016 to 2018.

6.13.1.2. OBSERVATIONS OF QUEUES OUTSIDE VENUES

Table 158 to Table 163 display the number of venues observed with a queue out of those observed open. For instance, Table 158 shows that at 10pm on 24 July 2016, 1 out of 7 Adult venues observed open had a queue. A queue is defined as a group or number of people waiting to enter a venue, who are not currently engaged by security.

Table 158. Summary of adult venues observed with queues in Fortitude Valley

Date	10pm	12am	2am	4am
24/7/2016	1/7	-	1/6	0/4
1/4/2017	2/7	2/7	1/6	-
28/10/2017	1/8	2/8	2/7	-
17/2/2018	3/7	3/7	2/4	3/3
28/7/2018	1/1	5/8	3/8	1/4

Table 159. Summary of bars observed with queues in Fortitude Valley

Date	10pm	12am	2am	4am
24/7/2016	1/14	2/10	-	-
1/4/2017	3/18	2/11	-	-
28/10/2017	4/17	4/10	-	-
17/2/2018	5/11	6/6	1/1	-
28/7/2018	4/20	8/14	1/9	-

Table 160: Summary of bar & dining venues observed with queues in Fortitude Valley

Date	10pm	12am	2am	4am
24/7/2016	1/15	1/8	-	-
1/4/2017	2/11	3/5	-	-
28/10/2017	7/9	4/6	2/5	1/2
17/2/2018	2/9	7/8	2/4	-
28/7/2018	3/10	6/8	1/6	0/1

Table 161: Summary of clubs observed with queues in Fortitude Valley

Date	10pm	12am	2am	4am
24/7/2016	7/19	7/18	1/17	1/6
1/4/2017	14/17	13/17	2/15	1/6
28/10/2017	11/15	12/17	4/13	2/8
17/2/2018	15/17	16/17	6/11	-
28/7/2018	14/18	14/17	11/17	1/4

Table 162: Summary of live music venues observed with queues in Fortitude Valley

Date	10pm	12am	2am	4am
24/7/2016	-	3/5	-	-
1/4/2017	3/6	3/5	-	-
28/10/2017	4/6	3/6	3/4	1/2
17/2/2018	6/6	5/5	3/3	-
28/7/2018	4/5	5/5	3/5	-

Table 163: Summary of pubs observed with queues in Fortitude Valley

Date	10pm	12am	2am	4am
24/7/2016	-	-	-	-
1/4/2017	3/6	1/6	-	-
28/10/2017	4/8	5/8	2/5	-
17/2/2018	4/7	4/5	2/5	-
28/7/2018	4/8	6/8	3/7	-

The observations indicate that queues were most common for clubs, live music venues and pubs. Queues were consistently observed at these venues through each of the five audits.

Figure 368 (and the tables above) demonstrate that the number of venues observed with queues after midnight, after 2am and after 4am rose across the period of observation. This rise was evident in the first two audits, conducted before the introduction of mandatory ID scanners.

Following the introduction of mandatory ID scanners the majority of clubs and live music venues were observed with queues after 10pm, 12am and 2am.

The rise appears to be sharpest, especially after 2am and after 4am, between the audit before and the audit after the introduction of mandatory ID scanning. These increases in queues appear to affect all venue types. Queues were observed after midnight and after 2am at venues like bars and bar & dining establishments that had previously not been observed with queues following the introduction of mandatory ID scanners.

Figure 368: Total number venues observed with queues on each audit in Fortitude Valley

These observations of increasing queues outside venues after midnight cohere with key informant interviews with live music venue owners and managers. These venues claim that queues of patrons waiting to be scanned into venues were a persistent issue that required management. This could be a particularly acute issue if large numbers of patrons arrived in a short time frame to enter the venue to see a scheduled performance. While demand to enter the venue might peak for only the half an hour or so before a show, to open a second scanner would involve the cost of hiring an additional scanner and employing a security guard for a minimum 4 hour shift to operate it.

6.13.1.3. MIX OF BUSINESSES IN FORTITUDE VALLEY PRECINCT

This section presents an analysis of businesses trading in the Fortitude Valley precinct. Data were collected in July 2016 and August 2018.

Data were primarily compiled by a physical walkthrough of the precinct to observe and record information about every street-level shopfront in the precinct. Cross-checking and contextual detail was added by using OLGR license data, internet and social media searches.

The purpose of the analysis was to examine whether the overall mix of businesses – across both daytime and night-time economies – changed during the period.

Businesses were categorised as:

- Bars
- Bar & Dining
- Buy & Sell (second-hand dealers)
- Cinemas, Galleries & Video gaming
- Duty Free retail
- Fast & Street Food (including coffee)
- Groceries
- Lifestyle & Fashion retailers (including homewares, beauty, hair and massage)
- Nightclubs
- Pubs
- Restaurants & Cafes
- Strip clubs
- Live venues (including live music and live performance venues).

We excluded from the analysis car dealerships, professional services (including bank branches, medical centres, pharmacies and education providers), convenience stores, accommodation, public amenities such as pools, police and post offices. We also excluded bottle shops (these are accounted for elsewhere in analysis of licensing data).

We counted 319 businesses open and trading in July 2016, and 334 businesses open and trading in August 2018.

The number of licensed businesses trading in the precinct was 163 in both 2016 and 2018.

Figure 369 illustrates the number of businesses open by category in 2016 and 2018. The data indicate some growth in the number of bars, restaurants, cafes and lifestyle and fashion retailers. And, a small decline in the number of nightclubs, bar & dining establishments, live music venues and fast and street food vendors.

Figure 369: Number of businesses open in Fortitude Valley SNP (2016-2018)

Figure 369 illustrates that the largest numbers of businesses trading in the Fortitude Valley SNP are lifestyle and fashion retailers (30.8% in 2018), followed by restaurants and cafes (23.9% in 2018). These business categories account for 54.7% of the businesses in the SNP in 2018. And, each category grew between 2016 and 2018. This suggests a diversifying lifestyle and cultural economy, both daytime and night-time, in Fortitude Valley. By comparison, bars, bar & dining establishments, nightclubs, pubs and live music venues collectively accounted for 29.6% of the businesses trading in the Fortitude Valley SNP, and the number of these businesses has not increased between 2016 and 2018, with the exception of smaller bars.

6.13.1.3.1. COMPARING ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM THE FORTITUDE VALLEY SNP TO ABS COUNTS OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESSES

Table 164 groups together the businesses trading in the Fortitude Valley SNP into the ANZSIC industry categories used by the ABS in their Counts of Australian Businesses surveys. This allows for some comparison between the 'entry' and 'exit' rates in Fortitude Valley with the Queensland average for that business category.

Table 164: Entry and exit of businesses in Fortitude Valley SNP grouped by ANZSIC business category

Business type	Number of businesses open (2016)	Entries	Exits	Number of businesses open (2018)	Change	Entry rate (%) for businesses in Fortitude Valley	Exit rate (%) for businesses in Fortitude Valley	Change (%) for businesses in Fortitude Valley	ABS Entry rate (%) for businesses in QLD	ABS exit rate (%) for businesses in QLD	ABS change (%) for businesses in QLD
Cafés and restaurants (ANZSIC 4511)	66	36	22	80	14	54.55	33.33	21.21	24.5	18.4	5.9
Takeaway food services (ANZSIC 4512)	37	8	12	33	-4	21.62	32.43	-10.81	19.6	18.4	1.3
Lifestyle & Fashion retail (ANZSIC 4251)	97	29	23	103	6	29.9	23.71	6.19	17.8	18.4	-0.2
Pubs, taverns and bars (ANZSIC 4520)	105	26	27	104	-1	27.8	25.7	-0.95	15.1	14.5	0.8
Performing arts venues (ANZSIC 9003)	11	0	1	10	-1	9.1	9.1	0	22.9	10.0	14.3

The ABS 'Counts of Australian Businesses, including Entries and Exits' from June 2013 to June 2017 dataset reports the following entry and exit rates for businesses in Queensland:

- Cafes and Restaurants (ANZSIC 4511) had an entry rate of 24.5% and exit rate of 18.4%, a percentage change of 5.9%.

- Takeaway Food Services (ANZSIC 4512) had an entry rate of 19.6% and exit rate of 18.4%, a percentage change of 1.3%.

- Pubs, Taverns and Bars (ANZSIC 4520) had an entry rate of 15.1% and exit rate of 14.5%, a percentage change of 0.8%.

- Performing Arts Venue Operation (ANZSIC 9003) had an entry rate of 22.9% and an exit rate of 10.0%, a percentage change of 14.3%.

- Clothing retailing (ANZSIC 4251) had an entry rate of 17.8% and exit rate of 18.4%, a percentage change of -0.2%.

- Other Personal Accessory Retailing (ANZSIC 4259) had an entry rate of 8.0% and an exit rate of 22.3%, a percentage change of -14%.

- Houseware Retailing (ANZSIC 4213) had an entry rate of 11.1% and an exit rate of 21.1%, a percentage change of -34%.

In comparison with the entry and exit rates reported by the ABS' Counts of Australian Businesses, the Fortitude Valley SNP displays:

- Above average growth in cafes and restaurants. Although, as reported in the section below this growth in the number of dining businesses in the Fortitude Valley area does not extend into the after 10pm economy.

- Above average decline in takeaway food businesses trading in the precinct. Although, once again, the late night economy of the Fortitude Valley SNP presents a different scenario, with above average growth in fast food businesses trading after 10pm.

- Minimal change in the total number of bars, pubs and clubs in the Fortitude Valley SNP, which is similar to the Queensland average. Although, the entry and exit rates in the Fortitude Valley SNP appear to be substantially higher than the Queensland average, suggesting a relatively large degree of turnover in these businesses. As noted in the observations above, this turnover is concentrated mostly in smaller bars and bar & dining establishments, rather than large clubs and pubs.

- Growth in the lifestyle and retail sector in the Fortitude Valley SNP. This growth contrasts with the ANZSIC codes for clothing, personal accessory and homeware retail, which all indicate a decline in these businesses across Queensland. In Table 164 above we group

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together the range of fashion, homeware and lifestyle retailers into one code, so this comparison is not a direct one. But, as demonstrated below, the growth of this daytime lifestyle and fashion retail is evident around the James Street hub of the SNP. It is geographically and temporally distinct from the valley's late night economy.

In comparison to Queensland averages, these observations suggest that the daytime retail economy of the Fortitude Valley SNP is experiencing above average growth, and the late night economy's growth is in-keeping with the state average. These observations indicate a diversifying daytime and night-time economy in the Fortitude Valley SNP. Although, the late night economy remains dominated by clubs, pubs, bars and live music venues.

Although the actual numbers are small compared to the larger Queensland dataset, the Fortitude Valley observations for all business categories suggest a larger rate of change in entry and exits than the state average. This may be suggestive of a volatility to the daytime and late night economy in the valley.

6.13.1.3.2. ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM FORTITUDE VALLEY SNP

Table 165 displays 'entries' and 'exits' from the late night Saturday night economy of Fortitude Valley between 2016 and 2018. It is important to note these are not businesses closing down or opening up (as described above), but rather the number of businesses continuing, starting or no longer being observed trading after 10pm during the period. Furthermore, the 'entry' and 'exit' observation is based on a single Saturday night audit in 2016 and 2018. The observations, therefore, are only indicative.

The observations indicate that while the number of bar & dining and dining businesses in the Fortitude Valley SNP did not change, the number open after 10pm appears to decline. While these observations are based on only a snapshot of five nights during the period, they do suggest that the late night economy of the Fortitude Valley SNP is still predominantly organised around late-trading bars, pubs and clubs.

Table 165: Business Entries and Exits in Fortitude Valley 2016-2018

Business Type	Open 2016 Audit	Number observed open for first time between 2016 & 2018	Number of previously observed venues not observed on final audit	Open 2018 audit	Change	Entry rate	Exit Rate	Percentage change
Adult	7	2	2	7	0	28.6%	28.6%	0%
Bar & Dining	15	3	8	10	-5	20%	53.3%	-33.3%
Bar	14	16	10	20	6	114.3%	71.4%	42.9%
Club	19	2	3	18	-1	10.5%	15.8%	-5.3%
Dining	6	20	12	14	8	333.3%	200%	-133.3%
Live Music	6	1	2	5	-1	16.7%	33.3%	-16.7%
Pub	6	2	0	8	2	33.3%	0%	33.3%

6.13.1.4. DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY OF BUSINESSES IN THE FORTITUDE VALLEY SNP

6.13.1.4.1. BUSINESSES OBSERVED ON SATURDAY NIGHT AUDITS

Figure 370 displays venues observed open in Fortitude Valley SNP on each of the Saturday night audits. The maps demonstrate the dense clustering of nightlife activity in the south-western corner of the precinct, around the Brunswick Street Mall.

The colour of pins demonstrate the location of venues by how late they were observed to be open.

Yellow pins display venues open after 10pm, green pins display venues open after midnight, blue pins display venues open after 2am, and purple pins display venues open after 4am.

The yellow and green pins are distributed most widely on the map. These businesses include a wider array of venue types, such as bars, bar & dining and dining establishments.

The blue and purple bins further demonstrate the dense clustering of late-night venues, open after 2am and 4am respectively, around the Brunswick Street Mall. The notable concentration of purple pins on the first map is largely attributable to venues using extended trade permits immediately after the introduction of the TAFV legislation.

The maps illustrate that the clustering of late-night trade around the Brunswick Street Mall did not change during the period of study. Despite the large geographic size of this SNP, the late-night economy is concentrated in a relatively small section. In following section we further explore the spatial distribution of businesses in the Fortitude Valley SNP.

24/7/2016	1/4/2017	28/10/2017
17/2/2018	28/7/2018	

Figure 370: Venues open in Fortitude Valley SNP 24/7/2016, 1/4/2017, 28/10/2017, 17/2/2018, and 28/7/2018

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6.13.1.4.2. ALL SHOPFRONT BUSINESSES TRADING IN THE FORTITUDE VALLEY SNP

Figure 371 and Figure 372 display the density and distribution of all shopfront daytime and nighttime businesses in the Fortitude Valley SNP. The colour of dots on the map indicates business categories (see the map legend).

Both maps illustrate the concentration of nightlife venues in the south-west corner of the precinct between Wickham and McLachlan Streets, and Warner and Brunswick Streets. All large nightclubs are concentrated in this area. Bar and dining establishments and pubs are more distributed throughout other parts of the precinct. Lifestyle retail is concentrated along the James Street precinct. The maps illustrate the geographic separation of the daytime and night-time lifestyle economics in the valley. The maps indicate no clear changes in the density and distribution of business types throughout the SNP.

Figure 371: Businesses in Fortitude Valley 2016

Figure 372: Businesses in Fortitude Valley 2018

Figure 373 illustrates entry and exit of nightlife venues (bars, bar and dining establishments, nightclubs, pubs and adult venues) from the Fortitude Valley SNP. The map confirms a pattern of entry and exit concentrated in the south-west corner of the precinct. Green dots represent new nightlife businesses since 2016, these new entries remain concentrated in the densest part of the precinct around the Brunswick Street Mall. This indicates little geographic diversifying of the late night trade in the precinct, nightlife venues are not moving out into other parts of the SNP.

Figure 373: Entry and exit of nightlife venues in Fortitude Valley 2016-2018

Figure 374 displays the distribution of food and dining businesses in the Fortitude Valley SNP, distinguishing between restaurants (including cafes) and fast food businesses. The map illustrates the clustering of dining in two parts of the precinct: intermingled with the 'clubbing' part of the precinct around the Brunswick Street Mall and along the James Street fashion and lifestyle retail strip. The map also displays the cluster of dining businesses around the Emporium development just outside the northern boundary of the precinct. Many of the dining businesses in the 'clubbing' part of the precinct are Asian restaurants proximate to the China Town Mall (that runs parallel to the Brunswick Street Mall). The map also illustrates the concentration of fast food businesses proximate to the late trading nightlife venues around the Brunswick Street Mall.

Figure 374: Distribution of food and dining in the Fortitude Valley SNP

Figure 375 illustrates the entry and exit of food and dining businesses in the precinct from 2016 to 2018. Yellow markers are businesses that have remained open throughout the study. Green dots have opened since mid-2016. Red dots are businesses that have closed since mid-2016. Particularly notable is the stability of restaurants and cafes in the James St part of the precinct. Businesses to close down in the period are mostly concentrated in the dense nightlife south-west corner of the precinct. In addition to James St, other upscale bar and dining establishments are emerging along the parts of Ann and McLachlan Street to the north of Brunswick St. These include Happy Boy, X Cargo Social and Little Valley.

Figure 375: Entry and exit of food and dining businesses in Fortitude Valley 2016-2018

Figure 376 illustrates the distribution of lifestyle and fashion retail in the Fortitude Valley precinct. Blue dots are lifestyle and fashion retailers. The map also includes orange dots for buy & sell second-hand dealers, blue markers for groceries, and green markers for cinemas, galleries and video gaming lounges. The map illustrates the clustering of lifestyle and fashion retailers along and adjacent to James St. In 2018, 60 of the 103 (58.2%) lifestyle & fashion retailers were concentrated in the northern fringe of the SNP along James St. There are some bar and dining establishments in this area, but no large nightclubs and only one pub. The only other part of the precinct where lifestyle and fashion retailers and nightlife venues noticeably overlap is the stretch of Ann St between the Brunswick St Mall and Winn Lane. This stretch also includes the Bakery Lane development.

Figure 376: Lifestyle and fashion retail in the Fortitude Valley precinct

The notable observation from these maps is that there appears to be little co-mingling of the daytime fashion and lifestyle retail and night-time economies in the precinct. These two parts of the precinct economy remain spatially separate. Lifestyle and fashion retail in the precinct is underpinned by the development of new retail space on and adjacent to James Street. Demand for retail space in this area appears high. There are few vacant shopfronts and several new mixed retail and accommodation developments are underway. And yet, in the parts of the precinct around the Brunswick St Mall (where the nightlife venues are concentrated) there are a number of empty retail shopfronts. Furthermore, there are several vacant retail developments in this area, including disused buildings and department stores on Wickham St, and the almost completely vacant TC Beirne retail development between the Brunswick St and Chinatown Malls. The TC Beirne centre is currently undergoing a renovation to reinvigorate retail and dining in this area.

At present though, the development of a daytime lifestyle and fashion retail economy in the northern fringe of the SNP has not 'spilled over' into the south-western part of the SNP dominated by the

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night-time economy. And likewise, although restaurants and bars are established around the James Street precinct these all close early relative to the late trading venues in the south-west corner of the precinct. These two parts of the SNP are remain noticeably distinct from each other. They have a different mix of business, different patterns of growth, and cater to different clientele.

6.13.2. WEST END AND SOUTH BANK

The West End and South Bank area is not a declared Safe Night Precinct, but is a key part of Brisbane's night-time economy.

The area audited stretched from Vulture Street in West End through to Grey Street in South Bank. The key areas of nightlife activity are the bars, bar & dining establishments, pubs and restaurants along and adjacent to Boundary Street in West End, the emerging dining and drinking development on Fish Lane, and the strip of restaurants and bar & dining establishments on Grey Street.

6.13.2.1. NUMBER OF BUSINESSES OBSERVED OPEN ON SATURDAY NIGHT AUDITS

Table 166 and Figure 377 depict the number of businesses observed open on the Saturday night audits in West End and South Bank. West End is the only neighbourhood in inner-city precinct that has a nightlife economy comprising dining and bars that is not part of an SNP. The data excludes convenience stores, but includes all others such as fast food, dining, bars, clubs, and pubs.

The data collected indicate some increase in the number of venues trading after 10pm. There were 29 at the first audit in 2016, and this number remained stable throughout the audits, until the final one in July 2018 when 41 businesses were observed open after 10pm.

With the exception of the audit in March 2018, most businesses in West End do not trade past midnight, and very few trade after 2am. While 6 were observed open after 12am in August 2016, this increased to 9 in September 2017, 27 in March 2018, and back to 12 in July 2018. This suggests the March audit was an anomaly, which we will explore further below. The research assistants reported nothing unusual about this night, such as one-off events that would explain the increase in venues open that night.

For the most part, nearly all venues are closed in West End by 2am.

Table 166: Venues observed open in West End and South Bank on Saturday night audits

Time	13/08/2016	06/05/2017	16/09/2017	10/03/2018	14/07/2018
10pm	29	34	29	32	41
12am	6	7	9	27	12
2am	4	0	0	1	0
4am	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 377 displays the increase in businesses observed open at 10pm, the sharp increase in businesses observed open after 12am in March 2018, and the small number open after 2am.

Figure 377: Number of businesses observed trading in West End on a Saturday night

Appendix 9 provides details on the venues observed after 10pm and 12am in West End on each of the audits.

A number of venues observed trading after midnight only on the March 2018 audit. These include 8 restaurants, 2 bar and dining establishments, 1 pub and 3 bars. There is no specific reason we are aware of (like seasonal trade or a change in method) that explains this increase in venues open after midnight on this particular Saturday.

Setting this anomaly aside, the pattern of trade in West End indicates that while more venues were trading after 10pm in 2018 than 2016, they typically closed by midnight or soon after. The only venue observed trading after 2am more than once was the micro-brewery Brisbane Brewing. Archive, Lock'n'Load (which closed down during the study) and the Pig n Whistle were all observed open after 2am on the first audit only.

West End's late night economy is organised around a strip of venues on Boundary Road that comprise bars, pubs, and restaurants. Archive, Brisbane Brewing, Catchment Brewing, The Lychee Lounge, The Bearded Lady and The Rumpus Room are key venues in this area. These venues are craft beer oriented bars and pubs, live music venues or cocktail bars. Lock 'n' Load was also part of this late night economy, but closed down and was re-opened as Covent Garden during the period of study. No other significant late-trading venues closed during the period of study.

The other late-trading venues are closer to the city and South Bank and comprise larger pubs: The Fox, The Charming Squire, Pig n Whistle and The Plough Inn. These venues are quite separate geographically and culturally from the Boundary Street bar and dining scene. The strip of bars and restaurants around Grey Street in South Bank has some venues which trade after midnight (like Cowch and Beach House) but not consistently.

6.13.2.2. ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM WEST END AND SOUTH BANK NIGHTTIME ECONOMY

Table 167 displays 'entries' and 'exits' from the late night Saturday night economy of West End between 2016 and 2018. It is important to note these are not businesses closing down or opening up, but rather the number of businesses continuing, starting or ceasing trading after 10pm during the period. Furthermore, businesses observed trading for the first time after the first audit are recorded as an 'entry' and businesses not observed trading on the final audit are recorded as an 'exit'. This is only indicative because the data are based on two single night snapshots. The table indicates a degree of churn in the number of dining and bar & dining businesses in West End during the period, but an overall increase in the number of businesses trading after 10pm.

Table 167: Business Entries and Exits in West End 2016-2018

Business Type	Open 2016 Audit	Number observed open for first time between 2016 & 2018	Number of previously observed venues not observed on final audit	Open 2018 audit	Change	Entry rate	Exit Rate	Percentage change
Adult	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0%
Bar & Dining	4	9	2	11	7	225%	50%	175%
Bar	9	3	3	9	0	33.3%	33.3%	0%
Club	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0%
Dining	11	21	19	13	2	190.9%	172.7%	18.2%
Live Music	0	1	1	0	0	100%	100%	0%
Pub	5	4	1	8	3	80%	20%	60%

The table demonstrates that no venue category saw a decline in the number of venues, with the exception of live music.

West End had one live music venue Max Watts. This venue was observed open after 10pm on one audit, but has since closed down. It had been an important original live music venue in the city since 2009 (trading as The Hi Fi from 2009 to 2015, before going into receivership and reopening as Max Watts). The venue currently remains empty. There were no other significant closures of venues in West End during the period of study.

The overall story in West End is the growth in small bars, restaurants and bar & dining establishments around three nightlife strips: along Boundary St near the intersection of Vulture Street, along Melbourne St near Fish Lane, and along South Bank's Grey Street. While there are some large pubs in or near each area, each strip is characterised by restaurants, bars and bar & dining establishments that are busier earlier in the evening and close shortly after midnight. While venues like The Fox Hotel have traded as nightclubs in the past, they do not currently appear to be trading after 2am.

Table 168: Comparing mix of businesses observed open on first and last audits in West End and South Bank

Business type	13/8/2016 audit (%)	10/3/2018 audit (%)
Adult	-	-
Bar & Dining	4 (13.8%)	11 (26.8%)
Bar	9 (31%)	9 (21.9%)
Club	-	-
Dining	11 (37.9%)	13 (31.7%)
Live Music	-	-
Pub	5 (17.2%)	8 (19.5%)
Total businesses observed open	29	41

Table 168 displays changes in the proportion of venue types observed trading after 10pm on the first and last audit. 29 businesses were observed open on the first audit in 2016, and 41 businesses were observed open on the final audit in 2018.

6.13.2.3. DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY OF NIGHTLIFE BUSINESSES IN WEST END AND SOUTH BANK

Figure 378 displays venues observed open in West End on each of the Saturday night audits.

The yellow pins indicate venues trading after 10pm, green venues trading after midnight, blue venues trading after 2am, and purple venues trading after 4am.

The maps demonstrate the clustering of venues along Boundary St between Vulture Street and Edmondstone Street. The maps indicate three notable changes across the audits from 2016 to 2018:

- The growth in the number of businesses trading after 10pm along Grey Street in South Bank.
- The growth in the number of businesses trading after midnight along Boundary Street in West End.
- The emergence of businesses trading after 10pm and after midnight along the Fish Lane development that runs parallel to Melbourne Street. This area is characterised by several new bars and restaurants. These businesses along Fish Lane only emerged in the final two audits in 2018.

It appears that the growth in businesses trading later along each of these strips are mainly bar & dining establishments or smaller cocktail, whiskey, craft beer, dessert and other bars.

Only occasionally were venues observed trading after 2am in this area of the city, these were larger pubs, bars and micro-breweries. Throughout this area, most nightlife activity revolves around venues where consumers eat or drink earlier in the evening.

The maps collectively indicate that West End and South Bank are becoming an important part of Brisbane's nightlife economy. Importantly, the area brings a different mix of businesses compared to the Fortitude Valley SNP that appear to be smaller, offering a broader range of consumer experiences centred around food and drink. Venues in this area are also more geographically distributed and trade earlier in the night than the valley. This nightlife economy is growing around three relatively separate retail strips. While Grey Street will likely remain separate from West End, it is possible that the Fish Lane and Boundary Street strips will eventually 'join' creating a continuous strip of nightlife venues from Vulture Street to Grey Street. It is also important to recognise that the kind of venues emerging on each of these strips cater to older and possibly more affluent consumers than the late-trading venues in the Fortitude Valley precinct. While both precincts have an emerging high-end dining and bar & dining scene, the valley's is mixed in with large clubs and bars that attract younger patrons, whereas West End and South Bank's is mixed in with businesses, including chain and family restaurants, targeting families and tourists. The Grey Street retail strip caters to a more diverse crowd of tourists and families than the Fish Lane or Boundary Street strips.

13/08/2016	6/5/2017	16/9/2017
10/3/2018	14/7/2018	

Figure 378: Venues open in West End and South Bank 13/8/2016, 6/5/2017, 10/3/2018 and 14/7/2018

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The Surfers Paradise SNP covers the main retail and tourist area centred on the Cavill Avenue mall and Orchid Avenue. It stretches from Main Beach at the top of the mall west across to the retail strip of restaurants and cafes on Chevron Island (Figure 379). The precinct is characterised by a tourist and retail economy – that includes lifestyle retail, tourist attractions and many large high-rise hotels and resorts.

Figure 379: Surfers Paradise Safe Night Precinct

Table 169 and

Figure 380 depict the number of businesses observed open in the Surfers Paradise SNP on the Saturday night audits. The data excludes convenience stores, but includes all others such as fast food, dining, bars, clubs, pubs.

The data collected indicate growth in the number of businesses trading after 10pm, midnight, 2am and 4am.

Table 169: Venues observed open in Surfers Paradise SNP on Saturday night audits

Time	30/07/2016	11/03/2017	16/12/2017	17/03/2018	04/08/2018
10pm	41	41	48	32	58
12am	17	17	48	30	27
2am	14	14	10	22	19

| 4am | 6 | 6 | 0 | 9 | 10 |

Figure 380: Number of businesses observed trading in Surfers Paradise on Saturday night audits

Table 170, Table 171 and Appendix 9 detail venues observed trading in Surfers Paradise after 10pm, 12am, 2am and 4am.

Table 170: Venues open after 10pm in Surfers Paradise by venue type

Venue type	30/07/2016	11/03/2017	16/12/2017	17/03/2018	04/08/2018
Adult	3	3	3	3	3
Bar	-	-	1	1	1
Bar & Dining	12	12	18	9	21
Club	7	7	9	8	9
Dining	16	16	14	8	20
Pubs	3	3	3	3	3

The same adult bars, pubs and clubs remained open throughout the period, with little variation. The most notable venue closures during the period appear to be Howl at the Moon, Ultra Lounge and O'Malleys, which each closed between the March 2017 and December 2017 audits. The owner of Howl at the Moon attributed the closure to the changing mix of nightlife venues along the Gold Coast, the growth of smaller bars and restaurants which traded through till midnight throughout the coast meant that locals were less likely to come to Surfers Paradise (63). The O'Malleys pub was renovated and reopened as the One Cavill Beach Bar in late 2017. Fluctuation is seen in dining and bar & dining establishments opening and trading later.

Table 171: Venues open after 12am in Surfers Paradise by venue type

Venue type	30/07/2016	11/03/2017	16/12/2017	17/03/2018	04/08/2018
Adult	3	3	3	3	3
Bar	-	-	1	1	1
Bar & Dining	3	3	17	9	7
Club	6	6	10	9	9
Dining	4	4	13	7	4
Pubs	2	2	2	2	2

The number of clubs, dining and bar & dining businesses open after midnight rises in December 2017 and March 2018 audits (see Table 171). The number of dining and bar & dining venues open after midnight spikes in December 2017. This is possibly attributable to the seasonal nature of trade in Surfers Paradise, with December being the high season in terms of weather and tourism.

The clubs Henessey, Retros and Shooters are all observed trading after midnight on the final three audits. They account for the rise in the number of clubs trading late.

No club or other venue appears to start closing earlier following the introduction of mandatory ID scanning.

Venues consistently observed trading after 2am include adult or strip clubs (such as Hollywood Showgirls, Players and The Toy Box), large nightclubs (such as Bedroom, Cocktails and Dreams, Elsewhere, Sin City and The Underground), some pubs (Waxy's and Fiddler's Green) and some bar and dining establishments (such as Melba's and Tune Up). While one nightclub appeared to close for a period of renovation during the period (Escape Bar) no other nightclubs appear to have stopped trading or closed earlier following introduction of the TAFV legislation or mandatory ID scanners.

Following the introduction of ID scanners several pubs and bar & dining establishments were observed trading after 2am, where they had not been previously (see Table 32). These include Avenue, Charlie's, Gilley and Kitty O'Shea's. Additionally, Hennessey, Retro and Shooter's nightclubs were also observed trading after 2am in 2018, where they had not been observed previously.

Across the five Saturday night audits an overall increase in the late night trade in Surfers Paradise is observed, driven by nightclubs, pubs and bar & dining establishments remaining open later.

Appendix 9 depicts businesses observed trading after 4am in Surfers Paradise across the five audits. This illustrates a similar pattern to businesses observed trading after 2am. A number of adult and nightclubs trade consistently after 4am throughout the period, and a number begin trading later in 2018. No businesses appear to cease trading after 4am during the period of the study.

Appendix 9 demonstrate that no venues appear to begin closing earlier in Surfers Paradise since 2016.

6.13.3.2. OBSERVATIONS OF QUEUES OUTSIDE VENUES

Table 172 to Table 176 display the number of venues with a queue out of those observed open in the Surfers Paradise SNP.

A queue is defined as a group or number of people waiting to enter a venue, who are not currently engaged by security.

Figure 381 displays the total number of venues observed with a queue on each audit. Observations of queues indicate a spike in queues on the March 2018 audit. This was evident across all venues, including venues that typically were not observed with queues like bar & dining establishments. There appears to be some increase in queues observed after midnight following the introduction of ID scanners.

Table 172: Summary of venues observed with queues in Surfers Paradise on 30/07/2016

Venue type	10pm	12am	2am	4am
Adult	2/3	-	-	-
Bar & Dining	-	-	-	-
Club	5/7	2/6	3/6	1/2
Pub	-	-	-	-
Total	7	2	3	1

Table 173: Summary of venues observed with queues in Surfers Paradise on 11/03/2017

Venue type	10pm	12am	2am	4am
Adult	2/3	-	-	-
Bar & Dining	-	-	-	-
Club	5/7	2/6	3/6	1/2
Pub	-	-	-	-
Total	7	2	3	1

Table 174: Summary of venues observed with queues in Surfers Paradise on 16/12/2017

Name	10pm	12am	2am	4am
Adult	-	1/3	-	-
Bar & Dining	1/18	1/18	-	-
Club	7/9	4/9	2/4	-
Pub	-	1/3	-	-
Total	8	7	2	-

Table 175: Summary of venues observed with queues in Surfers Paradise on 17/3/2018

Name	10pm	12am	2am	4am
Adult	2/3	2/3	2/3	2/2
Bar & Dining	6/9	6/9	4/6	-
Club	8/8	8/8	7/7	4/5
Pub	2/3	2/2	1/2	0/1
Total	18	18	14	6

Table 176: Summary of venues observed with queues in Surfers Paradise on 4/8/2018

Name	10pm	12am	2am	4am
Adult	1/3	1/3	0/3	0/3
Bar & Dining	2/21	2/7	0/3	-
Club	4/9	7/8	4/8	2/5
Pub	2/3	1/3	0/2	0/1
Total	9	11	4	2

Figure 381: Venues observed with queues Surfers Paradise on Saturday night audits

6.13.3.3. ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM THE SURFERS PARADISE SNP

Table 177 displays 'entries' and 'exits' from the late night Saturday night economy of Surfers Paradise between 2016 and 2018. It is important to note these are not businesses closing down or opening up, but rather the number of businesses continuing, starting or ceasing trading after 10pm during the period. Furthermore, businesses observed trading for the first time after the first audit are recorded as an 'entry' and businesses not observed trading on the final audit are recorded as an 'exit'. This is only indicative because the data are based on two single night snapshots.

The table indicates the growth in bar & dining establishments in the Surfers Paradise SNP. Between the first and last audits 13 bar & dining establishments were observed open after 10pm, while only 2 stopped trading after 10pm.

Table 177: Business Entries and Exits in Surfers Paradise 2016-2018

Business Type	Open 2016 Audit	Number observed open for first time between 2016 & 2018	Number of previously observed venues not observed on final audit	Open 2018 audit	Change	Entry rate	Exit Rate	Percentage change
Adult	3	0	0	3	0%	0%	0%	0%
Bar & Dining	12	13	2	23	11	108.3%	16.7%	91.6%
Bar	0	1	0	1	1	100%	0%	100%
Club	7	3	1	9	2	42.9%	14.3%	28.6%
Dining	18	13	11	20	2	72.2%	61.1%	11.1%
Pub	3	1	1	3	0	33.3%	33.3%	0%

Table 178 provides a snapshot of the mix of businesses observed open on the first and last audits in the Surfers Paradise SNP. It indicates that while the number of adult clubs, nightclubs, pubs and dining businesses in the precinct has remained steady, the growth has been among bar & dining establishments. They now make up a larger proportion, by business count, of the trade in the Surfers Paradise precinct.

Table 178: Comparing mix of businesses observed open on first and last audits in Surfers Paradise SNP

Business type	30/7/2016 audit (%)	4/8/2018 audit (%)
Adult	3 (6.9%)	3 (5%)
Bar & Dining	12 (27.9%)	23 (38.9%)
Bar	-	1 (1.6%)
Club	7 (16.2%)	9 (15.2%)
Dining	18 (41.8%)	20 (33.8%)
Pub	3 (6.9%)	3 (5%)
Total	43	59

6.13.3.4. DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY OF NIGHTLIFE BUSINESSES IN SURFERS PARADISE SNP

Figure 382 displays venues observed open in Surfers Paradise SNP on each of the Saturday night audits. The maps demonstrate the geographically dispersed nature of the Surfers Paradise SNP. It

extends approximately 1.5kms along main beach from Markwell Avenue to Pandanus Avenue, and then west across Chevron Island.

The figures indicate the dense clustering of pubs, clubs, bars and bar & dining venues along Orchid Avenue and Cavill Avenue. The blue and purple pins also indicate that it is in this area of the precinct that all the late night (after 2am, and after 4am) venues are located. With the exception of the audit on 16/12/2017 no venues were observed trading after midnight on Chevron Island.

The audit undertaken on 16/12/2017 potentially illustrates the seasonal nature of the night-time economy in the Surfers Paradise SNP. This was the only audit in which all venues observed open after 10pm remained open until after midnight, including five venues on Chevron Island. The final audit on 4/8/2018 indicates the growth in venues observed trading after 10pm, this is substantially different to earlier audits. Further audits would need to be undertaken to determine if this was a sustained change in the pattern of trade in Surfers Paradise. These venues observed open after 10pm for the first time were predominantly bar & dining establishments along Cavill Avenue and closer to the beach near The Esplanade.

30/7/2016

11/3/2017

16/12/2017

17/3/2018

4/8/2018

Figure 382: Venues observed open in Surfers Paradise SNP 30/7/2016, 11/3/2017, 16/12/2017, 17/3/2018, and 4/8/2018

6.13.4.   CAIRNS

The Cairns Safe Night Precinct is centred on the central business district and waterfront area, taking in the main marina developments that include resorts, restaurants and bars (see Figure 383).

Figure 383: Cairns Safe Night Precinct

6.13.4.1. NUMBER OF BUSINESSES OBSERVED OPEN ON SATURDAY NIGHT AUDITS

Table 179 and Figure 384 depict the number of businesses observed open on the Saturday night audits in the Cairns SNP. The data excludes convenience stores, but includes all others such as fast food, dining, bars, clubs, pubs.

The five audits conducted indicate a small growth in the number of businesses trading after 10pm and after 12am, and a small decline in the number of businesses trading after 2am and after 4am, from 2016 to 2018.

Table 179: Venues observed open in Cairns SNP on Saturday night audits

Time	30/07/2016	04/03/2017	16/09/2017	07/04/2018	04/08/2018
10pm	35	34	36	39	38
12am	19	18	14	15	17
2am	12	10	12	8	8
4am	5	3	2	3	2

Figure 384: Number of businesses observed trading in Cairns on Saturday night audits

Table 180, Table 181, and Appendix 9 detail observations of venues open in Cairns after 10pm, 12am, 2am and 4am on each of the audits. The tables indicate only small changes in the number of venues trading in each category.

Table 180: Venues observed open in Cairns after 10pm by venue type

Venue type	30/07/2016	11/03/2017	16/12/2017	17/03/2018	04/08/2018
Adult	1	1	1	1	1
Bar	5	5	8	6	8
Bar & Dining	4	6	4	5	5
Club	6	5	5	5	5
Dining	14	12	13	18	15
Pubs	4	3	4	3	3
Live music	1	1	-	-	-
Casino	1	1	1	1	1
Total	36	34	36	39	38

Table 181: Venues observed open in Cairns after 12am by venue type

Venue type	30/07/2016	11/03/2017	16/12/2017	17/03/2018	04/08/2018
Adult	1	1	1	1	1
Bar	2	2	4	5	4
Bar & Dining	5	6	2	4	5
Club	5	4	4	2	3
Pubs	1	2	0	1	1
Live music	1	1	-	-	-
Casino	1	1	1	1	1
Total	16	17	12	14	15

The venues consistently observed trading after 12am (but typically closed by 2am) are bar & dining establishments like Rattle and Hum and Salt. The Cairns RSL, Heritage, Bavarian Beerhouse and Court Yard were occasionally observed trading after midnight.

The venues consistently observed open after 2am included adult club Covergirls, the nightclubs PJ O'Briens, Pier Tavern, The Woolshed and Gilligan's Backpackers, and The Reef Hotel and Casino.

The late-trading venues in Cairns all stand alone and separate from one another, but within easy walking distance within the central part of the city. Unlike Fortitude Valley, Surfers Paradise, West End and Townsville there is not a concentrated strip of nightlife venues.

The Reef Hotel and Casino is the latest trading venue in the city, and so can attract patrons later at night once venues in the centre of Cairns close. While The Reef has an older clientele earlier in the

evening and trades like a bar & dining establishment, later in the evening it becomes more like a bar and club with a dance floor and DJ.

Cairns typically has a low season that goes from October to April. This period coincides with the wet season and a corresponding downturn in tourism and changing patterns of consumption from locals. Despite this, no significant seasonal variations were observed in the audits. This is possibly attributable to softer high seasons the past several years, with less incoming international tourists.

Several venues that were observed trading after midnight or after 2am prior to the introduction of ID scanners, were not observed trading after their introduction. These venues included the bars and clubs Rattle and Hum, The Courtyard, The Downunder, Lilo, Luxx, Lyquid, The Heritage and The Casbah Lounge.

Several these late-trading bars and clubs closed down during the period of study. These included Sanctum, Lyquid and Luxx. Rattle & Hum closed for a period of renovation in 2017. Prior to this it had been one of the largest late-night venues in the city. It has since reopened for trade.

Several venues were observed trading after midnight for the first time following the introduction of ID scanners, these include the bars and bar & dining establishments Elixir, Kezz and Bavarian Beerhouse.

There were no businesses that began trading after 2am following the introduction of ID scanners that were still trading after 2am on the final observation.

It is not clear from these observations that mandatory ID scanners affected the opening hours of bars and clubs in Cairns. Furthermore, queues were only occasionally observed outside Cairns venues.

6.13.4.2.   ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM THE CAIRNS SNP

Table 182 displays 'entries' and 'exits' from the late night Saturday night economy of Cairns SNP between 2016 and 2018. It is important to note these are not businesses closing down or opening up, but rather the number of businesses continuing, starting or ceasing trading after 10pm during the period. Furthermore, businesses observed trading for the first time after the first audit are recorded as an 'entry' and businesses not observed trading on the final audit are recorded as an 'exit'. This is only indicative because the data are based on two single night snapshots.

The table indicates a degree of churn among bars, clubs, dining and bar & dining venues in Cairns. It also records a decrease in the number of night clubs (2) and live music venues (1) trading in Cairns during the period of the study.

Table 182: Business Entries and Exits in Cairns 2016-2018

Business Type	Open 2016 Audit	Number observed open for first time between 2016 & 2018	Number of previously observed venues not observed on final audit	Open 2018 audit	Change	Entry rate	Exit Rate	Percentage change
Adult	1	0	0	1	0	0%	0%	0%
Bar & Dining	4	4	2	6	2	100%	50%	50%
Bar	4	5	1	8	4	125%	25%	100%
Club	5	2	4	3	-2	40%	80%	-40%
Dining	16	18	17	17	1	112.5%	106.3%	6.2%
Live Music	1	0	2	0	-1	0%	100%	-100%
Pub	3	1	2	2	1	33.3%	66.7%	-33.3%

Table 183 indicates the proportion of venues by type in Cairns, comparing the first and last audit. The table indicates some change in the proportion of bars and bar & dining establishments in Cairns during the period.

Table 183: Comparing mix of businesses observed open on first and last audits in Cairns SNP

Business type	30/07/2016 audit (%)	04/08/2018 audit (%)
Adult	1 (2.9%)	1 (2.7%)
Bar & Dining	4 (11.8%)	6 (16.2%)
Bar	3 (8.8%)	8 (21.6%)
Club	5 (14.7%)	3 (8.1%)
Dining	16 (47.1%)	17 (45.9%)
Live Music	2 (5.9%)	0 (0%)
Pub	3 (8.8%)	2 (5.4%)
Total businesses observed open	34	37

6.13.4.3. DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY OF NIGHTLIFE BUSINESSES IN THE CAIRNS SNP

Figure 385 displays the venues observed open in the Cairns SNP on each of the Saturday night audits.

The maps indicate the significantly smaller number of venues trading after 10pm relative to the larger and more urban SNPs, and the lack of any remarkable change in the density or trading patterns of businesses open after 10pm in Cairns during the period of study.

The maps show three main areas of nightlife trade. One is the cluster of waterfront restaurants, pubs and clubs around the Cairns Marina and its associated resorts. These tend to be more expensive bars and bar & dining venues. Along The Esplanade are a number of restaurants and cafes, with venues in this part of the city not trading as late. Heading away from the waterfront into the city is the casino and a number of large pubs and clubs (such as Gilligan's and The Woolshed that attract younger clientele and backpackers).

The maps do not indicate any notable change in the distribution or density of nightlife in Cairns during the period of study.

Although Cairns is a city where some variation around tourism and the wet and dry seasons should be expected this was not apparent in the audits. The wet season in Cairns, lasting from November to March, typically brings a downturn in tourism trade. The teams purposefully avoided auditing on nights where large rain events were forecast. One audit was conducted in March, but it did not show a different number of venues open to the other audits – which were each conducted during the dry season.

30/7/2016

4/3/2017

16/9/2017

7/4/2018

4/8/2018

Figure 385: Venues observed open in Cairns SNP 30/7/2016, 4/3/2017, 16/9/2017, 7/4/2018, and 4/8/2018

The Townsville Safe Night Precinct is elongated, running along The Strand, taking in The Ville Casino, and then stretching along Flinders Street and across the water to Palmer Street. Despite its length, much of the nightlife activity is concentrated around a single block on Flinders Street, between Wickham and Denham Streets (Figure 386).

Figure 386: Townsville Safe Night Precinct

6.13.5.1. NUMBER OF BUSINESSES OBSERVED OPEN ON SATURDAY NIGHT AUDITS

Table 184 and Figure 387 display the number of businesses observed open on the Saturday night audits in the Townsville SNP. The data excludes convenience stores, but includes all others such as fast food, dining, bars, clubs, and pubs.

The five audits conducted indicate no noteworthy change during any time period.

Table 184: Venues observed open in Townsville SNP on Saturday night audits

Time	24/07/2016	25/02/2017	02/09/2017	03/03/2018	28/07/2018
10pm	36	34	34	34	33
12am	14	15	17	19	15
2am	10	13	8	10	9
4am	1	3	2	2	2

Figure 387: Number of businesses observed trading in Townsville on Saturday night audits

Table 185 and

Table **186** indicate the number of venues by type observed trading after 10pm and after 12am in the Townsville SNP.

Table 185: Venues observed open in after 10pm in Townsville by venue type

Venue type	24/07/2016	25/02/2017	02/09/2017	03/03/2018	28/07/2018
Adult	-	-	1	1	1
Bar	7	8	6	8	8
Bar & Dining	1	1	1	1	1
Club	4	4	3	3	3
Dining	13	8	12	11	10
Pubs	9	10	9	8	8
Live music	1	1	1	1	1
Casino	1	1	1	1	1
Total	36	33	34	34	33

Table 186: Venues observed open after 12am in Townville by venue type

Venue type	24/07/2016	25/02/2017	02/09/2017	03/03/2018	28/07/2018
Adult	-	-	1	1	1
Bar	2	4	4	4	3
Bar & Dining	1	1	1	1	1
Club	4	4	3	3	3
Pubs	4	3	6	7	4
Live music	-	-	-	-	1
Casino	1	1	1	1	1
Total	12	13	16	17	14

There is no noteworthy change in the number of venues trading after 10pm. No bar stops trading during the period of the study. Two clubs, Bullwinkles and The Bank, closed permanently during the period of study. Bullwinkle's stated in March 2017 that it was closing indefinitely for renovations. Both clubs closed before the introduction of mandatory ID scanning. The other clubs are consistently observed trading after midnight throughout the period of study. The Townsville Motor Boat Club is observed trading after midnight on the final three audits (after the introduction of ID scanners).

Four pubs were consistently observed trading after midnight. Two pubs the Seaview and Shamrock are observed trading occasionally after midnight following the introduction of ID scanners.

No club, bar or pub appeared to reduce trading hours after midnight following the introduction of ID scanners (see Appendix 9). The Sovereign Hotel was closed on the final round of audits, although it appeared to be undergoing renovation rather than having closed down permanently.

Venues consistently observed trading after 2am were the Exchange Hotel, The Ville Casino, Flinders HQ, Mad Cow Tavern, Molly Malone's Irish Pub and Flynn's Irish Bar (see Appendix 9). With the exception of the casino, each of these late-trading venues are a large bar, pub or club along the densely packed Flinders Street nightlife strip. The Ville Resort & Casino was the only venue that consistently traded until after 4am.

The late-trading venues on Flinders Street were the only ones in Townsville frequently observed with a queue (see Appendix 9). Mad Cow and Flinders HQ were observed with a queue after midnight on every audit. On the final audit, all of these venues were observed with a queue after midnight.

6.13.5.2. ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM THE TOWNSVILLE SNP

Table 187 displays 'entries' and 'exits' from the late night Saturday night economy of Townsville's SNP between 2016 and 2018. It is important to note these are not businesses closing down or opening up, but rather the number of businesses continuing, starting or ceasing trading after 10pm during the period. Furthermore, businesses observed trading for the first time after the first audit are recorded as an 'entry' and businesses not observed trading on the final audit are recorded as an 'exit'. This is only indicative because the data are based on two single night snapshots.

Table 187: Business Entries and Exits 2016-2018 Townsville

Business Type	Open 2016 Audit	Number observed open for first time between 2016 & 2018	Number of previously observed venues not observed on final audit	Open 2018 audit	Change	Entry rate	Exit Rate	Percentage change
Adult	0	1	0	1	1	100%	0%	100%
Bar & Dining	1	0	0	1	0	0%	0%	0%
Bar	7	1	0	8	1	14.3%	0%	14.3%
Club	4	1	2	3	-1	25%	50%	-25%
Dining	13	10	13	10	-3	76.9%	100%	-23.1%
Live Music	0	1	0	1	1	100%	0%	100%
Pub	10	2	4	8	-2	20%	40%	-20%
Casino	1	0	0	1	0	0%	0%	0%

The table indicates little change in venues entering or exiting the late night economy in Townsville, with the exception of dining establishments. One adult bar opened, one bar opened, one club opened and two closed. There was a large degree of churn in dining establishments, with 10 entering and 13 exiting. Two pubs started trading later, but four started closing earlier.

Table 188: Comparing mix of businesses observed open on first and last audits in Townsville SNP

Business type	13/8/2016 audit (%)	10/3/2018 audit (%)
Adult	-	1 (3%)
Bar & Dining	1 (2.8%)	1 (3%)
Bar	7 (19.4%)	8 (24.2%)
Club	4 (11.1%)	3 (9%)
Dining	13 (36.1%)	10 (30.3%)
Live Music	-	1 (3%)
Pub	10 (27.8%)	8 (24.2%)
Casino	1 (2.8%)	1 (3%)
Total businesses observed open	36	33

Table 188 displays the proportion of businesses by type open after 10pm, comparing the first and last audits. It illustrates that there was no noteworthy change in the proportion of any business type in the night-time economy in Townsville.

Figure 388 displays venues observed open in the Townsville SNP on each of the Saturday night audits.

The maps illustrate the elongated nature of this SNP, approximately 4 kilometres from end to end. Despite this elongated shape, the nightlife economy is densely packed into two strips, a small section of Flinders Street of late-trading pubs and clubs and a number of bars and restaurants around the resorts on Palmer Street.

Most importantly, each of the figures demonstrates the clustering of late night venues along Flinders Street, between Denham Street and Wickham Street. This is the strip where all the venues consistently trading after 2am are located.

Only one venue, The Sovereign Hotel, at the western end of the precinct, consistently trades after midnight outside of this Flinders Street strip. This venue is distinct in terms of geography and clientele. It is not close to any other nightlife, and so trades as a stand alone late night venue (which is relatively uncommon in Queensland SNPs). It is also an 'iconic' regional gay pub. The owners advertised the sale of the venue in 2017 (64).

Across the water, around Palmer Street, are a number of restaurants and smaller bars that close earlier. These bars and restaurants are adjacent to resorts and tend to attract older and more family-oriented clientele.

Although The Strand, which runs along the ocean, is included in the official SNP it has very little nightlife. Businesses there are mostly cafes and restaurants, there are two bars the Seaview and The Office but neither traded very late.

The maps indicate no significant change to the density or distribution of nightlife in Townsville's SNP during the period of study.

24/7/2016

25/2/2017

2/9/2017

3/3/2018

28/7/2018

Figure 388: Venues observed open in Townsville SNP 24/7/2016, 25/2/2017, 2/9/2017, 3/3/2018, and 28/7/2018

6.13.6. TOOWOOMBA

The Toowoomba Safe Night Precinct covers the main central business district of the regional city (Figure 389).

Figure 389: Toowoomba Safe Night Precinct

6.13.6.1. NUMBER OF BUSINESSES OBSERVED OPEN ON SATURDAY NIGHT AUDITS

Table 189 and Figure 390 depict the number of businesses observed open on the Saturday night audits in the Toowoomba SNP. The data excludes convenience stores, but includes all others such as fast food, dining, bars, clubs, pubs.

The five audits conducted indicate a small decline in the number of businesses open after 10pm, but no change in the number of businesses trading after midnight, and a small increase in the number of venues trading after 2am.

Table 189: Venues observed open in Toowoomba SNP on Saturday night audits

Time	20/08/2016	04/03/2017	02/12/2017	31/03/2018	18/08/2018
10pm	17	14	13	9	13
12am	8	7	9	7	8
2am	5	4	6	5	7
4am	2	1	0	1	2

Figure 390: Number of businesses observed trading in Toowoomba on Saturday night audits

Appendix 9 display the number of venues observed open in Toowoomba after 10pm, 12am, and 2am.

There was a decline in the number of dining venues open after 10pm from 5 at the initial audit to 2 by the final audit. One new nightclub, Society, opened in Toowoomba in mid-2017.

Seven pubs consistently traded after 10pm in the Toowoomba SNP. The Gladstone Hotel was not observed trading after 10pm following the 4/3/2017 audit and the introduction of mandatory ID

scanners. Mueller Brothers was only observed trading after 10pm twice, once after the introduction of mandatory ID scanners.

The adult venue The Vault, the bar Fitzy's, the pubs Cube, Irish Club, Shamrock and Tattersalls, and the club Society (once it opened in mid-2017) consistently traded after midnight. No venues that consistently traded after midnight appeared to cease doing so during the period of study. The Gladstone Hotel and Norville Hotel were each observed trading after midnight once prior to mid-2017, but not after the introduction of mandatory ID scanners.

The adult venue The Vault, the bar Fitzy's, the club Society, and the pubs Cube, Shamrock and Tattersalls consistently traded after 2am in Toowoomba. None were observed ceasing to trade after 2am during the course of the study. No venues appeared to cease trading after 2am following the introduction of mandatory ID scanners.

The Vault was also consistently observed trading after 4am, and Cube traded after 4am on two occasions.

6.13.6.2. ENTRIES AND EXITS FROM THE TOOWOOMBA SNP

Table 190 displays 'entries' and 'exits' from the late night Saturday night economy of Toowoomba SNP between 2016 and 2018. It is important to note these are not businesses closing down or opening up, but rather the number of businesses continuing, starting or ceasing trading after 10pm during the period. Furthermore, businesses observed trading for the first time after the first audit are recorded as an 'entry' and businesses not observed trading on the final audit are recorded as an 'exit'. This is only indicative because the data are based on two single night snapshots.

The table notes the reduction in dining business trading after 10pm, the opening of one club and the closing of one pub.

Table 190: Business Entries and Exits 2016-2018 Toowoomba

Business Type	Open 2016 Audit	Number observed open for first time between 2016 & 2018	Number of previously observed venues not observed on final audit	Open 2018 audit	Change	Entry rate	Exit Rate	Percentage change
Adult	1	0	0	1	0	0%	0%	0%
Bar & Dining	1	0	0	1	0	0%	0%	0%
Bar	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0%	0%
Club	0	1	0	1	1	100%	0%	100%
Dining	5	2	6	2	3	40%	120%	-80%
Pub	8	1	2	7	1	12.5%	25%	-12.5%

6.13.6.3. DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY OF NIGHTLIFE BUSINESSES IN THE TOOWOOMBA SNP

Figure 391 displays the venues observed open in the Toowoomba SNP on each of the Saturday night audits. They indicate no change to the location or density of venues in the precinct.

One adult bar, four pubs, a bar and a nightclub make up the late-night trade in Toowoomba.

All except one of the late-trading venues are clustered within 250 metres of each other between Margaret Street, Ruthven Street and Russell Street. These venues are Cube, Society, The Vault, Tattersalls and Fitzy's.

The exception is The Shamrock down the far south end of the SNP, about 450 metres from other late trading venues.

The maps indicate no change in the density or distribution of nightlife in Toowoomba during the course of the study. They illustrate the relatively small nature of Toowoomba's SNP both geographically and in number of venues compared to other urban and regional SNPs.

20/8/2016

4/3/2017

2/12/2017

31/3/2018

18/8/2018

Figure 391: Venues observed open in Toowoomba SNP 20/8/2016, 4/3/2017, 2/12/2017, 31/3/2018, and 18/8/2018

6.13.7.   DISCUSSION

The precinct mapping and Saturday night audits illustrates only incremental changes to the number of venues in SNPs and trading on Saturday nights since mid-2016.

In the Fortitude Valley SNP some decline in the number of venues trading after 4am was observed, but this decline appeared mostly attributable to the availability of extended trade permits in 2016, while the number of venues open after 10pm, 12am and 2am remained steady. The introduction of ID scanners did not appear to affect the number of venues trading. Venues observed with queues rose during the period of the study. Following the introduction of mandatory ID scanners the majority of clubs and live music venues were observed with queues after 10pm, 12am and 2am.

There appears to be some growth in smaller bars and bar & dining establishments that would diversify the cultural economy in the valley. The Fortitude Valley SNP remains characterised by two geographically and temporally separate cultural economies: a late-trading nightlife economy around the Brunswick Street Mall; and, a lifestyle, retail and dining economy around James Street.

A major impending change to the cultural economy in the Fortitude Valley SNP is the construction of a new 3500 seat live music venue called 'Fortitude' on the Brunswick Mall. It is anticipated this venue will have a sizeable effect on the scale of live music performance in the Valley, the number and diversity of patrons coming to the area to see live music, and spill over effects on bars, restaurants and other venues in the precinct.

In West End and South Bank some increase in the number of venues trading after 10pm and 12am was observed. This area is not a declared SNP, but has a growing night-time cultural economy. The mix of venues is different to Fortitude Valley with three retail strips comprised of small bars, bar & dining establishments and restaurants.

In Surfers Paradise an increase in the number of venues trading after 10pm, 12am, 2am and 4am was observed. This growth continued after the introduction of mandatory ID scanners. This growth was evident across bars, pubs, clubs and bar & dining establishments. This suggests the Surfers Paradise SNP late-night economy may be both growing and diversifying. There appears to be some increase in venues observed with queues following the introduction of mandatory ID scanners.

In Cairns there were only small changes in the number of venues trading and observed open after 10pm, 12am, 2am and 4am on Saturday nights.

In Townsville there were only small changes in the number of venues trading and observed open after 10pm, 12am, 2am and 4am on Saturday nights.

In Toowoomba some decline in the number of businesses observed open after 10pm was observed, no change in the number open after midnight, and some growth in the number open after 2am.

ID scanners did not appear to impact venue trading patterns on Saturday nights, especially at larger venues like clubs and pubs. But, the introduction of scanners did correspond with an increase in the number of venues observed with queues in the larger urban precincts of Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise.

Viability and value of precinct mapping and auditing

This study established precinct mapping and auditing as a method for tracking changes in the number, diversity, density and trading patterns of businesses in nightlife precincts. The method works effectively in smaller precincts where a team of two research assistants can easily walk past every business within a relatively short timeframe. The method becomes more difficult to operate in a standardised way in larger and denser precincts. For large precincts like Fortitude Valley the method requires a larger team of research assistants to be implemented effectively.

The enduring value of this method is longitudinal. The data collected and presented here will serve as a valuable baseline of the number of venues, and their density and diversity, in a range of SNPs in Queensland, together with several snapshots of their trading patterns on Saturday night. This sets up the foundation from which further research can observe ongoing changes to the cultural economy of nightlife areas. The incremental and emerging changes observed in the diversity of businesses – especially the potential growth in smaller bars and bar & dining establishments in several precincts – is one pattern that could be observed over time in further research.

6.14. LIVE MUSIC DATA

For this report, trends relating to live and recorded music use within the Fortitude Valley, Brisbane City, Cairns, and Surfers Paradise SNPs are presented as case studies, covering the 2001-2018 financial years. Maps showing the temporal and spatial change of live music performances in each SNP are provided for the 2001, 2016, 2017, and 2018 financial years, so as to show the change in live music culture since 2001, the introduction of the Policy since 2016, and the implementation of mandatory ID scanners since 2017.

6.14.1. FORTITUDE VALLEY

Figure 392 and Figure 393 illustrate the changes over time in the number of live music venues and performances in Fortitude Valley. In Figure 392, an increase in the number of live music performances is demonstrated in Fortitude Valley from 2001, with a sharper increase between the

2015 and 2017 financial years, followed by a small decrease in the 2018 financial year. However, Joinpoint analysis indicated that this is not a significant decline. Using monthly data, there were also no discernible decreases either at July 2016 or July 2017. Figure 393 shows an overall increase in the number of live music venues in Fortitude Valley from 2001.

Figure 392: The number of live music performances per month in Fortitude Valley between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 393: The number of live music venues in Fortitude Valley between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 394 to Figure 397 show the temporal and spatial change of live music performances in Fortitude Valley for the 2001, 2016, 2017, and 2018 financial years. Maps for the 2002 to 2015 financial years can be found as Appendix 10. Following a clear increase in the number and density of live music performances in Fortitude Valley following 2001, the subsequent maps show a changing yet very active live music scene in Fortitude Valley.

Figure 394: Live music performances in Fortitude Valley for the 2001 financial year

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
Figure 395: Live music performances in Fortitude Valley for the 2016 financial year

Figure 396: Live music performances in Fortitude Valley for the 2017 financial year

Figure 397: Live music performances in Fortitude Valley for the 2018 financial year

6.14.2.   BRISBANE CITY

Figure 398 and Figure 399 illustrate the changes over time in the number of live music performances and venues in Brisbane City. Both figures show an increasing number of live music performances and venues between 2001 and 2018. Figure 398 demonstrates an overall increase in the number of live music performances in Brisbane between 2001 and 2017, with a small decrease shown in the 2018 financial year. As seen in Figure 399, the number of live music venues in Brisbane increases across the time period, including in the 2018 financial year.

Figure 398: The number of live music performances in Brisbane City between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 399: The number of live music venues in Brisbane City between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 400 to Figure 403 show the temporal and spatial change of live music performances in Brisbane City for the 2001, 2016, 2017, and 2018 financial years. Maps for the 2002 to 2015 financial years can be found as Appendix 11. As with Fortitude Valley, a clear increase in the number and

density of live music performances is observed over the years in Brisbane, including between the 2016 and 2018 financial years.

Figure 400: Live music performances in Brisbane City for the 2001 financial year

Figure 401: Live music performances in Brisbane City for the 2016 financial year

Figure 402: Live music performances in Brisbane City for the 2017 financial year

Figure 403: Live music performances in Brisbane City for the 2018 financial year

6.14.3. CAIRNS

Figure 404 and Figure 405 illustrate the changes over time in the number of live music performances and venues in Cairns. In both graphs, a sharp reduction can be seen in 2006, which is potentially attributed to a temporary closure of one of Cairns' largest live music venues. Figure 404 shows an

overall increase in the number of live music performances in Cairns between 2001 and 2018, with a rapid increase observed between the 2016 and 2018 financial years, while Figure 404 shows a decrease in the number of live music venues between 2013 and 2018. Overall, Figure 404 and Figure 405 show that in recent years an increasing number of live music performances have occurred in a decreasing number of venues.

Figure 404: The number of live music performances in Cairns between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 405: The number of live music venues in Cairns between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 406 to Figure 409 show the temporal and spatial change of live music performances in Cairns for the 2001, 2016, 2017 and 2018 financial years. Maps for the 2002 to 2015 financial years can be found as Appendix 12. As with Fortitude Valley and Brisbane, a comparison of these figures shows a clear increase in the number and density of live music performances in Cairns between the 2001 and 2016 financial years, with a varying number of performances in subsequent years.

Figure 406: Live music performances in Cairns for the 2001 financial year

Figure 407: Live music performances in Cairns for the 2016 financial year

Figure 408: Live music performances in Cairns for the 2017 financial year

Figure 409: Live music performances in Cairns for the 2018 financial year

Figure 410 and Figure 411 show the number of live music performances in the Surfers Paradise SNP between the 2001 and 2018 financial years. Figure 410 demonstrates an overall increase in live music performances in Surfers Paradise between the 2013 and 2017 financial years, followed by a small decrease in the 2018 financial year. Figure 411 shows variation in the number of live music venues over the time period, yet the number of live music venues have still increased overall and between the 2016 and 2018 financial years.

Figure 410: The number of live music performances in Surfers Paradise between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 411: The number of live music venues in Surfers Paradise between the 2001 and 2018 financial years (July 2000- June 2018)

Figure 412 to Figure 415 show the temporal and spatial change of live music performances in Surfers Paradise for the 2001, 2016, 2017 and 2018 financial years. Maps for the 2002 to 2015 financial years can be found as Appendix 13.

Figure 412: Live music performances in Surfers Paradise for the 2001 financial year

Figure 413: Live music performances in Surfers Paradise for the 2016 financial year

Figure 414: Live music performances in Surfers Paradise for the 2017 financial year

Figure 415: Live music performances in Surfers Paradise for the 2018 financial year

6.14.5.   SUMMARY

Overall, there have been substantial shifts in the live music scene in Fortitude Valley, Brisbane City, Cairns, and Surfers Paradise since 2001. When examining Fortitude Valley, there was no clear evidence that the policy introduction in July 2016 or ID scanner introduction in 2017 had any major influence on live music gigs. There was also no demonstrable change after this introduction of the TAFV policy in the other sites. It should be noted that while these analyses provide a picture of change occurring in Queensland's live music industry over time, these data are descriptive and cannot be used to make causal inferences.

6.15. FOOT TRAFFIC DATA

People entering entertainment precincts in Fortitude Valley and Cairns were counted via a wireless sensor that counted the unique mac address of each person's smartphone within 20 metres of the sensor. The average foot traffic counts by hour within HAH from 1 August 2016 to 30 June 2018 are presented below.

6.15.1.   FORTITUDE VALLEY

The number of mac addresses being recorded by the device during HAH (8pm to 6am) increased on average after October of 2016 and noticeably decreased on average after October of 2017 in Fortitude Valley (see Figure 416).

Figure 416: Foot Traffic per Month Fortitude Valley

Figure 417 shows the average amount of unique mac addresses recorded during HAH each week across the data collection period. An ARIMA(1,0,1) (Q=37.56, lag 2 specified, p=.580) time series analysis found no significant change in the average amount of foot-traffic as a result of the July 2017 ID scanner introduction (p=.512).

Figure 417: Foot Traffic per Week Fortitude Valley

Figure 418 shows the average number of unique addresses recorded per hour in Fortitude Valley on a Friday night and Figure 418 on a Saturday night, for August 2016 to June 30th 2018. There was a notable peak between 3-4am, after venues were required to shut.

Figure 418: Foot Traffic per Hour Friday Night Fortitude Valley - August 2016 to June 30th 2018

6.15.2.   CAIRNS

On average, the Cairns device saw a gradual decrease in the amount of unique mac addresses recorded on average each month from October 2016 to June 2018 during HAH (8pm to 6pm Friday and Saturday; see Figure 419).

Figure 419: Foot Traffic per Month Cairns

Note. May 2017 – September 2017 have been excluded from the figure, due to substantial missing data from this period.

Figure 420 shows the average mac unique addresses recorded per hour in Cairns on a Friday night and Figure 421 on a Saturday night. There was a notable peak between 3-4am, after venues were required to shut.

Figure 420: Foot Traffic per Hour Friday Night Cairns – October 2016 to April 2017 and October 2017 to June 30ᵗʰ 2018

Figure 421: Foot Traffic per Hour Saturday Night Cairns – October 2016 to April 2017 and October 2017 to June 30th 2018

6.15.3.   SUMMARY

At this stage, no discernible change to foot traffic at either site has been observed, as either a result of the intervention or other related factors. At all sites, there was a noticeable rise in foot traffic between 3am-4am. Foot traffic in Cairns declined steadily over the course of HAH, with the exception of the 3am-4am peak, while foot traffic in Fortitude Valley rose until 1am before beginning to decline. The current results display foot traffic on the streets within a 20 metre radius from sensors and are not indicators of the total amount of people within the entire SNP.

6.16. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

6.16.1.   SAMPLE

Sixty-six semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with identified informants including licensees, council members, health sector staff, Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) staff, a Safe Night Precinct Support Services Representative (SNPSS Rep), police, alcohol producers, and others (e.g. local security firm, liquor licensing consultant). Table 191 shows the breakdown of key informants interviewed in the project

Table 191: Key informant sample

Key Informant	N	%
Council	2	3%
Health	13	20%
Licensee	21	32%
OLGR	5	7%
SNP Support Service Representative	7	11%
Police	8	12%
Alcohol producers	3	4%
Other (e.g. Security firms)	7	11%
Total	66	100 %

In total, 437 people were contacted, of which 332 were licensees in the Queensland Safe Night Precincts - those most affected by the legislation. Seventy six (23%) emails bounced, leaving a total of 256 people contacted. One person declined (0.4%), 23 (9%) accepted, and 21 licensee interviews were completed (8.2%).

6.16.2. RESULTS

This section provides a detailed account of the perspectives of a range of key informants including Council, licensees, police, health workers, security personnel and safe night precinct support service workers. The main goal of the style of presentation of the results in this section is to demonstrate the different viewpoints of key informants. The results are organised thematically in relation to the four parts of the interview protocol: 1. Awareness of and attitudes to the 'Tackling Alcohol-fuelled policy' interventions; 2. Current liquor legislation; 3. Current local issues and 4. The effects of the policy change (licensees only).

It is worth prefacing the results with the context that the project contacted every affected licensed venue, including live music venues, and 91% of them declined to respond; an important consideration when considering media statements and claims regarding the impact of measures on venues, given the majority chose to stay silent when asked.

6.16.2.1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLICIES

This section asked questions about key informants' awareness of and attitudes to the Queensland Government's 'Tackling Alcohol-fuelled policy' with regard to specific interventions.

Key informants from all sectors, and within sectors, were divided on whether restrictions on rapid-intoxication drinks achieved anything. Some respondents expressed support for it:

> I think they're working. We support that one, we think it's great. Because when you think about it most young people, by the time they want to have shots they've probably had a few already and that's when you're feeling tall and bullet proof, that's when you shouldn't be having them. (Licensee-01)

Meanwhile, other informants felt that the drink restriction legislation achieved nothing:

> I think it belonged to a very small subset of patrons. I think if anything, it's made a wider group of patrons feel quite patronised -- like they don't know how to drink. (SNPSS Rep-05)

With the exception of a small number of licensees, many licensees felt that the introduction of rapid-intoxication drink restrictions hadn't impacted on their financial viability. Most licensees felt that patrons chose to drink something else instead:

> I think at the end of the day they [patrons] just drink something else. And they're not going to leave because they can't get a shot. I think everyone realises across the board that if they can't get a shot here they're not going to get one next door either, so I don't think so. I feel like a lot of the strategies seem to be working but they all affect every venue different in some way or another. (Licensee-01)

Informants also talked about the impact of pre-drinking undermining any benefit of the drink restrictions legislation:

> But I would say that policy [drink restrictions] really is kind of catching the - you know, closing the stable door once the horse has bolted. Because the very people that's supposed to impact on have come pre-loaded, anyway. (Licensee-04)

In sum, there was some difference of opinion on whether drink restrictions achieved positive change with regard to patron intoxication and harms. However, the licensee key informants were generally in consensus that the legislation did not unduly affected their trade. Drink restrictions were considered ineffectual, rather than detrimental to the viability of their business.

6.16.2.1.2.   ID SCANNERS

Key informants who were licensees were asked about whether they had an ID scanner prior to the mandatory introduction of scanners in July 2017. The majority had not.

1. Perceived Benefits of ID scanners

Three main themes emerged from responses to the question, 'what do you think are the benefits, if any, of implementing ID scanners?

1. Helps enforce banning orders:

> Anecdotally police and venues have reported some successes in terms of, you know, refusing entry to patrons who they've got the information of being evicted from another venue, and in like helping to enforce the banning orders. (Council-02)

It was suggested by informants from multiple sectors that ID scanners enable banning orders to be enforced – which has a subsidiary benefit of creating an even playing field because all venues need to do the same thing. This theme was the most common benefit of the ID scanner reported by key informants and is exemplified by this response from a licensee informant:

> I think the difficulty before mandatory scanning came in was that, you know, typically that big roosters, as I call them, they've always had a pack of followers and they're quite popular. Don't ask me why. And so, what – so they'd just gravitate to places where they weren't banned. And when you have people banned on the court order list or your Liquor Accord list, places wouldn't – some nightclubs wouldn't abide by it and they'd just claim, we didn't recognise it. So, it's taken that out, it's created an even playing field, if you like. (Licensee-09)

However, an inverse opinion suggests that because there are differences in licencing requirements for different licenses this has created an uneven playing field. In essence, some licensees felt that by operating scanners they were deterring patrons onto types of venues that don't required ID scanning as part of their license:

> We still have venues with different licenses- we all have different licenses basically that will operate as more as a restaurant and bar and trade until 1am but not scan so we've got issues that not everybody is scanning together. So, if a banned patron came into Flinders Street, walked past my venue and saw that we were scanning, he could then continue and walk into a venue without a scanner. (Licensee-01)

2. Increases public safety:

Among licensees, ID scanners were generally perceived as offering a perceptible increase to public safety, also had the effect of helping the venue to promote its public safety credentials:

The actual ID scanner on its own, now that we've had it for 18 months, - 100% we back it. The actual procedural use of us wanting to be known as the most responsible venue in Brisbane - we scan 100% of the time we're open, let alone the 10pm. Most nights, we open at 7pm, and we scan the first patron through the door. So, from that perspective, it works. It's the implementation that just doesn't help anybody, from what we've seen. But the actual using the scanner, 100% recommend it. (Licensee-16)

Informants were less consistent in their opinion of whether ID scanners encouraged patrons to act responsibly (knowing that their information had been collected). Opinion was fairly evenly split, with slightly more thinking that it did not encourage patrons to act responsibly, and contending that although ID scanners increased public safety and perception of a safe venue, they didn't change the behaviour of patrons who were predetermined to be risky or troublemakers.

No, hard core drinkers or trouble makers will fight anywhere. A person under the influence of a mind-altering substance like alcohol can reach a point where they don't care. (Police-07)

I don't think so. I think once you've taken drugs or drank too much the people just don't care. (Licensee-03)

Alternately, the slight minority of informants thought that ID scanners did encourage people to be more responsible inside venues, exemplified by this quote:

I think it does, the fact that we can identify who they are if they are in trouble-you have to remember when you enter a licensed venue now we know exactly who you are, we know all your personal details for about a month. And people realise that. (Licensee-01)

3. Identifying troublemakers and suspect identification:

The number one benefit is in being able to accurately identify troublemakers. So, if somebody sees a fight or if police need to find out the identity of someone, prior to that the only option was to look at the cameras and trying to identify someone purely from CCTV is nearly impossible. So yeah, definitely being able to look at the cameras now to say, "Okay, well we know this is what he looks like." Then you if you go back to the ID scanner and you match up. Once you've matched up the right person, which is pretty easy to do, then you know exactly who they are. (Licensee-02)

Most people who answered the question, "Do you think the scanners have resulted in more crimes **in** licensed venues being solved?" thought that the ID scanners had resulted in more crimes being solved but not necessarily crimes within venues but crimes that have happened outside the venue:

> I think that I think they're [ID scanners] good. I've used them in relation to finding offenders because they've got to show you know ID and they get photographed you know what they're wearing in town and I can see them on CCTV so it's brilliant in that regard and I think it's good as long as everybody knows that they have to bring their ID with them and go out. (Police-05)

Key informants thought that ID scanners helped with suspect identification if the suspect had been inside a venue and had their ID scanned:

> So, there will be a – someone will get raped at 3 o'clock in the morning somewhere out in the CBD, right? And the police – and they might see – and the lady will go yeah, the person was in an orange T-shirt and a bit of a description, say. The police are really hoping that that person will have been at a venue like mine and they might – and so they'll look in there, they'll go to the 120-odd CCTV cameras that we've got installed around our CBD and go to the camera room and look back at footage leading up to it and in and around where the rape occurred in this hypothetical case. And then they're going to go – and then they'll see that person and they'll track them back and they'll see that person's left my venue. And so then they'll ring my wife and they'll go okay, so I've got a guy has left your venue at such and such a time. And so then Deb goes on the ID scanner and she'll go looking for that description and they might email a photo that they've lifted off the cameras to make it easier for her. And then she'll pick it up and that person entered our premises at 11:30 and got their ID scanned. And she gives them the registration number that goes with that person. Prior to it being Queensland government legislation, we used to have their full name, address and everything but I'm glad we don't have that now because it just makes it safer for the clients. Anyway, and then so they key into their system and bingo, it's [Joe Bloggs] of 127 Mugging Way, Australia Beach, whatever it is and they go around and it's done. They've got them. And that sort of scenario comes up often with us where we are able to work backwards and help make the CBD a safer place. (Licensee-09)

2. Perceived areas for improvement of ID Scanners

Key informants were asked what changes they would make to improve the use and impact of ID scanners, and six main themes were identified regarding areas for improvement:

1. ID scanner screening start time

> There were varying perspectives regarding whether 10pm commencement was appropriate. Even licensees disagreed about start times, with some saying the scanning should start earlier, and some saying it should start later. However, only licensees believed scanning should commence later:

>> I believe the ID scanning should start from midnight and I should, and we should be allowed to trade 'til five AM with no lockout… there's no one out prior to midnight. It's not our peak time. Between three and five was considered back then, between three and five was considered as a high risk period. Prior to these new legislations. (Licensee-07)

On the other hand:

>> No, I think that once the place starts getting a bit busier they should start at 8 or 9 o'clock at night. Some of the venues do that voluntarily. (OLGR-01)

While opinions vary, the newly available data from this report from the ID scanners themselves, and the people counting data, shows that there is a high volume of patrons entering the precincts from 8 pm onwards and that 10pm represents a mid-point in terms of overall traffic volume (see ID Scanner data and Foot traffic data chapters).

2. Restrict ID scanning to Friday and Saturday night and have everyone scanned at all venues

>> Yeah, Fridays and Saturday nights, I'm happy with that happening, but the biggest issues we've got, over and above that is that we think that everybody should have to scan. So I can go next door. Their license might only be to midnight, so they don't have to scan. So you can go in there until midnight and by them you've had probably more than enough to drink. If you're a troublemaker then you hit the streets again. So it's really, if you're a troublemaker you know where you can go with no scanning earlier if you've been caught and registered as a troublemaker. (Licensee-08)

3. Introduce a method whereby people who have already had their ID scanned can step outside and can re-enter without having to rescan.

An often raised issue in interviews and the media has been the current requirements to have people scanned every time they enter a venue, especially in relation to smoking areas or for venues where toilets are external. This element of the scanning was not specifically a part of the TAFV and was left to the discretion of the Commissioner, who determined that patrons would need to be re-scanned.

> A: You know like nightclubs and things like that, they'd stamp you, wouldn't they? So you stamp again and then you'd come again. Let's say, right ... I've heard that some are doing tags where if you're at a function they'll put a tag on your wrist. If you go out then the tags still attached, you can get back in again. I don't know what the liquor licensing think of that, I don't know for that sort of thing. It seems silly when it's the same guy on the door scanning, and you've got to line up then with the queue. The kids are happy to queue. Night time on a Saturday night you might be 10 minutes on a queue outside to get back in again.

The situation outlined appears to be impacting on venues in a way which may be unnecessary. Patron identification schemes such as stamps and tags have been in use globally and have a high level of acceptability. In this instance, there is no evidence supporting the need for people to be re-scanned where CCTV and a stamp/tag scheme is in place.

4. Licensees should have discretion on allowing entry for people that have forgotten ID

A number of key informants identified that a common issue for them was that people who had forgotten their ID often spoils the night for a group of them. They felt that this affected their business profitability. For example:

> It would sort out the re-entry and sort out the older people, I think there's got to be a bit of grace there somewhere. As I said, I think if you've got ten or 15 people and one of them who might be 50 or 55 hasn't got their ID I think it's ludicrous that I lose that group… a little bit more flexible. (Licensee-12)

The key informant above highlights a common issue raised, that if one patron in a large group does not have their ID, they lose the whole group. He feels that they should have some discretion to allow that one person in without scanning on the manager's judgement. The issue has gained prominence in the media as well, but there have been few if any, solutions proposed.

5. Allow other staff (not just security staff) to perform ID scanning.

The excerpt selected below highlights an issue that some licensees had with the ID scanners. They felt that requiring security guards to perform scans increased their costs unreasonably and was not

necessary for the effective running of the scanners. They proposed that the role could also be performed by other trained venue staff:

> Yes, that scanning should start at 12. That it should be reviewed for Sunday to Thursday because it's unnecessary. And that it shouldn't be just only licensed security officers can scan. Because a lot of people just resent having to pay four hours for a security guard, for a minimum. But that's why I said, if we've got to pay them, we get them to start at a quarter to ten and so we may as well stay open until quarter to two. We may as well have them here. (Licensee-15)

6. Exemption from ID scanning for community clubs

There are very few clubs in Safe Night Precincts where a double verification is necessary under the current legislation. However, this exchange highlights an inefficiency in the current system which is flagged as a significant inconvenience for the clubs affected:

> A: Under the Liquor Act, as a community club, we have to be able to identify people who enter the venue. So, members have already provided their details, so they will show a membership card. Reciprocal members display a reciprocal membership card, and we have arrangements with other clubs in this regard. All visitors and guests are scanned in, using an ID document such as a driver's licence or, for overseas guests, a passport. And that's any time they enter. So, all people who enter the venue are identified in one way or another.

> Q: So, with the new scanner - is the new scanner able to scan your membership cards?

> A2: No. It also has the disadvantage that - we are obliged to keep records of addresses, as well as name. And the ID scanner will only give you the name of somebody, and I think date of birth, and obviously a photograph.

> Q: Right. So, do you have to then manually take their address?

> A: We scan them through the ID scanner for the safe night precinct, and then we scan them through our system as well. We have to do double scanning.

> Q: Okay. Was there ever any consultation to try and bring your membership so that the new ID scanners which you had to have were able to scan your membership cards?

> A: We tried, on several occasions, and we were told that there were only two accredited suppliers. So, basically - I've got verbatim the message we were given, but we were basically told to stop asking.

Q: Right. And they wouldn't include your membership cards as one of the IDs that the new one was able to scan?

A: We didn't go that far. Because we already had a system in place, we were - and that supplier of our original system had put in applications to the government to be an accredited provider. But the government seemed to have fairly strict ties to the original two accredited suppliers. (Licensee-04)

3. Other suggestions for improvement of ID scanning

There have been processing and software issues with the ID scanners, this is the responsibility of the technology providers to ensure the scanners work effectively. Of those who supported the ID scanners in principle there were some problems they felt needed to be addressed.

For example, one key informant felt that making ID scanners mandatory had caused problems by distributing risky patrons outside of SNP areas where ID scanning is not mandatory:

Yes, I was the first person to actually have an ID scanner and I've had an ID scanner since 2007. And I've found it very beneficial for myself and my business to have that ID scanner. But since the law has come in where everyone had to get ID scanners, it's not a level playing field. All its done is distributed all the patrons into wide areas, into the outer suburbs where they don't need ID scanners. So, it hasn't helped. I believe it hasn't helped whatsoever in the SNP [Safe Night Precinct] area because it's not a level playing field. The people that don't want to get scanned, or the troublemakers, or the drug dealers or the bikies or everyone you're talking about that plays up, they don't go in towns. They go out to these suburbs. And all that's caused is more, you know, it costs the state more money to police those areas as well. (Licensee-13)

This sentiment was not shared by all respondents. Despite the effectiveness of scanners being limited to their use in SNPs, another key informant suggested that without the global mandatory system, the patron banning would not work as well within SNPs:

I think they are terrific because they are able to identify a banned person. I think that's their major -- you know, without scanners, you could ban people till the cows came home and it wouldn't really matter. But with the scanners, they're flagged as being banned. So, it complements -- without the scanners, the banning orders wouldn't work, and I do think that is the best strategy that we've got. (SNPSS Rep-05)

Also, another key informant took the long-term view that ID scanners could, over time, play a role in a larger cultural change to nightlife. Their view was that licensees ought to see their long-term value:

> I just took a long-term view of it and it cost us but we cleaned the place right up…So it's a matter of commitment as well and whether you're prepared to cough up a reduction in profitability. I think these days now that it's universal, I think that it's – I wouldn't have had as much problem because you just go through it systematically and every time someone – there's a problem you report it, go through the police, get the police to put them on the banning list which – and then they're banned from more venues. The other thing that I'm disappointed in publicans overall and the QHA's reluctance to embrace the ID scanners and their capabilities and it's not just about identifying idiots within your own venue, it works backwards as well. The other thing, strength in ID scanners that I see is the ability to, over a long period of time I think there's going to – if the industry embraces them they could have the same impact as breathalysers did on people's attitudes towards drunk driving. So, the idiots that are violent, they love strutting around nightclubs and there's something about these little black boxes with lights flashing inside them that they just love. (Licensee-09)

SUMMARY

There were a wide range of perspectives about the utility of ID scanners and their overall impact on business and public health and safety since being introduced. For the most part, they were viewed as being useful, but there were implementation problems with the software and a number of grey areas not specifically dealt with in the legislation, such as the training required to operate a scanner, re-scanning of patrons, and the days and times of operation. Most of the concerns raised are amenable to moderate tweaking which should ameliorate most concerns without undermining the core function of identifying risky or criminal patrons.

6.16.2.1.3.   LAST DRINKS

Key informants were asked a series of questions regarding their experiences of, and opinions about, the last drinks legislation. Most informants who responded to the question, 'what are your thoughts about last drinks' thought it was a positive intervention. Informants that thought negatively of last drinks expressed views that contradicted evidence collected elsewhere in this project.

Some informants said that the benefits included reduced costs by not employing staff in the period between 3 and 5am:

Because now we trade full ball until 3:00, they leave, I'm not paying – you know, between 3:00 and 5:00 you're not turning over much money because you've got nothing coming through the door, you've got no – you're doing your RSA so you're not serving a great deal of alcoholic beverages anyway and a lot of water. You're paying penalty rates on penalty rates so your wage bills are very high and so from the financial perspective, it was better for us. (Licensee-09)

Some felt it reduced problems and helped create a vibrant night life:

I would say that by reducing the number of night-time hours of sale of alcohol, we've reduced the number of potential problem hours while we're still allowing patrons to get time to enjoy themselves. So our observation as an organisation is that prohibiting the sale of liquor after 3 has had a really positive impact on the Safe Night Precinct and it hasn't curtailed people's enjoyment of their night out …Obviously right outside venues, there does need to be good management and there's plenty of police and security that are managing those areas really well, as we do, as we walk past and there are always problem makers and there probably always will be but I think that's had a positive effect. (SNPSS Rep-02)

Like most themes to emerge from the interviews, not all informants held the same perspective on the success of the last drinks legislation, with some who felt that the last drinks legislation had negative consequences and said that it had a negative financial impact on their business:

Well, I don't like it because it has destroyed a lot of businesses, because a lot of the businesses, like myself, got into these businesses in full awareness that you could sell alcohol to five o'clock. So, what it's basically done is, overnight, dropped the turnover of a lot of businesses below dramatic figures, which they had no control of. Really, you took a high percentage of people's livelihoods away from them overnight. (Licensee-13)

Some also felt it put undue pressure on the available transport options by not staggering venue closure, and consequently having a large volume of patrons exiting venues out onto the streets at 3am:

What we found here is that instead of venues that had a 5 am licence being able to disperse the crowd over a longer period of time, that if the venues were full at 3 o'clock, suddenly a large number of people were dumped out onto the street at the same time, so it put taxis under pressure. Dispersing people from town became a real issue and the food shops and stuff, well, that got overwhelmed at 3 am and there were flash points because of it. (Licensee-14)

The above comment does not mirror the foot traffic data we have collected. There has been no change in the number of people outside of venues after closing (see Foot traffic data chapter).

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A few key informants spoke about the way in which late trading venues had been impacted compared to other venues in SNPs:

> I think the reduced trading hours has had a financial…like especially for hotels it's been…you know, especially for a nightclub, like people who have nightclubs, I think it's impacted them more than anything because the nightclub licence, that's all they have, where a hotel licence they have gaming, they have meals, whereas a nightclub licence that's all they have is a nightclub. (OLGR-04)

Some key informants also felt that regardless of the government having been elected on the policy, and the intense media focus over the preceding year, the implementation of the policy had been a problem with poor education of the public about the legislation changes and the ensuing confusion created problems:

> For us, because we were never really an alcohol-fuelled venue [strip club] - if that's the right terminology - it did hit our bottom line, but it was more a complete change to the way everybody in Brisbane went out that hit us more than anything. And the fact that people would come out and not know what was going on. There were no TV ads. There were no - had they run an election style campaign and put it on an ad in the Channel Nine news, and bought billboards at the footy, and stuff like that, then I think it would have run a lot more smoothly. People would have been ready to deal with it, and it would have cost businesses less money in the long run. (Licensee-16)

Effect on quantity of alcohol consumed

Some key informants felt that last drinks had resulted in a reduction of alcohol consumed; others felt that it had not changed the amount of alcohol people are consuming:

> I think people are drinking less. I think people are drinking less in these types of venues and late-night venues. We're seeing that people are only consuming up to four to five drinks per visit. I feel that the new laws have impacted on how people behave, or what they choose to drink and as I said a lot of people are more conscious of their health these days as well so… (Licensee-07)

Some key informants reported that pre-drinking impacted the perceived effectiveness of this policy:

I believe it [last drinks legislation] has reduced the consumption of alcohol of people out in the nightlife scene. And secondly, no, because the expense of the drinks over night-time, you still get a lot of people pre-loading before they go out into the night-time. (Other-02)

For those who felt it hadn't changed the amount of alcohol consumed, this was thought to be because people were drinking earlier as well as the opinion that people did not drink much between 3am and 5am anyway:

I know a lot of people, I know they're either started drinking earlier or going out earlier because of the early shut off. It's not that we had people who used to go out 11:00 or midnight, now they're starting drinking earlier because they know they can only drink through until closing at reduced hours. (Health-02)

Consistent with most other emergent themes from the interviews, there were diverse opinions about the impact of the last drinks strategy within and between sectors of informants. Inevitably a 3am close will affect some venues and SNPs more than others and this may partly explain the disparity in informant perceptions. These differences were perhaps felt more in rural and regional areas compared to areas like Fortitude Valley and Brisbane. Importantly unexpected consequences highlighted in the above quote work against the value of the capacity of the legislation to reduce alcohol-fuelled violence.

6.16.2.1.4. PATRON BANNING

Key informants were asked a series of questions regarding their experiences of, and opinions about, patron banning.

Unlike most other themes, there was generally broad support for patron banning among key informants. However, some informants expressed concern about the discretion venues had to implement bans, and some suggested improvements to current practices.

Most informants who responded to the question, 'what are your thoughts about patron banning' thought it was a positive intervention:

It's always been a good thing. I would always encourage any venue where if they've had a problem with somebody, they need to be banned. So again, well, being able to share that with other people is a great thing. So anytime we can find out a little bit about somebody before they enter, certainly, it will make life a whole lot easier down the track.

Q: do the ID scanners help or support this patron banning at all?

A: Yes they do, but I haven't seen many people that walk up that have been scanned where they actually banned from a venue. I'm sure there's been plenty of them out there but I don't see those people walking out and being scanned and saying, "Yeah, sorry, you can't come in." I've only ever seen it once so it's just making those people go somewhere else. (Licensee-10)

Almost unanimously licensees will ban a patron if they have a banning order:

It's up to the discretion of you, but if he's been banned from one venue then it's probably not worth letting him in. Most venues agree to it. And us personally if we came across someone and they were banned from another venue, and that does happen, we just say 'look, you've been banned from this venue for this reason, maybe you need to go sort it out with them.' (Licensee-01)

The few instances where there was discretion by the licensee were for venue bans if they were what they considered low-level offences:

Yeah, most of them we've been following, though it depends on who it is. If we know them we will have a chat to them and say, "Look, if you are involved in anything we'll extend your ban." A lot of times they'll be like, "No, it was a one-off. This guy did this," or "she did that." So, if they are involved in something in our venue when they're on a venue specific ban and we've let them in, then we'll extend it. So, we put in a ban for further term. (Licensee-03)

There were some concerns about the venue banning from those who were supportive of police bans. The concerns revolved around misuse of the bans, for example vexatious bans:

If I was to suggest another way for that to happen it would be that, you know, as a venue manager you say yes, I want to put a venue ban on that person because they abused one of the bartenders or they threw a glass or whatever, and that then should be escalated to the police or Licensing who then come into the venue, look at the footage, read some instant reports and then they make the final decision on yes or no, that should be a ban. I just don't think that you should be giving, I don't think that, you know, possibly an 18-year-old bartender or an 18-year-old security guard should have the ability to ban someone for life from all SNPs. (Licensee-17)

For example, one key informant offered a possible scenario:

Yeah so I've heard stories of people banning people for stupid reasons and like I've heard people come down from another venue saying a banning notice has come up, there's no reason on there and they've said, "I slept with the security guard's missus and they've banned

me." I've had another venue down the road giving someone like 10 years for like jumping the fence or, it's like it's just out of control these bans and I'm like, this is dangerous. (Licensee-21)

Those who were opposed to patron banning felt that it did not achieve much:

I mean I think there's some…there's, I suppose there's the opportunity that maybe it might bring attention to somebody's drinking habits but realistically like it's quite shaming and I mean if someone is going to be banned from one place they'll just go to another place. Again, like I don't think it's going to create behaviour change. In some it might instigate reflection and desire, you know, might be impetus to change but overall I think, yeah it's probably only mildly effective. Yeah I don't think it's an answer. (Health-11)

One key informant challenged the legality of police accessing patron information from venue banning orders:

The privacy issues with sharing venue bans are not supported by the legislation, and venue bans (Other-7)

However, this informant was incorrect in their assertion. In broad terms, the Liquor Act 1992 addresses privacy by requiring licensees of regulated premises and approved operators of ID scanning systems to comply with the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 and its associated Australian Privacy Principles in relation to the collection, use, disclosure and storage of personal information.

Long term effects of patron banning

Most key informants felt that patron banning had long term effects on patron behaviour, beyond those who had received a ban:

If you like going out on the town and you're a young person and you know that you misbehave once and you've been banned for six months, I mean if that's what you do every Friday and Saturday, I think it's got to change your behaviour in some way. (Licensee-01)

A minority of respondents thought it did not have any long-term effects on patron behaviour, and tended to argue that this was because banned patrons just went elsewhere outside of SNPs:

No I don't think it makes them think twice because if they're banned from the SNP they're simply going to the suburban pub and they can still get their entertainment and drinks up 'til two AM or they can go down newly built venues within the casinos. (Licensee-07)

<u>Suggested changes to patron banning</u>

Most informants felt that the length of the police banning was not long enough (10 days), the times suggested ranged from six weeks to three months to six or twelve months:

> Oh look, I think the first offense; it should be a minimum of three months. I think if the second offence, it should be a year, and depending on the type of defence. It's a hard one, depending on – Each case is obviously different. (Licensee-02)

> Look probably a few months. Yeah like I would say three months is a fair time to allow that person to clean their act up a little bit and pull their head in but ten days is certainly not enough. You know if someone commits an offence on a Saturday night they only have to miss one weekend and then they can go back out with no problems. So yeah I don't think it's long enough. (Other-06)

6.16.2.1.5. LICENSEES PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE POLICY ON THEIR BUSINESS

There were five areas that licensees were asked about in relation to how they felt the TAFV policy package changes had affected their business.

<u>1. Income/ Closing time/ Ideal closing time/ Peak trading hours</u>

When talking about ideal closing times the problem of the early closing for those with a 5am license was raised again:

> I didn't want to lose my [five AM closing time] because we sort of had a competitive advantage over most of the other bars in the street that didn't go until five. But when it went to three [AM], I thought, oh, well. And now on some nights you think, well, I'm glad we don't have to stay open until five [AM]. But we are seeing people in a bit earlier. (Licensee-15)

<u>2. How have the changes influenced business?</u>

Many licensees felt that the new legislation had made it harder for them to operate and make a profit:

> It's essentially made people like myself, and my colleagues, and people that I will associate with, within the industry, it's made our life a lot harder, and if anything, it's made us look at how we've got to cut corners and do different things, because quite simply, there's just too much legislation around what we're doing, and too much one-size-fits-all… we've got additional costs. I've now got a couple of thousand dollars additional in security fees per week because I've got to have a

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guard – I can't do it myself, with all of my licences, with all of my responsibilities that I have to, one, be a business owner, two, be the manager then of a licenced venue, and all the hoops I've got to jump through, I'm still not allowed to actually scan somebody. So, I've got to pay somebody $45 an hour to scan your licence to come in and play my poker machines, which has got nothing to do with harm minimisation.

Many informants felt that the legislation had created a large loss in revenue:

A: We're down about 30%. We're down about 30% and that's with bars closing, competition bars closing, we're still down 30%. Like everybody else I talk to, because we all are quite close, some people are down as much as 40% on last year.

Q: I just want to clarify, so you're down 30% and would you say that you'd attribute most of that to the fact that you've got to use the scanners during the week or –

A: It killed our weekday trade. Yeah, whole groups are leaving because one person over the age of 30 doesn't bring ID. So if one person – there's a big group – and this is a regular weekly occurrence – one idiot will just "I don't have ID" and they'll be over the age of 30, they'll be 35 plus, then the whole group leave. Then the whole group pinballs around the valley thinking they can get in to some other places, they don't know about sneaking in through the pokie rooms, and then they all end up at the casino because somebody goes "casinos don't have scanners, go to the casino". Now, if you want to see the real impact of where all of this money's gone from the valley, you know, from the city, from Caxton Street, from the valley, it's simple, you've just got to look at Echo Entertainment, publically traded company, let's see how much those casino figures are up in the last year. And there's going to be a direct correlation between that.

Many informants also expressed that the legislation had disadvantaged them competitively:

It's influenced in [a] dramatic negative way, the viability to remain competitive is dwindling very fast. We're now seeing the casinos implementing new venues within the casino. The trade like venues like ours who are now trading 'til three AM and five AM on Friday and Saturday nights with no ID machines located within the SNP [Safe Night Precinct]. And we're also seeing suburban pubs who close at two AM, one hour less than the SNPs also introducing or renovating parts of their pubs and turning them into you know dance floors and disco lights and trading like venues like us. I think competitively we're really disadvantaged with the new implementation of the rules or the legislation of ID and reduced trading hours

and I don't think we're on an even competitive ground amongst our peers as major corporations such as the casinos, OH group, Coles or Woolworths. (Licensee-07)

4. Special consideration

The main theme to emerge from responses about the special consideration changes was the problem that regional and rural precincts faced: that their local events weren't being considered major enough to gain them a trading extension.

Local police have always objected to the wording in the legislation so we've basically given up on the one-off extended hours as the application doesn't consider local events and local areas. It's more business rely upon. National estates, significant events only occur in major cities, disadvantages regional areas. (Licensee-07)

One key informant felt the system for special consideration could be streamlined with regard to special events that were recurring large scale:

The only issue I have with it currently is that there's a lot of explanation required for events that really shouldn't need any explanation. From my perspective, I think the system would run a lot more easily if OLGR pre-determined a list of major events for Brisbane. Like everybody knows State of Origin is the biggest night of the year. It's bigger than New Year's Eve. Riverfire, which is the closing ceremony of the Brisbane festival - that's a massive night. Australia Day. They could pre-determine those, and say if you wanted these nights, you can apply, pay your fee, and it's automatically approved. I think that would save them a lot of headaches, paperwork wise. (Licensee-16)

5. Patron understanding of the legislation/ Staff-patron interactions/ Staff training

Of the eight licensees that responded to the question about patron understanding of the legislation, it was unanimously perceived that patrons did not understand the new laws, exemplified by this excerpt from one licensee:

I think they do understand them [the new legislation] now. I don't think that ... but I also think that, once again, I think it's had a negative impact on the number of people who are coming into licenced premises after ten o' clock, and I also think that it's confusing to a lot of people... we might understand, in the industry, the differences between the different licences, for example closing at midnight and reducing your closing hours to midnight, and not having to scan IDs, as opposed to trading later and having to ID scan every night of the week,

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regardless of whether you're open until that late trading time or not. So, a lot of people can't understand why they could go to a safe night precinct, be knocked back at, or not have ID at one venue, and not be allowed to go into a late night venue, and then walk to the licenced premises next door, which only trades 'til midnight, at quarter past ten, and go straight in and have an alcoholic beverage. That, to me, is quite difficult for the general public to understand, and well, for basically anyone to understand how that can happen. (Licensee-06)

In response to questions about staff training on the new legislation, key informants explained that the Responsible Service of Alcohol certificate was the training. There was no standard for extra training offered specific to the policy changes:

Yeah, well, not so much training as such but just a staff meeting to bring them all up to date on the changes and how they affected our business. (Licensee-14)

When asked whether the legislation had affected staff-patron interaction in anyway, positive or negative, most (8) people who responded felt that it was positive or had remained the same. However, seven key informants thought that staff-patron interactions had become more negative, primarily to the ID scanners:

It's more at the door, because it's the security guards who cop the brunt of it, and we've had a lot of people leave the industry because of the amount of flak they've copped. One of the other things that is another unintended consequence of this is, a good security guard who has a line up in front of them, will use that time while people are waiting to walk down the line, and he'll ascertain who ... Maybe there's a group of guys who are being a bit boisterous – he might, rather than letting them wait for 15 or 20 minutes in the line, he might go up to them and say, 'listen, guys, you're not wearing the right shoes... I'm going to refuse you entry, so I'm just letting you know now, rather than letting you wait another 20 minutes'. They'll appreciate that. But now, because they've got their head down and they're scanning everything, they're scanning the next person who comes up to them, the next ID scan, so they don't have the time to do that, so they're actually not ... They're probably letting in people that they probably ordinarily wouldn't, purely for the fact that they haven't been able to observe them in the line, and that's what a lot of security is about – it's observation, and body language, and experience. So, now they're only solely focussed on the next person who's got their ID out, and scanning that ID; they're not looking down the line anymore; they're not working out who's going to cause trouble later on, so that has ... Those guys are the ones who, when they finally get to the front door, and he says, 'sorry, guys, you can't come in; you've had a bit too much', or 'you haven't got the right shoes', they're the ones who are going to

kick off because they've waited now for 20 minutes – now they're going to have an issue. The other ones where we have a real big issue are older men who are 40, 50, 55, who don't take their IDs out with them, who go to the football, the game finishes at ten o' clock;' they walk up the road, five past ten, they're told they can't come in because they don't have a drivers' licence, and they lose it. (Licensee-06)

Licensees also felt that the education of the public before the legislation was introduced was inadequate, leaving them to deal with the public's confusion and aggravation:

The marketing the Queensland government employed was terrible in regards to that. So we're on the receiving end of quite a bit of the confusion and sometimes aggression due to the lack of education by the Queensland government to the general population. They sent out beer coasters, they spend $8 million on – and sent out some beer coasters, nobody knew what was going on. We get quite a bit of flack and confusion and that's about it, really. (Licensee-19)

6.16.2.2. ILLICIT DRUG USE

Twenty-five informants from various sectors responded to the question about whether the legislation had any impact on illicit drug use. It was generally reported thought that illicit drug use had not changed as a result of the TAFV policy package. Of those who answered this question, some key informants thought that drugs were cheaper than alcohol, which made it more attractive to young people:

But you're mixing these pills with alcohol they go crazy but…and even a girl here I was talking to the other day and she's said, "I'm coming out." And I said, "Oh ok." And she said, "Oh do you know where I can get drugs?" "I said what?" And she said, "Yeah, yeah well it's too expensive to go out and get on the grog so I just buy a pill for 20 bucks and it lasts all night and I don't wake up with a hangover." (Licensee-21)

Some felt drugs to be a bigger problem than alcohol:

Yes, certainly. Again, that would be one of the biggest problems we see inside. Again, probably not so many just intoxicated from alcohol, so its people intoxicated more by drugs [I'd say]. And again, you could tell by the level of aggression where that comes from. I think that's the underlying factor we need to look at in Queensland because we have more of a problem with drugs than what we do with alcohol. (Licensee-10)

It would require further research to determine whether these narratives are supported by data.

1. Alcohol-related harm

Informants from Health sectors stated that their answers were based on their perceptions without the support of data, but they were happy to speak anecdotally about their experiences of the types of alcohol-related injuries and numbers they had observed. Overall, many informants expressed the perception that alcohol-related harms had decreased following the introduction of the TAFV policy change. However, like most themes, there was a lack of consensus among the informants, and a general acknowledgement that their perspectives were anecdotal:

> There's definitely anecdotally been a reduction in the number of presentations. So, we don't see quite as many as we used to, there's probably about a 15-20% reduction in the numbers of presentation in alcohol related interpersonal violence. So that's noticeable. I used to work in Newcastle as well where there's been a similar introduction and a noticeable drop in presentations in Newcastle, I think that's been objectively shown as well, but … there's not really any change in the severity of the injuries, I mean that's fairly standardized, there's not really any change in that, so it's probably more the numbers of presentations and again, no change in the distribution of age or sex, you know, it's all fairly unchanged from that point of view. (Health-07)

Contrary to this perspective, one key informant thought that the nature of how the policy was rolled out limited its effectiveness at reducing alcohol harms:

> Part of the reason I think is that they watered down the lock out laws so much and then on top of that I think they gave pubs and clubs up to, oh I don't know, there are…they got a minimum number or a number of exemptions that they could apply for across the year and if you go to Fortitude Valley you have networks of nightclubs that are owned by the same cohort and when you add up all the various, you know, exemptions that they could apply for you could pretty much guarantee that at any given night they could have, you know, at least one of their nightclubs open to some ridiculous hour of the morning and so I don't think that materially we've seen anecdotally any significant change in the, you know, the attendances or the pattern of attendance. (Health-09)

Informants from health sectors stated they were still seeing injuries that were alcohol-related:

We continue to see many injuries associated with intoxication. I admitted a patient this morning who's got a tibial fracture. He was admitted at half-one this morning, having fallen off a kerb somewhere and he has no recollection of events… So, this sort of thing obviously is anecdotal but that's the kind of thing that we see. And as a clinician you don't get, unless you have access to state-wide data, you don't have a real impression of any significant changes. (Health-05)

The above quotes exploring alcohol-related harms and injuries show the difficulties in judging alcohol-related harm from the perspective of a service provider, and most key informants recognised that their comments were anecdotal. It highlights the need for on-going data collection from relevant services.

2. Alcohol-related assaults

One informant from the health sector stated that the number of alcohol-related injuries hadn't decreased, but there had been a slight decrease in assaults in the early hours of the morning since the change in the licensing came in in July 2016:

Well, I'm aware that there has been a decrease in assaults in early hours of the morning since the change in the licensing came in in July 2016. There has been a slight decrease. So, I think that is something that, certainly the college we've talked about, is that the college is supportive of that - reducing the opening hours or the number of premises that are open after midnight. And that sort of comes back to what we were talking about, about different behaviours, and that seems to be a very positive change. In terms of admissions and attendances I don't think there has been a huge amount of difference but it must follow through eventually that if we're seeing change in behaviour and the number of assaults in the early hours of the morning that that is very positive. (Health-05)

Another informant, also from the health sector, thought that the rate of assaults had stayed the same but that there may have been a shift in the times that the assaults occurred:

Anecdotally it feels like there's more people presenting prior to midnight than there used to be when I was a registrar and – you know, but whether that's due to this or due to the fact that I now work at a different hospital than where I did most of my registrar training. (Health-08)

About half of the informants from all sectors who responded to this question thought that alcohol-related violence in venues had decreased:

> Yeah look I think I would have to come down on the side of saying yes. It's a bit difficult to point to what elements of a policy have contributed to that and to what degree that they've contributed to that. And that, and I know you even the evaluation I suspect is going to have problems in differentiating in which elements are more effective and which elements are less effective. But by and large I think it's you know you would anticipate a positive outcome. (OLGR-05)

A number of other informant felt that alcohol-related violence had decreased on the streets (outside of venues). Most of these informants found it difficult to attribute the fall directly to the new legislation, although some did:

> There's been, definitely been a reduction in violence in and out of premises. I don't think we'll ever get it to zero just because mixing alcohol and certain people personalities doesn't react well. But there's been a marked reduction. And violence, like, sorry, like really violent aggression seems to have reduced… Yeah, I don't know that there is a singular reason. Like I think it's a combination of everything. The initiatives that have been introduced, the structure of the Safe Night committee, the involvement of licensees, the funding that's been made available, the increased police presence. It's a higher profile on a lot of different levels, and I think the public has got a bit of a message and so has the industry. (OLGR-02)

Conversely, there was also approximately half of informants who felt that levels of alcohol-related assaults had remained the same:

> I really don't see any changes in the violence at, within venues. We've probably seen a probably decrease outside venues, ever so slightly. And I think that's a result of some good work being done at getting people away out of the city fairly quickly. But definitely seeing probably a continual pattern of interaction between our itinerant population and those nightclub dwellers which ends up in you know some type of conflict. (Police-04)

Finally of note, a minority of informants expressed that they thought assaults had increased since the new legislation was introduced:

Because I attend safe night out precinct meetings, and the police officer who attends it reported to us that in the prior quarter - which would now be maybe two months ago, the prior quarter - there had been a 66% increase in violence related to licensed premises. (Licensee-07)

3. Suggested improvements regarding alcohol related assaults and harms

When asked about ways to reduce alcohol-related harms, approximately half of the respondents felt that more education would help:

Look I think that there needs to be good community engagement about what constitutes responsible consumption and that's, that needs to be targeted at the various, to the community i.e. you know those say those under 35, those over 35. (OLGR-05)

Education and training for people who work in this industry is, I think, is something that needs to be addressed. You know for example from our point of view it's very, very easy for someone to get a security licence and get minimal training and then enter the security industry. So I tend to think that more training needs to be delivered and there needs to be more prerequisites before somebody can get a job as a security provider. I mean we're lucky, we're lucky we have a good staff base and we provide our own training to our staff you know on everything from legislation to writing reports to you know how to deal with police and how to, you know everything you can think of. And these things aren't covered in the security courses people get. The same can be said about the RSA [Responsible Service of Alcohol Certificate]. So you know you can go online, you can do your RSA in like 20 minutes and it costs you like 23 bucks. So I don't think enough education is there for people who are, who are having to deal with these issues. (Other-06)

Approximately half of the respondents also felt that further reductions in trading hours above what was already implemented in the legislation package would help to reduce assaults and harms:

Reduce trading hours further is all that I could think would do it but we understand the implications of drinking at home and that as well. Violence in the safe night precinct and around licensed areas is not the be all and end all of violence. It happens, domestic violence is still a massive issue for us and a lot of that's alcohol-related as well so there's arguments to and fro and I'm not the expert in it so I'd like to see reduced trading hours but if that means

it's displacement to other areas then perhaps we're better off to have the [babysitting] in town. (Police-03)

One key informant felt increased security was the only way to reduce alcohol-related harm:

I don't think ID scanners are going to stop fights but then I think more security would stop fights. (OLGR-04)

6.16.2.4. PERCEPTIONS OF INTOXICATION

As with alcohol-related harm, there were more informants who had the perception that intoxication was declining rather than increasing (however, licensees were not asked this question). Most responses were couched in terms of being anecdotal, and a general awareness that their perception of changes to intoxication levels may not be a representative evaluation of the matter, or that changes may not be attributable to the policy change.

Look I think the answer to that is possibly, yes but you know without having empirical evidence to support that. But I'm not, and I think the policy, the tackling alcohol fuelled policy has played it's part in this but I'm not sure it's entirely attributable to that policy because I think that there, you know more broadly in the community and from health departments etcetera, etcetera there has been a push to, for people to moderate their intake of alcohol. And I think we're you know probably seeing some of that reduction in consumption is probably attributable to those factors as well as the tackling alcohol fuelled violence policy itself. (OLGR-05)

One police informant responded:

Yeah, I've certainly seen a decrease in the number of massively intoxicated people that are so drunk they can't stand up. We still get them but we don't get anywhere near as many as we used to get, and again that's only an anecdotal thing; I wouldn't have any hard evidence to back that up. (Police-01)

Other informants who answered this question were similarly ambivalent about offering a definitive statement on intoxication change, but tended towards claiming that the policy had no effect on the levels of intoxication:

I don't know the answer to that. My gut feeling is that people still get intoxicated, maybe they just do it a bit faster. Yeah so I suspect that they probably don't affect intoxication as such, yep. (Health-11)

No not really, I think it's just moved. Yeah not that I could definitively say. If anything I'd say people are probably just getting on it sooner. (Council-01)

One key informant felt there was no intoxication problem in the first place:

I don't think there has been. That's my personal view. I mean I can't, it's hard to sort of say I know this because but this, in my certainly my perception is that there's been no change at all. And at the same time remember my starting point for this is I don't believe that there's a massive intoxication problem that's been, that needs to be solved. I think that, I mean I think there is more than can be done and things that would be of benefit, things that can be fixed which would improve the people's drinking behaviour and behaviour generally but I don't think that, I don't think we've got a serious problem that we're looking for some sort of urgent correction. (Other-01)

6.16.2.5. PRE-DRINKING

In line with studies documenting the increasing issues associated with pre-drinking in Australian nightlife (2, 16, 19, 65), pre-drinking was seen unanimously as a problem which continued to undermine nightlife culture and economic viability, as well as causing increased harm and anti-social behaviour.

The problems of pre-drinking are experienced by venue owners. They felt that venues were not the cause of alcohol-related violence and harm and intoxication, rather it was the culture of pre-drinking:

Well certainly on our front doors we're wearing the brunt of it, particularly for our security and door staff. And like I said, most of our offences occur on our front doors more than inside our venues. Our trained, our staff are trained in RSA and they've got a high compliance regime to adhere to so when offences do occur on licenced premises it's generally not caused by a licenced venue but obviously the individual and how much they've consumed prior. There's been incidences proven many a times in our particular venue where we've either have someone being assaulted or being disorderly in our, in our premises and many times we've proved that they've only had two between one to four drinks in our venue so. (Licensee-07)

Pre-drinking was seen as both an economic and social issue. Like previous studies, the difference between the cost of off-premise and on premise alcohol put licensees at an economic disadvantage.

Yes, because what it comes down to again is that the price the big corporations sell people alcohol to now, like Dan Murphy, they can buy booze cheaper or just as cheap as what I buy it from my wholesaler. (Licensee-13)

It is clear from comments above that the key informants feel that pre-drinking is a major problem. Finding ways of addressing pre-drinking is an important part of a holistic approach to alcohol-related harm. Many key informants did not think there had been a cultural change. In general most people thought that pre-drinking was still a big problem and if people want to get drunk they will get drunk. That drinking behaviour is ingrained in the culture,

> But like I say, we still see that pre-loading before people come out. So there is a culture still in place about alcohol consumption. What we're seeing is probably less drink drivers so the actual practice of going out, getting drunk and driving home has probably reduced. (Police-04)

Any unanimity regarding pre-drinking dissipated when informants began to comment on the incidence of pre-drinking. Many industry key informants claimed that the incidence of pre-drinking had increased, whereas others thought that levels had stayed the same or decreased. There was also difference of ideas about motives for pre-drinking and why changes in incidence may have occurred. The majority of informants stated that price was the dominant factor in pre-drinking levels, i.e. that it was much cheaper to drink at home than it was to drink in venues:

> When teenagers preload it's usually also about cost of alcohol so you know when you can buy it in a bottle shop as opposed to buying it at a venue that's a good reason why they preload. (Health-01)

> It's cheaper for a night out, particularly those venues that charge a cover charge. They'll get to the venue and they'll only need one drink; buy one drink and they're happy. (Licensee-08)

There were a number of informants who felt that the interventions had increased pre-drinking incidence, with both last drinks and drink restrictions measured identified by informants:

> I think pre-loadings remained the same, if not I think pre-loadings probably increased due to the fact that the 18 to say 30s know that venues are closing earlier so they're trying to either get their I guess their general high or alcohol fix before they're coming in. And there's no changes in the legislation in relation to bottle shops so therefore I think the pre-loading remains the same if not has gotten worse. (Licensee-07)

A number of licensees that we spoke to indicated that their inability to advertise drink specials meant that people weren't coming to venues to drink but instead were staying at home. Repeating long-running narratives from industry, they claimed that it would be better to have people drinking in a

supervised and controlled environment rather than pre-drinking at home then turning up to venues drunk and trying to enter venues or causing problems in the street:

> If I said to you, you know, this will sound very much the hotelier, but if I said to you, look, we're allowed to advertise a happy hour or a special drinks price earlier in the night, would the kids come out and buy those drinks and get them served under regulation and under supervision and security? Or are they just free pouring vodkas at someone's house or in someone's hotel room? So, if I suggest that, it's clearly going to come from a vested interest. But it seems to me that, like certainly on a Friday and a Saturday if there's not a big footie, you know, if we did a happy hour between six and eight or seven and nine, we could attract a few people. But whether that's going to stop pre-loading, I really don't know. (Licensee-15)

A couple of informants thought that the loopholes allowing Casinos and restaurants to be exempt from the restrictions meant that the legislation was not as effective as it could be. While not strictly "pre-loading" under the generally accepted definition of the term, some licensees within SNPs felt that the harm from patrons arriving at their venues intoxicated was also attributable to Casinos and restaurants that were exempt from the relevant restrictions:

> The thing for us is that pre-loading, for us, isn't just necessarily at home. It's the guys that have been to the casino for eight hours in the afternoon, then try and come down at 8:30 PM and can barely walk. (Licensee-16)

6.16.2.6. CURRENT LOCAL ISSUES – CRIME AND ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

This section looks at the informants' perceptions of local crime and anti-social behaviour in their area. Most informants thought that crime in their local area had either gone down or had remained the same:

> No I think we'd be on the status quo as well, it'd be reasonably stable as it has been over the last-the time's I've been in the city here, so no significant increases. (Police-02)

> No. Just like I said, the crews and I went in and spoke to them about it, they do report anecdotally that like those assaults and just fights at sort of taxi ranks and stuff have reduced on a Friday, Saturday night. They're still getting them but it's probably not as prevalent as it was. (Health-02)

Some industry key informants thought crime had increased, and three were unable to say either way. Some felt the increase was due to drugs or other factors. Informants did not explicitly link the legislation amendments to changes in local crime:

I have noticed more aggression with people who are clearly on steroids, I have noticed a bit of a steroid problem. When I say clearly it's because they clearly weren't intoxicated and clearly react in a kind of psycho-crazy way, and, I mean, unless someone's been drug tested I can't say unequivocally that's what it is, but as an educated guess I've seen more problems with, obviously ice is a problem, it's not really our clientele, but definitely steroids. (Licensee-18)

Most key informants felt that anti-social behaviour in their local area was down. One key informant linked the decrease directly to the ID scanners:

Yes I have. And well look one of the main reasons for that is because of the ID scanners. To elaborate on that I mean you know we have everyone's identity you know scanned and saved on entry so even if we're going to refuse entry to somebody we'll generally scan them first and that will, that really is a deterrent to playing up because you know if we scan their ID and then they, and then we refuse them entry and they play up and commit a liquor offence well we have their details and it's very easy for QPS to catch up with them. So yeah so I believe, I believe there is less anti-social behaviour now. (Other-06)

Others did not assign any reason for the decrease:

No, that's mainly because I'm involved with our legal reporting and we see the banning notices coming through and the guys and the decreases of banning notices of premises. (Other-02)

One key informant thought that levels of anti-social behaviour were the same, two believed that levels had increased, one because of drugs, the other directly linked the legislation to the increase in aggression. Others attributed an increase in aggressiveness to the inconvenience of ID scanners and queuing for entry:

I've had to observe, you know, disorderly and frustrated behaviour at unprecedented levels from queueing. People have been lined up outside, and managers, who should be running the business, are running a line and they're doing little more than apologising and trying to calm customers down who are pissed off. They're talking, you know. The first few months was horrendous. People were not used to it, did not like it. Left. And the managers were spending all of their time out making sure that scanners were working, security were doing it properly. They were being watched like hawks. And customers were saying, mate, I'm pissed off about this. You know, I'm here with my dad. My dad's down from country Queensland and I can't come into your pub because dad hasn't got his driver's licence with him. This is effed. This is stupid. And the managers had to cop the brunt of that. (Other-07)

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Key informant interviews were conducted with 66 informants from various industries, including licensees, council, health, Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR), Safe Night Precinct Support Services Representative (SNPSS Rep), police, alcohol producers, and other (e.g. local security firm, liquor licensing consultant). While the key informant interviews were not designed to give definitive answers, and cannot answer questions of actual impact of the policy, they provide a rich body of qualitative data that gives important 'on the ground' context. It helps highlight the difficulties and successes of the interventions and gives a platform for key informants to voice their experiences in the context of industry motivations and priorities, and also allows the research team to identify different claims and test them against empirical data, or other forms of evidence. Opinions were diverse, but there were common themes that emerged.

Key informants had a range of differing opinions on the impact of restrictions on rapid-intoxication drinks. Interestingly, informants from within the same expertise/industry area did not always agree on whether the restrictions had a positive impact. Whilst some licensees noted that restrictions on rapid-intoxication drinks reduce the level of intoxication of patrons, others acknowledged that this may be undermined by pre-drinking behaviour. Overall, licensees did not feel that drink restrictions affected their trade, which may be a result of all venues implementing restrictions, and patrons being aware that they would not be able to purchase rapid-intoxication drinks at any venue, and so simply chose to drink something else. There is currently no published evidence on the impact of drinks restrictions on violence, or intoxication levels in venues or on the streets. Previous work has only documented key stakeholder opinions.

Key informants were asked about the benefits of implementing ID scanners. One key perceived benefit, identified from both licensees and other informants, was the ability to enforce banning orders. Prior to the use of ID scanners, enforcement of banning orders required venue security and management to identify faces of persons who had been banned from venues or by police, which may reach unmanageable numbers that are not feasible to rely upon staff memory. In addition, venues would not necessarily be aware of other venues' banned patrons, and so such patrons could simply attend a different venue. This may have resulted in many banned patrons not being recognised, and being allowed entry into venues, undermining the banning scheme. ID scanners overcome this problem. Banning data can be entered directly into ID scanners by both the venue and police, which allows all persons who have received a ban to be identified prior to venue entry, and denied entry. Informants noted that using ID scanners at all venues allows for consistency across venues within the SNPs in terms of identifying problematic patrons who have received bans, and ensuring they do not enter licensed venues. It was also considered by one licensee to be evidence of a responsible venue.

However, it was acknowledged that problematic patrons may simply choose to attend venues who are not required to have ID scanners, such as those venues outside of the SNP or that close at 12am. As such, it was noted that all venues, despite their location and closing time, should have to implement ID scanners.

Informants also noted that recording patron information on entry using the ID scanner did not seem to have a deterrent effect on negative patron behaviour, highlighting that once patrons were intoxicated they no longer care. However, one licensee felt that using the scanner reminded people that their information is recorded for up to a month. Importantly, it was identified by police and licensees that the use of ID scanners allows for people who were in fights or who engaged in offending behaviour in or around a venue to be identified from their scan record, which in turn helped to solve crimes.

Key Informants were also asked what improvements they thought could be made to improve the use and impact of the scanners. Some licensees felt that ID scanning should start later, given the 10pm starting is not the peak time of business for them. This is despite ID scanner data and foot traffic data indicating that there is a high volume of patrons entering venues from 8pm onwards. Licensees also highlighted that having to re-scan a patron who is re-entering the same venue was unnecessary, and simply created longer queues. A further issue raised by licensees was that when one person in a group forgot their ID and could not be scanned and in turn allowed entry, the whole group would leave the venue, which impacts profitability. This was highlighted particularly for older age groups, who were not used to be asked to present their ID for entry to venues.

Key informants were generally supportive of the last drinks legislation. Amongst the benefits identified included reduced costs associated with not having to employ staff between 3am-5am, reduced number of night-time hours of alcohol sale, and in turn a reduction in problems. However, there were licensees who did not agree with these sentiments, with one noting that it had a negative impact on their business, another noting that it tends to negatively impact venues who previously traded later unfairly when compared to those venues who already closed earlier, and that it created undue pressure on the transport system as everyone exists venues at the same time. This is in contrast with the foot traffic data, which has shown that there has been no change in numbers of people outside of venues at or after closing times as a result of the last drinks legislation. One licensee felt that the policy would have been more accepted by the general public, and less damaging on businesses, if it had been better advertised to the public. This was exemplified by licensees who felt that not only did patrons need further information about the policy, but that staff would have benefited from increased training about the legislation from government, so they could improve their interactions with patrons.

Patron banning was broadly supported by key informants. Licensees in particular felt bans were a positive intervention for reducing problems in venues, and that being able to identify a person who has been banned from another venue was useful in terms of reducing harm in their own venue. However, some informants identified concerns at the ease with which a person is able to receive a venue ban (i.e. vexatious bans), suggesting that young staff may not be the right people to implement SNP-wide bans or that bans were being used because staff did not like the person, and instead this decision could be made impartially by police or liquor licensing officials. Some informants noted that bans are not a behaviour change intervention, and any impact is compromised by the lack of enforcement of bans outside of an SNP. Others highlighted that the bans have long term effects on patron behaviour, even if only a mild impact. Informants were consistent in their view that police patron bans were not long enough, and suggested such bans should be extended to at least a few months long.

Informants highlighted that the policy had changed the way they operate their business. One licensee noted having to focus harder on the restaurant, gaming, and TAB components of their venue to ensure they are still able to make a profit. Another felt like achieving a profit is not much more difficult, and this creates an environment where they are trying to save money elsewhere. Casinos were highlighted as a key competitor on an uneven playing field, as they do not have to abide by the last drinks legislation, nor are they required to have ID scanners.

Key informants from the health sector were inconsistent in their perspective about whether the policy was able to reduce alcohol related harm. For example, whilst one informant felt there was a reduction in alcohol-related presentations for interpersonal violence, others noted that there were still intoxication-related injury presentations and it was difficult to determine if these had decreased without looking at data. Importantly, one informant acknowledged that the ability for venues to apply for extended trading permits undermined the impact of the policy on alcohol-related harms.

There was a range of inconsistent responses about whether there had been a change in alcohol-related assaults. Some informants noted that there had been a decrease in the number of assaults, and that whilst this may not be reflected in emergency department data, that it would be with the continuation of the policy. However others felt it hadn't changed, that it was too difficult to determine if there had been any change as a result of the policy, or that violence related to licensed venues had increased.

Informants discussed increased education for patron and staff around responsible service and consumption of alcohol would help to reduced alcohol related harms, as would more security. A police informant noted that further reducing trading hours would assist in reducing harm, though this needs to be considered in light of domestic violence.

In terms of levels of intoxication, some informants discussed anecdotally that levels of intoxication seemed to have decreased, though acknowledged they did not evidence to support this, nor could they be sure that this was a result of the policy. Further, some informants reported that people might simply be getting intoxicated earlier, rather than any actual reduction in intoxication level.

There was one issue that received consistent acknowledgment from all key informants; pre-drinking. Informants consistently identified pre-drinking as a problem which led to increased harm and antisocial behaviour. Further, informants identified that pre-drinking was an economic and social issue, placing the night time economy at an economic disadvantage. Informants did not feel the policy had resulted in any change to pre-drinking behaviour or drinking culture more generally, and some even felt that it had increased the incidence of pre-drinking. Licensees highlighted that it would be advantageous to have people consuming alcohol in a supervised and controlled environment (a licensed venue) than at home.

Generally, informants felt that crime and antisocial behaviour was experiencing a downward trend, but did identify some increases that they felt were related to illicit drugs, or other factors such as queuing, or not being able to enter a venue without an ID.

Overall, the key informants had a range of differing perspectives on each of the issues, and these discrepancies were seen both between and within sectors. For example, some licensees identified the impact the policy had on their business, whilst other licensees noted there was no impact on their business. The only issue for which consistent support emerged was pre-drinking, and the impact this behaviour has on business, and alcohol related harm.

6.17. ORIGINAL LIVE MUSIC VENUES IN FORTITUDE VALLEY

6.17.1. BACKGROUND

The number and qualities of live music venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP is of significant cultural and public concern. In this chapter the Fortitude Valley SNP is frequently referred to by its colloquial local name 'the Valley'. The area has been an important site in the city's live music culture for several decades (66-68).

This chapter offers contextual information on original live music venues in the Valley drawn from key informant interviews with owners and managers of original live music venues, the precinct mapping, and analysis of street press gig guides and venue websites. The precinct mapping shows that the number of original live music venues in the precinct did not change from 2016 to 2018. Further, the trading patterns of live music venues on Saturday nights does not appear to have changed since 2016.

In addition, APRA live performance data show that the number of live performances in the Valley has been trending upward (although it is important to note that the APRA live performance data includes live performances by cover bands and DJs, so it is possible that the story for local and touring original live music may be different).

The original live music scene has long been recognised as a critical issue in local and state government planning concerning the Valley. The Brisbane City Council's 2004 Valley Harmony Music Plan (69) recognised the cultural importance of the Valley's live music scene, and sought to strike a balance between the music scene, residents and other businesses. The plan was clear that residents and other businesses in the Valley could not expect 'quiet internal noise' and would experience a higher 'ambient noise environment' than in suburban residential areas.

The plan proposed establishing a special entertainment precinct in the Valley that would require developers to 'incorporate a high level of noise insulation' and set 'Valley-specific noise levels' that allowed for live amplified music, as part of the Liquor Licensing framework. This Valley Special Entertainment Precinct was created on 1 July 2006, with the council making clear that its purpose was to 'ensure the long-term future of the music-based entertainment industry in the Valley without exposing residents or businesses to unreasonable levels of amplified music noise' (70).

The development of the Valley's cultural economy since the early 2000s, and the establishment of a special entertainment precinct, has arguably been a mixed story for live original music. While the precinct gave certainty to venues that staged live original music, it also underpinned the commercialisation of the area as a nightlife district, which brought competing interests into the area.

Figure 422 below illustrates the boundaries of the special entertainment precinct created by the council in 2006. The boundary of the Special Entertainment Precinct areas are marked with a red line. The blue line shows the boundary of the Safe Night Precinct created in 2014. The two precincts overlap to a large degree, indicating the longer history of using a precinct boundary to concentrate and manage the nightlife, live music and cultural economy in the Valley.

Figure 422: illustration of the Special Entertainment Precinct and Safe Night Precinct boundaries in Fortitude Valley

Note. Red = Special Entertainment Precinct; Blue = Safe Night Precinct

6.17.2. NUMBER OF LIVE MUSIC VENUES IN THE VALLEY SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE TACKLING ALCOHOL-FUELLED VIOLENCE LEGISLATION

Precinct mapping and analysis of street press gig guides and venue websites demonstrates that during the period of this study the number of live music venues in the Valley remained stable. There were ten venues in 2016, and 9 in 2018. The precinct lost one dedicated live music venue: The New Globe Theatre. And, there is one large music venue, The Fortitude, currently under construction. The Fortitude will hold 3500 people, making it the largest inner city music venue in the city, featuring national and international touring acts (71). The venue is likely to bring patronage into other bars, restaurants and venues around the Brunswick Street Mall (Informant 2). Given the cultural importance of live music venues, attention must be given to the specific qualities of each venue, and the kinds of performances they support.

The New Globe Theatre was an eclectic venue that specialised in independent, alternative, emerging and community arts performances. Public comment at the time indicated the venue had closed because it was no longer financially viable. However, the owners made no public connection between the larger economy of the Fortitude Valley or the legislation in citing their reasons for closing.

The other major live music venues in the Valley: The Zoo, Black Bear Lodge, The Brightside, The Foundry, Woolly Mammoth, Crow Bar and Ric's remain open, featuring weekly performances. Key live music venues on the precinct fringe – The Tivoli and The Triffid – also remain open.

6.17.3. NUMBER OF LIVE MUSIC VENUES IN FORTITUDE VALLEY OVER TIME

In this section we have focussed on venues in the Valley that are dedicated original live music venues. This is a narrower definition than used by APRA AMCOS, whose collection of live music data extends to any 'in person' performance of music (including DJs and cover bands). We note that there are a range of other kinds of venues that play an important role in the live music culture of the Valley. These include: nightclubs and small bars that stage original live music or touring DJ performances, but that is not their main activity, bars that support live performance of jazz or cabaret, and dedicated performing arts venues that are not predominantly used for live music.

Analyses of street press gig guides indicated a stable entry and exit rate of live music venues over the period of this study (2016-2018). This stability in the number of venues is evident over more than a decade.

Figure 423 documents the number of original live music venues in Fortitude Valley from 2003 to 2018, from only six venues in 2003, to a peak of 10 venues in 2017. In nine of the past 15 years, either nine or ten original live music venues have traded in the precinct.

Figure 423: Number of live music venues in Fortitude Valley 2003-2018

Table 192 provides a description of the opening and closing of original live music venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP from 2003 to 2018. Between 2003 and 2018 we identified a total of 21 venues supporting original live music. Of the six live music venues in the precinct in 2003, three are still trading today: The Zoo, The Tivoli and Ric's. These three venues have supported live original music since before 2000. From 2005 to 2013 there were between 7 and 9 live music venues. From 2014 to 2017 there were 10 live music venues, with one closure in 2018 bringing the total down to 9 again. The table demonstrates that the number of live music venues in the Valley has been relatively stable over the past five years.

One active venue – Black Bear Lodge – has supported live original music since before 2010. Before being Black Bear Lodge, this venue was another live music venue called The Troubadour, and its support of live music has been continuous since 2004. Five active venues – The Brightside, Crow Bar, Woolly Mammoth, The Triffid, and The Foundry – have emerged since 2010.

These analyses show that the majority of venues that support live original music are less than ten years old, but several venues have been instrumental to the scene over a long period of time.

We also considered the average number of venues in the precinct over time, to determine how the current number and range of live music venues compares to historical patterns. This suggests that from 2005 to 2018 the number of live music venues in the precinct has remained relatively stable. This stability is possibly underpinned by the creation in 2006 of the Special Entertainment Precinct in the Valley as part of the Valley Music Harmonisation Plan. The Council's Amplified Music Venues

Local Law protects live music venues in the precinct by giving them regulatory certainty around the noise created by live music performances.

Table 192: Description of changes to live music venues in Fortitude Valley 2003 to 2018

Year	Number of live music venues	Description of change
2003	6	There are 6 live music venues in the precinct, including the following venues that are still trading in 2018: The Zoo, Ric's, and The Tivoli.
2004	7	The Healer closes (it is now The Brightside, but for several years was not a music venue). The Troubadour and The Rev open.
2005	9	The Globe and 610 open. 610 was an unlicensed and semi-legal artist space that featured underground and emerging brands. The venue ran for only a short time but was well-attended by members of the music scene.
2006	7	610 and Indie Temple cease trade. Indie Temple featured emerging indie and hard rock bands. The venue had traded for several years in the city before moving to the Valley.
2007	9	The Rev closes. Alhambra, Step Inn and The Colombian all open. Each of these are smaller venues that support independent and local bands.
2008	9	The Colombian closes. The Valley Studios (formerly 610) opens. Each of these were small venues that supported independent and local bands.
2009	8	The Valley Studios closes.
2010	9	X&Y opens and features local and independent bands in one of its rooms.
2011	9	The Troubadour closes and changes to Black Bear Lodge.
2012	8	The Arena and The Step Inn close. Oh Hello and Crow Bar open. While Oh Hello is a primarily a nightclub we include it here because it was advertising original live music shows during this period.
2013	8	No closures, no new venues.
2014	10	The Brightside and The Woolly Mammoth open. No closures.
2015	10	Alhambra closes. X&Y remains open but no longer features live music performances. The Triffid and The Foundry open. The Triffid is a mid-size music venue outside the formal precinct, but immediately becomes one of the key live music venues in the city. The Foundry is a smaller venue featuring mostly independent local and touring artists.
2016	10	No change.
2017	10	No change.
2018	9	The Globe closes down.

6.17.4. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS WITH FORTITUDE VALLEY LIVE MUSIC VENUES

10 key informant interviews were undertaken with owners and managers at key live music venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP, and a representative of the peak music industry body, QMusic. Six informants currently owned or managed venues. Between them, they owned or managed seven (of the nine) original live music venues in or around the Fortitude Valley SNP. Six of the informants had

operated live music venues for more than ten years, and two operated live music venues since the 1990s.

Below we present a summary of key findings from these interviews, grouped around two key areas of discussion: the experience of running a live music venue in the Valley (including the business models, changing trends in nightlife and cultural consumption, strategies for supplementing revenue, and the number of gigs held in venues); and the impact of legislation on the venue.

6.17.4.1. THE EXPERIENCE OF RUNNING A LIVE MUSIC VENUE IN THE FORTITUDE VALLEY SNP

6.17.4.1.1. BUSINESS MODELS

All informants reported an arrangement in their venue where the band takes the proceeds from 'the door' (ticket sales) and the venue takes the proceeds from 'the bar'. Most venues took a cut of ticket sales to cover production and staff costs. Some venues occasionally paid bands a 'guarantee' or set rate to perform, but this was not the norm. Only one venue did this for all shows.

This means that, at best, the live performance covers most of the direct production costs (such as door staff and sound engineer), with the venue relying on bar sales to cover all other costs (such as rent, insurance, license fees, wages) and make a profit. Within the venue business model, live original music is a draw card that brings in patrons who will buy drinks over the bar. Informant 6 offers a typical explanation of this arrangement:

Yeah, so 99 per cent of that money goes back to the band. All my revenue is made over the bar and that's what pays everything, so if I basically take $2.50 a head and that covers the door girl, the sound guy and that's about it. [We have a] 300 count venue so it's $600 worth of things. (Informant 6)

Informant 8 offered a detailed explanation of how tenuous this reliance on the bar sales was for live music venues that did not have a mixed business model (for instance, other offerings like food, or mixing live music with club nights). This venue reported only being able to attract patrons to the venue through live music, describing it as a "destination venue". Sales are only made around the time the band is playing, with patrons typically arriving just before a band begins their set and leaving straight afterwards. The informant describes a range of variables that can affect the amount of income generated from the bar:

Monday to Friday - we only operate really three nights a week, our core income is basically through the bar, which makes it quite difficult sometimes. ...Depending on the genre of music, so if it's a really

chill show, people don't drink as much, so we don't make as much. If it's a really hectic show, we make more.

With a young crowd, a lot of them tend to pre-drink at home, so that creates another challenge in itself, that people don't come until right before the headlining act, so we sometimes only have one hour to make our revenue. Then I guess when the headline act starts, they stop and watch. So we've got that window.

The headliner usually starts at 11, if people don't rock up until nine, we've got from nine until 10 to make our money. Then everything simmers down then again while the band plays. So yeah, if you think about it, depending on the shows we have coming through, we can operate anywhere between eight to - eight hours a week is a minimum , and then maybe up to 16 hours a week. So we don't have a lot of time to smash that through, unfortunately. (Informant 8)

Evident in the informant's account is the relatively small window of time the venue has to generate bar sales, as they are 'only open three nights for four hours' (Informant 8). A similar account was given by multiple informants.

This informant described several efforts the venue had made to extend the amount of time patrons spent in the venue drinking at the bar:

We've tried to look at opening earlier, staying open later, but it's a tough slog because it's such an old venue, that people just see it as what it is, and it is what it is. It's a destination venue, it's a live music venue. We're not a bar, we're not a club, we're not a restaurant. We are a live music venue.

Similar circumstances were described by all the other live music venues that did not operate as clubs in combination with staging original live music. These venues faced a real challenge in getting patrons to stay at the venue before or after the scheduled 'headline' performance.

6.17.4.1.2. CHANGING NIGHTLIFE AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION

Several informants who had operated venues since the 1990s separately described a change in cultural consumption over the past decade. These informants described observing a pattern of consumption emerge in their venues where patrons who would have once 'hung out' in a venue all evening now only came in for the scheduled live performance. This bothered them in the sense that they felt that went to the effort of supporting live music but that patrons did not pay it back to the venue by drinking there. Informant 9 described a pattern whereby bands would often generate more revenue from the show than the venue would, as patrons would pay a relatively large amount for the ticket, but then not purchase drinks over the bar. Informant 8 felt this was partly because patrons did not

understand how the venues made money, and the investments and risks venues took to stage live music. In their view, patrons are often concerned about supporting musicians but do not recognise the need to support venues.

Several informants, especially those who had been operating venues for over a decade, suggested the challenge of generating revenue over the bar was compounded by changing nightlife culture and consumption. Live music venues are 'destination' venues, as patrons come there specifically for a show. In the past venues like The Zoo or Ric's had a 'community' of music scene participants who would hang around the venue, and a culture of patrons arriving early and seeing all the bands (Informant 1, 3, 4 and 9). This meant they were there for the evening, patronising the bar and ordering food. Now, venues report audiences are more likely to arrive specifically for the band they want to see, they arrive shortly before the performance and leave shortly after. In response, venues either need to maximise bar sales during that short window or find other ways of generating revenue by incorporating dining or club nights into the venue's offerings. As Informant 1 put it:

When you're talking about patterns. In our youth, you went at the beginning of the night. You watched all the support bands. You went for the whole night. You saw all of the bands. Whereas, now that's definitely it. They walk in, say the headliner is on at 10.30. They walk in at 10.20. They're there. They have one drink. Normally they'll be drinking water. Then they're watching. They've got their phone out. They hear the song that they know and sometimes they don't even stay the whole show. There's a real difference in millennials and the way that the process music I feel. (Informant 1)

Informant 2 expressed a similar view that 'the music industry still hasn't fully grasped that' smartphone screens 'are the competition for lived experiences'. This informant pointed to the way that music festivals had diversified beyond the live performance to include art, fashion, brand activations, themed spaces, light shows and so on. In his view, younger audiences were now 'bored' by just watching a band on stage.

Some informants also expressed a view that they felt the forms of alcohol and nightlife consumption that had come to dominate the Valley were at odds with the ethos of their venue, or their personal values. Informant 9 explained, 'I had to go to these liquor licensing meetings and I really felt like I didn't belong there… you're part of the kids that get punched and die in the Valley. I didn't want to be a venue…'. Informant 3 and 8 expressed similar views.

A further challenge to live music venues is the growth of music festivals. This is experienced in two ways. While some argue that festivals have increased the appetite for, and spend, on live music, they are also competitors for live music audiences, and they have changed the way live music is consumed. In a larger sense, festivals are packaging live music as a multi-dimensional cultural and media

experience – video screens, lights, art installations, themed bars and so on. Audiences are looking for more than just a band playing on stage. In a more specific sense, the large festivals that run through the summer and winter months mean that bands are not touring or able to play at venues for several months a year. In some cases bands are contractually obliged by festivals not to play venue shows in the period leading up to and after the festival. And, more generally, audiences spend their money and attention going to the major festivals. For Fortitude Valley the key festivals that affect trade are Splendour in the Grass in winter, and then a range of summer festivals including Falls Festival, Laneway and others.

6.17.4.1.3. STRATEGIES FOR SUBSIDISING OR SUPPLEMENTING REVENUE FROM LIVE MUSIC

All venues explained various ways that they either subsidised or supplemented the income they generated from staging live original music. These strategies included:

- Using the revenue generated on weekend nights by touring acts to subsidise smaller shows on weekday nights by local acts.
- Staging live original music earlier in the evening before converting the venue to a club with DJs later in the evening. This attracted two waves of patrons and extended the period over which patrons were in the venue drinking at the bar.
- Making live original music performances one part of a range of entertainment, food, drink and gambling[54] offerings.

Importantly, these strategies each acknowledge in different ways that live music, particularly local live music, was not commercially viable on its own.

Several informants explained that their motivations for staging live music were not only commercial. Some ran their venues because live music was a passion and they saw their venue as playing an important role in the Brisbane music scene. Some venues clearly viewed live music as a complementary part of their business model alongside other more commercially viable activities like trading as a club. Several venues reported that they often made a loss opening on weeknights, or at best broke even. They continued opening on these loss-making weeknights for a mixture of reasons. These included their personal investment in supporting the local live music scene and their need to

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[54] No informant specifically said their venue used gambling to subsidise live music, but several informants expressed a view that several venues in the precinct were able to stage live music in part because they generated so much revenue from poker machines. The poker machines meant that venues could sustain using part of the venue for lower margin live music performances

offer regular shifts to retain bar staff. Some venues reported using profits from weekend nights to offer guarantees to bands on loss-making shows on weeknights, thus effectively using profits on weekends to subsidise local performance mid-week. The following exchange with Informant 9 is illustrative this situation:

Researcher: So you would make a loss opening on a… Tuesday, Wednesday night?

Informant 9: Yeah, sometimes, especially on Sundays. You'd make $300 on the bar…

Researcher: Whoa.

Informant 9: …and you're like…

Researcher: It's not even really paying the wages.

Informant 9: Yeah, you do it for love. You do it for love a lot, yeah. Yeah, you definitely don't make a lot of money but…

Informant 6 describes a similar practice of regularly and deliberately putting on shows even when they know they will make a loss.

Researcher: Can you tell me about when you do guarantees[55], why you do them?

Informant 6: Yeah, I think that's an emerging thing. It's always good to keep your venue ahead of the pack. So you know if I see some good bands coming through Melbourne or coming up, I'll be like okay, I'd for you to tour Brisbane. They'll be like, I got no money and I'll be like okay, I can give you a guarantee of $500 and if you get this many payers, you will get every bit of the cream after that $500 is recouped.

Generally, I lose on that I'd say nine times out of 10 on the smaller ones. Even on internationals, I lose on that sometimes, so it's a hard one mate, because all these venues have all these pokies and they're fucking massive chains and they basically go 'all right, Band A, I'll give you $150,000 to play

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[55] A 'guarantee' is a term venues use to describe a guaranteed amount the venue pays a band for performing. The guarantee is then subtracted from ticket sales. When a venue pays a guarantee to a band they take the risk. If ticket sales do not cover the guarantee the venue effectively pays the difference to the band, if the ticket sales exceed the guarantee the band typically takes that extra revenue.

Sandstone Point with Sticky Fingers and yeah, yeah, yeah'. It's like all those things are wrong. That's what's wrong with music.

Informant 6 also explained that they opened for weeknight shows even when they made a loss in order to offer their bar staff regular shifts. They felt this was necessary for bar staff to be able to work at the venue long term.

Informant 8 offers another similar view, explaining that they put on loss-making local shows out of a principled effort to support the local scene.

We do local nights because we feel it's incredibly important to support the local music scene. All the bands at the top started at the bottom, so it's really important for us to nurture that as much as we physically can. Yeah, local nights are not ideal, but we do them several times a month. Sometimes we do them once a week, and they're usually on a Thursday, sometimes on weekends. But they're a risk, local nights are very, very much a risk for us as a venue to do them, unfortunately.

What emerged from the accounts informants offered was that while many venue owners were motivated by a combination of commercial and cultural concerns, as they needed to find ways to make their venues financially sustainable.

Several venues explained that if they did not have the club night that followed the live show, they would not break even or make a profit from the night. In effect, the club night subsidised the live performance. Other venues reported that the live show helped to bring in a different audience to the venue earlier in the evening. It was a way of having patrons engaged with the venue, and generating revenue, for a longer period of the evening. In some cases patrons from the live show stayed on for the club night, in other cases the venue had 'two waves' of patrons – one that arrived for the live show and then left, and another that arrived for the club night later in the evening. The venues that did not have a club night explained that they had a very short window of time to generate bar sales to sustain the venue. Patrons typically arrive shortly before a performance and leave immediately after. Some shows – for instance, weeknights and certain genres – generated far less bar sales. This was often a consideration in booking the venue, with venue managers and bookers developing a sense of which bands brought in crowds that would drink over the bar.

Informant 10 explains this relationship between the live music and clubbing parts of their venue.

Informant 10: I mean, our strength I think as a - if the ticket sales aren't as strong certain nights, our free entry crowd - we've worked pretty hard to establish that. We really kind of - we sometimes bank on that to really make the venue tick over in the way of bar sales.

Informants 4 and 10 explained that the venue had worked to cultivate a clubbing crowd that came to the venue on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. While the live music crowd came earlier in the evening and bought a ticket to the show, the clubbing crowd were allowed in for free once the live music show was over. This clubbing crowd made each night commercially viable, so they did not view the live music as making a loss as such. Although, they wouldn't open the venue just for live music shows, they knew they needed the later clubbing crowd to cover the costs of any night they opened.

The venues 'would not survive as just purely a live music venue, there's no way' but they did not necessarily view the clubbing part of the venue as subsidising the live music. Instead, they staged live music earlier in the evening as a way of bringing patrons to the venue earlier in the evening. Informant 4's venue covered the direct costs of live music shows by making bands pay a venue hire fee that covered direct costs like door staff and sound engineers. In this arrangement bands then took the risk, needing to sell tickets to cover the venue hire fee. This meant that the venue never makes a direct loss on live music. Informant 4 explained:

What we've found in our model is that music like live bands in general from our modelling is a great way to utilise early hours in the night, but then it creates a base of people that then mill about and then people come in for the DJ afterwards and everybody's having a good party. For [VENUE], we do it on a Wednesday because nobody comes - we'll have four customers on a Wednesday if we don't do it. We'll have 40 customers on a Wednesday if we do do it.

Importantly, the venues that informants 4 and 10 ran only opened on nights when they could profitably trade as a club. Informant 4 explained 'our business is built around live music but the reality is it's a bad business'. So, they needed to develop the venues in such a way that live music, while being intrinsic to the cultural status of the venue, was not the primary offering from a commercial point of view. The informants who described running live shows that made a loss operated venues that did not trade as a club, or deliberately opened mid-week when there was no clubbing trade.

What is evident in the informant accounts is two different approaches to staging live shows. Some venues would open mid-week for loss-making shows and even pay the band a guarantee. Whereas, other venues, such as those run by informants 4 and 10, would only open on nights when a club night or some other themed event (like a trivia night, dress up party, or DJ playing a classic record as a tribute) made the night commercially viable. These venues would not pay guarantees, and in some cases would make the band underpin the financial risk by paying a venue hire fee. These more

commercially-minded venues had typically opened since 2010, in the much more 'commercialised' recent history of the Valley as a dense nightlife district.

Informants 1, 3, 4 and 9 who each ran venues in the 1990s and 2000s described the first wave of music venues in the Fortitude Valley area as artist-run or artist-oriented spaces. These venue owners described increasing pressures to 'professionalise' their venues over time – higher licensing costs, more licensing and security requirements, higher rents and so on. They also expressed ambivalence at being drawn into various industry and stakeholder instruments to manage nightlife in the area, where their interests were not always aligned with the interests of other nightlife proprietors. They felt the nightlife industry in the area was dealing with more regulatory issues as the number of people in the precinct generated more security and safety concerns, and a changing mix of patrons who were less interested in the alternative artistic and music culture that had thrived in the area through the 1990s and into the early 2000s. These pressures made it more difficult to operate a sustainable live music venue. Informants 1, 3 and 9 explained that when running their venues they were only breaking even or making a basic livelihood. Each of these informants recalled that as liquor licensing fees rose, and they were forced into expensive 'nightclub' licenses, they struggled to make a sustainable livelihood from their venue. The majority of the live music venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP now run a mixed live music-clubbing model, in the sense that a live music show happens earlier in the evening and then the venue transitions into a club. With all venues requiring bar sales to stay afloat, extending trade over this time is crucial to supporting live music.

6.17.4.1.4. NUMBER OF GIGS PER VENUE

While the number of live music venues in the precinct appears relatively stable from 2003 to 2018, it is possible that the number of gigs may fluctuate. Interviews with key informants suggest that larger shows on weekends by touring bands subsidise mid-week shows by local bands. Increasing costs make it more difficult for venues to stage these loss-making mid-week shows. Several informants reported that their venues had reduced the number of shows they offered on Tuesday and Wednesday nights. If this pattern holds, then it has a potentially negative effect on the local scene – with venues and stages unused on nights that once provided an opportunity for local performers to hone their craft and build audiences. Additionally, venues might over time reduce the number of live shows and replace them with performances by DJs or open as a bar with just recorded music or other events like trivia nights and themed parties. Several venues appear to have morphed into a hybrid 'live music' and 'club' business model, in some cases preferencing club nights and theme nights over live music performances.

Most informants indicated that the Fortitude Valley SNP did not necessarily need more live music venues. Instead, what was needed was more frequent and sustainable use of the venues and stages that already exist. Since the early 1990s in Fortitude Valley there have been a small handful of venues that put on live music performances every night of the week. This is reported by the interviewees as being increasingly uncommon. All venues reported reducing mid-week shows, and only regularly putting shows on with larger acts from Thursday through to Saturday each week. This suggests opportunities for emerging and local musicians to perform have reduced.

Several informants spoke of the need to diversify the forms of nightlife and cultural consumption in the Valley SNP (wine bars, galleries, art spaces). Diversifying the forms of cultural consumption, particularly from Sunday to Wednesday and before 10pm on all nights, was seen as a critical challenge by several informants.

Informants argued that if this happened, it was likely more diverse audiences would come into the Valley and create an incubator for a more diverse use of live music venues. Several informants saw positive signs in this regard, with the growth of bar & dining venues in the SNP that were bringing in an older clientele. Some informants also spoke of the new music venue under construction on the Brunswick Street Mall as being a positive catalyst because they thought this venue wouldn't compete with existing venues because it was so much larger than any other venue. Informants thought the value of the venue would be to bring large and new audiences into the Valley, to create more mid-week trade, and the possibility of a more regular patronage to dining and bars that could flow through to more live music performances.

The data to verify changes in the number of shows venues offer per week is not easy to access. Street press no longer provides a credible published record of the number of gigs venues stage. Key live music venues were approached throughout the course of the study to see if they would be willing to provide 'calendars' they may have of gigs over the time the venue has been in operation. The venues claimed they were unable to provide their gig 'calendars' for a variety of reasons including: commercial-in-confidence and privacy concerns, changes in personnel, the difficulty and cost of collating the information (it is not easily exportable, is held by third party ticket providers, or is kept in hand written calendars and diaries and would be labour-intensive to collate). None of these issues is insurmountable, and this remains a potential avenue for further research. A key limitation of original live music venues' claims is a lack of publicly available records of how many gigs they stage. Industry stakeholders – Qmusic, APRA, online ticket sellers like OzTix, and venues – could collectively and relatively easily provide publicly accessible data on the number of original live music shows in their venues.

One of the key venues in the Valley, The Zoo, has published on its website a list of all ticketed gigs in the venue from 1994 to 2016. Figure 424 provides a count of the number of gigs listed for each year. This gig guide provides one useful illustration of how the number of gigs a live music venue stages might fluctuate over time. Furthermore, it demonstrates the value of original live music venues collectively illustrating these trends, in order to inform public and cultural policy. The highest number of gigs The Zoo staged was 254 in 2000, and the lowest was 37 in 2016. During 2016 the venue changed ownership. The Zoo averaged 190 gigs per year from 1994 to 2005, and then following a dip to 68 shows in 2006, the venue averaged 128 shows per year from 2007 to 2015.

Figure 424: Number of gigs at The Zoo (1994-2016)

The interpretation of these fluctuations requires local knowledge and key informant accounts. In the case of The Zoo, key informants explained that changes in the number of gigs were attributable to a range of factors including changes to policy, the precinct, cultural consumption and their own personal circumstances.

Key informants detailed a range of reasons the number of shows at a venue might fluctuate, including:

- The emergence of similar sized music venues in the scene.
- Changes in licencing conditions that limit venue capacity, sometimes while compliance issues relating to noise or the building are addressed.
- Changes in precinct policies that made staging live amplified music more difficult.
- Changes in the business partnership or booking arrangements for the venue.
- The emergence of music festivals reducing the number of shows in July and January.
- Personal circumstances like relationships with co-owners, having children or caring for relatives.
- The cost of ID scanners.

- Changing patterns of cultural consumption.

. To verify the connection between any of these factors and fluctuation in the number of shows, the original live music industry would first need to follow The Zoo's example and make records of gigs at the venue publicly available.

6.17.4.1.5. IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGE ON LIVE MUSIC VENUES

Most informants did not feel that last drinks or restrictions to trading hours had substantially affected their venue, but all informants expressed a view that the requirements around ID scanners had negatively affected their venue.

Informants consistently expressed a view that venues should be afforded more discretion in their use of ID scanners and the responsible service of alcohol. One informant explained that 'I think a lot of venues like the ability to shut people out who they don't want to come in. I think that's – people want flexibility in how they use the system' (Informant 2).

One venue owner described a situation where an international artist, who had played a major venue in the city, had wanted to go to a smaller live music venue after the gig to DJ an after-party. But, when the artist arrived, the venue owner explained:

He wants to come and drink a whiskey with me, he can't. There's no musicians allowance or anything like 'oh you played in a band tonight, so you can have a shot when you finish the show'. It's like 'oh, sorry dude, you're better off going home or back to your hotel and drinking with your mates than coming to DJ at [VENUE] because yeah, you can't have a shot of Jamieson. I know you just play(ed) to all these people and attracted all these people to Riverstage and sold out every hotel in town, but yeah. (Informant 6)

Another venue described the diverse age range of patrons attending their venue, particularly for some touring bands. Some bands brought out older patrons who rarely went to nightlife precincts. The venue owner explained:

If we have someone, and they're clearly in their 50s or 60s, and they're not used to coming out, and they've come a long way to a show – this happened a lot – and they'd come a long way to a show, they're not used to being asked for ID, and they didn't bring their ID, we would've just said, 'oh sorry, you don't have ID'. They're like, 'what do you mean? We're over 18!' I'm like, 'oh yeah, we have to put your ID through'. And, it's just so dumb. We want to be able to make that call, we're adults, we want to be able to make that call ourselves. We have the ability to cut people off at the bar, and serve people alcohol, we should be able to make a sound judgement of whether or not we feel

someone if of age come into the venue. I think that that was the most annoying thing, is yeah, we'd have people who were very much over 18 that we had to turn away simply because we didn't have a machine to tell us what to do, which was dumb. (Informant 8)

Another informant described a situation where they had to turn away an entire bridal party because the bride did not have her ID:

That bride has probably been out in the first time in two years, she might not go out very often, she might have no concept of scanner ID laws. There's nothing in place to put communication to people like that about, well, you absolutely 100 per cent have to have your ID even if you're about 38. (Informant 7)

While all venues reported problems with ID scanners, many expressed in principle support for ID scanners, provided they could work efficiently, malfunction less frequently, and be implemented more flexibly. Several venues reported they would happily use ID scanners if they could do so on terms that were appropriate and financially viable for the venue.

Some informants believed ID Scanner operation were costly because they had to pay licensed security guards for a minimum of four hours, even if the venue was not trading for four hours after the security guard started work, and did not improve the security of the venue, often because most patrons were already inside the venue by 10pm when scanners became compulsory.

An informant who ran several venues explained that the venue's security bill 'is up by 40 per cent, and we work on thin margins as it is'. The reason for the rise in security costs is because, as a small venue trading six nights a week, it typically would not employ security except for weekend nights when it traded past 1am. Prior to the introduction of ID scanners the informant explained:

'Informant 4: We were doing live music six days a week. We were staying – we do live music and what would happen is we'd have a late rush of a hospital crowd come in at 11 and that would subsidise doing the live music early. They'd stick around until one and they'd drink the bar dry and it's like oh yeah, we did $1500 on Tuesday, we're going to do this again. Now it's like well, we did $500 from the jazz band and now we have to close and we're not going to get that other $800 that we would have. ... Paying the guards is an enormous pain in the arse.

Researcher: Because you'd have to put a guard on for a night where you ordinarily wouldn't have a guard?

Informant 4: And you have to put the guard on for a minimum of four hours. It's like we're paying them for four hours even though we're only going to be open to midnight, then they've got to operate

the scanners. It's like fuck alright. Whereas you used to be able to - it's like hey, as long as you're not going past midnight you wouldn't even need a guard, so you'd just be like don't bother.'

The ability to keep the bar open late on weeknights for a regular crowd of shift-workers meant they could afford to open and put on a live music performance. Following the introduction of ID scanners the venue had a choice. They could open and stage the live music performance and then close before 10pm, or they could trade past 10pm but would need to employ a security guard for a four hour shift. Either of these choices made the night financially unviable. The informant went on to explain that as a consequence they no longer open the venue or put on the jazz night on Tuesdays.

The most critical issue for several venues was having to operate ID scanners after 10pm on weeknights. If the venue is to open past 10pm they need to employ a security guard for a minimum four-hour shift (when normally they would not employ a guard at all) so that the guard could scan patrons entering after 10. But, as a live venue, nearly all patrons are in before 10 to see the show. Typically the guard might only scan half a dozen patrons and then the venue would shut before midnight. Several venues reported reducing their number of mid-week shows as a consequence of the mandatory ID scanners. Venues reported reducing the number of mid-week shows because the cost of operating ID scanners. Often mid-week shows already generated a loss or just broke even.

One venue explained that they had had to hire a security guard for a one hour period on the majority of nights they were open to scan IDs between 10pm and 11pm when they closed. They needed to pay the security guard for a four hour shift, but only required them for this one hour. The informant explained:

Informant 7: So the advice that we were given is that we had to have the scanner out from 10 o'clock (till) 11 o'clock. Now, on a Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, we would get 150 people, 200 people, 250 people coming through the doors between eight o'clock and nine o'clock. Seven o'clock and nine o'clock.

Six people might come in through the doors after 10 o'clock, so we're effectively paying a security guard for the minimum four-hour shift to set up a scanner ID for one hour to make sure that the six people that come in between 10 o'clock and 11 o'clock are scanned appropriately, which will solve nothing for anybody.

It's a little bit different on the Friday and Saturday night, we have 10 o'clock until one o'clock in the morning, but the majority of our crowd come between six o'clock and 10 o'clock.

This informant explained that they 'have no huge problem with scanner IDs as a whole or having scanner ID policy, but there has to be common sense exemptions, there has to be, but there isn't. There absolutely isn't'.

They recounted that they had raised these issues with liquor licensing but were told 'that's the rules, that's the only good reason they really have to come back'.

The upshot of mandatory ID scanning after 10pm on weeknights in particular is that 'if there was a chance to get any profit out of the weeknights, it's just been flattened by it' (informant 2). The informant suggested that the key change the government could make to the legislation is to 'relax weeknights… particularly for small venues because they're the ones that really, really can't afford it'. Several informants were concerned about this situation because it had 'led to people putting on less music' (Informant 2). This is particularly an issue because weeknight shows at small venues play a critical incubator role in the music scene, they provide a regular opportunity for emerging artists to hone their craft. If these shows disappear from the city then it becomes harder for artists to establish their style and an audience that would allow them to secure weekend shows or shows in larger venues.

Venues also reported issues with the efficiency and reliability of scanners. They reported issues with scanners not connecting to the network and slowing down entry to venues. When these problems occurred technical help was not always immediate this left them in the position of having to refuse entry to patrons until the scanner was working again or having to manually check each ID against a register of venue bands. This was particularly an issue when a large number of patrons were trying to get into a venue by a set time to see a headline set. One informant explained:

'We have to pay this third-party company and like I said, two weeks ago when the internet went down, my scanners went down. So you know what my guard has to do? Manually check 30 pages of bans for people's names. Imagine doing that on a sold-out show.' (Informant 6)

Another said the scanners:

Informant 5: Slow everything down. Hugely slow everything down. Again, that's people just probably not aware that if they rock up at 11 o'clock at night they're going to be standing in a queue for 40 minutes, which… We've got preferential guards that we have on and ones that generally get stuck on the scanners all the time, just because they are that little bit faster, or friendlier, or less aggravative, better at dealing with people. But people in general, I still have to walk up and down the queue, tell everybody to stay tightly packed in a queue so that it's not all over the footpath…

Facilitator 1:   So you're having to go up and down the queue, telling people to get their ID out, tell them what's going on?

Informant 5:   I waste hours and hours of my life just telling people to make sure that they've got their IDs out and ready. (Informant 5)

In this informant's view the ID scanners meant patrons spent more time waiting outside the venue and that venue staff had to spend significant time outside the venue managing the queue, especially when it snaked past other venues or patrons were standing in the queue for a long time. Informant 10 reported similar issues managing their queue. In these two cases the venues were adjacent to other large nightclubs and on a strip with a relatively narrow footpath. The footpath was taken up with two or more overlapping queues plus pedestrians wanting to get past. They also reported concerns with patrons choosing their venue not based on the entertainment on offer but rather on the length of the queue, this brought patrons into the venue who had been intending to go to a large nightclub, which was not always ideal.

Several venues reported that queues were particularly a problem when large numbers arrived simultaneously to see a live show and then had to wait to be scanned in through a single point of entry. Sometimes patrons missed the start of shows because of delays being scanned in. For several venues it was not practical or financially viable to have more than one scanner (Informants 4, 5, 6, and 10).

This informant, and others, expressed a view that the scanners made it more difficult to market the Valley as a cultural destination. It made the Valley seem like a securitised clubbing district, which worked against efforts to diversify the nightlife economy in the area in terms of venues and patrons. They felt this deterred patrons from coming to the Fortitude Valley SNP because they didn't like the feel of venues that needed to scan patrons to enter – it emphasised policing and danger, it suggested the area was dangerous, or that as patrons of live music venues they were undesirable. They felt this could also lead to patrons would choose other nightlife options elsewhere in the city. In a similar vein, another informant expressed a view that:

The scanners, I just believe very strongly that the visual landscape sends symbolic messages to people who about who we want to be as a people and a culture. What they're saying is you're not trusted and everything is dangerous but we'll look after you. (Informant 2)

One informant, who managed a venue that put on live music early in the evening before transitioning into a club night, explained that the 'big positive' from ID scanners was patron banning:

Informant 10: If someone does something bad in a venue, you can track them down through CCTV and through their face from the scanner. That's the major positive of the scanners. Probably in the - since the start of - since we started with the scanners, I've personally banned six to ten people; some for major things; some for quite minor things. But, yeah.

Researcher: Then it just gives you an automatic way of enforcing the ban.

Informant 10: Yeah, that's right. As soon as I flag them on the Scantek system downstairs it'll come up on the computer and then I can - if I need to ban someone for a certain amount of time, or if they've done something completely incredibly wrong, I can put a description there and - but I don't - obviously we won't - we don't do it lightly. If it's a issue - a big issue, that someone's put a hole in a wall or assaulted a staff member or assaulted myself, or - it'd be a sizeable ban, but I don't like to use it too much.

All informants currently operating live music venues thought the regulations surrounding the use of scanners need to be adapted to specific venues and their trading practices. The critical issues were their cost, their use on weeknights, and being able to operate them without needing to employ a licensed security guard to oversee them.

6.17.5.   DISCUSSION

This chapter has specifically focussed on original live music venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP. The Valley is unique in Australia for its concentration of culturally significant live music venues in a dense nightlife precinct.

While the number of live music venues in the Fortitude Valley SNP did not change substantially over the period, and neither did their pattern of trade on Saturday nights, several informants reported that venues were reducing the number of mid-week shows, especially following the introduction of mandatory ID scanners. We are not able to verify this claim with independent data. It our view that this data is available in the sense that all venues keep a calendar of the gigs they stage (although they do not archive it publicly). The live music industry – QMusic, APRA, online ticket sellers, and venues – could collectively play a role in creating a system of archiving, tracking and publishing the number of gigs staged over time. This is an important cultural policy question, the viability of mid-week and smaller shows is crucial to fostering and supporting the live music culture of the Valley and wider city.

The most significant issue for live music venue was the requirement to scan IDs after 10pm on weeknights. The regulations clearly state that if a venue is *approved to trade past midnight on a*

permanent basis in an SNP they must have an ID scanner and scan patrons entering after 10pm *regardless of whether you choose to close at or before midnight* (72). The upshot of this that small live music venues who open on a weeknight for a show that might go till 11pm now need to employ a security guard for a minimum 4 hour shift to supervise the operation of an ID scanner, even though maybe only half a dozen patrons might enter the venue after 10pm (because the show is almost over). Typically, all patrons are inside the venue before 10pm to see the show and have left by 11pm, with the venue closing at midnight. The use of the scanner on these nights does not serve much purpose in managing patrons entering the venue. Yet, it imposes a significant impost on the venue that has led several to change their mid-week operating hours.

This has had an impact because on these weeknight shows venues often trade at break-even or a loss anyhow, and don't typically employ security at the door. This is a significant issue because these shows typically provide opportunities for local and emerging artists. The requirement to have an ID scanner for these mid-week shows means hiring a security guard for a minimum four hour shift, to scan patrons entering the venue after 10pm.

The key informant interviews demonstrate some of the unique characteristics of original live music venues. In the Valley SNP it appears increasingly the case that original live music venues are integrated with larger pubs or clubs. This makes the staging of original live music financially dependent on late night trade in ways that it wasn't in the past. It appears that the staging of original live music has become more financially dependent on late night trade over time.

The Valley Entertainment Precinct was created in 2006 in part to protect live music venues, and in doing so, gave expression to the principle of keeping the Valley a culturally diverse and significant precinct. The development of the Safe Night Precinct and policies predominantly targeted the dense nightlife generated by larger pubs and nightclubs. If we reflect on the lessons of the VEP and SNP, then an important principle to hold on to is creating a precinct where a diversity of venues can thrive, including venues that stage original cultural performances without being integrated into the late-night clubbing economy.

Most informants indicated that the Fortitude Valley SNP did not necessarily need more live music venues. Instead, what was needed was more frequent and sustainable use of the venues and stages that already exist, especially for local artists. Since the early 1990s in Fortitude Valley there have been a small handful of venues that put on live music performances every night of the week. This is increasingly uncommon. All venues reported reducing mid-week shows, and only regularly putting shows on with larger acts from Thursday through to Saturday each week. This suggests opportunities for emerging and local musicians to perform have reduced.

6.18. FACEBOOK EVENT DATA

The following figures provide the total amount of Facebook advertised events held at each venue by financial year, for each week day and for the year as a whole.

6.18.1. LIVE MUSIC VENUES

6.18.1.1. BLACK BEAR LODGE

The majority of events at Black Bear Lodge were held on Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 425). As indicated in Figure 426, the number of events at Black Bear Lodge increase from 2016-17 to 2017-18.

Figure 425: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Black Bear Lodge

Figure 426: Total number of events for each financial year, Black Bear Lodge

6.18.1.2. CROWBAR

For Crowbar, the majority of events were held on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 427). As indicated in Figure 428, the number of events at Crowbar increase from 2015-16 to 2017-18.

Figure 427: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Crowbar

Figure 428: Total number of events for each financial year, Crowbar

6.18.1.3. RIC'S BAR

Events at Ric's Bar were evenly distributed across all weeknights (see Figure 429). As shown in Figure 430, the number of events at Ric's Bar decreased slightly in 2015-16, but remained stable after this year.

Figure 429: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Ric's Bar

Figure 430: Total number of events for each financial year, Ric's Bar

6.18.1.4. THE BRIGHTSIDE

The majority of events at The Brightside were held on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights (see Figure 431). As indicated in Figure 432, the number of events at The Brightside increase from 2014-15 to 2017-18.

Figure 431: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Brightside

Figure 432: Total number of events for each financial year, The Brightside

6.18.1.5. THE FOUNDRY

The majority of events at The Foundry were held on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights (see Figure 433). The number of events at The Foundry remained relatively stable from 2015-16 to 2017-18 (Figure 434).

Figure 433: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Foundry

Figure 434: Total number of events for each financial year, The Foundry

6.18.1.6. THE TRIVOLI

For The Trivoli, the majority of events were held on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 435). As indicated in Figure 436, the number of events at Crowbar increase from 2015-16 to 2017-18.

Figure 435: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Trivoli

Figure 436: Total number of events for each financial year, The Trivoli

6.18.1.7. THE TRIFFID

The majority of events at The Triffid were held on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday nights (see Figure 437). As shown in Figure 438, the number of events at The Triffid remained increased from 2015-16 to 2017-18.

Figure 437: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Triffid

Figure 438: Total number of events for each financial year, The Triffid

For The Zoo, the majority of events were held on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 439). As indicated in Figure 440, the number of events at The Zoo increase from declined between 2012-13 and 2016-17, followed by a subsequent increase in 2017-18.

Figure 439: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Zoo

Figure 440: Total number of events for each financial year, The Zoo

6.18.1.9. WOOLLY MAMMOTH

The majority of events at Woolly Mammoth were held on Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 441). As shown in Figure 442, the number of events at Woolly Mammoth remained increased from 2012-13 to 2017-18.

Figure 441: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Woolly Mammoth

Figure 442: Total number of events for each financial year, Woolly Mammoth

6.18.2.   NIGHT CLUBS

Only listed events from Friday, Saturday and Sunday were included in the day of week figures for The Family, The Met, and TBC Club as there were insufficient number of events listed events on weekdays. The overall financial year figures for these three venues include weekday events.

6.18.2.1. THE FAMILY

The Family changed ownership in June 2017 and was rebranded as "EI8HT", which then opened two new nightclubs within the venue "ONE" on Saturdays and "Fluffy" on Sundays[56]. The events from both these pages were included in the final summary for "The Family" as the venues all exist at the same location. Listed Facebook events from all pages were crosschecked and duplicates were removed.

Events at The Family were predominantly on Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 443). As shown in Figure 444, the number of events at The Family remained relatively stable up until 2016-17, with a decline in 2017-18. This decline in events may be attributable to the change in ownership.

Figure 443: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Family

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[56] http://scenestr.com.au/news/music/family-nightclub-closes-its-doors-end-of-an-era-for-the-superclub

Figure 444: Total number of events for each financial year, The Family

6.18.2.2. THE MET

The majority of events at The Met were held on Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 445). As indicated in Figure 446, the number of events at The Met remained increased from 2012-13 to 2017-18.

Figure 445: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Met

Figure 446: Total number of events for each financial year, The Met

6.18.2.3. TBC CLUB

The majority of events at TBC Club were held on Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 447). The number of events at TBC Club remained relatively stable from 2014-15 to 2017-18 (Figure 448).

Figure 447: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, TBC Club

Figure 448: Total number of events for each financial year, TBC Club

6.18.2.4. NEW GLOBE THEATRE (CLOSED APRIL 2018)

Most events at New Globe Theatre were held on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights (see Figure 449). As shown in Figure 450, the number of events at New Globe Theatre remained decreased between 2014-15 and 2015-16, but remained stable after that time.

Figure 449: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, New Globe Theatre

Figure 450: Total number of events for each financial year, New Globe Theatre

6.18.2.5. OH HELLO (CLOSED AUGUST 2018)

The majority of events at Oh Hello were held on Friday and Saturday nights (see Figure 451). The number of events at Oh Hello increased from 2011-12 to 2015-16, after which there was some decline (Figure 452).

Figure 451: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Oh Hello

Figure 452: Total number of events for each financial year, Oh Hello

6.18.3. ADDITIONAL VENUES

6.18.3.1. ALFRED & CONSTANCE

Alfred & Constance only advertised a very small number of Facebook events across the years.
However, for Alfred & Constance, the majority of events were held on Thursday, Friday and Saturday
nights (see Figure 453). As indicated in Figure 454, the number of events at Alfred & Constance
remained relatively stable over time, with a temporary decline in 2015-16.

Figure 453: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Alfred & Constance

Figure 454: Total number of events for each financial year, Alfred & Constance

6.18.3.2. CLOUDLAND

The majority of events at Cloudland were held on Thursday and Sunday nights (see Figure 455). The number of events at Cloudland increased from 2011-12 to 2017-18 (Figure 456).

Figure 455: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Cloudland

Figure 456: Total number of events for each financial year, Cloudland

6.18.3.3. OSBOURNE HOTEL (FORMER FRINGE BAR)

Data from the Osbourne Hotel was only available from 2017 onwards. The majority of events at Osbourne Hotel were held on Thursday, Saturday, and Sunday nights (see Figure 457). The total

number of events for the 2017-2018 financial year listed on the Osbourne Hotel Facebook page was 57.

Figure 457: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Osbourne Hotel

6.18.3.4. PROHIBITION

The majority of events at Prohibition were held on Thursday and Friday nights (see Figure 458). The number of events at Cloudland increased from 2015-16 to 2017-18 (Figure 459).

Figure 458: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, Prohibition

Figure 459: Total number of events for each financial year, Prohibition

6.18.3.5. THE FLYING COCK

Most events at The Flying Cock were held on Friday nights (see Figure 460). As shown in Figure 461, the number of events at The Flying Cock increased between 2014-15 and 2017-18.

Figure 460: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Flying Cock

Figure 461: Total number of events for each financial year, The Flying Cock

6.18.3.6. THE PRESS CLUB

The majority of events at The Press Club were held on Wednesday, Thursday, and Sunday nights (see Figure 462). As shown in Figure 463, the number of events at The Press Club remained relatively stable across the time period, with a peak in 2015-16.

Figure 462: Total number of events for each financial year by day of week, The Press Club

Figure 463: Total number of events for each financial year, The Press Club

6.18.4. SUMMARY

As a whole there appears to be a steady increase, or at least maintenance, in in the number of Facebook advertised events across the venues. A few trends were apparent: The Foundry has appeared to have decreased the number of advertised events on Sundays, The Zoo have decreased the number of advertised events on Wednesdays, and both Woolly Mammoth and The Family appear to have an overall decrease in the number of advertised events in 2017-18.

6.19. QUEENSLAND HEALTH SURVEY

The Queensland preventative health survey has collected alcohol consumption data from 2010 to 2016, then again in 2018. We obtained a report on the trend in alcohol consumption from the Chief Health Officer, Queensland Health.

The Queensland Health report used three alcohol consumption measures to assess potential impacts of the TAFV policy: standard drinks consumed per week, drinking days per week, and standard drinks consumed per drinking day. Intervention effects were defined as alcohol consumption in 2018 that was lower than predicted based on trends from 2010–2016.

6.19.1. RESULTS

The distribution of the alcohol consumption measures were skewed, meaning that fewer people drink high volumes of alcohol whereas most people consume lesser amounts, therefore, measures were log transformed. Table 193 through Table 195 provide data for each outcome variable by age group from

the Queensland Health report. Results indicate that for all measures, the observed 2018 alcohol consumption results were within or above the projected 2018.

Table 193: Comparison of projected and actual 2018 alcohol consumption, persons

Indicator	Age group (years)	Projected from trend to 2016 Mean	Observed 2018 Mean (95% CI)	Per year change	Change 2010–18	Trend p-value
Drinks per week	18 and older	4.2	4.6 (4.3–4.8)	-0.046	-0.368	0.321
	18 to 29	4.0	4.8 (4.1–5.6)	-0.286	-2.288	0.051
	30 and older	4.2	4.5 (4.3–4.7)	0.006	0.048	0.880
Drinking days	18 and older	3.1	3.1 (3.0–3.2)	-0.018	-0.144	0.354
	18 to 29	2.4	2.5 (2.2–2.8)	-0.060	-0.48	0.144
	30 and older	3.3	3.3 (3.2–3.4)	-0.006	-0.048	0.728
Drinks per drink days	18 and older	2.5	2.6 (2.6–2.7)	0.001	0.008	0.918
	18 to 29	3.2	3.4 (3.2–3.6)	-0.050	-0.4	0.027
	30 and older	2.4	2.5 (2.4–2.5)	0.011	0.088	0.412

Table 194: Comparison of projected and actual 2018 alcohol consumption, males

Indicator	Age group (years)	Projected from trend to 2016 Mean	Observed 2018 Mean (95% CI)	Per year change	Change 2010–18	Trend p-value
Drinks per week	18 and older	6.4	7.2 (6.7 - 7.7)	-0.081	-0.648	0.301
	18 to 29	5.9	7.4 (5.9 - 9.3)	-0.397	-3.176	0.085
	30 and older	6.5	7.1 (6.7 - 7.6)	-0.006	-0.048	0.926
Drinking days	18 and older	3.6	3.7 (3.6 - 3.8)	-0.014	-0.112	0.504
	18 to 29	2.9	3.0 (2.6 - 3.5)	-0.053	-0.424	0.282
	30 and older	3.8	3.9 (3.8 - 4.0)	-0.004	-0.032	0.813
Drinks per drink days	18 and older	3.0	3.1 (3.0 - 3.2)	-0.007	-0.056	0.659
	18 to 29	3.8	4.0 (3.6 - 4.3)	-0.070	-0.56	0.017
	30 and older	2.8	2.9 (2.8 - 3.0)	0.007	0.056	0.655

Table 195: Comparison of projected and actual 2018 alcohol consumption, females

Indicator	Age group (years)	Projected from trend to 2016 Mean	Observed 2018 Mean (95% CI)	Per year change	Change 2010–18	Trend p-value
Drinks per week	18 and older	2.7	2.8 (2.7 - 3.0)	-0.015	-0.12	0.574
	18 to 29	2.7	3.1 (2.6 - 3.7)	-0.173	-1.384	0.056
	30 and older	2.6	2.8 (2.6 - 3.0)	0.015	0.12	0.551
Drinking days	18 and older	2.5	2.5 (2.4 - 2.6)	-0.018	-0.144	0.343
	18 to 29	1.9	2.0 (1.7 - 2.3)	-0.060	-0.48	0.105
	30 and older	2.7	2.7 (2.6 - 2.8)	-0.006	-0.048	0.768
Drinks per drink days	18 and older	2.1	2.2 (2.2 - 2.3)	0.010	0.08	0.414
	18 to 29	2.8	2.9 (2.6 - 3.2)	-0.026	-0.208	0.179
	30 and older	2.0	2.1 (2.0 - 2.1)	0.016	0.128	0.214

Queensland Health concluded that there was no evidence of population-level reductions in alcohol consumption associated with the TAFV policy. However, it was noted that the preventive health survey series is designed to measure improvements in population-level trends typically resulting from long-term, sustained investment in policies and programs. Such data sources are not well suited to measure behavioural change resulting from interventions over short periods or for specific demographic groups. Further, the few instances where observed consumption in 2018 was higher than predicted should not be interpreted as an increase in consumption due to the intervention. While population-level patterns in preventive health risk factor trends tend to be stable, the rate of change will vary as additional data are added. Caution should therefore be used when interpreting rates of change or in attributing change to specific policies or programs.

6.19.3.   LIMITATIONS OF THE PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SURVEY

The major limitation of this report is that the Queensland annual 'Preventive Health Survey' did not collect alcohol data in 2017 (following the introduction of the TAFV Policy). Whilst alcohol data are available for prior years and reintroduced for the 2018 Preventive Health Survey, understanding any cultural impact of the TAFV Policy has been limited by this. This was in the context of alcohol being the leading cause of death and disability globally in people aged 15-40 (73) and having a government that was elected with a clear alcohol policy reform agenda.

The sample size and response rate are reported by Queensland Health (see https://www.health.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/732821/qsas-methods.pdf), with sample sizes in the past four years consisting of approximately 12,000 adults each year and a reported cooperation rate of 65%-70%.

Complete information is available at: https://www.health.qld.gov.au/research-reports/population-health/preventive-health-surveys/about with specific files available at the bottom of the webpage:

- Survey methods (adult and child)
- Adult survey sample size information

Data from the Queensland Preventative Health Survey provide some useful background trends, but the survey is targeted at overall population health behaviours and is potentially not representative of the key behaviours being addressed in this project. The survey reports a high cooperation rate (~75%), but this potentially overstates the true response rate substantially by not including respondents who were selected but with whom no contact was made. In a telephone survey this is likely to be a substantial number. Furthermore, data from the survey technical report show that non-response was a

particular problem for young adults – 18-24 year olds made up less than 4% of the survey sample, but are 12.6% of the adult population. Even if weighting is applied, there is a high probability that the particular 18-24 year olds included in the sample differ in systematic ways from the overall population of 18-24 year olds, making reliable inference problematic.

However, in further discussion, the Queensland Government Statistician's Office (QGSO) and Queensland Health did not provide information to determine the response rate:

1. What denominator was used for determining the response rate;
2. The number of people who answered the phone
3. The number of people that didn't answer the phone (many people screen calls).
4. The number of incomplete calls

For the sake of transparency, their response is provided in Appendix 14. While the QGSO is correct that response rate is not the only consideration of a survey's validity, it is a key piece of information, and standard practice in the interests of transparent science and public policy.

Also in the government's response to these suggestions, the Department of Health personnel responsible suggested that we investigate using the National Drug Strategy Household Survey (NDSHS) and Australian School Students Alcohol and Drug (ASSAD) surveys. However, these data sets are limited in their applicability to the evaluation of the TAFV policy:

- The ASSAD survey provides information on the use of tobacco, alcohol, and illegal and legal (for non-medical purposes) drugs in 12 to 17 year olds, and their attitudes toward these substances (https://beta.health.gov.au/resources/publications/secondary-school-students-use-of-tobacco-alcohol-and-other-drugs-in-2017). This information is not relevant to a policy focussed on licensing restrictions and violence in licensed venues;
- The NDSHS was conducted in 2016 and may only occur again in 2019 (https://www.aihw.gov.au/about-our-data/our-data-collections/national-drug-strategy-household-survey), making their findings irrelevant for the current evaluation.

6.19.4.   SUMMARY

Current, government led, survey measurement and monitoring of Queensland's drinking culture is not sufficient for the purposes of measuring the impact of policy change; nor drinking trends in younger adults, especially for policy changes that mostly focus on those attending drinking venues. The data collected represents a minimum dataset, and to accurately monitor and reduce harmful drinking, in-depth quantitative and qualitative methods are required. Further, the lack of reporting of key information about the sample of the survey leaves the research team with unanswered questions

around the validity of the findings reported for young people; arguably a key focus of preventative health. Because of this, and the decision to omit alcohol questions in 2017, the research team is unable to make any conclusions about the trends described in the Queensland health annual Preventive Health Survey, but recommend a review of the current sampling quotas for young people and reporting of the response rate.

6.20. ALCOHOL SALES DATA

Due to the voluntary nature of data submission, records of alcohol sales are absent for some regions. This has limited the ability to suitably perform regional analyses within and between financial years. However, the available data allows for analysis of total alcohol sales across Queensland.

Figure 464 presents an amalgamation of both direct and licensed alcohol sales by volume and alcohol type, per financial year. Since 2014/15, the number of sales for heavy and mid-strength beer have steadily increased, dipping slightly in 2016/17. In contrast, sales for cask table wine along with regular and pre-mixed spirits have decreased. The alcohol type with the highest volume of sales in 2017/18 was heavy beer with 271 million litres. Alcoholic soda, cask and bottle fortified wine maintain the lowest volume of sales.

Figure 464: Alcohol sales by volume and alcohol type per financial year

6.20.1.   SUMMARY

Overall, from the data that are available, it is evident that sales of heavy and mid-strength beer have steadily increased since the 2014/15 financial year. At the same time, the volume of sales for cask

table wine, regular spirits, and pre-mixed spirits have decreased. Incomplete data meant it was not possible to conduct regional analyses. In conclusion, due to the current unenforced collection of data, analysis of alcohol sales within Queensland is limited. Non-responsive licensees and the return of incomplete data impacts the depth of analysis able to be undertaken and the conclusions which can be drawn from analysis of sales data. These limitations may be overcome if reporting alcohol sales was mandatory for Queensland liquor license holders.

6.21. TOURISM DATA

6.21.1. GOVERNMENT TOURISM DATA

The following summary was compiled using data obtained by QGSO and Tourism Research Australia

6.21.1.1. INTERNATIONAL VISITORS

Figure 465 demonstrates the estimated number of international visitors aged above 15 that travelled to Queensland, Brisbane, Gold Coast, Tropical North Queensland and Townsville in each financial year between 2009-10 and 2017-18. The data were obtained using the TRA's International Visitor Survey, which was administered each year to 40,000 participants in the departure lounge of major Australian International airports.

Figure 465: Number of international visitors to Queensland

Source: http://www.qgso.qld.gov.au/subjects/industry-development/tourism/tables/internat-visitors-qld-tourism-region/index.php

6.21.1.2. DOMESTIC VISITORS

Figure 466 shows the number of domestic overnight trips to Queensland, Brisbane, Gold Coast, Tropical North Queensland, and Townsville in each financial year between 2009-10 and 2017-18. Trips only were recorded if the destination was more than 40km from the traveller's home.

Figure 466: Number of domestic visitors to Queensland

Source: http://www.qgso.qld.gov.au/subjects/industry-development/tourism/tables/domestic-visitors-qld-tourism-region/index.php

6.21.1.3. GROSS VALUE ADDED (GVA)

Gross Value Added (GVA) refers to the total capital revenue and labour income raised by the tourism industry, as well as the resulting net taxes that the government receive. GVA is comprised of both direct and indirect values, with direct values referring to money spent and generated within the tourism industry and indirect values referring to the economic "flow-on" effect generated by the tourism industry.

The following figures (Figure 467, Figure 468, and Figure 469) demonstrate the estimated direct, indirect and total GVA received by the tourism industry in Brisbane the Gold Coast, and Tropical North Queensland between the 09-10 and 16-17 financial year. The following data were generated by the TRA using economic modelling drawing from various data sources.

Figure 467: Gross Value Added, Brisbane

Source: https://www.tra.gov.au/Economic-analysis/Economic-Value/Regional-Tourism-Satellite-Account/regional-tourism-satellite-account

Figure 468: Gross Value Added, Gold Coast

Source: https://www.tra.gov.au/Economic-analysis/Economic-Value/Regional-Tourism-Satellite-Account/regional-tourism-satellite-account

Figure 469: Gross Value Added, Tropical North Queensland

Source: https://www.tra.gov.au/Economic-analysis/Economic-Value/Regional-Tourism-Satellite-Account/regional-tourism-satellite-account

6.21.1.4. PERSONS EMPLOYED

The figures below (Figure 470 to Figure 472) show the estimated number of people directly and indirectly employed, both full-time and part-time as a result of the tourism industry in Brisbane, the Gold Coast, and Tropical North Queensland between the 2009-10 and 2016-17 financial years.

Figure 470: Persons employed, Brisbane

Source: https://www.tra.gov.au/Economic-analysis/Economic-Value/Regional-Tourism-Satellite-Account/regional-tourism-satellite-account

Figure 471: Persons employed, Gold Coast

Source: https://www.tra.gov.au/Economic-analysis/Economic-Value/Regional-Tourism-Satellite-Account/regional-tourism-satellite-account

Figure 472: Persons employed, Tropical North Queensland

Source: https://www.tra.gov.au/Economic-analysis/Economic-Value/Regional-Tourism-Satellite-Account/regional-tourism-satellite-account

6.21.1.5. BACKPACKERS

The TRA estimated that there was a 3% reduction in the number of international backpackers visiting Queensland between 2017 and 2018. This appears to be a common trend across all states and territories, as all regions showed reductions in the number of international backpackers (Table 196). As backpackers are defined by the TRA as "individuals who spend at least one night in backpackers/hostel accommodation", it does not take into account those staying at Airbnb's which according to Sydney University report have doubled between 2017 and 2018. There was also a 16.5% increase in international visitor's use of "other accommodation" between 2017 and 2018, which may incorporate the rising rate of Airbnb use.

Table 196: Estimated number of international backpackers visiting Australia in 2017 and 2018 (000's)

Year and change	NSW	VIC	QLD	SA	WA	TAS	NT	ACT	Total
2017	478	308	341	75	98	51	86	31	645
2018	471	300	331	69	81	50	75	31	629
Percentage Change Between 2017 & 2018	-1.5	-2.6	-3.0	-7.6	-17.3	-2.6	-12.1	-1.0	-2.5

Source: https://www.tra.gov.au/International/International-tourism-results/overview

https://stokes2013.files.wordpress.com/2018/09/acca-online-str-research-project-report-final-24-09-2018.pdf

6.21.2. CAIRNS TOURISM SURVEY DATA

To provide a snapshot of tourism in Cairns, tourists were interviewed over three dates in October 2018.

6.21.2.1. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The Cairns tourism survey interviewed 131 participants, with ages ranging from 18-78 ($M = 36.64$, $SD = 14.01$), 53% of which were female. The most common age bracket was 18-25 years (26%), followed by 26-30 years (18%) then 31-35 years (12%).

The current sample was predominately Australian (65%) with the remainder visiting from Europe (16%), Asia (11%) and New Zealand (8%). The composition of the Australian sample was primarily Queenslanders (33%), then Victorians (9%), followed by Western Australians (8%) and New South Welshmen (6%). Of the remaining Australians, there was at least one participant from the other states and territories.

ACCOMMODATION AND SPENDING HABITS

Fifty percent of participants indicated their primary accommodation for their trip was a hotel, 20% indicated it was friends/family, 12% indicated it was at a backpackers, 7% at an Airbnb, and 4% at a caravan park or a vehicle. The remainder of the sample did not specify where they were staying.

For planned on spending over the duration of their trip, 23% of participants indicated they would spend under $500, 40% indicated they would spend between $500 and $1,000 and 26% planned on spending more than $1,000. The remaining 11% of participants did not know how much they would spend, or provided daily amounts with no indication of trip length.

6.21.2.3. VISITATION REASON AND TOP ATTRACTION

When asked about their top reason for visiting Cairns, 46% of participants indicated they were visiting for a holiday, 20% indicated they were visiting for a special occasion (i.e. birthday, anniversary, and honeymoon) and 11% stated they were visiting friends and/or family. The remainder of the participants stated they were either backpacking, working, or on a working holiday.

Regarding what participants considered to be the top attraction in Cairns and the surrounding areas, 40% stated their top attraction was the Great Barrier Reef, 23% indicated it was inland nature (i.e. rainforests, Skyrail, waterfalls) and 12% indicated it was island activities (i.e. scuba diving, Green Island). The remaining 25% indicated various reasons, including family, markets and special events.

6.21.2.4. AWARENESS OF TAFV POLICY

When asked about their intended nightlife behaviour, 36% of participants indicated that they planned on going out after midnight, and of those, 43% planned on staying out past 3am. The age bracket of these individuals can be seen in both Table 197 and Table 198, with the majority of participants planning to stay out late 18-30 years old.

Table 197: Frequency and age brackets of participants intending to go out in Cairns after midnight

Age Bracket	Frequency	Percentage
18-25	23	48.9
26-30	15	31.9
31-35	4	8.5
36-40	3	6.4
41-45	1	2.1
46-50	1	2.1

Table 198: Frequency and age brackets of participants who planned on going out in Cairns past 3am

Age Bracket	Frequency	Percentage
18-25	14	70.0
26-30	5	25.0
31-35	1	5.0

When asked about their knowledge of the Queensland trading laws, 26% of participants indicated they were aware of them, of those aware, 97% were Australian and 76% were Queenslanders. The age bracket of these individuals can be seen in Table 199.

Table 199: Frequency and age brackets of participants who were aware of the Queensland trading laws

Age Bracket	Frequency	Percentage
18-25	7	11.8
26-30	8	8.8
31-35	4	8.8
36-40	4	2.9
41-45	3	5.9
46-50	3	2.9
51-55	1	11.8
56-60	2	8.8
61+	1	8.8

6.22. SCHOOL EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

6.22.1. WEBSITE ACCESS

Frequency of use of the online alcohol and other drugs (AOD) program was determined by the number of 'access hits' to the website. Overall access hits provide a tally of user visits to: the program website homepage, program guidelines and content overview documents, resources, and session content. The number of access hits were examined from October 2014 to June 2018 for year levels 7 to 12. Overall, in the 2014-2015 financial year there were 8987 access hits,;4943 (55%) of those hits were for session content. Overall access hits increased to 16760 in 2015-2016, with 8331 (49%) access hits being from session content. In 2016-2017 the number of overall access hits decreased to 13827 with 7611 (55%) sessional content access hits. A further decrease in overall access hits occurred in 2017-2018 with 10807 hits, of which 5736 (53%) related to session content.

Overall access hits to the AOD education program website by month for each financial year is presented in Figure 473. The program had the highest number of access hits in the 2015-2016 financial year with a total of 17650 hits, peaking at 3462 hits in October.

Figure 473: Website access hits - Monthly totals by financial year
Note. Data for the 2014-2015 financial year was only inclusive from October 2014 – June 2015, as data collection commenced in October 2014.

Figure 474 displays the overall access hits for each year level by financial year. In the 2014-2015 financial year, access hits were low for all year levels besides Year 11 and 12 which had the greatest number of hits. Overall, the program website received the highest number of access hits in the 2015-2016 financial year by Year 12 students with 3877 hits. In the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 financial years, similar trends were seen with the greatest number of access hits being from Year 11 students.

Figure 474: Website access hits - Year level by financial year
Note. Data for the 2014-2015 financial year was only inclusive from October 2014 – June 2015, as data collection commenced in October 2014.

Access hits for sessional content refer to anytime a user accesses a webpage from one of the five sessions in the AOD program. Figure 475 displays monthly totals for sessional content access hits per financial year. In the 2015-2016 financial year a spike in access hits for sessional content occurred in October with 1925 hits.

Figure 475: Website access hits for sessional content - Monthly totals by financial year
Note. Data for the 2014-2015 financial year was only inclusive from October 2014 – June 2015, as data collection commenced in October 2014

Figure 476 breaks down the number of access hits for session content by year level per financial year. In the 2014-2015 period, the highest number of access hits to session content was from Year 11 and 12 students. All other year levels had low numbers of access hits during the 2014-2015 financial year. Year 11 students had the highest number of sessional content access hits in the 2015-2016 financial year with 1166 hits.

Figure 476: Access hits for sessional content by year level per financial year
Note. Data for the 2014-2015 financial year was only inclusive from October 2014 – June 2015, as data collection commenced in October 2014

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In the 2014-2015 financial year there was a spike in sessional content access hits for Year 12 in November with 725 hits (Figure 477). The number of sessional content access hits also peaked in November for Year 11 students, with two smaller spikes in February and May. All other year levels had few or no sessional content access hits throughout the financial year peaking slightly in January.

Figure 477: Access hits for sessional content by year level by month for 2014-2015 financial year
Note. Data for the 2014-2015 financial year was only inclusive from October 2014 – June 2015, as data collection commenced in October 2014

In the 2015-2016 financial year, sessional content access hits peaked for year levels 7, 8, 9, and 10 in October (Figure 478). Sessional content access hits for Year 11 spiked in February with two smaller spikes in May and October. For Year 12 students, access hits for sessional content peaked in August with smaller spikes in February and April.

Figure 478: Access hits for sessional content by year level by month for 2015-2016 financial year

For the 2016-2017 financial year, access to sessional content peaked in November for year levels 7, 8 and 9 (Figure 479). Year 10 sessional content access hits spiked in August with 509 hits, followed by a smaller spike in October with 394 hits. For both Year 11 and 12 students, sessional content access hits peaked in July.

Figure 479: Access hits for sessional content by year level by month for 2016-2017 financial year

Figure 480 displays the number of access hits to sessional content by year level in the 2017-2018 financial year. The number of access hits peaked for year levels 7, 8, and 9 in May, whilst years 10, 11 and 12 peaked in August.

Figure 480: Access hits for sessional content by year level by month for 2017-2018 financial year

Figure 481 presents the number of access hits to resources by year level per financial year. In the 2014-2015 financial year, year levels 7, 8, and 9 had low levels of access hits to their resources. Year levels 10 and 11 had the highest number of access hits for their resources in the 2016-2017 financial

year. Year 12 students had the highest number of access hits to their resources in the 2015-2016 financial year with 1540 hits.

Figure 481: Access hits for resources by year level per financial year
Note. Data for the 2014-2015 financial year was only inclusive from October 2014 – June 2015, as data collection commenced in October 2014

Table 200 displays the number of access hits to content per session by year level and financial year. In general, for each financial year, the number of access hits decline towards later sessions.

Table 200: Number of access hits for each session by year level per financial year

FY 2014-2015						
Session Number	**Year 7**	**Year 8**	**Year 9**	**Year 10**	**Year 11**	**Year 12**
Session 1	18	15	9	6	128	608
Session 2	7	7	8	9	449	409
Session 3	12	28	11	12	331	348
Session 4	12	15	14	7	292	273
Session 5	12	12	18	10	236	259
FY 2015-2016						
Session Number	**Year 7**	**Year 8**	**Year 9**	**Year 10**	**Year 11**	**Year 12**
Session 1	410	238	294	479	527	631
Session 2	141	93	173	402	288	352
Session 3	110	192	111	295	203	239
Session 4	70	91	88	240	177	193
Session 5	70	87	71	145	112	172

FY 2016-2017						
Session Number	**Year 7**	**Year 8**	**Year 9**	**Year 10**	**Year 11**	**Year 12**
Session 1	326	279	368	431	471	191
Session 2	192	169	204	424	383	151
Session 3	170	226	147	292	242	102
Session 4	156	160	97	203	238	77
Session 5	78	123	64	135	145	73
FY 2017-2018						
Session Number	**Year 7**	**Year 8**	**Year 9**	**Year 10**	**Year 11**	**Year 12**
Session 1	283	251	322	214	408	247
Session 2	160	136	185	180	181	118
Session 3	131	130	139	178	127	98
Session 4	83	100	90	94	176	72
Session 5	52	104	89	88	108	80

Note. Data for the 2014-2015 financial year was only inclusive from October 2014 – June 2015, as data collection commenced in October 2014

6.22.2. SUMMARY

Overall, access to the AOD program has fluctuated since it became available to schools in October 2014. The program had the highest number of access hits in the 2015-2016 financial year, peaking in October. In earlier financial years after the program was first introduced, the peak months of access were October and November. However, in the past two financial years this peak has shifted towards August. This shift may have occurred due to changes in school curriculum or changes in how the program was promoted to schools. Data also suggests a decline in access hits towards the later sessions of the program. This pattern may be due to several factors including time restraints as the year becomes busier in later terms. Evaluating the AOD program in terms of access hits alone may underestimate its usage as schools may choose to download or print out program content and resources. Another limitation is that there is no method to determine how long the user accessed the site for during a visit. Further information is required to assess the level of engagement Queensland schools have with the program, and its impact on students' attitudes and behavioural changes regarding alcohol and drugs.

6.23. AWARENESS AND EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS

6.23.1. THE WHAT'S YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ALCOHOL? CAMPAIGN

The 'What's your relationship with alcohol?' campaign aimed to drive awareness and get Queenslanders to stop and think about their drinking habits and alcohol consumption. In a joint campaign between Queensland Health and The Department of the Premier and Cabinet, the campaign targeted three Queensland audiences based on their risky alcohol consumption and their contemplation (positive or negative association to change) profile.

6.23.1.1. TARGET AUDIENCE

Queensland drinkers were segmented based on their risky alcohol consumption behaviour profile. In terms of behaviour change, the segments most open to change and the high risk segment were identified as the priority for messaging: Segment 5: people 18-24; Segments 4 & 6: males 25+; Segment 2: females 25-44

6.23.1.2. THE CAMPAIGN

The 2016/17 What's your relationship with alcohol? campaign was executed from October 2016 – June 2017. The campaign was run in a variety of settings, including: TV, Outdoor, Digital display, Facebook, Twitter, InMobi, Facebook, Snapchat, YouTube, and Spotify See Table 201.

Table 201: Campaign delivery modes and amounts

Mode	Amount	Targeting information
TV	2,545 TARPS at 1+ reach at 71%	Key programming included: I'm A Celebrity Get Me Out of Here, 60 Minutes, The Voice, X-Factor, Seven News, Australian Test Cricket.
Outdoor	38 large format digital billboards 400 city light panels 480 street posters 840 taxi backs 1,600 convenience ads 3 QMS Mobile Media smart cars at 'Falls' music festival 3 QMS Mobile Media Vespa's at 'Laneway' music festival	throughout Brisbane and the Gold Coast's major nightlight precincts
SEM	107,157 impressions delivered 8,709 clicks at a click through rate of 8.12% & a cost per click of $1.12	654 PDF downloads 2,685 survey completions
Facebook	16,741,310 impressions delivered 280,161 clicks at a click through rate of 1.33%	3,444,687 video views 2,685 PDF downloads 21,475 survey completions
Twitter	3,582,064 impressions delivered 10131 clicks at a click through rate of 0.27%	
Digital display	9,688,636 impressions delivered 61,637 clicks at a cost per click of $0.65	
YouTube	4,678,916 impressions delivered 1,428,675 video views at a cost per view of $0.09	
InMobi	2,590,812 impressions delivered 8,033 clicks at a cost per click of $2.80	
Spotify	1,545,396 impressions delivered 2,721 clicks at a cost per click of $13.78	
Snapchat	5,724,702 impressions delivered 41,872 views at a cost per view of $0.90	

6.23.1.3. KEY MESSAGES

The program developers reported that "Formative research showed that young males are unlikely to respond to communication activity specifically targeting drinking and anti-social behaviour." They also further claim that "The research also shows that it is not only young males engaging in violence and anti-social behaviour linked to binge drinking. Therefore, the messaging needed to draw from the position of broad alcohol harm reduction that resonated with a range of audiences, including young

males, to promote moderate drinking and address alcohol consumption at a cultural and societal level".

The key messages sent by the 'What is your relationship with alcohol?' campaign were:

- Most people enjoy drinking – but what is a 'safe' level of alcohol consumption?
- There are tools to help you assess your alcohol consumption
- Alcohol can impact your wellbeing over the short and long term
- There are many ways to reduce your alcohol consumption
- There is professional help available

6.23.1.4. OBJECTIVES

The What's your relationship with alcohol? Campaign focussed on getting all Queenslanders to consider their relationship with alcohol and how it could affect themselves and those around them. The objectives of the campaign activity were to:

- Make Queenslanders stop and think about their relationship with alcohol
- Show Queenslanders the different types of 'drinkers' there are
- Educate Queenslanders about the effects of alcohol consumption
- Drive Queenslanders to support services and information (visit the website and take the 'My drinking choices')
- Starting to reduce risky alcohol consumption

Key outputs included:

- 484,538 total sessions during campaign period.
- 70,917 quiz completions
- Majority of visitors were male, living in Brisbane.

6.23.1.5. EVALUATION

The Department of Health commissioned Kantar Public to conduct an evaluation of the intervention (73). A brief summary of the methods (see Table 202) and findings are reported below.

Table 202: Research Methods Summary from Evaluation Report

Methods	
Who Did We Interview?	Queenslanders who have consumed alcohol in the past 12 months
When Did We Interview?	W1 - 2016: 6th – 12th May W2 - 2017: 8th – 17th February W3 - 2017: 3rd – 19th July
How Many Did We Interview?	W1 - 2016: N=808 / LOI=18 mins / IR=79% W2 - 2017: N=800 / LOI=15 mins / IR=81% W3 - 2017: N=800 / LOI=14 mins / IR=79%
Target Market	Quotas were applied by gender, age and location to ensure a minimum number of interviews were achieved across age (16 – 95 years) and regions (SEQ/ROQ)
Margin of error	+3.46%.
Weighting	Data were post-weighted to the ABS Census to reflect region, age and gender

6.23.1.5.1. SAMPLE

The market research company Kantar Public reported "I have had a response from our panel partner, and they indicate in the region of 15,000 invites would have been sent to panellists to achieve the n=800 complete interviews. This equates to a response rate of approximately 5%. They are unable to provide any further information." A 5% response rate is deeply unreliable; and baselines for most surveys to get past any sort of peer review is 30-50%, depending on the sample. But far more concerning is that this is only 5% of a pre-selected group of people that fill in surveys online for money.

6.23.1.5.2. FINDINGS

In the report, the authors highlighted a number of findings in their summary:

- Two in three (66%) Queensland drinkers spontaneously recalled seeing or hearing about government campaigns related to alcohol, with the majority doing so via TV or news outlets.
- 41% considered that the campaign made them think about their relationship with alcohol
- The campaign showed Queenslanders 10 different types of 'drinkers' in creative executions relevant to target segments.
- 15% advised focusing on the message "how alcohol impacts your life"
- 30% considered the impact of their alcohol consumption on those around them
- Over 483,135 website sessions during campaign
- Over 70,900 quizzes were completed on http://mydrinkingchoices.qld.gov.au/
- 43% stated they had considered the amount of their alcohol consumption

- 21% reported reducing their alcohol consumption

However, some additional relevant findings from within the report that were not highlighted, but warrant consideration include:

- Significantly more people reported that they intended to get drunk on a weekly and a fortnightly basis than prior to the intervention (primarily from the male heavy drinkers);
- Significantly more drinkers now reported that they don't really think about the amount they drink than before the intervention;
- There was a significant increase in the number of people, especially young men, who felt that they were anti-social if they didn't go out for drinks with work colleagues;
- Less people are aware of the 'drinking causes violence' message;
- Fewer people are aware of the 'drink driving' message;
- There were large increases in 25+ males who drank more than they intended to, and;
- The number of 25+ males reporting "Experienced reduced performance at work or sport because of the amount you have been drinking" doubled.

6.23.1.5.3. RELEVANT QUANTEM INFORMATION

During the course of the TAFV evaluation, the only relevant data collected that was related to assessing the impact of the 'What's your relationship with alcohol?' Campaign was the BAC levels of people interviewed in patron field interviews. As previously reported in the Results section, there were no significant changes over the study period of BAC levels in any of the relevant nightlife districts. This evidence runs counter to the evaluation data supplied by the Kantar.

6.23.1.5.4. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

The program put in place reached a substantial number of people, and the evaluation report suggests that it may have had some impact, although the findings also suggest that the most problematic drinkers in the survey actually did worse over the evaluation period. Further, the QUANTEM data showed no observable changes in the key population which was meant to be the target of the intervention; young males aged 18 – 40 who experience disproportionate harm from alcohol.

Awareness campaigns such as 'What's your relationship with alcohol?' have generally been found ineffective when subject to rigorous peer-reviewed studies. This is especially the case with soft-targeted campaign, especially anything that focusses on 'Responsible Drinking' (13, 74). Indeed, there is a body of research which has demonstrated that responsible drinking messages are interpreted

as being supportive of drinking, and that an ill-defined message about 'responsible' suggests to most people that they can continue their current behaviours. However, and even more concerning, one recent well-designed experimental study found:

"Poster materials promoting responsible drinking were associated with increased consumption amongst undergraduate students, suggesting that poster campaigns to reduce alcohol harms may be having the opposite effect to that intended." (75).

Based on these findings, it is unsurprising that there has been little or no change in harm associated with drinking in Queensland, especially in the most problematic drinking groups.

The discrepancy between results reported in the summary, the overall report, and the drinking patterns of people is likely due to the sample methods employed by the evaluators, which have previously used online 'panel' surveys of people who get paid to fill in online surveys, which may lean strongly towards getting compliant non-problematic drinkers. While such surveys can be useful in determining some societal trends, alcohol and drug consumption is notoriously difficult to survey, and almost always massively under-represent the most difficult populations. While population weighting techniques can address some of this issue, it is impossible to weight if there is no data on which to draw. Given the funding under the TAFV legislation, the survey should have reported on the proportion of people who attended SNPs in the past month, and those who had experienced aggression.

6.23.1.6. SUMMARY

The campaign was performed was successful in terms of its reach to the general population. However, as with previous campaigns, it appears that stated intentions of the population do not translate into identifiable objective trends. Further, it is clear that the campaign evaluation identified significantly worsening trends in the most problem drinkers, which is in line with the previous peer-reviewed evidence which shows that 'responsible drinking' campaigns, so strongly advocated for by the alcohol industry (76, 77), can actually validate bad drinking practices (78), are used to promote the product by industry (77), and worsen the drinking practices of young people (75).

As raised earlier, there are also very substantial issues regarding the logic behind the program and the evaluation that was conducted. A sample of 5% of a paid online panel is not adequate for measuring population trends. This equates to a tiny sample of a very specific sub-sample of the population.

This matter is more concerning when considering that the 'formative research' on which the campaign was built came from a similar sample, achieving only a 16% response rate from an online panel

sample, which is similarly unlikely to reflect the nature of the key sample for the TAFV legislation. The 'research' also failed to do any systematic literature review.

This information strongly suggests the need for a paid, independent, external steering committee to assess all tenders by the Department of Health and the commissioning of any evaluations or 'formative research'. All reports should be open for public comment online to ensure accountability.

6.23.2. DANNY GREEN'S STOP THE COWARD'S PUNCH CAMPAIGN

The TAFV also supplied funding for Danny Green's Stop the Coward's Punch Campaign (CPC). Advertisements branded with the QG logo appeared on taxi backs and on digital panels from 11 January 2016 for a period of two weeks. Thirty seven panels were placed in 26 shopping plazas, a panel was also placed in each of 26 sporting clubs and 29 venues also hosted panels as well. Data were not available for the amount of television or other coverage, nor was any evaluation conducted.

6.23.2.1. RELEVANT QUANTEM INFORMATION

During the course of the TAFV evaluation, relevant data collected included police-recorded assaults, and patron interviewee recollection of anti-violence campaigns.

There was no observable decline in assaults for the 6 months following the CPC in Jan 2016, either statewide, or in most jurisdictions. This is in line with a large body of evidence from the World Health Organisation (79) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (80) which shows that simple awareness campaigns do not have evidence supporting their inclusion in the recommended strategies for reducing youth violence. Further, the very brief duration of the intervention is also unlikely to ensure message saturation, and means that the main element of the campaign to be recalled will be the brand.

6.23.2.2. SUMMARY

The available data does not suggest that there was any substantive impact of the CPC, with low recognition amongst nightlife patrons and on demonstrable reductions in assaults. However, the current design was developed after the campaign was run and did not include specific pre and post surveys on the matter, so conclusions are tentative. However, given that the key evidence-based strategies developed by bodies such as the WHO and CDC do not include such awareness/education campaigns, it is likely that more effective measures can be found in expert review publications (79, 80).

6.24. DRUG AND ALCOHOL ASSESSMENT REFERRAL (DAAR)

In December 2014 the Bail Act was amended, allowing police as well as courts to impose DAAR as a condition of an offender's release on bail (11AB Condition of the Qld Bail Act). In March 2016, the Bail Act was again amended, removing the ability of police to make such referrals. Since this time, DAAR has been a court-initiated referral. Considering these amendments and the time of the policy changes under examination, QPS did not provide DAAR data for this report.

Courts data were examined for finalised cases that included: offence(s) occurring on a high-alcohol day (Saturday or Sunday); in an SNP suburb (not necessarily within SNP boundary); resulting in a guilty outcome (i.e. not resulting in dismissal, withdrawal, transfer to other court, or 'noble prosequi' outcome). There were 172 cases finalised in Queensland courts between January 2009 and September 2018 that received a court-initiated DAAR referral. Of these referrals, 11 were for cases that included at least one charge of assault (including serious assault). Referrals by the courts were predominantly made for drug-related offences. Due to the low numbers of court-initiated DAAR referral over time for assaults in SNPs during high-alcohol days, it was not possible to examine trends in referrals.

6.25. ECONOMIC EVALUATION

6.25.1. SCOPE AND METHOD

The economic evaluation is designed to estimate costs and benefits of the policy intervention in Queensland in the short- and middle-term. The financial, economic and social impacts associated with the policy were examined by using a pre- and post-intervention analysis to identify the costs and benefits.

The potential benefits include reductions in violence and injuries, savings in health care costs, income gained by non-alcohol businesses, and benefits to government costs from reduced late-night policing. It should be recognised that a reduction in drinking, particularly for night-time heavy drinkers, will also result in gains in overall health status, reducing costs for health care and of lost productivity in the longer term, but these are not included in this analysis. The potential costs of the policy intervention include the loss/change in revenue of affected late night licensed premises, the loss/change in sales for alcohol producers and wholesalers, the costs to industry and government of implementing and policing the restriction, and the loss/change of local government revenue. The estimated costs and benefits of the intervention over 2016 and 2017/2018 will be computed to reflect 2018 dollars using the current 2% inflation rate (52).

The approach for conducting the cost-benefit analysis is summarised as below:

1) Identify all impacts of the policy for each stakeholder
2) Quantify the impacts of the policy on stakeholders
3) Value the aggregate effects of the policy intervention
4) Assess the cost and benefits of the policy to society

Table 203 outlines the potential costs and benefits associated with implementation of the TAFV policy.

Table 203: Potential costs and benefits associated with implementation of the TAFV policy

Benefits/costs	Key stakeholders	Description
Costs	Government	Implementation costs to Queensland government
	Industry	The costs to alcohol industry and licenced premises ▪ reduction in alcohol wholesales and production. ▪ net costs of implementing the policy for licenced venues ▪ any negative financial or economic impact of the policy on business performance of the licensed venues.
Benefits	Government	The benefit to government services resulting from: ▪ reductions in alcohol related crime (specifically assaults) and the related avoidable costs to the criminal justice system and police services. ▪ reduction in alcohol related injuries and acute alcohol intoxication, and the related avoidable costs to the health services system.
	Industry	Benefits to non-alcohol industries and local non-alcohol business: ▪ increased sales or production of non-alcohol goods and services. ▪ any positive financial or economic impact of the policy on business performance of non-alcohol business.
	Community	The benefits to the community: ▪ benefits of avoiding alcohol-related assaults. ▪ benefits of avoiding alcohol-related injuries. ▪ benefits of avoiding alcohol-related traffic crashes. ▪ benefits of any improved perception of safety and neighbourhood amenity ▪ benefits of improved health and lifestyle of heavy drinkers in the long-term

Both net present value (NPV) and benefit-cost ratio (BCR) will be used to measure the economic impacts of the policy in Queensland. The net present value indicates the difference between the present value of total future benefits and present value of current and future total costs of the policy.

$$NPV = PV \ (Benefits) - \ PV \ (costs)$$

The benefit-cost ratio is computed by dividing the PV of benefits by the PV of costs.

$$BCR = \frac{PV \ (Benefits)}{PV \ (costs)}$$

DATA SOURCES, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The data for the benefits evaluation were primarily obtained from previous results sections of this report (e.g., assaults, hospital admissions, ED injury presentations). Costs data were provided by the Queensland government, response agencies and industry. The description, sources and limitations of the indicators/drivers of cost and benefit analysis are summarised in the Table 204.

Table 204: Description, sources, and limitations of the indicators/drivers of costs and benefits analysis

Cost and benefit items	Description	Data sources and limitations
Implementation costs to QLD government	Any financial costs to government entities of implementing the policy intervention, including delivering the interventions/policies, compliance, enforcement and other safety initiatives.	-Cost data were provided by the QLD government. -The cost data covers a broad range of cost items related to the operation and implementation of Tackle Alcohol Fuelled-Violence (TAFV) Legislation during 2016 and 2018.
Implementation costs to licensed premises	Any additional financial costs incurred to licensed premises or their employees to ensure they are compliant with the introduction of the policy intervention. - Additional costs for ID scanners Applications for extended trading permits	-ID scanner data were provided by the product and services suppliers. -Cost information for applications for extended trading permits among licensed premises were not collected. These costs are likely to be relatively low.
Impact of intervention on the business revenue, employment and number of licensed premises	Negative financial or economic impact on the licensed venues. - Loss or changes in business turnover, - Changes in security services and employment - Staff training costs	-A business performance survey on all QLD on-license premises in both SNPs and non-SNPs was conducted between 8th August 2018 and 30th September 2018. -Due to the very low response rate (3%) and unrepresentativeness of the sample, the data on the impact on the business performance of licenced venues were excluded in the cost-benefit analysis.
Impact on the alcohol producers and wholesalers	Loss or Changes in sales or sale values of alcohol in QLD	Due to the low quality of data collected, sales and related data were excluded in the CBA analysis, although the data suggested substantial increases in sales.
Loss or changes in live music and	Revenue by time for local taxi services, fast foods chains and live music industries.	-Results of APRA chapter show there was no significant impact on live music performances or gigs in Fortitude Valley in 2016-18.

Cost and benefit items	Description	Data sources and limitations
other entertainments		-Data of other entertainment activities were not available.
Benefits from reduced assaults and related costs in Criminal Justice system	Significant changes in various indicators after the intervention. - Costs avoided resulting from any significant decrease in alcohol-related assaults in the intervention areas. Reduced costs in Criminal Justice system include value of changes to police judicial support and investigation activities (i.e., court, prison and correction services)	-Monthly assault data between January 2009 and June 2018 were collected from QLD Police. -Data from Criminal Courts, Australia, 2016-17 were used to calculate percentage of assaults incidents in QLD which were found guilty and percentage of the total cases reported to lower courts and higher courts in order to calculate the benefits from reduced assaults and related costs in Criminal Justice system.
Benefits from reduced injuries and related costs in health system	Reduced costs in the health system include the values of any significant decrease in ambulance callouts, ED visits, hospitalisations, support services and insurance.	-Monthly data of hospital admissions, emergency department, and ambulance call-outs were collected. -Support services and insurance data are not available and excluded in the analysis.
Benefits from reduced traffic accidents/crashes	Costs avoided resulting from any significant decrease in alcohol-related traffic accidents QLD.	Annual traffic crashes data were collected from the Department of Transport and Main Roads
Benefits of improved safety and neighbourhood amenity	Benefits of any improvement in the perception of safety in the intervention areas and value of any improvement of neighbourhood amenity.	Due to data availability, we will not be able to quantify this in the analysis.
Benefits of improved health and lifestyle of heavy drinkers	Health and related gains in the long term if the restrictions reduce drinking below risky levels	We will not be able to quantify this in the analysis because the values of prevented chronic diseases, mental problems or improved quality of life of affected night-time drinkers cannot be quantified in the short-term.
Opportunity costs and benefits on consumer and community	The opportunity cost to consumers of having restrictions on alcohol related spending and being able to enter and re-enter the liquor venues late at night. The benefits/opportunity costs to non-alcohol industries and local non-alcohol business are likely to be equal to the changes in revenue of pubs, clubs, restaurants and other premises in	The policy may cause a reduction in alcohol-related business, but there will be benefits to businesses if restrictions lead to a more pleasant environment and people previously deterred by others' drinking come out more. Given that these expenditure switchers are reducing alcohol consumption willingly on the basis of improved information, it may be inferred that individuals who switch expenditure are not losing any consumer surplus.

Cost and benefit items	Description	Data sources and limitations
	the affected area and surrounding area, since expenditure switchers will spend their disposable income on non-alcohol goods and services.	

6.25.3. OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION COSTS TO THE GOVERNMENT RELATED TO TAFV POLICY

The overall cost or funding approved by the Queensland Government since 2015-16 to implement the TAFV policy are summarised in Table 205 as below.

Table 205: Funding approved since 2015-16 to implement the TAFV Legislation

Year	Total allocation	Department	Allocation specifics	Activity
2015-16	$23.9M	Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services (*as it was then*)	$10.8M over three years	Expand the number of rest and recovery services in entertainment precincts to reduce alcohol related violence and create safer entertainment precincts by providing early intervention support to ensure people affected by excessive alcohol consumption receive necessary assistance and are not exposed to risk or harm as a result of their condition. Included: • Support services for fifteen precincts across Queensland • Includes mobile patrols along with rest and recovery hubs.
		Justice and Attorney-General	$9.6M over three years	A range of compliance related initiatives. for the Office of Liquor and Gaming ($6.855M) to provide additional compliance activity including: • 9 liquor compliance officers • 3 specialist investigators • 1 legal officer • Mystery shopper program. In addition, funding was provided to Queensland Corrective Services ($2.73M) for the supervision of community service orders.

Year	Total allocation	Department	Allocation specifics	Activity
		Queensland Health	$3M over two years internally reallocated	Education and awareness campaign targeting the community, particularly young people, about safe drinking practices and the dangers of binge drinking and excessive alcohol consumption.
		Premier and Cabinet	$0.465M over three years	Contribution to the Queensland Health education campaign.
	$20M** (part only of this funding)	Queensland Police Service	$20M over five years for police overtime and travel to target specific types of crime, crime hotspots, and issues such as organised crime, alcohol-fuelled violence and/or ice	This funding was not exclusively for alcohol-fuelled violence, but was to be allocated across the state using the QPS Place and Case Management Strategy and based on risk of harm and demand for police services. Locations in which the additional funding would be utilised are not identified, but were to include drink safe precincts.
2016-17	$0.67M	Premier and Cabinet	$0.67M	Funding to commission an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the Policy and its impact on the community.

Overall total of specific funding allocated by the Queensland Government to implement the Tackling Alcohol Fuelled Violence policy since 2015-16 is approximately $24.6M. A further $20M was allocated in 2015-16 for police overtime and travel, including for (but not limited to) targeting alcohol-fuelled violence. These costs include some continuing programs and a range of costs that fall outside the scope of our evaluation.

6.25.4. COST OF IMPLEMENTING TRADING HOURS RESTRICTION AND ID SCANNER TO THE GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

The above section covers all costs to government. However, there were only two key measures put in place that have been tested and found to have benefit within the TAFV legislation: trading hours restrictions and the implementation of ID scanners. While it would be ideal to further breakdown the analyses to measure the benefit and costs of each of these elements separately, there was often a combined effect observed, which means the design can't separate the two interventions for the purpose of the economic evaluation. For the cost benefit we focus on costs related to the two key active ingredients of the intervention; trading hours restrictions and the implementation of the ID scanners.

As has been documented elsewhere in this evaluation report, the majority of activity funded under the TAFV legislation and described above was an extension of normal operational activities, rather than the true cost of implementing the new major ingredients. Further, most of the elements described above that were budget line items for the TAFV legislation have been demonstrated in this evaluation to have negligible or no impact. Therefore, we report costs, benefits and then the economic evaluation of the key ingredients of the TAFV legislation.

Based on the above, in the calculations, we have excluded some cost estimates (e.g. for policing, communities, disability services and public education) which were not related to the implementation of the key ingredients (see Table 206).

In 2016-17, OLGR received $2.085M for 9 inspectors, 3 investigators, 1 legal officer and associated costs such as penalty allowances. In 2017-18, OLGR received $2.13M for these same items with the exception of legal officer funding, which was discontinued. While it is possible that these officers did some work related to the implementation of the key measures, it is impossible to know the exact amount. Of the positions and tasks identified, the compliance officers and legal officer are likely to have spent a portion of their work on tasks associated with the new legislation. In an attempt to acknowledge the proportional nature of the cost, we have conservatively estimated 50% of the additional funding went to efforts associated with the implementation of the legislation.

While the TAFV legislation discussed funding for police to respond to alcohol-related violence, the majority of the tasks outlined do not relate to the implementation or upkeep of restricted trading hours and ID scanners. Indeed, both measures are likely to have reduced overall police time spent on alcohol-related violence; though it would not be likely to be significant at this stage. Police tasking data shows no increase in policing resources since the key implementation date of 1 July 2016. On the basis of this, policing costs will not be included in the calculations.

The estimated implementation costs to the government on the key ingredients were $2.3 and $2.8 million in 2016-17 and 2017-18 respectively, including costs for regulation, compliance and enforcement and subsidy of ID scanners to the licensed premises (computed as 2018 value). The cost of evaluation is excluded as it not implementation cost of the policy. The implementation cost to the alcohol industry was the costs of ID scanners during 2016 and 2018 including extra costs of buying and renting machines and service fee after receiving subsidy from the OLGR (totalling 2.5 million). It is worth noting that the enforcement and implementation costs included here are likely overstated – these funds presumably covered significantly more work than the direct implementation of the policies. However, we have included them as they are the only estimates available.

Table 206: Summary of implementation cost to the government and industry in Queensland

Cost items	Description	2016-17 ($000)	2017-18 ($000)
Implementation cost to the Government			
Regulation, compliance and enforcement costs	A range of compliance related initiatives for the Office of Liquor and Gaming to provide additional compliance activity including: ▪ 9 liquor compliance officers ▪ 3 investigators, ▪ 1 legal officer ▪ other associated costs, such as penalty allowances	-2,123	-2,130
Subsidy of ID scanner paid to license venues from OLGR	Total $0.8 million one off payments made to licensees to assist them with the introduction of ID scanning, representing 202 payments of $4,000 each.	-135	-676
Implementation cost to the industry			
ID scanners		-1,690	-1,657
License premises received subsidy of ID scanners		135	-676
Total costs to government and the industry		-3,813	-3,787

Note: the values were presented in 2018 dollars

6.25.5. IMPACT ON LICENSED PREMISES AND LIVE MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT

A business performance survey on all Queensland on-license premises in both SNPs and non-SNPs was conducted between 8th August 2018 and 30th September 2018. The survey invitation was sent by the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) to 1985 on-premise licence venue managers or owners and only 61 of them provided valid answers, a response rate of 3%. Due to the very low response rate and unrepresentativeness of the sample, the data on the impact on the business performance of licenced venues were excluded in the cost-benefit analysis. However, based on the results of the liquor licensing data, the precinct surveys, and the pedestrian counts presented earlier in the report, the impacts on industry appear relatively limited. Brief results of the survey are presented in Appendix 15.

A very broad range of the objective indicators available suggest that there has been virtually no impact on business, and many indicators have increased. More people are travelling to and from Fortitude Valley during weekend nights; the amount of foot traffic in Fortitude Valley and Cairns is stable; tourism is increasing across the state, and alcohol sales appear to have increased. The number of liquor licenses have increased, as have the number of new licenses granted. The results of analysing data from the Australasian Performing Right Association (Live Music Chapter) show that

there was no significant influence on the number of live music performance in Queensland since the measures were introduced. Thus, the impact of the policy on live music entertainment was considered as none in the cost-benefit analysis.

6.25.6. IMPACT OF THE POLICY ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND HEALTH SYSTEMS AND TRAFFIC CRASHES

We used before and after intervention data (police-recorded assault cases, hospital admissions, ambulance call-out data, ED presentations and traffic crashes) to estimate how the introduction of the policy affected alcohol-related problems. Please see more detailed ARIMA analyses in previous results sections. The trend of population growth was controlled in the estimation.

The estimated significant changes in criminal justice and health system and traffic crashes during 2016-18 are presented in Table 207. The results show that there were significant decreases in serious assaults during Friday and Saturday 3am-6am, in ocular floor fracture hospital admissions, in ambulance call-outs in high alcohol hours, in injury- and poisoning-related ED presentations during Friday and Saturday 12am-2:59am, and in traffic crashes in high alcohol hours between 2014-16 and 2016-18. In contrast, a significant increase was found in serious assaults during Friday and Saturday 8pm-midnight.

Table 207: Estimated significant changes in criminal justice and health system and traffic crashes

Estimated items	Date description	Significant change	Estimated impact (number of incidents) compared to 2014-16	
			2016-17	2017-18
Serious assaults	Rate of serious assault per 100,000 population during Friday and Saturday 3am-6am	Decrease	-44	-82
	Rate of serious assault per 100,000 population during Friday and Saturday 8pm-midnight	Increase	63	115
Hospital admissions	Rate of alcohol intoxication hospital admissions per 10,000 population	Decrease	-565	-2,013
	Rate of ocular floor fracture hospital admissions per 10,000 population	Decrease	-2	-56
Ambulance call-outs	Number of alcohol-related call-outs in high alcohol hours (Friday and Saturday 8pm - 6pm)	Decrease	-208	-287
ED presentations	Number of injury and poisoning-related ED presentations during Friday and Saturday 12am-2:59am	Decrease	8	-129
Traffic crashes	Number of traffic crashes in high alcohol hours (Friday and Saturday 8pm - 6pm)	Decrease	-4	-58

These significant changes were included in the following costs and benefits estimation (see Table 208). Mean costs per incident among different indicators/outcomes were calculated based on a number of government reports (please see the detailed calculation method of cost per incident in Appendix 15). In summary, there was $15.9 million cost avoided (benefit) to the criminal justice and health system in Queensland during July 2016 and June 2018 as the result of reductions in serious assaults, hospitalisations, ED presentations and traffic crashes.

Table 208: Summary of benefits to the criminal justice and health system in Queensland

Benefit/cost items	Mean cost per incident ($)		2016-17 ($000)	2017-18 ($000)
	2016-17	2017-18	2016-17	2017-18
Significant reduction in rate of serious assault per month during Friday and Saturday 3am-6am,	5,229	5,339	230	438
Significant increase in rate of serious assault per month during Friday and Saturday 8pm-midnight	5,229	5,339	-329	-614
Significant reduction in rate of alcohol intoxication hospital admissions	5,301	5,483	2,995	11,039
Significant reduction in rate of ocular floor fracture hospital admissions	7,115	7,361	14	412
Significant reduction in number of alcohol-related ambulance call-outs in high alcohol hours (Friday and Saturday 8pm - 6pm)	676	690	141	198
Significant reduction in number of injury and poisoning-related ED presentations during Friday and Saturday 12am-2:59am	1,051	1,073	-8	138
Significant reduction in number of traffic crashes in high alcohol hours (Friday and Saturday 8pm - 6pm)	20,802	21,218	84	1,255
Total benefits			3,127	12,866

Note. The values were presented in 2018 dollars

6.25.7. IMPACT OF THE POLICY ON CONSUMER AND OTHER NON-ALCOHOL INDUSTRIES

The benefits to non-alcohol industries and local non-alcohol business are likely to be equal to the changes of revenue of pubs, clubs, restaurants and other premises in Queensland, since expenditure switchers will spend their disposable income on non-alcohol goods and services. Given that these expenditure switchers are reducing alcohol consumption willingly on the basis of improved information, it may be inferred that individuals who switch expenditure are not losing any consumer surplus.

6.25.8.   SUMMARY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS RESULTS

The cost-benefit analysis is an effective mean to measure whether a policy or program delivers a net benefit to the community. The total average costs, benefits, net present value of the policy and benefit-cost ratio of the key ingredients of policy intervention were summarised in Table 209.

Table 209: Benefit, cost, NPV and BCR of the policy analysis of the policy in Queensland in 2016-18

Cost/benefit indicator	2016-17	2017-18	Total (2016-18)
PV costs ($'000)	-3,183	-3,783	-6,970
PV benefit ($'000)	3,127	12,866	15,993
Total NPV ($'000)	-56	9,079	9,023
Benefit-cost ratio	0.98	3.40	2.30

Note. The results were presented in 2018 dollars

As we indicated above that the compliance and legal officers are likely to have spent a portion of their work on tasks associated with the new legislation. Thus, a sensitivity analysis was presented in Table 210, using the conservative estimate of 50% of the implementation costs.

Table 210: Sensitivity analysis using 50% of implementation cost to the government

Cost/benefit indicator	2016-17	2017-18	Total (2016-18)
PV costs ($'000)	-1,592	-1,894	-3,485
PV benefit ($'000)	3,127	12,866	15,993
Total NPV ($'000)	1,97	10,297	11,517
Benefit-cost ratio	1.96	6.80	4.59

Note. The results were presented in 2018 dollars

The results in cost-benefit analysis of the policy are:

1) There were identifiable costs of $2.5-5.1 million to the government and at least $2.5 million to industry between 2016 and 2018.
2) The key benefits at the state level were $16 million in results of reductions in serious assaults, hospital admissions, ED presentations, ambulance callouts and traffic crashes.
   The net benefit (NPV) that we can identify with the available data was between $9.0 and $11.5 million during 2016 and 2018 with a benefit-cost ratio in a range of 2.30 to 4.59. This suggest that the policy has returned the government in terms of $2.30-$4.59 for every dollar spent.

6.25.9.   LIMITATIONS

There are a number of unavoidable limitations in our cost-benefit analysis, the enforcement and implementation costs covered more work than the implementation of restriction of trading hours and

ID scanners. The police services costs were provided as the whole police services across the Queensland state and the direct costs of police services on the policy implementation and enforcement were not available. Data for education, communication and media costs directly related to the implementation of ID scanner and trading hour restriction were not available.

The documented costs to industry are also likely to be an underestimate. However, despite repeated attempts to document the costs to industry, there was too small a response to be able to make any valid statements from. Key informant data showed that while some business reported increasing their profits, others reported being very substantially affected.

Similarly, there may be potential other benefits that we cannot measure at this point, for example, other changes to policing practices, long-term health benefits from reduction chronic diseases and injuries, and improved quality of life. Furthermore, introduction of ID scanners may lead to more successful prosecutions /quicker and cheaper investigations into crimes in licensed premises and these benefits cannot be measured in our analysis.

6.25.10.   CONCLUSIONS

The results of the cost-benefit analysis suggest that the key ingredients of policy (trading hour restriction and introduction of ID scanner) are cost-effective and they have successfully delivered a net benefit of between $4.0 and $9.9m to the state of Queensland.

7. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF TRENDS

This summary describes the findings of the three major elements of the TAFV legislation, as well as some relevant other factors occurring in Queensland during the evaluation period. The Policy was designed to achieve the following outcomes:

- a safer night-time environment, in particular in entertainment precincts

- cultural change around drinking behaviour, including more responsible drinking practices

- a regulatory framework that appropriately balances the interests of the liquor industry with a reduction in alcohol-fuelled violence.

The below discussion is essentially structured on these three elements, although there is a section discussing legislative timing and context. Following the three key elements, this chapter then discusses the impact of each individual element of the legislation, followed by a conclusion.

7.1. A SAFER NIGHT-TIME ENVIRONMENT

This section synthesises the information from the many data sources reported to describe and understand what impacts have been seen during the evaluation period, how they compare with previous evidence (if any exists). It also discusses potential causal and confounding issues where relevant.

A key motivator and consideration of the TAFV legislation was stopping deaths associated with alcohol related violence in and around safe night precincts. While data are limited because of the considerable time associated with coronial proceedings, the number of alcohol-related deaths identified with assaults has dropped overall, and there have been no cases identified that occurred around licensed venues in a safe night precinct. While this is good news, the findings should considered with some caution.

Overall, the data suggests that there were significant reductions in ambulance attendances statewide, and improvements in safety in some areas, especially in relation to more severe cases such as serious assaults and hospital admissions. This was primarily in the larger population areas of South East Queensland. Statewide, there was a time-specific reduction across the state in the rate of serious assaults during 3am-6am for each intervention point, but there were small increases earlier in the night.

The most pronounced effect seen was in Fortitude Valley, which accounts for a large proportion of the population and harm statewide. The substantial reduction in serious assaults in Fortitude Valley (the most reliable measure of harm) suggests a positive and ongoing impact from the TAFV legislation,

following the initial teething problems of ETPs and the staged introduction of ID scanners. While ID scanners have only been in place for 12 months at the time of analysis for this report, it appears they have had a moderate impact on some harms, but have also had some unintended consequences on a small number of businesses.

However, aside from the reductions in ambulance callouts, fatalities, some forms of hospital admissions and the shift in assaults to earlier in the night, most of the state saw no substantial overall change in other harm outcomes measured such emergency department attendances. Statewide crash data shows a continuing downward trend overall. Patrons interviewed in the field reported small decreases in harm in Cairns across the study period, but levels of self-reported harm in other sites remained stable and high. There were a very small number of areas which saw some significant increases in harm (for instance, combined assaults increased outside the Rockhampton SNP, but not in the SNP), but ambulance call outs remained stable and the trend commenced prior to the introduction of the TAFV legislation.

Key informants' reports varied hugely, even within specific occupational groups. For instance, while some licensees reported that last drinks measures had been very effective in reducing violence in their venues, other reported no impact. While there were some areas of improvement on which most key informants agreed, such as the general benefit of patron banning and crime-solving attributable to ID scanners, differences were common between geographic areas (such as site-specific issues in cities like Rockhampton) and by the occupational background of the interviewee; in general, police and health personnel reported different views from licensees.

The below sections discuss specific issues which have arisen during the evaluation period, and the relevant literature regarding the potential for further reducing alcohol-related harm in Queensland.

7.1.1. THE SCOPE OF ALCOHOL-RELATED HARM IN QUEENSLAND

Queensland has historically experienced disproportionately high levels of alcohol-related harm (81). The findings of the current study show that Queensland continues to experience some of the highest levels of harm in the country, and that people in nightlife settings continue to be at substantial risk of harm compared to other states.

Patron interviews supported the general finding of a high level of harm – higher than shown from response-agency records. Archival data under-reports alcohol-related harm because many people experiencing violence or harm do not report issues to police, or even attend the emergency department (55, 82, 83). Invariably, a proportion of people will consult with private health providers or never seek

help at all. A different measure of overall harm is to ask patrons in the night-time entertainment districts what levels of injuries and assault they have experienced.

Fifty-five percent of participants in Fortitude Valley (over 40% in Cairns and over 55% in Surfers Paradise) reported being involved in verbal aggression, physical aggression or unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues in the three months prior to interview. Table 211 reports these findings in comparison to prior research using the same methods (2, 16, 84). Much higher proportions of interviewees in Queensland reported experiencing physical aggression in the past three months compared to other cities surveyed in Australia. High rates of unwanted sexual attention were also reported in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise, compared to other Australian cities surveyed.

Table 211: Proportion of interviewees who report being involved in aggression in and surrounding night-time entertainment precincts in the previous three months across sites

Study and site	Physical aggression %	Verbal aggression %	Unwanted sexual attention %	Sexual aggression %
QUANTEM – Fortitude Valley	29	34	35	
QUANTEM – Cairns	26	28	23	
QUANTEM – Surfers Paradise	31	39	37	
QUANTEM – West End	19	25	22	
DASHED – Canberra	17	30	28	
DASHED – Hobart	16	33	26	
POINTED – Geelong	16	14		3
POINTED – Melbourne	8	8		1
POINTED – Perth	9	5		1
POINTED – Sydney	13	11		1
POINTED – Wollongong	7	8		1
DANTE – Geelong	16			
DANTE – Newcastle	15			

In addition to these regularly collected figures, from March 2017, participants who completed the field interview in Fortitude Valley were invited to complete an online follow-up survey. These data have not been recorded previously within Australia to our knowledge. More than one quarter (26.5%; $n = 101$) of participants reported involvement in some form of aggression (i.e., verbal aggression or physical aggression) or experienced unwanted sexual attention in or around licensed venues on the night they were interviewed (see Table 212).

This was especially the case for younger people. Over a third of 18-19 year olds in Fortitude Valley experienced physical violence in the past three months, suggesting that they are much more likely to

experience harm than their older counterparts. Rates were especially high for young women, who bear the brunt of unwanted sexual attention in nightlife settings.

Table 212: Self-reported involvement in aggression past three months by gender – Fortitude Valley

Variable		Aggression type			
		ANY	**Physical**	**Verbal**	**Unwanted Sexual Attention**
		n (%)	*n* (%)	*n* (%)	*n* (%)
Sex					
Male	(*n* = 137)	22 (14.5)	5 (3.3)	13 (8.6)	9 (6.0)
Female	(*n* = 213)	79 (34.5)	17 (7.4)	13 (5.7)	65 (28.4)
Total	(*N* = 381)	101 (26.5)	22 (5.8)	26 (6.8)	74 (19.5)

Note. Gender of unwanted sexual attention missing for 1 case

Another key measure of alcohol-related harm is the experience of injury. The current study found that 11-16% of patrons interviewed in SNPs reported experiencing some form of injury or accident whilst under the influence of alcohol. Previous nightlife studies using the same methods and questions have shown self-reported injury rates between 13% and 18% (2, 16, 19) , suggesting that injury levels are roughly similar to those seen in other states.

Self-reported injury was reduced in Fortitude Valley following the introduction of the TAFV in July 2016, and then levelled out. Injuries reported in other sites fluctuated but remained level overall.

7.1.2. REGIONAL VARIATIONS

Queensland is a geographically and demographically huge state, and the impacts of the legislation appear to have been different in different areas.

Some areas are dealing with what is more traditionally thought of as 'nightlife' issues, such as Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise. Within Fortitude Valley, after the policy introduction there was a significant reduction in the rate of serious assaults in the periods 8pm-midnight and 3am-6am, and for the overall high-alcohol-hours time-frame. There was also a significant decline in common assault and public nuisance (violent) offences during 8pm-midnight and 3am-6am in Fortitude Valley. In Surfers Paradise, there was a significant decline in the number of public nuisance (violent) offences after July 2016. There was also a significant decrease in the rate of serious assault within Toowoomba. In other cities like Cairns, the statistics reflect a combination of factors, such tourism and indigenous issues, as well as more traditional nightlife with local patrons.

Many areas of north Queensland are also still dealing with the impact of declining income from the mining boom, which has particularly affected the main group of patrons of interest (young men).

While Cairns saw no significant changes in assault or emergency department trends, Mackay saw fluctuating trends, with an initial increase in late 2016, but a decrease in 2017 and 2018 following the introduction of all measures.

There was no significant impact of the policy for other SNPs where statistical testing was possible. SNPs such as Ipswich, Airlie Beach, Bundaberg and Broadbeach showed fluctuating, but generally stable trends. Most did not have enough assaults in specific offence categories to conduct statistical testing.

In light of these findings and their variations, expansion of the current measures and the addition of more targeted measures to reduce alcohol-related harm is indicated.

7.1.3. DIFFERENTIAL PROBLEMS AND IMPACTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SNPS

The report has also provided some comparisons between SNP and non-SNP areas. While low numbers often mean that some caution needs to be exercised in these comparisons, a number of relevant trends have appeared. Firstly, areas outside SNPs continue to experience far less harm, suggesting that a policy focus on such precincts should continue. Secondly, the levels of harm arising outside SNPs remained low, and there was no evidence of displacement across the state due to the TAFV legislation. Looking at comparison sites within Queensland (i.e., non-SNP areas), Rockhampton non-SNP areas demonstrated a significant increase in the combined rate of serious assaults, common assault, and public nuisance (violent) offences after the introduction of the policy. However, further analysis showed that this trend commenced in January 2016, before the TAFV legislation came into place. This may indicate a displacement effect from the Rockhampton SNP area; however, there was no corresponding significant decreases in offences in the Rockhampton SNP and other factors such as industry competition and the lingering impact of the decline in the mining boom are also likely to be relevant.

7.1.4. SMALL BARS

The research team have tried to analyse data based on the GPS coordinates that locate the venues and in match with OLGR to determine the impact of small bars in assaults. However, the current data and the nature of the sorts spilling out into the street in high-density entertainment precincts has meant that the work to date is not possible today reliably in the current timeframes and with the current data. The collection of last drinks data by emergency services, as recommended later, would allow for such work to be conducted.

7.1.5. CASINOS

Another major variable to be considered is the role of casinos on both the outcomes of the current trial and the culture of nightlife in Queensland. Previous interventions which have found substantial reductions in violence and other harms have not had 24hr trading casinos within the precincts considered. This evaluation has found that the Treasury Casino and Cairns Casinos (with surrounding blocks) saw over 10% of the assaults recorded during HAH for the entire CBD, this climbed to over 30% in Broadbeach, but was only around 1% for Townsville. This is the case for serious assaults, common assaults and public nuisance (violent) recorded cases.

The data presented within this report documents the substantial number of assaults associated with the Treasury Casino. It is important to also consider the substantial harm that is likely being caused in terms of injury and intoxication. Recent findings in Melbourne which identified Crown Casino as the leading source of alcohol-related admissions to St Vincent's Hospital emergency Department (https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/alcohol-lands-one-in-four-weekend-emergency-patients-in-hospital-with-crown-casino-and-the-mcg-the-leading-danger-spots/news-story/d7233b285f2f615057fe35fef99d89f3). While Queensland doesn't have this level or type of information for either emergency departments or ambulance, it is likely that the casino/s contribute to a substantial amount of those harms given the information from Victoria.

Even without the additional information on alcohol-related harm caused by three of the four casinos, and ignoring the very substantial gambling-related harm, and previous findings that gambling is associated with increased levels of family violence (85), it is clear that the current exclusion of casinos from the liquor sales restrictions undermines the spirit of the legislation, the strength of the message sent by the legislation, and the restriction on the amount of liquor being sold very late at night. Further, the exemption of casinos from mandatory ID scanning laws further undermines the impact of the measures, allowing banned individuals to go to the casino where they can drink 24 hours a day, but not to nightclubs or bars where they are limited to 3am.

7.1.6. SUMMARY

In summary, while there were some positive reductions in alcohol-related harm associated with implementation of the TAFV, it is clear that the modest measures put in place did not have the level of impact seen elsewhere, most probably due to the very high levels of initial and continuing alcohol consumption and related harms -- much higher than those seen in cities such as Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Geelong and Hobart. These findings suggest the need for an increased response level, and policy options for this are outlined in the following sections.

7.2. CULTURAL CHANGE AROUND DRINKING BEHAVIOUR

Potential 'cultural change' was measured in this evaluation through a range of methods, including interviews with people on the street, key informant interviews, and analysis of alcohol sales data. It is important to note that the language of 'culture' is often been used by a range of vested interests to undermine responses that focus on public health and community well-being. In this context, it is far more accurate and measurable to discuss 'culture' in terms of drinking practices and drinking problems (86). The original design also included assessment of the Queensland population health survey, which was to be used to provide information on any population level changes in culture around drinking behaviour. The data for this arm are presented, but due to major methodological limitations, this information is not considered as being reliable or necessarily relevant. Similarly, as outlined in the results section, alcohol sales data from Queensland was found to be deeply methodologically flawed and should be considered an unreliable indicator of alcohol consumption trends.

Queensland historically has high levels of harmful consumption of alcohol, especially in high risk groups. Around 46% of Queenslanders have exceeded single occasion risk guidelines in the past year (87), higher than in NSW and Victoria. Although some regions in Australia have seen declines in alcohol use and increases in abstinence rates (88), this does not appear be the pattern for Queensland according to the Queensland Government Health survey results (89), which show fluctuations between 17% and 18% for abstainers since 2012. While all of the general population surveys have limitations and face substantial challenges in terms of describing local trends, the apparent continued high levels of risky drinking in Queensland indicate further intervention is warranted.

7.2.1. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND INTOXICATION

The main indicator of culture change in this report comes from street-intercept interviews throughout the night. While conducting such interviews in all SNPs was not financially possible, the data can give us some relevant comparisons with other cities around the country. Demographic patterns of interviewees were generally similar to those in Newcastle, Geelong (2), Melbourne, Sydney, Perth and Wollongong (16). The median age of interviewees was 20 (females) to 21 (males) in Surfers Paradise and Fortitude Valley and 24 in Cairns. Generally, around 50% of interviewees were female, although this was lower (45%) in some sites. Again, these distributions are similar to those for patrons interviewed in other cities.

Patron street intercept interviews showed high levels of intoxication across the Queensland sites, reflecting other indicators of harm. Mean BAC levels in Fortitude Valley and Cairns increased until 12 am, declining at 1am, with increases again between 2am and 3am; peaking at 0.080 in Fortitude

Valley, and increasing more steadily at Cairns to a peak of 0.11. Surfers Paradise appears to show a different trend, with higher BAC levels (around 0.1) at the beginning and end of the night, dipping between midnight and 4am, although smaller numbers in this site mean the trends are not as reliable.

As outlined in Table 213, the average BAC levels documented in this study are consistently and substantially higher than those previously reported for other cities such as Melbourne, Sydney, Geelong and Newcastle, despite using almost identical methods (2, 16, 90). This higher level of intoxication suggests that the scope of the problem may be greater than in other jurisdictions and drinking culture may be less amenable to change, requiring more impactful measures than in other sites.

While there was some initial finding of reduced levels of high intoxication in the month following implementation (91), average BAC levels over the course of the evaluation did not show any significant change, although there were substantial fluctuations over time due to seasonal influences.

Table 213: BAC levels across Australian cities

Study and city	Collection period	*n*	Median BAC	BAC Range
QUANTEM – Fortitude Valley	06/2016-06/2018	2359	0.077	(.000-.300)
QUANTEM – Cairns	08/2016-06/2018	964	0.087	(.000-.289)
QUANTEM – Surfers Paradise	09/2018-06/2018	260	0.086	(.000-.290)
QUANTEM – West End [a]	10/2018-06/2018	293	0.065	(.000-.279)
DASHED – Canberra	04/2015-12/2015	876	0.051	(.000-.254)
DASHED – Hobart	04/2015-11/2015	719	0.064	(.000-.299)
POINTED – Geelong	11/2011–06/2012	1235	0.067	(.000-.230)
POINTED – Melbourne	11/2011–06/2012	1890	0.048	(.000-.328)
POINTED – Perth	11/2011–06/2012	1185	0.066	(.000-.290)
POINTED – Sydney	11/2011–06/2012	1683	0.033	(.000-.350)
POINTED – Wollongong	11/2011–06/2012	699	0.066	(.000-.277)

Note. [a] West End in a Non-SNP comparison site.

As noted earlier, these findings align with reliable national comparison studies that show Queensland has a history of high alcohol consumption. Indeed, the National Alcohol Indicators Project (NAIP) (92) reported that estimated per capita consumption in Queensland (10.96L) in 2012/13 was almost 1 litre higher per annum than the national average (9.88L).

7.2.2. PRE-DRINKING BEHAVIOURS

Pre-drinking has been identified as a major contributor to alcohol-related harm internationally since 2009 (93) and in Australia since 2012 (2, 16, 33, 94). Previous studies in other states have documented the increasing prevalence of pre-drinking in night-time precincts, as well as the increasing levels of alcohol consumed in the home before attending night-time precincts. In 2012, the most common reason that people reported for pre-drinking was the price differential between low-cost package outlets and licensed venues (2). In that study, and subsequent studies (16, 94), it was identified that along with an increasing prevalence, culture had now built up around pre-drinking in the home whereby people found it more sociable to do so, as well as mentioning the financial benefit. Most previous research in the area has also identified the challenging nature of pre-drinking and the difficulty in identifying policy or venue/precinct level responses that can effectively reduce its impact (2, 16, 41, 93).

The rate of pre-drinking was relatively consistent across Fortitude Valley, Cairns and Surfers; Paradise (78-88.8%). These rates were higher than those found in previous work in Canberra, Hobart (19) Sydney, or Melbourne (16). Younger participants were more likely to report pre-drinking and males were more likely to report higher alcohol consumption during pre-drinking than females who also engaged in pre-drinking. On the other hand, pre-drinkers in this study reported drinking one more standard drink before attending a licensed venue than those in Hobart and Canberra, but consumed similar amounts to Geelong and Perth for males in the 2012 POINTED study (16). Pre-drinking was associated with heavier alcohol consumption, and in some cases greater involvement in risk-taking behaviour. Participants who completed the follow-up survey indicated that the main motivator for pre-drinking was the cost of drinks in licensed venues.

The raw numbers presented in this report appear similar to those reported in recent studies of Queensland nightlife (33). Despite partially different methods, samples and definitions of pre-drinking (95), Devilly reported that approximately 80% of patrons in Fortitude Valley reported pre-drinking, compared to our finding of 84% for males and 87% for females. Our sample also reported similar levels of pre-drinking (6.5 mean vs 6 median), despite methodological differences in terms of the location and time of night people were recruited. Regardless of the differences in methods, the similarities in the final numbers suggest that around 8 in 10 people attending Fortitude Valley predrink, with an average of between 5 and 6 drinks before going out (95).

The findings of this study highlight the ongoing need for policy and other responses to the issues of pre-drinking. The majority of previous research has found consistent relationship to the price differential between packaged liquor and licensed venues, although further research to demonstrate

this link is warranted. Regardless, policy responses that increase the price of alcohol such as minimum unit price (floor price) or increase taxes have consistently been found to have considerable benefit in terms of reduced alcohol consumption and its related harm. Conversely, when alcohol prices have dropped, increased harm has been documented (96), although we are unaware of studies that have considered this variable in conjunction with other factors such as outlet density. In the context of the evidence presented here, showing increased levels of harm experienced by people who drink before attending licensed venues, a trial of measures which reduce the availability of very cheap alcohol is indicated. In 2012, the DANTE research team recommended "levies on each unit of alcohol sold by packaged liquor outlets to recover costs associated with alcohol [with] that money … allocated for police, hospitals and councils to meet the costs of alcohol-related harm." Since then, a number of research reports have identified reductions in violence and alcohol consumption associated with the introduction of a minimum unit price for alcohol in Canada (97-99). There has also been a substantial body of work from the United Kingdom producing modelling data which suggests a substantial benefit associated with an increased minimum unit price. In the absence of evidence regarding any other interventions, such reforms are indicated as have been implemented in the Northern Territory.

7.2.3. ILLICIT DRUG CONSUMPTION

Illicit drug use is common in the patrons interviewed, with one quarter (25.9%) of people in Fortitude Valley, 35.5% in Surfers Paradise and 33% of people in Cairns who were tested for drug use returning positive swabs. These figures are similar or slightly higher than previous studies in other Australian cities (2, 16), which found an average of 20% of positive swabs. While proportions in surfers Paradise and Cairns appear substantially higher, these findings should be confirmed using other methods to ensure accuracy. Self-reported drug use was mostly stable across the different interview sites during the evaluation period, except for Fortitude Valley, where there was a substantial decline in the first two months which was sustained over time.

The most commonly detected drugs were amphetamines, methamphetamines and cannabis. This trend is important because, as in previous research (16), people who reported using drugs were more likely to report both experiencing more harm (e.g., alcohol-related injury or aggression), and being engaged in anti-social behaviour. Males were also significantly more likely to report the consumption of ecstasy, cocaine and cannabis compared to females. Participants who reported illicit drug use were significantly more likely to report experiencing some form of aggressive or unwanted sexual attention in or around a licensed venue. They were also more likely to report harmful or risky behaviour (i.e. damaging property, being refused entry or service at a venue or being ejected from a venue) compared to participants who had did not report illicit drug use.

7.2.4. SUMMARY

Overall, it appears that there has been little or no change in Queensland's drinking culture due to the implementation of the TAFV legislation. This is consistent with previous research findings regarding the impact of education campaigns and modest restrictions on trading. The trading hours restrictions and mandatory ID scanners implemented had no direct mechanism of influence over attitudes towards drinking and were therefore unlikely to impact on drinking culture in Queensland. Specific awareness measures will be discussed below, however previous evidence has consistently shown the general community attitudes and awareness campaigns have no impact on drinking patterns (14, 100) and are more often likely to serve the interests of those who fund them, especially when they have been supported by the alcohol industry (101, 102).

7.3. BUSINESS

One of the key outcomes identified for the TAFV legislation was "a regulatory framework that appropriately balances the interests of the liquor industry with a reduction in alcohol-fuelled violence". A number of outcome variables were utilised to try to provide an overall picture of the impact on businesses profitability. A range of objective measures and survey instruments were collected to describe the impact on business as well as possible. While objective measures were successfully collected, poor uptake of feedback opportunities by liquor licensees means that some issues may not be described as well as could be. Regardless, the data reported is the most comprehensive set of information collated on the impact on business we are aware of.

7.3.1. FOOT TRAFFIC

Foot traffic data highlighted that the number of people entering Fortitude Valley and Cairns entertainment precincts was stable overall, although there were fluctuations in 12 month cycles, especially related to weather. The method has recently been validated against other counting methods and found reliable for measurement of trends over time (103). The method has been valuable in providing a consistent measurement of people moving through the main thoroughfares in Fortitude Valley and Cairns. These data provide critical information regarding the overall impact of the TAFV legislation on the number of people moving through these entertainment districts. While it does not tell us whether people entered venues or how much they spent, it is an important part of the picture, and demonstrates that the legislation did not impact the number of people moving through Fortitude Valley and Cairns.

7.3.2. ID SCANNER DATA (OLGR AND SCANTEK)

This report has presented data from two sources of ID scanners: OLGR and the private supplier, Scantek©. ID scanners only document the number of people entering a licensed venue, but foot traffic data provides another part of the picture of people movement in, out and around the nightlife precinct. The data presented highlights the value of ID scanner data for the purpose of ongoing study of nightlife trends, as well as more providing nuanced understandings of people traffic flows between venues, including the number of banned people trying to enter venues.

ID scanners in all late-trading venues were only implemented across Queensland in July 2017, although a number of units were operating previously in venues outside SNPs. However, system changes mean that pre-and post intervention comparisons were not able to be conducted. Further, a number of teething problems mean that the first three months of data presented (July to September 2017) should be treated with caution.

The data reported in this evaluation suggests that nightlife attendance trends have been stable since the introduction of mandatory ID scanners. These data align with foot traffic counts and suggests that overall the number of people entering licensed venues and moving through night-time precincts has remained stable overall.

7.3.3. ALCOHOL SALES DATA

Alcohol sales data supplied by the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (OLGR) is received from Queensland liquor licence holders. Data includes sales made to retailers and direct to the public but does not include those made between wholesalers. Substantial gaps in alcohol sales data exist from 2011-2014, so only data for the period 2014-2018 were analysed. There are substantial limitations in these data and any conclusions should be treated with caution.

Overall, from the data that is available, it appears that sales of heavy and mid-strength beer have steadily increased since the 2014/15 financial year. Sales for cask table wine, regular spirits, and pre-mixed spirits have shown a much smaller decrease. While this data covers all sales of alcohol, it suggests that alcohol consumption overall has not been affected by the introduction of the TAFV legislation, although many limitations associated with the data means that these estimates are unreliable.

7.3.4. TRANSPORT

Combined, all transport data shows that the number of people arriving in and leaving from Fortitude Valley from 2014/5 to 2017/18 during high alcohol hours has increased substantially year on year.

While there has been some shift in the mode of transport that people use, mostly to more convenient means, the number of people attending Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise has continued to increase. Importantly, the peak hours for arrivals is between 8pmpm and midnight, which supports the current timing of ID scanning commencing at 10pm and even suggests the potential benefit of earlier scanning commencement.

This report has highlighted a major change in terms of how people get home at night, with over half of the people interviewed in Surfers Paradise and Fortitude Valley SNPs reporting using Uber to get home. This compares to previous studies conducted pre-Uber in other cities, which showed that 49% of interviewees across five cities reported catching a taxi home, compared to 18% in the current study. While it is impossible to estimate the impact of this concurrent change, there is clearly less queuing required for taxis and more transport options available for people trying to get home at the end of the night. Data were made available from Uber and the taxi directorate, but has been combined to provide the overall picture and in recognition of commercial sensitivities. In addition, public transport data were available for a number of jurisdictions and has been presented to further enhance the picture.

In summary, more people are attending SNPs across the State using recordable transportation, which aligns with other indicators showing stable or increasing attendance trends.

7.3.5. PRECINCT MAPPING

Precinct mapping is an innovative method documenting the businesses that are trading at different times of night over time in five SNPs across Queensland. In this report, we present analyses of the precinct mapping in five SNPs.

During the period of this study the number of live music venues in Fortitude Valley remained stable – with one exit and one planned entry. The precinct lost one dedicated live music venue: The New Globe Theatre. There is one large music venue, 'The Fortitude', currently under construction. The venue will hold 3500 people, making it the largest inner-city music venue in the city, featuring national and international touring acts.

The data collected indicate no substantial change in the number or type of venues trading throughout the night. The number and type of nightclubs, pubs, bars and live music venues remain stable, especially at the 10pm, midnight and 2am audits. As intended, there was a decline in the numbers of venues open very late at night, but this was less than seen in other precincts subject to similar conditions in previous research. Surprisingly, 60% of venues originally open at 4am when the TAFV legislation was introduced continue to trade after 3am in 2018, suggesting that the desired impact on trading after 3am has been hampered and that it is likely that a substantial number of people remain in

the SNPs after 4am. In the West End and Southbank (control site where there is no trading after 1am), there was an increase in the number of venues trading after 10pm and at midnight.

Trends in the other SNP<u>s</u> studied showed a mostly stable environment. Surfers Paradise showed a generally stable, or slightly increasing, trend in the number of venues observed open throughout the night, even at 4am. On the other hand, Cairns exhibited a small growth in the number of businesses trading after 10pm and after 12am, and a small decline in the number of businesses trading after 2am and after 4am, from 2016 to 2018. Somewhat unexpectedly, Toowoomba experienced a small decline in the number of businesses open after 10pm, but no change in the number of businesses trading after midnight, and a small increase in the number of venues trading after 2am. Townsville saw no noteworthy change during any time period.

In summary, all of the precincts studied showed only minor changes, and most were stable beyond the desired impact of reducing trading at 4am. The surprising finding that most late trading venues in Fortitude Valley continued to have their doors open after 4am suggesting that while the service of alcohol may have ceased, people continue to hang around venues and entertainment districts when the doors are not closed, as seen in the changes in alcohol service hours in Newcastle (104). Given the current findings and previous research which demonstrates that intoxication levels remain high late at night, and that people awake at 4amare generally also experiencing substantial fatigue, this means they are more likely to experience some form of harm such as injury, assault or becoming overwhelmed by intoxication. It may be that the continued operation of these venues after 3am, has reduced the impact of the TAFV legislation.

VENUE QUEUES

Queues outside nightclubs and pubs are not a new phenomenon and have often been a strategic way in which venues can attract people. In large cities, queues can often stretch down city blocks, and people will wait over an hour to enter. Often patrons will adapt their behaviour to avoid queues by arriving earlier, which is also beneficial to the venue. However, this process of adaptation often is gradual, and there will always be cases where specific events mean that large queues form outside venues. The issue of queues is further complicated by the need for venues to ensure that they are meeting responsible service of alcohol and licensing requirements by ensuring people that are entering their venue are not already too intoxicated.

Another part of the precinct mapping was to observe the number and size of queues outside venues before and after the introduction of mandatory ID scanning in Fortitude Valley and Surfers Paradise.

In Fortitude Valley, the observations indicated that queues were most common for clubs, live music venues and pubs. Queues were consistently observed at these venues through each of the five audits, however it appeared that the number of venues with queues did increase over the study period.

Queues in Surfers Paradise were also most common for clubs, live music venues and pubs. Queues were consistently observed at these venues through each of the five audits, although there does appear to have been an increase in the queues over time, even at 2amand 4am, which suggests a different variable at play than ID scanner introduction because the queues are late at night – probably reflecting the clubs being full and not letting more people in.

The use of ID scanners in other precincts -- and indeed prior to the legislation they were also used in many venues in Queensland -- appears to have triggered more queues outside venues. But the mechanisms behind this are unclear. ID scanner data clearly shows that the average scan when people are queued takes only 10 seconds. While there are undoubtedly occasional system malfunctions, large queues should be something which can be managed through patron education and venue practices. Of course, there are always exceptions. Venues with popular events have always had queues and will continue to do so. A number of recommendations have been made to reduce this for smaller venues and during weeknights; however, in the absence of evidence-based responses, it is possible that industry responses like 'beat the queue' discounts and promotions may have a positive impact for venues and patrons.

7.3.6. LICENSING

Licensed venue data presented in this report described: 1) the current and historical numbers of liquor licenses across Queensland, and 2) the number of extended trading permits granted. As with other trends, there appears to be a steady modestly increasing trend in licence numbers. Licence numbers increased across the state by around 300 per year until 1 July 2018. Similarly, there has been a modest increase in the number of new liquor licences granted each year. In contrast to some predictions in the media prior to the introduction of these measures (105, 106), it is clear that there have only been minor fluctuations in terms of the overall number of venues trading during this evaluation period, and that the modest restrictions on trading hours incorporated in the TAFV legislation has not affected the quantity or diversity of nightlife across Queensland.

In regard to extended trading permits, there was a very substantial increase in the number of applications in Brisbane and Surfers Paradise in 2016, when the interpretation of licensing laws were more relaxed, which was also reported to be an industry strategy (106). While 2017 numbers are substantially reduced, it is clear that extended trading permits were still being granted, which ultimately means there are many nights in which SNPs are not effectively closed at 3am (107). This is

consistent with precinct mapping, showing that a high proportion of venues continue to trade after 3am 18 months after alcohol sales hours restrictions were introduced. A number of key informants reported that Brisbane venues were more likely to have extended trading permits approved than those outside Brisbane, but our data are unable to identify any such trend.

7.3.7. LIVE MUSIC DATA

This report presents an analysis of data supplied by the Australasian Performing Right Association (APRA), providing an important insight into trends in live performances in nightlife precincts and the potential impact of alcohol legislation in this space.

The data presented in this report shows that the number of live music venues generally increased from 2001 to 2015, followed by a levelling out since then with minor fluctuations. While venue numbers in Fortitude Valley has been stable, Brisbane City has seen a substantial increase over 2017/18, as has Cairns. However, while the number of venues has increased across the state, the number of performances has fluctuated, staying relatively stable. On the basis of these findings, there is no suggestion of a significant impact of the TAFV legislation on live music overall. While some smaller venues may have experienced operational issues regarding introduction of ID scanners, these will be discussed and addressed in the key findings and policy options section. Finally, it is important to note the contribution of APRA supplying the data and allowing it to be analysed, thus ensuring that future discussions are based on evidence and not anecdote and hysteria, as has been the case in other jurisdictions. It is important that the independent analysis and reporting of live music data continues to ensure the industry's continued growth and well-being.

7.3.8. TOURISM

This evaluation monitored trends in tourism using data obtained by the Queensland Government Statistician's Office (QGSO) and Tourism Research Australia (TRA). This outcome variable was seen as being important because, prior to implementation of the TAFV legislation, a range of industry and political actors claimed that tourism would be devastated.

It was found that the number of international and domestic visitors to Queensland continued to increase at the same level following the introduction of the TAFV legislation. It was estimated that value in gross and per tourist continued to increase in accordance with previous trends, and that employment in the tourism industry increased in the 2016/17 financial year. While there was a 3% reduction in the number of backpackers visiting Queensland, this reflected a national trend across all states, and is therefore unlikely to be related to the legislation introduction.

Therefore, it appears that tourism has not been affected by the introduction of statewide liquor control measures, and that tourism, like the other business variables investigated, continued previous trends with no identifiable influence from the legislation.

7.3.9. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Key informant responses regarding the impacts of the TAFV legislation varied hugely. Some licensees interviewed reported that the legislation had been very good for business, others reported that it had been devastating. Different elements appear to have impacted differentially on business. For example, smaller bars report being more affected by ID scanners than many of the larger hotels and nightclubs, most of whom already had ID scanners in place. On the other hand, smaller bars were mostly unaffected by last drinks restrictions, whereas some larger venues report substantial reductions in profits -- although others reported that this was completely offset or even that they make more profit by having reduced the cost of staff. Of course, in Fortitude Valley especially, many venues would not have reduced staff costs because they continue to trade past 3am.

For example:

> Because now we trade full ball until 3:00, they leave, I'm not paying – you know, between 3:00 and 5:00 you're not turning over much money because you've got nothing coming through the door, you've got no – you're doing your RSA so you're not serving a great deal of alcoholic beverages anyway and a lot of water. You're paying penalty rates on penalty rates so your wage bills are very high and so from the financial perspective, it was better for us. (Licensee-09)

And:

> Well, I don't like it because it has destroyed a lot of businesses, because a lot of the businesses, like myself, got into these businesses in full awareness that you could sell alcohol to five o'clock. So, what it's basically done is, overnight, dropped the turnover of a lot of businesses [by] dramatic figures, which they had no control of. Really, you took a high percentage of people's livelihoods away from them overnight. (Licensee-13)

For the purposes of this evaluation, the Key informant interviews provided helpful insight into many dimensions of the impacts of the TAFV legislation. However, when considering impact on business, it seems that no consistent narrative emerged. An example of this was one licensee who reported to the research team that the implementation of the TAFV legislation had been very detrimental to the business. This licensee provided their business accounts to the research team, who subsequently analysed the accounts to assess when the business started to change from being profitable to

nonprofitable. The analysis showed that the trend began in 2015, long before the TAFV legislation was in place, and was much more closely related to the mining downturn in Queensland and the change in business model of a local competitor.

A similar example was seen in media reports of the demise of one business owner who was selling Lefty's Old Time Music Hall on Caxton Street and blamed the TAFV legislation, specifically ID scanning, for the failure of his business (108). However, another article reported that the bankruptcy administrator, Michael Dalloway, determined that there was more to it and that "the company may have been insolvent for up to 2 years" (108). It was further reported that "Majid's financial support for two other now-failed Webb-controlled companies, which ran the Hope and Anchor pub in Paddington and Gingers Wine Bar (later rebadged Seymour's Cocktails and Oysters) on Caxton Street, was 'a significant reason'' for its collapse" (108) . As seen in the previous cases of the Sydney and Newcastle opening-hours restrictions, it is common for business people and others to attribute specific incidents to the introduction of alcohol restrictions, but that these attributions are mostly found to be incorrect once investigated.

While there has undoubtedly been some economic cost to some operators, others report having benefited, and there are a wide variety of factors at play which influence the financial viability of licensed venues, most of which are not related to the recent legislative changes.

7.3.10.   SUMMARY

One of the key outcomes identified for the TAFV legislation was "a regulatory framework that appropriately balances the interests of the liquor industry with a reduction in alcohol-fuelled violence".

Based on the data sources available to the team reported above, it appears that overall key variables such as the number of people entering SNPs, the number of people entering venues, alcohol sales, people travelling to SNPs and the number of venues trading throughout the night until 3am, along with the number of live music performances across Queensland, have not shown any significant reductions, and some have improved. Indeed, many of the variables investigated showed continued modest improvement. While some venues have probably faced some losses, these data were not made available for analysis by industry operators, despite repeated requests.

The data presented in this report, and the conclusions reached, mirror the independent work of others. In the recent "*Measuring the Australian Night Time Economy 2016-17*" report (109), it was reported that:

"QLD has the third largest Core NTE in Australia across all key metrics and is growing at faster pace than that of VIC and NSW"

The report also found that there had been increases in the number of establishments, the employment within the industry and in the annual turnover (gross sales) of industry (from 3.8% to 5%). Whilst it was identified as being the key sector within the night-time economy, entertainment and drink accounted for only around one third of its income. Profiles of both Brisbane and the Gold Coast highlighted the continued growth of the night-time economy, especially in relation to most of the value being in food, rather than drink and entertainment.

To summarise, while there have been some impacts and inconveniences for some establishments selling alcohol and others in the liquor industry, on balance there has been no overall recorded impacts on most of the key variables associated with their income, and many operators across the state continue to flourish. Such information is crucial in policy evaluations, and the controversy over them highlights the need for such variables to be measured and reported independently into the future, to address community concerns and ensure discussions are based on evidence, rather than anecdote.

7.4. LEGISLATIVE TIMING AND CONTEXT

As discussed in the introduction, it is important to consider that, in the period between 1 July 2016 and February 2017, there was a substantial undermining of the trading hours restrictions due to the granting of a very large number of Extended Trading Permits (ETPs)(107). In some jurisdictions, venue operators actively planned to ensure that at least one venue was trading until 5amon any given weekend. While entirely legal, this undermined the key active ingredient of the legislation and left a lingering confusion with patrons regarding the nature of the policy change and when their night in the SNP came to an end.

In this context, and considering that it encompasses the Christmas/New Year's period, the first intervention period should be seen as problematic, especially given the many mixed messages being sent in the media regarding 'lockouts' and venues promoting they were 'still open til 5'. At a minimum, this will have massively reduced the impact of the intervention in the first time period, at worst, it may have increased the levels of harm because of frustration and confusion playing out. While reforms introduced in February 2017 addressed the issue of alcohol being served later, many venues continue to have their doors open even though they are not serving alcohol because they are not required to cease trading at 3am. In discussions with some venue operators, they reported that they were staying open to continue the culture of late night partying, even though it would cost them money in the short term. The precinct mapping study found that many venues are still open much later

in the night. With people still in entertainment precincts while intoxicated, fatigued, and many also drug-affected, the current situation is likely to reduce the impact of the TAFV legislation.

7.5. IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES

The following section seeks to briefly summarise the evidence obtained in this evaluation in regards to each individual measure put in place. Although differentiating the impacts of some elements of the intervention is impossible because of their nature or implementation timing, the section will aim to provide as much insight into each intervention's impact as possible, including how these findings compare with those of previous research if available.

7.5.1. CHANGES TO VERY-LATE-NIGHT LIQUOR TRADING HOURS.

The measures introduced in the TAFV legislation were associated with significant decreases in statewide ambulance attendances, serious assaults in fortitude Valley and hospital admissions in some jurisdictions, although most jurisdictions did not see significant reductions in alcohol-related harm or consumption. Further, there was a statewide reduction in assault after 3amin the morning, although this effect was undermined by increases earlier in the night.

There are a number of key differences between this intervention and the previous interventions on which it was based within Australia. Measures introduced in Queensland were an adaptation of the measures introduced into the King's Cross and Sydney central business district precincts in New South Wales (110). These were in turn based on the successful Newcastle intervention, which closed venues at 3am and saw a reduction of 37% in assaults recorded by police after 18 months (104). But the Newcastle measures took over a year to show clear effects (1, 2) and even longer for the continued downward trend become apparent. While the measures introduced are similar to those in Sydney, the Sydney intervention was only applied in two geographically small precincts within a very large city where patrons continue to have a large choice of other entertainment districts and options (111). In contrast, patrons attending SNPs in Queensland do not for the most part have alternate entertainment precincts with later trading hours that they can attend.

Most importantly, the venues in Sydney chose to shut at 3:30amfor the most part, whereas up to 60% of venues in Fortitude Valley continue to trade after 4am. Within Fortitude Valley, this was an active strategy by some people within the industry to maintain a culture of people staying at very late at night. Further, the initial strategic use of extended trading permits to ensure late-night trading continued, and their continued use on 'special events', have undermined the basic premise of the precinct shutting at 3am. To the best of our knowledge, previous trials around the world have operated on closing venues within a specified time frame and patrons returning home at the end of trading

hours. The current situation in Queensland means that many people remain on the streets until much later and while these people have not been drinking after 3am, they have still been awake for a very extended period of time (meaning that fatigue is also contributing to aggression and poor decision-making) and remain intoxicated and/or drug affected, meaning that the potential benefit of reduced trading hours has been substantially undermined.

It should also be considered that the trading hours restrictions implemented represents the minimum indicated by previous research. In their meta-analysis, Hahn and colleagues (112) found that the evidence suggests 2 hours is the minimum reduction in trading hours which has impact. Of note, discussions with the authors shows that all of the trading hours restrictions that were studied involved the closure of the venue when alcohol was no longer being served.

A further dimension to the picture is that current liquor licensing laws are undermining the efforts of OLGR and QPS to successfully prosecute venues for serving intoxicated patrons. It was reported that despite substantial funding for additional licensing inspectors, their ability to enforce legislation around responsible service is completely undermined by the current legislation which does not stipulate how proof of intoxication should be determined. In doing so, it means that, while venues are now restricted in their trading hours, they can serve people as much as they want while they are in the venues without fear of prosecution, again undermining the aim of reducing intoxication on the street, and the potential impact of the TAFV legislation.

An additional dimension to be considered is that Queensland also has higher levels of alcohol consumption, higher average BAC levels on the street and higher levels of self-reported aggression (up to double that of other cities previously studied (2, 16)). Previous meta-analyses and reviews have not had such detailed information to consider in their assessments. While it is difficult to know exactly how this influences the impact of the measures such as restricting the hours of service of alcohol, one possible outcome is that the population is more resistant to change and requires more substantial intervention to achieve a similar effect. This could be true for a more violent population, or for higher levels of drinking, although some previous research in other jurisdictions has suggested that heavier drinkers are more affected by restrictions than light drinkers, but this might well refer to a very different dynamic in terms of the main subjects in those studies being older alcohol-dependent drinkers, rather than younger 'binge drinkers'.

Finally, as mentioned in Section 7.1.5, the exclusion of casinos from selling liquor very late in the night has potentially undermined the impact of the restrictions both practically, and in the message sent to patrons.

7.5.1.1. TEMPORARY PERMITS FOR EXTENDED LIQUOR TRADING HOURS

As mentioned in the previous section, temporary permits for extended liquor trading hours have substantially undermined the fidelity of the last drinks intervention. In addition to the initial use of the permits in an orchestrated manner with coordination between retailers to ensure continued 5amtrading in Fortitude Valley, their continued use on 'special occasions' continues to muddy the waters concerning the actual time of "last drinks". It is not possible to determine any specific impact of the permits after the February 2017 legislative changes, because most of these permits are given out to events where there is high police activity and management. Heavy police presence may reduce the number of serious assaults observed (2, 34), but also increase the number of public nuisance offences recorded (2), meaning that it is unlikely that the real effects of the extension would be seen. On the other hand, if the counterfactual position was to be taken, it is worth questioning the validity of permits which allow for continued alcohol consumption during periods where emergency services are already stretched. At this stage research team is unable to determine the ongoing impact of these permits.

7.5.2. BAN ON THE SALE OF HIGH-ALCOHOL CONTENT DRINKS AFTER MIDNIGHT

The ban on the sale of high alcohol content drinks after midnight was a part of the broader range of measures including in the TAFV legislation. Many interventions have tried to directly target consumption of various 'high-risk drinks' (e.g. shots, mixed drinks with more than 30 ml of alcohol, ready mixed drinks with over five percent alcohol, or over four drinks to a sinigle patron past 10pm; 113). However, the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of these alcohol restrictions remains limited (114), but the intervention has become popular among policy makers. This may be due to its simplicity in both implementation (113), and its apparent face validity, as it gives the appearance of addressing the problem (114).

The introduction of drinks restrictions alongside a trading hours restriction would normally limit the ability of researchers to evaluate the unique impact of each intervention. Any decrease in alcohol-related harm due to drinks restrictions would likely be masked due to the already known effectiveness of trading hour restrictions in reducing alcohol-related harm in nightlife precincts (2).

Using licencing data from June 30 2016, five SNPs were identified where no venues were affected by the 3am trading hour restriction. These SNPs were smaller than precincts in larger cities and generally had lower levels of alcohol-related harm than seen in somewhere like Fortitude Valley. They were also areas which were either family tourism oriented (e.g. Caloundra and Maroochydore) or small local nightlife scenes (e.g. Ipswich).

Analysis found no significant change in the number of serious assaults per month after the introduction of drinks restrictions during High Alcohol Hours (HAH) in SNPs that were not affected by restrictions on trading hours. However, these findings need to be considered in light of the intervention and the population it is meant to affect. Given that these SNPs were already not trading late, it could be argued that the nature of the problem was different in these areas and that measures such as drinks restrictions may be more relevant to larger and later night-trading settings.

Key informants also reported a range of opinions around the impact of drinks restrictions. As with other topics, while some people felt the measure would be effective, others felt it had no inherent benefit. But, as in previous investigations of drinks restrictions (115), the majority of people interviewed felt that drinks restrictions sent a message to patrons around acceptable consumption patterns, had good face validity, and was not overly onerous to implement.

While the findings of this evaluation suggest little impact of drinks restrictions on alcohol-related violence, it is too early to say definitively that the measures are not helpful. Clearly, the sites which we were able to test the impact of the intervention were not normal nightlife precincts and were likely to have different drinking cultures later at night. Ideally, drinks restrictions would be tested in a systematic design to determine the impact in different venues and entertainment precincts.

7.5.3. NO FURTHER LATE NIGHT APPROVALS FOR TAKEAWAY LIQUOR TRADE

The legislative changes restricting late night approvals for takeaway liquor trade occurred at the same time as a range of other interventions across the state. Given that there is no record of applications that might have been approved, it is impossible to determine whether this measure has had a specific effect on alcohol-related harm. However, in the context of no increase in harm in selected areas where SNPs do not operate, it is likely that this measure has at least not contributed to greater harm and may have assisted in preventing potential increases in harm should those approvals have been given. The most relevant recent evidence comes from New Zealand, reporting that of the drinkers who purchased between midnight and 4am from on-licensed premises or between 8pm and 11pm from off-licensed premises, two thirds drank at levels placing them at risk of harm (116). These findings suggest that the current measures are most likely targeted at the right times, though further research is warranted.

7.5.4. TARGETED POLICING ACTIVITIES

The TAFV legislation introduced a number of police-related interventions to be evaluated within the course of this study. The nature of these interventions makes it difficult to assess impact in simple

terms, and there are no identifiable objective measures which can be provided. Because of the nature of these measures, comment was sought from Queensland police and a summary is provided below:

7.5.4.1. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

Queensland Police Service (QPS) Liquor Units operate within the domain of policing and community safety. The liquor units provide information-sharing protocols of intelligence-led policing to support the Queensland Government's Tackling Alcohol Fuelled Violence legislation.

The intelligence sharing makes use of the appropriate technology, supportive policy and legislative frameworks. The strategic objectives and underpinning principles guide us towards achieving our vision of intelligence partnerships for a safer Queensland. The ongoing interagency partnerships between QPS and other government agencies, community groups and licensees, is one of the major strategies utilised in providing an intelligence-led policing response. The ongoing partnerships are vital in providing a collective response to keeping the community safe.

Utilising intelligence which has been gathered, proactive intervention / consultation with higher risk venues at the start of trade has proven to be beneficial in minimising and preventing incidents later in the trading period. Police provide high visibility patrols and liaise with venue staff / security at these higher risk venues early in the trading period with consultation undertaken to provide advice on potential issues. The liquor units also share close working relationship with Major Events and Planning Units which allows intelligence to be gathered and shared in early preparation of events through stakeholder meetings, to ensure that liquor service and consumption practices are managed effectively and safely at major events.

7.5.4.2. BUILDING A POSITIVE RAPPORT WITH LICENSEES ASSISTS WITH EARLY INTERVENTION TO IDENTIFY ISSUES.

QPS contends that building a positive rapport with licensees assists with early intervention to identify issues.

7.5.4.3. BREATHALYSING INTOXICATED OR DISORDERLY PATRONS FOR THE POSSIBLE PROSECUTION OF LICENSEES

There is no legislative authority for Police to stop, detain and or require a person to submit to a breath analysis test for the purposes of gathering evidence of the commission of an offence by a licensee.

There are occasions where Police can breathalyse an offender, for example when they have been arrested for an offence and brought to the watchhouse for processing. If the watchhouse officers

believe the person to be showing signs of intoxication, they can breathalyse the offender as a harm minimisation strategy to assess whether the person requires medical treatment etc.

There are various means by which evidence is gathered to commence prosecution proceedings against a licensee. The process can begin via a 'Liquor Incident Report' (LIR) which may contain evidence/information of non-compliance by licensees, or approved managers and/or security personnel performing duty at licensed premises. The LIR is then provided to OLGR which then may result in an investigation being commenced.

Breathalysing intoxicated or disorderly patrons is not considered to be a viable method of prosecuting licensees. There are significant practical and legislative barriers to undertaking this process.

7.5.4.4. PARAMEDICS IN WATCH-HOUSES INITIATIVE

Under the TAFV legislation, funding for the "Paramedics in Watchhouses" initiative was continued. The "Paramedics in Watchhouses" initiative commenced as a trial in several watchhouses[57] around the State in 2014/2015. The watchhouses included in the trial were: Surfers Paradise, Brisbane, Mt Isa, Townsville, Cairns, Beenleigh, Maroochydore, Toowoomba, Rockhampton, Southport, Pine Rivers, Gladstone, Mackay, Redcliffe, Cleveland, Richlands and Ipswich.

The trial was successful and the Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) and QPS agreed to continue the initiative after the trial had finished.

The service reduced the number of persons requiring transport for medical assessment. The service has also reduced the number of instances where the QAS have been called to conduct an assessment at watchhouses, allowing for the QAS to commit its limited resources to frontline services. The most common issues treated by QAS paramedics located in the watchhouses are alcohol and drug intoxication; effects of assaults and falls such as pain, lacerations, grazing, abrasions and bruising; and complaints of sickness and feeling unwell.

Statistical data relevant to the number of persons treated by the QAS and the types of medical issues is held by the QAS. Anecdotal data made available by Gladstone Watchhouse indicates that QAS has

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[57] Watchhouses refer to the cells within police stations where people arrested are held before attending court.

provided medical assistance approximately once out of every six shifts (on Friday and Saturday nights).

The research team received mixed feedback as to the success or ongoing support of the initiative. Several watchhouses have advised the trial did not continue past the trial period, where others have had negative experiences, including instances where the paramedics were called away to other jobs due to QAS being unable to roster sufficient staff for frontline responses. Some stations reported that they rarely utilised the services.

On the other hand, there are watchhouses that are strong advocates for this initiative. Staff at one watchhouse commented 'staff strongly advocate for the program and nearly every person that comes in that is intoxicated is reviewed, injuries are also seen to and the paramedic assists greatly when they have to be transported to hospital, arranging QAS crews and even assisting in determining which hospital. I would loathe to see it cancelled ...'

Several other benefits of this initiative were noted, particularly regarding health assessments of prisoners upon reception at watchhouses. QAS officers were able to ask explorative questions to responses given to the standard QPS health assessment questions to better ascertain required prisoner management strategies and provide quality professional advice. Their presence has also assisted with the Watchhouses complying with QPS policy relating to drug and alcohol assessment. Due to the high percentage of received clientele who are dependent on methadone and opiate-based drugs (normally ingested within a 24-hour period), custody suitability has been able to be quickly assessed at the time of reception thus reducing imposts on road crews having to transport their prisoner to hospital to obtain medical advice as to their suitability and fitness for custody. This can be further expanded to other medical conditions, e.g. cardiac, where the QAS officer has been able to assist with the safe monitoring of that client, again assisting in maintaining road crews to attend to core business who would otherwise be deployed to obtain medical assessment external to the watchhouse.

7.5.5. EDUCATION

The TAFV legislation supported a range of novel and existing education and awareness campaigns. The main campaigns were a school education campaign, a 'responsible drinking campaign, and an existing anti-violence campaign by high profile boxer, Danny Green.

7.5.5.1.   COMMUNITY EDUCATION ABOUT SAFE DRINKING PRACTICES

The TAFV legislation provided over 3 million dollars funding for an awareness campaign which was used to implement the 'What's your relationship with alcohol?' campaign. The available evidence reported in this evaluation suggested that there was little or no impact of the awareness programs

implemented by government as part of the TAFV legislation. Blood alcohol levels remained consistently high in safe night precincts, and there were no observable changes in alcohol consumption in the available measures (acknowledging their substantial flaws). In fact, the evaluation conducted on the 'What's your relationship with alcohol?' campaign also showed that many of the target population (young men and heavy drinkers) actually reported worse drinking patterns and intentions.

While such education campaigns are consistently advocated for by the alcohol industry and other vested interests (76, 78), these findings are consistent with the scientific literature which shows little or no impact from week messaged sporadic campaigns (13, 74). However, the evidence from other public health campaigns shows the value of strategies that provide novel information, that are conducted on a regular basis, and are hard hitting (117). Further, campaigns which raise awareness without providing people with real skills and strategies to change behaviour have been found detrimental. Even then, awareness campaigns that have been rigorously evaluated show little impact on actual behaviour on a sustained basis, rather they show an impact on people's attitudes towards response measures and legislation (117). Further, they can act to keep alcohol-related harm on the public agenda (118). Therefore, while awareness raising and education campaigns can be useful, they should never be considered a valid intervention to change behaviour, and only considered as an addendum to evidence-based interventions found to reduce key predictors of harm (13)

7.5.5.2. SUPPORT FOR MR DANNY GREEN'S COWARD'S PUNCH CAMPAIGN

The TAFV legislation also provided funding for Danny Green's Stop the Coward's Punch Campaign (CPC) program. The available evidence reported in this evaluation suggested that there was little or no impact of the CPC program. Only a small percentage of people who the message was targeted at remembered the campaign. This is consistent with a vast international literature showing that violence and aggressive acts are usually complex and seldom related to a rational act (80), especially when alcohol or drugs are involved (38, 79).

No information was available on the amount spent on the program, and only partial details were available regarding the spread of the campaign. No evaluation was conducted.

7.5.5.3. EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

Overall, access to the AOD program has fluctuated since it became available to schools in October 2014. The program had the highest number of access hits in the 2015-2016 financial year, peaking in October. In earlier financial years after the program was first introduced, the peak months of access were October and November. However, in the past two financial years this peak has shifted towards

August. This shift may have occurred due to changes in school curriculum. Data also suggests a decline in access hits towards the later sessions of the program. This pattern may be due to several factors including time restraints as the year becomes busier in later terms. Evaluating the AOD program in terms of access hits alone may underestimate its usage as schools may choose to download or print out program content and resources. Another limitation is that there is no method to determine how long the user accessed the site for during a visit. Further information is required to assess the level of engagement Queensland schools have with the program, and its impact on students' attitudes and behavioural changes regarding alcohol and drugs.

Unfortunately, there was a very poor level of information available about the level of participation in the online intervention program. Notably, there was no way of determining which schools in Queensland accessed the program, nor the level of engagement in the curricula.

As documented in the results, there was no way to know how the information had been used, nor whether they had even downloaded it. This lack of basic information about the implementation and usage of the education program, and how it works in with the wider AOD education program and anti-violence program, means there is no way to reliably assess the potential benefits and value of this program.

This basic lack of basic data collection, and a lack of transparency about implementation means we are not confident that the government's targets for the education campaign in schools was met.

7.5.6. LIQUOR LICENSING AND COMPLIANCE

The TAFV legislation supported a range of measures specifically in the domain of Liquor Licencing and compliance. Specifically:

1. Increased compliance activity by liquor licensing officers to address alcohol-fuelled violence
2. Increased licence fees for high risk venues
3. Publishing information on liquor licensing, compliance and enforcement activity

7.5.6.1. INCREASED COMPLIANCE ACTIVITY BY LIQUOR LICENSING OFFICERS TO ADDRESS ALCOHOL-FUELLED VIOLENCE

As reported earlier, in response to this element, OLGR reported that OLGR has substantially increase its inspection activity at licensed premises, both statewide and within SNPs. In 2017-18, the OLGR completed 5,556 liquor inspections statewide, 2,719 in SNPs. This was a 32% increase statewide and 121.4% increase within SNPs compared to 2013-14. They reported that this had allowed has made

significant enhancements to its risk based liquor compliance plan. However, as also noted, OLGR went on to report that while the funding has allowed much greater capacity and activity, the most significant barriers faced related to being able to take high end enforcement action in instances of persons being served liquor while they are unduly intoxicated or being allowed to consume liquor in these circumstances. Specifically, there remains significant difficulties for regulators (OLGR and QPS) wishing to prove the relevant offences to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt. This is largely the result of the onus sitting with the regulator to:

1. prove that the signs of undue intoxication which may have been visible/audible to a compliance officer and/or visible on CCTV footage were seen by person/s who served the person liquor or allowed the person to consume liquor.

2. disprove that the signs of undue intoxication were not the result of something other than liquor or drugs, e.g. physical impairment, when the OLGR are often not in a position to identify and interview the patron as an OLGR officer was not present at the time of the service/consumption occurring

These issues effectively mean that while government funding has flowed to increase activity, some of that activity is wasted because of inadequate legislation that hampers the ability of OLGR and QPS staff to enforce the law.

7.5.6.2. INCREASED LICENCE FEES FOR HIGH RISK VENUES

In response to this element, OLGR provided the following report: The (now) Government's 2015 General Election Commitments included that licensing fees for high-risk venues would be increased.

We understand the commitment was considered by Government to have been delivered on 1 July 2015 through the making of Liquor Amendment Regulation (No. 1) 2015 (Amendment Regulation). The Amendment Regulation prescribed new fee amounts in the Liquor Regulation 2002 for the new nightclub licence type.

Accordingly, the Amendment Regulation increased the base annual fee for nightclub venues from $605.30 to $3388.00 from 1 July 2015, to reflect the high risk nature of these venues.

7.5.6.3. PUBLISHING INFORMATION ON LIQUOR LICENSING, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

In response to this element, OLGR reported that this condition had been met because information was enhanced in their annual report. However, the wording of the government commitment could equally be interpreted to mean that the public should be able to access all information on compliance and

enforcement activity. Indeed, this has been argued strongly in many communities around Australia, and the Riley review in the Northern Territory recommended that all licensing activity should be transparent to the communities in which venues are located and the harm occurring. In Queensland, it is impossible for a member of the public to find out details of any compliance activity, or any details of the enforcement of measure on venues. It is difficult to imagine this was the intention of the government statement, when they did not need to talk about reporting if they did not want to.

7.5.6.4. SUMMARY

The TAFV legislation and accompanying funding has led to substantially more engagement and activity on behalf of the OLGR. However, the current legislation undermines the ability of OLGR to enforce the responsible service of alcohol. While technically, licence fees rose, this didn't happen in reality because of the TFV legislation, as it was determined that the changes put in place in 2015 were enough; it is unclear whether this aligned with the government's intent. Finally, the aim of publishing information on licensing was too vague to be able to ascertain whether the goal was achieved. This would require greater clarity form the government regarding its intent, but policy option are presented in the following sections to provide best practice in transparency for the community.

7.5.7. PRECINCT MANAGEMENT

The TAFV legislation also included a number of interventions under the banner of Precinct Management designed to assist in the management of licensed venues and their patrons.

7.5.7.1. SAFE NIGHT PRECINCTS

Safe night precincts (SNPs) exist in key entertainment areas across Queensland. SNPs are managed by local boards operating as incorporated associations. These boards manage and plan for the precinct to address a range of community safety issues. SNPs were created by the previous LNP government in August 2014.

Police-recorded assaults and ambulance callout data confirm that the current boundaries of SNPs accurately identify areas where the most alcohol-related harm occurs within Queensland, especially during high alcohol hours.

The Queensland Government allocated $10.76 million over three years to fund rest and recovery services in these Safe Night Precincts. In addition to this, $8.69 million from the Gambling Community Benefit Fund will be available for Safe Night Precinct local boards to develop and implement local initiatives to minimise alcohol and drug-related harm, disturbances and public disorder within the precincts. The Safe Night Precinct grant funding was used for a range of

interventions accessed by local boards, including funding for security, taxi marshals and education campaigns.

None of the measures implemented by SNP boards have any evidence to support further implementation. Indeed, two programs were associated with increases in assaults reported to police. While some of the measures may have impacts which are not measurable according to normal practice, there remains no evidence to support their implementation. Measures such as taxi marshal might assist in greater management of the nightlife, but do not appear to translate to less assaults reported to police. It may be that more sensitive measures are required, or specific in-depth studies which can gain higher quality data, but while they should be considered good practice, they do not appear to reach significance in terms of reducing ambulance attendances, police recoded assaults or emergency department attendances. Given such interventions service the patrons of venues that have just profited from their attendance, it may be appropriate for such services to funded by industry, as has been done in the past.

7.5.7.2. SAFE NIGHT PRECINCT SUPPORT SERVICES

Substantial additional funding was granted through the Department of Communities for safe night precinct support services (SNPSS). A separate evaluation of these services was conducted in 2017, funded by the Department of Communities and led by Prof Miller. The research team maximised efficiency where possible by combining data collection for some elements. The SNPSS report will be considered by government. However, a range of data were collected for both evaluations and a range of key issues and policy options were identified for the TAFV evaluation based on the specific data collected and Prof Miller's experience. These are reported in Section 8, key findings and policy options. The recommendations from the SNPSS evaluation report are included in the recommendations for this evaluation.

7.5.7.3. MANDATORY NETWORKED ID SCANNERS

On 1 July 2017, mandatorily networked ID scanners were implemented across Queensland in SNPs. Scanning commences at 10pm in venues within the SNPs that hold licences to trade after midnight. The original proposal for mandatory networked ID scanning was included in the Safe Night Out Strategy released in 2014 by the Newman LNP Government. The main difference between the original legislation and that implemented was that ID scanning commences at 10pm, rather than midnight. The decision to implement ID scanners was announced by the Queensland government in January 2017. The scanners were implemented with support from QMusic and the Valley liquor accord amongst others. Many licensed venues already had ID scanners voluntarily and had been using

them for an extended period, however the need to network the scanners meant that many had to change their equipment and some of their practices.

As summarised in the January 2017 interim report, a small body of literature suggested that ID scanners could reduce alcohol-related violence and harm, although there were only two case studies previously published. These case studies indicated that in general the use of scanners was popular with patrons and venue operators, along with emergency services and law enforcement personnel. Further, the evidence demonstrated some reductions in alcohol-related harm associated with implementation of ID scanners in Geelong and Newcastle (2), although there were substantial differences between each scheme implemented. The interim report concluded that "The lack of change in alcohol-related harms during earlier hours also indicates that measures used to reduce harm earlier in the night such as ID scanners, and banning orders for repeat offenders continue to be warranted"(107). This conclusion informed the government decision to implement ID scanning legislation.

Because ID scanners were implemented in July 2017, and this report presents analysis until July 2018, the evaluation period is comparatively short for such an intervention and should be considered as preliminary findings. Ideally, analysis would be re-conducted on data until July 2019 to allow sufficient data points to detect trends, and allow for nightlife culture to adapt. Further, because ID scanners were introduced one year after the introduction of 3am last drinks in SNPs, there may be some confusion around whether any reductions in alcohol-related harm that are recorded were due to the scanners on their own, or the combined package.

Evidence from this first trial of mandatory networked ID scanners has shown modest, but significant reductions in police-recorded serious assaults in a number of precincts and statewide. At the statewide level, the implementation of ID scanners on their own were associated with a significant reduction in serious assaults between 3am and 6am on Friday and Saturday nights, and non-significant reductions during midnight-3am. In addition to this, ID scanners contributed to the significance of the full policy measures effective between 3amand 6amon weekends.

Emergency department attendances remained stable during the period when ID scanners were introduced, with seasonal fluctuations.

Hospital admissions for ocular floor fractures showed a significant reduction associated with the introduction of ID scanners and the overall policy. Hospital admissions for intoxication showed modest reductions with the introduction of ID scanners; however, there were no significant changes in mandible, nasal bone or skull fractures.

The introduction of ID scanners into Fortitude Valley SNP saw significant reductions in police recorded serious assaults over all high alcohol hours, and in the 8pm to midnight and 3am to 6am time periods. The reduction between midnight and 3am was not significant. In addition to this, ID scanners contributed to the significance of the full policy measures effect in the 8pm to midnight and 3am to 6am on weekends.

In Toowoomba, there was a reduction in serious assaults reported to police for the whole intervention, but not for ID scanners specifically. Further, there was a reduction in ambulance callouts during high alcohol hours (8pm to midnight) with the introduction of ID scanners.

The introduction of ID scanners was not associated with significant reduction in police-reported serious assaults in any other SNPs with enough assaults on which to conduct analyses. ID scanners were also associated with significant reductions in ambulance callouts during high alcohol hours in Surfers Paradise (midnight to 3am).

The findings tend to suggest that ID scanners are primarily focused on antisocial behaviour, rather than intoxication and injury, though there is not enough data yet to account for seasonal trends.

One issue which has been raised by media commentators a number of times has been a number of people that have been identified by ID scanners as attempting to enter venues when banned. There are two ways of thinking about determining whether ID scanners are being effective in terms of the small number of people on banning orders attempting to enter venues. The most logical way, and the way in which other issues like drink-driving are measured, is that having a small number of people attempting to breach bans means that they clearly know that they will be unable to enter venues and therefore do not attempt to break the law in first place. Clearly, this is a desirable outcome.

On the other hand, a range of commentators seem to want to suggest that a small number of people trying to enter venues means that ID scanners are not working. This logic seems naive at best, as having a lot of incidents where people are trying to break the law is hardly desirable and means that both the communication of the legislation, and the respect for the law are failing, let alone individuals' understanding of how the technology works and implications for them of trying to enter the venues. However, such understandings have not been sought by Queensland media.

In terms of impact on business, there was no significant impact on foot traffic, transport usage or live music performances associated with the introduction of ID scanners. However, the precinct mapping study did identify that more venues had queues outside them after the introduction of ID scanners than before. As discussed earlier, while there have always been queues outside venues, and some of them will be a part of either the business strategy or reflect the venue being full, there has been an impact

on venues with events that require many people to enter the venue in a short period of time. It remains to be seen whether continued technological improvements and culture change ameliorate this impact and a number of policy adjustments are discussed below.

While a number of industry representatives claimed that there would be displacement of troublemakers to non-SNPs, the police-recoded assault data reported above demonstrate that there has been no significant change in assaults recorded outside SNPs across Queensland.

Many key informants believed that the introduction of ID scanners was a worthwhile investment from a longer-term perspective, especially in terms of changing culture in and around venues and of being a measure which works on individual responsibility for behaviour.

The major benefits outlined by key informants were: 1) the utility in helping to enforce banning orders; 2) increasing public safety, and; 3) identifying troublemakers. On the other hand, problems identified by key informants included: 1) delays in getting large volumes of patrons into venues quickly; 2) the need to scan patrons of community clubs twice; 3) the need to rescan patrons who have left the club briefly (e.g. going to the toilet or having a cigarette); 4) the requirement to have a crowd controller directly overseeing the ID scanning and checking IDs, although this issue was addressed in legislative changes introduced in December 2018.

Key informants also talked about the implementation process being too quick and the need for greater awareness-raising activities with patrons around the ID scanners, their benefits and the requirements of the law.

Another key variable in relationship to the success or otherwise of ID scanners in reducing alcohol-related violence is the success of patron bans. This requires both the continued use of bans by police, and ensuring that the bans are of an appropriate duration to impact on the individual's behaviour. If the current bans are not long enough to act as a salient punishment and potential deterrent for recidivist behaviour, then ID scanners will not be able to fulfil their potential on this front.

Finally, this report has documented the additional important benefit of ID scanners in terms of solution of crime and rapid identification of perpetrators. The quick and definitive solution of crimes in the nightlife benefit both the community and the industry, although it is difficult to quantify in terms of being a positive outcome for victims. The evidence provided in this report documents the repeated use of ID scanners to solve crimes which may not have been solved previously and that they have often been used as corroborating evidence in other cases. While an economic analysis was not possible, there is substantial benefit to the community in the early detection of crime and the

definitive nature of the evidence from ID scanners, which can mean convictions are quick and court cases are short.

7.5.7.4. STRATEGIES TO ENSURE INDUSTRY STAFF ARE SAFE WHEN TRAVELLING TO AND FROM WORK IN THE EARLY HOURS

The TAFV legislation also prioritised support for programmes which assisted industry staff in travelling to and from work safely. While no specific programs were implemented, a number of initiatives funded through the legislation and managed by the OLGR, such as street security patrols, have included this outcome in their aims and objectives. However, there is no evidence to suggest the impact of such measures in either direction.

7.5.8. POLICE AND COURT POWERS

A range of programs received continuing funding under the TAFV legislation to support offenders to receive support to address their alcohol and drug use problems.

7.5.8.1. TARGETED REFERRALS TO DRUG AND ALCOHOL INFORMATION AND COUNSELLING

Targeted referrals were made on an ad-hoc basis and no systematic record has been ket.

7.5.8.1.1. DAAR

Referrals to DAAR ceased early in the program because of a requirement that people who wish to be referred to the program also admit their alcohol/drug use. This was perceived as being an admission of guilt by the legal fraternity and almost no cases have been referred to DAAR from this source since that time.

7.5.8.2. BANNING TROUBLEMAKERS FROM PUBS, CLUBS AND PRECINCTS

Banning troublemakers from venues has been a core mechanism for operators to manage patron behaviour for thousands of years. In recent decades in Australia, other parties such as police, liquor accords and courts in Australia have also become involved in the practice. Of course, patron banning is only effective when the individual can be identified -- thus the requirement for mandatory ID scanners. Despite the historical and contemporary popularity of banning troublemakers from pubs, there is little literature regarding the impact of doing so, whether that be on the individual, the venue, or the wider community. Anecdotes abound describing troublesome patrons being banned from one venue or district and simply displacing to another. The use of exclusion reflects key assumptions in relation to alcohol-related disorderly behaviour and effective management of risks to which it may

give rise, but the evidence supporting much of the banning-related interventions remains largely unsubstantiated. Previous research has certainly found that it is popular with key stakeholders in nightlife precincts, including venue operators (45), and even patrons (2).

Farmer and colleagues (35) reviewed banning provisions in different states across Australia (see Table 214). Despite the steady expansion of banning powers across Australian jurisdictions, there is limited evidence of which combination of duration and extent of the penalty works best (35).

Given banning orders were in place in Queensland prior to introduction of the TAFV legislation, it is difficult to attribute any specific changes in the post-TAFV period to patron banning. Every policy change regarding patron banning in the past has included other elements as well, making a determination of qualitative effectiveness in Queensland impossible at this stage.

Table 214: Summary of police-imposed banning provisions in each Australian jurisdiction

Jurisdiction	Act & date	Scope	Maximum duration	Review option
Victoria	Liquor Control Reform Amendment Act 2007; Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & Other Matters) Act 2010	Designated areas Designated areas	24 hours 72 hours	Police only
South Australia	Statute Amendment (Power to Bar) Act 2008	Specified areas	6 months/ indefinite (for ≥3 bans)	Liquor & Gambling Commissioner (if ban ≥1 month)
Western Australia	Liquor Control Amendment Act 2010	Specified areas	12 months	Liquor Commission (if ban ≥1 month)
Northern Territory	Liquor Legislation Amendment Act 2010	Designated areas	48 hours	Police only
New South Wales	Liquor Amendment (Kings Cross Plan of Management) Act 2013 Liquor Amendment Act 2014	Kings Cross Prescribed precincts	48 hours 48 hours	Police only
Queensland	Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 2014	Safe night precincts	10 days	Queensland Civil & Administrative Tribunal (QCAT)
Tasmania	Liquor Licensing Amendment Act 2015	Specified areas, or as determined by police officer	6 months	Police only

Source: Farmer, C., A. Curtis and P. Miller (2017). "The steady proliferation of Australia's discretionary police-imposed patron banning powers: An unsubstantiated cycle of assertion and presumption." Criminology & Criminal Justice **18**(4): 431-449.

Key informants provided a range of perspectives regarding patron banning. For the most part these perspectives were consistent with previous literature on the intervention (45). While a small number felt that bans could have negative outcomes for individuals, the majority believed that patron bans were an integral part of nightlife and an important tool for patron management and education.

There were some concerns about banning by the venue from those who were supportive of police bans. The concerns revolved around misuse of the bans, for example vexatious bans:

> If I was to suggest another way for that to happen it would be that, you know, as a venue manager you say yes, I want to put a venue ban on that person because they abused one of the bartenders or they threw a glass or whatever, and that then should be escalated to the police or Licensing who then come into the venue, look at the footage, read some instant reports and then they make the final decision on yes or no, that should be a ban. I just don't think that you should be giving … an 18-year-old bartender or an 18-year-old security guard … the ability to ban someone for life from all SNPs. (Licensee-17)

> I've heard stories of people banning people for stupid reasons and like I've heard people come down from another venue saying a banning notice has come up, there's no reason on there and they've said, "I slept with the security guard's missus and they've banned me." I've had another venue down the road giving someone like 10 years for like jumping the fence;… it's like it's just out of control, these bans, and I'm like, this is dangerous. (Licensee-21)

Finally, a substantial number of key informants believed that the biggest problem with the current banning system was that the current 10 day limit on a ban was inadequate:

> Look, probably a few months. Yeah, like I would say three months is a fair time to allow that person to clean their act up a little bit and pull their head in, but ten days is certainly not enough. You know, if someone commits an offence on a Saturday night they only have to miss one weekend and then they can go back out with no problems. So yeah, I don't think it's long enough. (Other-06)

Key informants also suggested that ban length should escalate with successive offences. The most common length of first ban discussed was 3 months, with subsequent offences being increased to a year. The issue of subsequent offences also raises the opportunity to view patron bans as signals of dysfunction within the individual, and that a trial be conducted of engaging with young people (via youth services) to assess their wellbeing, assess their criminogenic needs, and potentially recruit them for further intervention be implemented. Ideally, the first stage of the trial would explore whether first-time offenders were the right target group, or whether second time offenders, a much smaller

group, were the right mix of need and intervention group size. A person who receives a second ban could be required to have a 6 month minimum, but this could be open to review upon recommendation from a youth worker after an intervention schedule was completed.

In summary, patron banning remains an integral part of licensed venue and patron behaviour management. The introduction of ID scanning has brought with it substantial opportunities for improvements in safety as well as patron management. The current system, in conjunction with ID scanning, does not appear to have made major changes to levels of violence, but it is clear that the system has been successful in limiting the number of people on bans trying to enter licensed venues. Key informants suggested that the current 10 day police ban is amenable to review, as it does not realistically represent a punishment for most people attending SNPs. An increasing punishment level was also recommended, along with clear avenues of review and measures to be introduced to prevent the use of vexatious bans by some venue personnel.

7.6. CONCLUSIONS

The measures introduced have been associated with some promising reductions in alcohol-related harm, although these reductions have been modest. Most notably, nobody has died in Queensland entertainment precincts during HAH due to alcohol-related violence in SNPs since the implementation of the TAFV legislation. Coroner's data suggests there has been a reduction in alcohol-related deaths from assaults[58].

Promising reductions in ambulance call-outs, serious assaults, and hospital admissions have been documented. Each incident reduced represents substantial benefit to the individuals involved and their families, local communities, workers dealing with trauma as well as a reduced financial cost to the community.

This report has used a wide array of information sources to understand the impacts of the TAFV legislation, to investigate some of the reasons behind the results and gain insight into what else can be done to reduce the burden on the community of alcohol-related violence and harm. It has highlighted that different areas in Queensland have experienced different consequences associated with the legislation, often due to their already existing differing levels of harm and consumption.

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[58] not all the data is processed yet and caution is warranted

It is clear from the data that the harm associated with nightlife in Queensland is very substantial, and some figures indicate that harm is higher than in other comparable states (2, 16, 19). Younger people (18-19 years old), and especially young women, tend to experience the greatest levels of harm, particularly unwanted sexual attention in and around licensed venues.

This is especially worrying given the national trend of declining drinking levels in young people across Australia. It suggests that the underlying drivers of drinking and violence in Queensland represent a much greater challenge than other jurisdictions, requiring stronger interventions. This is even more concerning when considering that the evidence from around Australia also suggests a divergence of trends in the population, whereby drinking and violence patterns are most ingrained in the most vulnerable populations.

However, it is clear that the current measures were also undermined by some industry and patron responses, and have not gone far enough, especially considering that Queensland drinkers report some of the highest levels of drinking, intoxication and harm in the country. These higher levels of harm were in place before the TAFV legislation, and have may have indicated that stronger measures were required than other jurisdictions.

The potential impact of the measures have also likely been partially undermined by legislative anomalies left over from previous governments that undermine the successful of venues discovered serving unduly intoxicated patrons. Burden of proof requirements under the criminal code mean that it has been virtually impossible for police and OLGR inspectors to enforce the law. Previous research has demonstrated how crucial good regulation and enforcement use in creating safer nightlife environments. In effect, this means that some of the benefits of the TAFV legislation may have been undermined by venues serving people well beyond intoxication without fear of successful prosecution. It is impossible to determine the impact of this on the current trends.

As with many policy changes, there were a small number of implementation problems and unintended consequences (especially in regards to ID scanning), most of which can be addressed through the recommendations made later in this report. There has been very little or no demonstrable harm to the nightlife industry in the objective data available to the research team. Many businesses report doing better. The number of people attending SNPs has remained stable or increased, and tourism in Queensland has continued to flourish. The number of people arriving in and departing from fortitude Valley has continued to substantially increase every year. Some of the policy options below are aimed at further reducing inconvenience for venue operators and patrons.

8. KEY FINDINGS AND POLICY OPTIONS

In light of the study's findings, we present below a range of key issues identified in the report and potential responses which can be implemented by the government to further reduce alcohol-related violence and harm in the community. Each policy option has been given a rating based on the existence of evidence supporting it, whether the findings from the current report support it, or whether there is currently no relevant evidence, but it has been implemented elsewhere.

The presented options are not mutually exclusive and can be implemented in phases, or as a comprehensive response. Recommendations will be made separately, informed by the discussion below and the evidence presented in this report.

There are also a range of recommendations made of a more operational manner which come directly from the information collected in this study, but that do not have relevant evidence available from other jurisdictions or in the peer-reviewed literature.

8.1. EVIDENCE RATING SYSTEM

For the purpose of this report a rating system was adapted from previous work (120) to inform the subsequent discussion. Ratings are outlined in Table 215 below.

Table 215 Evidence and effectiveness rating system

Symbol	Criteria
✔✔✔	To achieve the highest level of impact (✔✔✔), an intervention must have substantial compelling evidence for its effectiveness, both in an Australian and an International context. All relevant literature is supportive of the intervention.
✔✔	The second level of evidence (✔✔) can be achieved by any intervention which has strong evidence for positive outcomes, however studies may be confined to a context outside of Australia, or there may be limited evidence of impact in an Australian context. There may also be studies which have small effect sizes.
✔	The third level of impact that can be achieved (✔) is achieved by interventions which have research that is supportive of its effectiveness, however effect sizes are small and number of studies may be limited.
?	? is given to any intervention where evidence in inconclusive for its effectiveness. This may mean the evidence is both supportive and contradictive of the intervention, or research is the area is so limited a conclusion cannot be drawn.
✖	✖ is indicative of evidence that is unsupportive of the intervention as being effective. Evidence consistently produces reliable findings which indicate a lack of, or poor outcomes, for reducing harm.
**	This rating is given where there was strong evidence supplied within the current study, but there are no existing other studies. This rating is achieved for interventions which received support from two or more separate data sources within the current study.
*	This rating is given where there was evidence supplied within the current study, but there are no existing other studies. This rating is achieved for interventions which received support from a single data source within the current study.

8.2. FURTHER REDUCING ALCOHOL AND DRUG-RELATED HARM

As shown throughout the report, while the modest reductions in trading hours and subsequent introduction of ID scanners have had some demonstrable benefit, and had very little impact on industry, the levels of harm remain high and will require substantial further intervention to achieve further reductions in the substantial harm, as well as the large cost to the community of this harm.

International evidence on the effective policy responses to reducing alcohol-related harm has consistently identified three key levers: price, availability and access (74).

Based on this reasoning, some of these below policy options are included as recommendations, whereas some are not. A number of recommendations have been made without discussion in this

section because they come directly from the findings of this report and have no external evidence to be compared with.

Option 1: Close all venues in SNPs at 3:30am

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓

Previous interventions around the world found to successfully reduce alcohol-related harms restricted access to alcohol during very late nights by encouraging patrons to leave entertainment districts (1, 2, 11, 112, 121-123), and replicating these conditions is likely to lead to further reductions in alcohol-related harm. The peer-reviewed literature has only dealt with the licensing restrictions which actually close venues and the precinct mapping and interviews in this report suggest that the loophole allowing venues to stay open has allowed patrons (often those who are either drug-affected, disaffected and whom are now much more fatigued) to continue to mill about SNPs, ultimately watering down the impact of closing venues and sending people home. Newcastle specifically, had the policy of last drinks at 3am, with the venues closing at 3:30.

Option 2: Introduce a 1:30am One-way door policy in all SNPs

Evidence rating: ?

Both Newcastle and Sydney (104, 110) involved the use of precinct-wide one-way doors as a part of the overall strategy. While one-way doors as a stand-alone intervention do not have strong evidence (120, 124), they have been an integral part of previously successful strategies (2, 110, 111). However, it has been hypothesised that one-way doors may reduce pre-drinking, or at least push it earlier into the night (94). In light of the continued high levels of harm being experienced in Queensland, the introduction of one-way doors is a viable and relevant policy option for the government to consider. While precinct wide one-way doors as a blanket policy may not be applicable, the use of one-way doors for areas that have problems with movement between venues or high levels of pre-drinking has supporting evidence from the New South Wales violent venues scheme (125) and may be indicated as a more targeted response.

Option 3: Stop the Extended Trading Permits scheme.

Evidence rating: ✓✓

While no national or international literature exists regarding extended trading permits, there is an extensive literature (12) regarding closing venues earlier. Extended trading permits ultimately act to undermine the intent of the legislation, and also practically extend drinking sessions on the busiest nights of the year. It is clear that on these nights, emergency services are stretched and rates of harm are high despite massive investment by the community in deployment of police and other services.

There appears little sense in adding further drinking hours and alcohol consumption to the mix. While there has been a substantial reduction in the number of permits granted since changes were implemented in Feb 2017, over 500 were still granted in 2018. While the extended trading permits scheme on its own is not likely to make a large difference to alcohol-related harm, it will still be a contributor and removing it is likely to reduce the number of assaults and injuries related to alcohol in Queensland.

Option 4: Introduce a two-year moratorium on new liquor licences for off-licence sales and on-licensed premises except for restaurants and licensed cafes where people can only purchase alcohol if they are having a meal.

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓

There is a large and convincing international body of evidence demonstrating that increased numbers and density of outlets selling liquor is associated with increased violence and harms (13, 126, 127). Since the introduction of the TAFV legislation, there has been a substantial increase in the number of liquor licenses in Queensland, which is likely to have partially undermined the impact of trading hour restrictions. While there is historical precedent for reducing the number of liquor licenses through buyback schemes, a more contemporary solution in an age of increasing population is to place a moratorium on the number of new licences being granted. This is a strategy used by the Queensland Government previously and is being used by other state Governments such as Victoria and the Northern Territory. The moratorium should also include licence transfers – or at least variations to a licence that would increase availability - to prevent transfers that would increase availability by increasing the size of an outlet.

Option 5: Introduce Last Drinks questions to Emergency Services across Queensland

During the course of this study, a number of issues have been identified in terms of the data being collected about alcohol consumption and related harm in Queensland.

The use of Last Drinks data has been found of benefit in NSW (128) and New Zealand (129) for being able to accurately identify the most problematic venues associated with incidents attended by police. This forms the basis of licencing schemes and informs a range of licensing decisions including the granting of new licenses and changes to existing licences.

There is a strong case for Last Drinks data collected to be collected from Emergency Departments in Queensland, following the Cardiff model implemented in Wales found to be responsible for reductions in alcohol-related violence attendances at hospital emergency departments (130). In

Cardiff, post data-sharing, police-recorded assault rates fell from seven to five a month per 100,000 population, compared with an increase from five to eight in comparison cities (131). Following the model's implementation in England, over a 6-year post data-sharing period in Wirral, UK, intentional ED injury attendances decreased by 35.6% and alcohol- related assault attendances decreased by 30.3% (132). Last Drinks data are now mandatorily collected across England and will be collected in the Northern Territory. It would also allow for more targeted information for off-premise venues, which contribute disproportionality to harm (133), as well as for on-premise venues.

In addition to police and emergency department data, the collection of last drinks information by ambulance officers and safe night support services workers would ensure complete coverage of emergency services. This could also be linked with liquor licensing data to ensure accurate compilation of lists.

Option 6: Introduce a high-risk venues scheme which replicates and builds on the NSW Violent Venues scheme to incorporate Last Drinks data from hospitals and ambulance attendance information.

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓

The Violent Venues scheme in NSW has been consistently successful at reducing alcohol-related violence in NSW. The scheme primarily uses last drinks questions collected by NSW Police (128, 134) and has been associated with a 25 % reduction in assaults since 2008. Just as relevant is that the vast majority of venues identified in the past five years as being most violent changed their practices and are no longer on the register. This data collection has been ongoing for more than a decade and successfully underpins a number of strategies in New South Wales, such as the violent venues scheme and the three strikes policy. The scheme is a targeted response built on evidence focused on reducing harm to the community. Implementation costs are very low and models exist from around the world which can be transported and adapted.

One key limitation with the Violent Venues scheme is that it only considers police-recorded incidents, a recording system which carries a number of flaws and misses out on a substantial proportion of intoxication and injury cases related to venues (83).

This is a significant limitation of the scheme, as it does not consider the very substantial burden on ambulance, ED and hospital admissions of heavy intoxication and injury. Murray (now de Andrade) identified that of 492 ambulance assault cases (December 2003-June 2006), only 118 (24%) had a police incident match, based on date (accounting for change at midnight), time (within 1/2 hour of

each other), location, gender, and description of incident and injuries (135). As shown in this report, this represents around half of the self-reported harm reported by patrons, and most of the workload that arrives in the Emergency Department on weekend nights.

As with the NSW Violent Venues scheme, venues could be categorised on a number of levels, depending on the level of alcohol-related harm that has been associated with them. Venues which have (for example) more than 20 alcohol-related incidents in any one year (including licencing breaches, police-recorded assaults, identified ED attendances or ambulance attendances) would be placed on Level 1 of the register. Venues which have more than 10 alcohol-related incidents in any one year (including licencing breaches, police-recorded assaults, identified emergency department attendances or ambulance attendances) would be placed on Level 2 of the register.

Information for the scheme should be collated by an office separate to any of the interested agencies, such as the Office of Statistics. The Violent Venues list would be released every six months by the Queensland Government Statistician's Office (QGSO). One potential model could look like:

Venues on Level 1 would have a number of special conditions imposed including:

1. A mandatory 1.00 a.m. venue specific one-way door
2. Mandatory networked ID scanners, if not already inside an SNP
3. Mandatory CCTV at all entry/exit points[59]
4. Ten-minute alcohol sales 'time out' every hour after midnight or active distribution of water and/or food.
5. Level 1 venues which remain on the register at Level 1 for more than 2 consecutive years be subject to 1am closing times until they have recorded six months without more than two alcohol-related incidents.
6. A venue which remains on Level 1 for a further year should have their liquor licence revoked.
7. Venues which improve can be moved to Level 2 or removed from the list depending on the level of improvement.

Venues on Level 2 would have a number of special conditions imposed including:

1. Mandatory networked ID scanners, if not already inside an SNP
2. Mandatory CCTV at all entry/exit points
3. Level 2 venues which remain on the register at Level 2 for more than 2 consecutive years will be escalated to Level 1.

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[59] Subject to government adoption of Option 8 presented below.

4. Venues will be removed from Level 2 of the register after the first 12 months once they have not recorded more than three alcohol-related incidents for a six-month period

Option 7: Increase of minimum police bans to 1 month with an option of up to 6 months.

Evidence rating: ✓*

The current police banning system in conjunction with ID scanning does not appear to have made major changes to levels of violence in SNPs across Queensland, although there are some promising signs. However, it is clear that the system has been successful in limiting the number of people on bans trying to enter licensed venues. Key informants suggested that the current 10 day police ban is amenable to review, as it does not realistically represent a punishment for most people attending SNPs. An increasing punishment level was also recommended. Banning may suit additional purposes such as providing a cooling off period or preventing potential harm by removing problematic individuals from the nightlife. While increasing the length of bans handed out by police will certainly act to increase the prevention level and punishment level, it is not likely to increase effectiveness in terms of a cooling off period. While there is an intuitive appeal for much longer bans, current policing and sentencing evidence (136, 137) suggests that it is important to not make penalties so great as to appear disproportionate for the offence, especially to the police officers administering the bans, since they are then less likely to implement the ban. While a ban of 10 days is only effectively one weekend, and would not be seen as a penalty for many people as most patrons interviewed reported that they do not go out every weekend, a three month ban as a minimum might be seen as being too punitive by operational police, and use of the ban might decline. Following this reasoning, a one-year trial is recommend for month-long bans, escalating to a 6 month ban with an attached youth or adult services assessment for subsequent offenders. Key variables to be considered would include recidivism rates in this population, assault rates in the community, and officer willingness to use longer bans. The scheme should also include provisions for appeal to the bans. It may be that the Magistrates Court is the appropriate body to manage appeals, and it might also be appropriate that normal fees be waived for people apply with low incomes.

Option 8: Add an offence to the Liquor Act of making vexatious bans for ID scanner operators/licensees

Evidence rating: **

Key informants identified the need to ensure that operators do not post vexatious bans on the network which excluded patrons from other venues unfairly. For example, one venue could ban the staff of another venue, and that record would appear on all ID scanners. It is proposed that recording of

vexatious bans on the ID scanner network be made an offence under the liquor act, and that investigations and appeals can be made to the OLGR.

Option 9: Limit the amount of time that bans from venues remain on the system

Evidence rating: **

Key informants identified a number of examples where individuals were banned by venues on the ID scanner system for 10 or more years for a single transgression. While this is perfectly acceptable within their own venue, posting such bands on the network without justifying explanation undermines principles of fairness. It is proposed that a limit of six months be placed on venue bans uploaded to the network as standard practice. An option should be included for venue operators to apply to the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation for longer bans when they deem them appropriate.

Option 10: Remove funding to SNP project grants scheme

Evidence rating: **, ✓✓✓

The evidence presented in this report regarding the impact of the separately funded projects for SNP projects showed that none of them were found to have a significant impact on serious assault rates. Further, none of the SNP project grant measures put in place had any substantial peer-reviewed literature to support them. On the basis of this, these funded measures could be considered pilots, but that the evidence is not supportive.

Option 11: Amend the liquor Act to make CCTV mandatory for all venues that trade after midnight

Evidence rating: **

The evidence collected in this report showed that areas outside Brisbane have continued to experience high levels of alcohol-related harm and have been resistant to the current modest measures. One inadvertent consequence of the TAFV legislation was that some venues that were previously required to operate CCTV on entries and exits are no longer required to do so. Key informants reported that this presents problems in terms of crowd management, and solution of crime, and creates a situation where troublemakers would be more inclined to attend venues outside SNPs. There is some anecdotal evidence to support this occurring in North Queensland.

The current legislation is complicated and has special conditions for Brisbane, but not for other areas, which vary substantially, reflecting historical licensing conditions and interventions.

Therefore, it is suggested that the current conditions and qualifications around CCTV be replaced by provisions in the liquor act to simply stating that any venue operating after midnight requires CCTV

(of the standard previously outlined for Brisbane venues) to be in operation during trading hours. Further, they should meet the other requirements outlined in the act for Brisbane in terms of daily checking and equipment quality.

Option 12: Police breathalysing and engagement of patrons early in the night

Evidence rating: ?

In a recent paper, Devilly and colleagues briefly described the impact of police and researchers engaging with patrons and providing them BAC estimates amongst other measures (33). The research team obtained arrest/charge rates and the number of logged calls for assistance made to the police. They compared these data from the same nights and locations for the previous year and found significant reductions in personal crime and public order offences. The design outlined is not able to control for confounders, and as discussed in this report and elsewhere, the use of lower level offences and calls to service do not account for differences in policing recording and arrest practice at the time, differences in the number of police on the night, nor other factors which might account for changes such as other events on specific nights. Further, the mechanism of change is not clear. It may be that having police officers talk to patrons changes the behaviour of the police officers in terms of their likelihood to hand out penalty notices, or it may change the behaviour of patrons in terms of their willingness to approach police and point out issues rather than making calls. Our observations noted that police behaviour in different sites was quite different in terms of the way in which officers engaged with the public or stood off in groups. Regardless, given this was not the primary aim of the project, the data reported is interesting and deserves consideration. Ideally, the intervention would be tested in a range of sites with a randomisation element across multiple sites, and while the current level of evidence on the intervention is limited to being a secondary outcome in a single paper, it warrants further trialling.

Option 13: For every alcohol advertisement, a government-produced public health advertisement should immediately follow (funded via a levy on all sales by alcohol producers) informing the public of the harms associated with drinking, and addressing social norms around intoxication.

Evidence rating: ?

The current study documented very high levels of drinking and harm in Queensland which appear resistant to current efforts, indicating that stronger messaging and intervention is warranted. French authorities have used this proposed model; concern about rising levels of childhood obesity led the French Government to take action on junk food advertising in 2004. It passed public health legislation

under which advertisements on television or radio 'for beverages containing added sugar, salt or artificial sweeteners and for food products processed and sold in France must contain seven percent health information'. For example, on television and in cinemas, health messages are shown on a thin horizontal band (corresponding to 7% of the height of the screen), or as a screened notice displayed just after the advertisement (138).

Option 14: National Health and Medical Research Council guidelines for low-risk drinking could be prominently posted on all points of sale in Queensland.

Evidence rating: ✓✓

Current levels of awareness and knowledge about low-risk drinking guidelines are poor. It should be mandatory to provide constant reminders on all advertisements, rather than vague calls for 'responsible drinking' campaigns. These 'responsible drinking campaigns' have been strongly advocated for by the alcohol industry (76, 77), can actually validate bad drinking practices (78), are used to promote the product by industry (77), and typically worsen the drinking practices of young people (75). Alternatively, research on warning labels, including tobacco labelling, has provided evidence that these labels can help raise awareness of specific risks (139, 140). Combined with other approaches to reducing harm, alcohol warning labels can be effective ways to communicate risk at the point of consumption. It is difficult to reduce demand without accurate information about related health-related consequences being disseminated to consumers at the point of consumption. While it is outside the power of the Queensland government to implement mandatory warning labels at point of consumption, it is feasible to ensure that NHMRC guidelines for low-risk alcohol consumption be prominently placed within 2m of all points of sale.

Option 15: Conduct a trial of the 'clubs against drugs' program

Evidence rating: ✓✓

Illicit drug use was found at all sites, and drug use was found to significantly predict people experiencing greater violence and injury. Funded trials of interventions such as the 'clubs against drugs' program (141) are recommended. Venues identified as having a lot of drug use could be subject to conditions to remove flat surfaces in toilets and having their security increase surveillance of toilet areas.

Evidence rating: ✓✓, **

Three out of four casinos across the state were identified as contributing to a significant proportion of police-recorded assaults. This would undoubtedly extend to other harms given findings in Melbourne which identified Crown Casino as the leading source of alcohol-related admissions to St Vincent's Hospital Emergency Department (https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/alcohol-lands-one-in-four-weekend-emergency-patients-in-hospital-with-crown-casino-and-the-mcg-the-leading-danger-spots/news-story/d7233b285f2f615057fe35fef99d89f3). Further, the 24-hour trading of casinos in SNPs materially undermines the reality of limiting the hours that liquor is sold as well as the spirit of the legislation which focussed on reducing alcohol supply in the community.

The fact that casinos are not a part of the mandatory scanning network is also unhelpful. Clearly, it is important that casinos are alternate venues for people banned from other venues, and likewise, that people who cause problems at the casino are still able to go out to venues elsewhere.

It is likely that the government's ability to respond to this issue is controlled by contractual arrangements established by previous governments and would likely result in huge financial costs to the community if they tried to make changes. However, it needs to be clear that casinos play a primary role in undermining the wellbeing of the community and exacerbating alcohol-related violence in cities. The fairest approach for dealing with casinos, given the different levels of harm seen across the state, is to make them subject to the high-risk venues scheme listed above. Casinos that currently trade with little recorded harm can continue to do so, but those that cause demonstrable harm in the community will be subject to the same rules as the rest of the alcohol industry.

Option 17: Improve the collection of Alcohol sales data:

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓, **

Previous research and policy documentation has found that the collection of accurate and timely data on alcohol sales is a crucial piece of information for public health and social order policy (142). The current evaluation has found that extant alcohol sales data collection is unreliable and is not a valid tool for policy making or evaluation. Most of the problems stem from current voluntary processes and a lack of accountability or verification. These issues can be addressed by three key changes:

a)   Liquor suppliers who do not provide comprehensive and accurate data within three months of request should be subject to a substantive penalty.

b)   The OLGR should be given powers under the liquor act to audit liquor suppliers' records to ensure that data provided is accurate.

c)   The OLGR should conduct random audits of 5% of the data provided annually.

8.3.   CONTINUED HIGH LEVELS OF PRE-DRINKING

As seen in previous studies (2, 16, 94), this research identifies pre-drinking as a significant predictor of alcohol-related harm and a major impediment to responsible service of alcohol. The impact of pre-drinking documented in this study is substantially greater than reported in previous studies (2, 16, 19). It suggests an even greater need for effective action. Current pricing regimes mean that packaged liquor outlets contribute to alcohol-related harm. Changing these trends will require serious, substantial, evidence-based interventions across a range of variables (e.g. price, availability and advertising) (13, 74).

Option 18: Introduce a Minimum Unit Price on alcohol across Queensland.

Evidence rating: ✓✓

The most evidence-based measure to reduce alcohol consumption is to increase the price of alcohol (13, 96), either through taxation or the use of a minimum unit price. By targeting the very cheapest alcohol sold in the community, the measure affects problem and young drinkers; both groups are most likely to experience alcohol-related harm (143). A minimum price was introduced in the Northern Territory in 2018, and was associated with a 18.2% reduction in violence after 6 months when implemented in Saskatchewan, Canada (98). The recent Riley review in the Northern Territory recommended a minimum unit price of $1.50 per alcohol unit (144) and it is suggested that this evidence-based amount is appropriate as an initial level for Queensland, with provision for adjustment according to changes in the cost of living.

As a part of this study, we asked venue operators for their perspectives on a minimum price per unit of alcohol in the context of recent policy change in the Northern Territory. Of the key informants who answered this question, there was general support for the idea:

> It would have to be more. A schooner here is, like, $8, $9 kind of thing, so what if it was going to be $5, it's still going to be cheaper to be at home than go out. … I'm starting at the same price that the public is and having to put a mark-up on it... (Licensee-18)

With virtually no implementation cost, a wide array of empirical support (97-99, 143), and very few limitations of any type, excise taxation and minimum pricing of alcohol can certainly be regarded as a

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highly (if not the most) efficient, cost-effective, and encompassing approach to reducing overall alcohol consumption and thereby alcohol-related harm and social costs.

Option 19: Introduce a ban on all advertising of alcohol promotions based on price

Evidence rating: ✓

Given the evidence regarding the strong relationship between price and consumption, the government should consider banning of all promotion of alcohol reporting price. Current regulations prohibit on-premise venues to advertise price, but this does not extend to packaged liquor outlets, which are the source of alcohol used for pre-drinking. Extending the ban on advertising alcohol on the basis of price levels the playing field and reduces the amount of alcohol advertising in the community, which in turn have been found to have beneficial effects on overall.

Option 20: Promoting happy hours to get people into nightspots earlier.

Evidence rating: ✘

Some commentators have proposed a counterintuitive solution to restrictions, proposing that there should be greater advertising of cheap drinks in happy hours to draw people into nightspots (145). There is little relevant evidence to draw on because there has never been such a huge price disparity between the price of alcohol available from packaged liquor outlets versus the price of alcohol at licensed venues. In the DANTE report (2), key informants reported that alcohol was being sold by the supermarkets cheaper than they could buy it from wholesale outlets. In this context, it would be impossible for the on licensed premises to realistically compete on price via a happy hour promotion.

The evidence that does exist has mixed findings stretching back over time. Where some find that it has increased drinking levels (146), especially in heavy drinkers, others have found little or no impact (147), although the most recent and best designed study (148) found that people who had been drinking at happy hours promotions were more likely to experience negative events and engage in illegal behaviours.

Option 21: Trial the introduction of government support scheme for original live music played before 10 pm.

Evidence rating: ?,*

This evaluation documented that while overall numbers of live music performances were increasing - an existing trend unaffected by the introduction of the TAFV legislation – key informants claimed that a myriad of changes in the nightlife setting and music over the past decades had made them less able to support emerging live music performers, and more reliant on alcohol sales and late-night trade. The

one venue that made an archive of its gigs publicly available demonstrates a decline in original live music performances since 2012 (data were only available until 2016). While ID scanning legislation has impacted some live music venues across the state, a range of reforms have been recommended to address those issues. However, given the longer-term declining trends documented in the Live Music chapter, simply changing liquor legislation is unlikely to help.

It was also suggested that live music being funded by late night drinking is not a healthy basis for ongoing development. However, a number of key informants talked about their successful business practice of promoting original live music earlier in the evening. Venues did this because it attracted patrons to the venues earlier, but covering the cost of opening earlier was a key factor in the viability of this strategy. These narratives suggest that a scheme which both supports original live music and gets patrons attending venues earlier on nights when venues open, or on weeknights when venues might not typically open, might warrant a trial. Venues could be supported to cover the costs of staging original live music earlier in the evening or on weeknights. This might be achieved by having a scheme that allows musicians, bands and/or venues to apply for financial support to stage original live music performances. This financial support would cover the costs of opening a venue to stage a performance that might not normally be commercially viable. Venues could attract patrons earlier or on weeknights, and receive some compensation for their ongoing support of original live music in Queensland. Such a scheme could be administered by a music industry or performing arts body.

8.4.   LIQUOR LICENSING AND COMPLIANCE

A crucial element of the impact of the TAFV legislation is the regulatory context in which it occurs. A large amount of literature points to the importance of monitoring and enforcement underpinning levels of harm and venue and patron behaviour in and around nightlife precincts (9). The TAFV legislation included funding for expanded liquor licensing and compliance activities. While the evidence reported herein documents increased levels of activity by the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation, it also highlights the issue that without adequate legislation, licensing officers and police are unable to successfully prosecute venues that breach their responsible service of alcohol requirements. In line with this, it is indicated that a number of changes may be required in the Liquor Act to underpin the activities of enforcement officials and ultimately to ensure that venues are meeting the requirements of their liquor licences.

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓ , **

The current evaluation documented that there is a very, very low rate of successful prosecutions of venues for serving intoxicated people. This is largely the result of the onus sitting with the regulator to prove that the signs of undue intoxication which may have been visible/audible to a compliance officer and/or visible on CCTV footage were seen by person/s who served the person liquor or allowed the person to consume liquor. The relevant provisions place no positive onus upon the licensee and their employees/agents to take reasonable steps to ensure that an accurate assessment is made of a person/s state of intoxication. In effect, the less attentive a person is, the less likely it could be proven they served an unduly intoxicated person.

When it comes to alcohol consumption by a person who is unduly intoxicated, unless the employee/agent has directly engaged with the patron while the patron is showing the signs of undue intoxication, there is no ability to attribute an offence to any individual. In effect, the less interaction that is had with patrons, the less likely any blame can be attributed to an individual for a person being able to consume liquor while unduly intoxicated.

Further, in terms of the licensee themselves (who may be a corporate entity and therefore not physically present), at least for a first offence, an easy defence can be created by providing some level of training to staff and having then sign off on this - regardless of how the staff then operate in practice.

The regulator is also currently required to prove that the signs of undue intoxication were not the result of something other than liquor or drugs, e.g. physical impairment, when the OLGR are often not in a position to identify and interview the patron as an OLGR officer was not present at the time of the service/consumption occurring.

In an unsuccessful prosecution brought by OLGR, one argument put by the alleged offender at interview and later by defence counsel in court was that the alleged unduly intoxicated patron was always showing certain indicia when at the premises. No steps had been taken by the party being prosecuted to check with the patron concerned whether there was a reason other than liquor/drugs for the indicia of undue intoxication. The prospect that a person regularly frequenting licensed premises might 'always' display signs of intoxication because they are attending the premises while intoxicated was of no assistance to OLGR in this case.

Previous national and international research (9) has provided strong support for the need of consistent and reliable enforcement and monitoring to reduce alcohol-related harm.

<u>Option 23: Set up an independent liquor commission</u>

Evidence rating: ✓

The recent Riley review in the Northern Territory concluded that the community is best served by having an Independent Commission.

The Riley Review makes a number of recommendations regarding the re-introduction of an independent Liquor Commission in NT (there was one until 2015 when it was disbanded). The review reported that the consultation process for the review saw very strong support for the return of an independent commission, with the main rationale being the need for a tiered decision-making framework with separation between those making decisions and those undertaking enforcement and compliance, and the need for greater transparency and community involvement. Specific elements included:

2.2.1 A Liquor Commission be established as the independent and primary decision maker under the Liquor Act. 2.2.2 The Commission consist of four appointed members, with three members (Chair and two others) required to be in attendance for a hearing.

2.2.3 The Chair of the Commission be a lawyer with a minimum of five years of post-admission experience and be of good standing in the community.

2.2.4 At least one sitting member have a health background.

2.2.5 The structure and operations of the Commission reflect the matters discussed in this report.

2.2.6 The position of Director of Licensing be established, with the position being vested with the powers discussed in this report.

The setting up of an independent liquor commission is a very substantial undertaking on the part of the government. In the current context, this evaluation makes a substantial number of recommendations which, if adopted, could possibly improve the current situation to the point where an independent commission is not warranted. However, this decision should be the subject of a specific evaluation which must include the consideration of objective measures such as substantial reductions in the number of alcohol-related ambulance attendances across the state, substantial reductions in the level of serious assaults reported by police across the state, and reliable reductions in other measures of alcohol-related harm including alcohol consumption.

<u>Option 23: The Liquor Act should ensure that all liquor licensing decisions are transparent, that reasons are published for every decision, and that there is timely and easy public access to all submissions and evidence that an applicant seeks to rely upon throughout the proceedings in support of their application.</u>

Evidence rating: ✓✓

The Riley review similarly identified the need for timely and public access to ensure ongoing monitoring and ensuring the community has knowledge of, and influence over, liquor licensing decisions in Queensland.

<u>Option 24: Amend the Liquor Act to include, and document, consideration of violence rates, family violence rates and the current density of outlets in any granting of new liquor licenses or changes to existing licenses.</u>

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓

One key element of recent trends around alcohol related violence and the escalation of alcohol-related harms in communities across Australia has been the disjunct between increasing violence and liquor licensing decisions and a range of levels (126, 127, 149). By incorporating a specific consideration of domestic and non-domestic violence rates in the catchment area, communities will have greater protection from the potential harm which can occur when over-supplied with alcohol.

A large and robust literature demonstrates the association between increased liquor outlet density and street and domestic violence, indicating the need for such restrictions (126, 127, 150, 151). It is proposed that clear limits be placed on the density of both on- and off-premise alcohol outlets and that family violence rates be a key benchmark for placing caps on any new licenses being allowed.

It is important within the context of Queensland, and the huge distances between some outlets, that consideration of 'harm' not only be confined to the area it is located, but that it is also based on evidence of the catchment of the venue, rather than rule-of-thumb distances such as 30km.

8.5. EDUCATION AND AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS

This evaluation has demonstrated that despite massive investment in education and awareness campaigns, there were no demonstrable benefits of these campaigns, and that some peoples' drinking got worse, in line with previous research (75). Further, the current transparency around evaluation and reporting of the impact of these campaigns is inadequate, and requires independent, rigorous review.

Option 25: Revise future awareness campaigns to have strong messaging and not use 'responsible drinking' wording

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓ ,**

The available evidence reported in this evaluation suggested that there was little or no impact of the awareness programs implemented by government as part of the TAFV legislation. Blood alcohol levels remained consistently high in safe night precincts, and there were no observable changes in alcohol consumption in the available measures (acknowledging their substantial flaws). In fact, the evaluation conducted on the 'What's your relationship with alcohol?' campaign also showed that many of the target population (young men and heavy drinkers) actually reported worse drinking patterns and intentions.

While such education campaigns are consistently advocated for by the alcohol industry and others with vested interests (76, 78), the current findings are consistent with the scientific literature which shows little or no impact from weak messaged, sporadic campaigns (13, 74). It is therefore recommended that future awareness campaigns be more strongly informed by the available evidence (152-154) and constructed by a panel of experts including academic researchers with substantial track records focused on alcohol and drug education and awareness campaigns. Importantly, strong consideration should be given to the whole of government approach for alcohol which includes consistent messaging across point of sale interventions, label warnings, health advertising and sports sponsorship arrangements to ensure that money spent by government is not effectively a waste because of the sea of advertising and promotion in which it is trying to act.

Option 26: Conduct a review of anti-violence strategies and campaigns to inform a whole of government approach to violence.

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓

The available evidence reported in this evaluation suggested that there was little or no impact of the Danny Green's Stop the Coward's Punch Campaign (CPC) program supported by government as part of the TAFV legislation. Only a small percentage of people who the message was targeted at remembered the campaign. This is consistent with a vast international literature showing that violence and aggressive acts are usually complex and seldom related to a rational act (80), especially when alcohol or drugs are involved (38, 79).

Similarly, the use of 'anti-violence' campaigns in schools that focus on victim's stories has no evidence to support its use. While not doubting the good intentions of the people involved, if such interventions are to be funded by government to address young people, this should occur within a

clear structure of evidence-informed responses. Such responses should include appropriate and effective interventions for young people who are exhibiting early signs of anti-social behaviour beyond stigmatisation and prison-based responses.

The review should consider relevant scientific work such as the "Comprehensive Technical Package for the Prevention of Youth Violence and Associated Risk Behaviors" produced by the Centers for Disease Control, Division of Violence Prevention (80).

<u>Option 27: Ensure future awareness campaigns are rigorously evaluated by suitably qualified professionals and reports are made public within 6 months of completion.</u>

Evidence rating: ✓✓✓, **

Another important observation in the course of the TAFV evaluation has been that there is a lack of quality evaluation and underpinning research, and that available research findings have not been released for public scrutiny and comment by suitably qualified professionals. This situation has led to a range of programs that sit completely in contrast to the peer-reviewed literature of what works, and amounts to a substantial waste of taxpayer money. By ensuring rigorous evaluation and enforcing the public release of any such evaluation, the government should be better informed around responses to alcohol-related violence and harm in the future.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of this evaluation and the literature discussed within the report, the following recommendations are made to build on the current measures to further reduce alcohol-related violence and other related harm in Queensland.

9.1. IMPROVING QUEENSLAND'S LIQUOR LICENSING TO REDUCE ALCOHOL-RELATED VIOLENCE AND HARM

9.1.1. CLOSE ALL VENUES IN SNPS AT 3:30AM

Closing venues inside Safe Night Precincts at 3:30am, and retaining 3:00am last drinks, would address a number of major limitations identified in this evaluation in terms of fidelity to previously implemented interventions and would provide motivation for people to leave the precinct.

9.1.2. STOP THE EXTENDED TRADING PERMITS SCHEME

The extended trading scheme undermines the impact of last drinks, confuses the patrons as to when venues will be closed, and adds alcohol to late-night drinking on large events.

9.1.3. RETAIN MANDATORY NETWORKED ID SCANNERS, WITH AMENDMENTS;

Make banning lists available to all venues in Queensland operating after midnight. The police assaults data presented supports retaining mandatory networked ID scanners for a further period of two years, at which time their impact should be independently evaluated.

Some key informants reported that there was a disproportionate burden on low-risk venues within SNPs which are required to use ID scanners 7 days a week. Police assaults, Ambulance call-out data and Emergency Department data supports this assertion. In line with this, a range of modifications to the current regime are recommended:

9.1.3.1. REDUCE THE DAYS ON WHICH MANDATORY SCANNING IS REQUIRED FOR VENUES CLOSING BEFORE 1AM TO FRIDAY, SATURDAY AND SUNDAY NIGHTS, AS WELL AS LATE TRADING PUBLIC HOLIDAYS.

Based on the hours that assaults and ambulance attendances have been documented in SNPs, a viable policy option is reduce the number of days that venues are required to use ID scanners to Friday, Saturday and Sunday nights for venues which close before 1am. Special event nights and public

holiday weekends should still require mandatory ID scanning. However, powers should be made available to the OLGR, with applications available to police, public and other interested parties, that special conditions can be imposed on a specific venue, or on an SNP, if there is consistent evidence of high levels of harm occurring on other nights of the week.

9.1.3.2. ALLOW VENUES WITH EXTERNAL TOILET AND SMOKING FACILITIES TO 'STAMP' PATRONS TO AVOID THE NEED FOR RESCANNING.

Key informants identified that a number of smaller venues were required to re-scan patrons when they went to external toilets or to external smoking areas. This was found to be a problem because patrons were needing to be scanned multiple times a night. This was frustrating for patrons and staff, and adds unnecessarily to queue length as well as potentially creating management problems (returning patrons wishing to jump the queue). Licenced venues have a long history of using pass-out stamps across the world. To avoid stamp duplication, venues should be required to use different stamps on different nights and the practice should be monitored by OLGR and QPS. Venues found to be non-compliant should lose the right to be exempt.

9.1.3.3. COMMUNITY CLUBS BE GRANTED EXEMPTION FROM MANDATORY NETWORKED SCANNING, BUT REMAIN SUBJECT TO OTHER RESTRICTIONS, INCLUDING THE RISKY VENUES SCHEME.

Community clubs in SNPs are currently required to record membership details from people entering their venues, as well as mandatorily scanning patrons' IDs. It is recommended that this requirement be reviewed by OLGR with a goal to finding a technological solution. While the ideal solution would be to have software which can simultaneously record membership details and be linked to the ID scanner network, clubs that have not experienced more than one alcohol-related incident in the past six months might be granted temporary exemption from the conditions until the review by OLGR is completed.

A key condition of this recommendation is that all patrons entering these clubs be identified/recorded after 10pm on Friday and Saturday nights.

9.1.3.4. ADD AN OFFENCE TO THE LIQUOR ACT OF MAKING VEXATIOUS BANS FOR ID SCANNER OPERATORS/LICENCEES

The recording of vexatious bans on the ID scanner network should be made an offence under the liquor act, and investigations and appeals can be made to the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation. As bans are available to all other venues and clearly influence their decision to let an individual enter, the bans entered onto the system should be of reasonable duration and for an

adequate reason. While venues will retain the right to ban anyone the wish to, for as long as they wish, responsible use of the system is warranted. Appeals could be made possible through the Magistrates Courts.

9.1.3.5. LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF TIME THAT BANS FROM VENUES REMAIN ON THE SYSTEM TO SIX MONTHS

It is proposed that a limit of six months be placed on venue bans uploaded to the network as standard practice. An option should be included for venue operators to apply to the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation for longer bans (on the scanner system) when they deem them appropriate. These could be included in a 'code of conduct' signed up to by operators and retailers of ID scanners.

9.1.3.6. MAKE BANNING LISTS AVAILABLE TO ALL VENUES OPERATING AFTER MIDNIGHT

The current ID scanner system only allows for venues that are on the network to have access to the full list of banned patrons from OLGR (although they may have ad-hoc access to local lists). It is recommended that all venues be granted access to the current OLGR lists, subject to acceptance of appropriate Privacy and Confidentiality conditions. It is noted that OLGR is currently developing app-based technology to achieve this goal. This development is deserving of support.

9.1.4. INTRODUCE A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM ON LIQUOR LICENCES FOR ON-LICENSED PREMISES EXCEPT FOR RESTAURANTS AND LICENSED CAFES WHERE PEOPLE CAN ONLY PURCHASE ALCOHOL IF THEY ARE HAVING A MEAL

Since the introduction of the TAFV legislation, there has been a substantial increase in the number of liquor licenses in Queensland, which is likely to have partially undermined the impact of trading hour restrictions. There is a large and convincing international body of evidence demonstrating that increased numbers and density of outlets selling liquor is associated with increased violence and harms (13, 126, 127), thus a brief moratorium is warranted, with a review to occur at the end of the moratorium.

9.1.5. CONDUCT A REVIEW OF SNP BOUNDARIES, CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AND INTRODUCE ANNUAL REVIEWS

This evaluation has documented a wide variation in SNP make-up and levels of harm experienced. Some current SNPs have only one or two late night venues and it has been argued by key informants that the boundaries either fail to capture where patrons are going, or that the mix of venues has

changed, resulting in SNP conditions not being appropriate for the rest of the business in the area. Two current SNPs stood out as places where the vast majority of venues within the defined boundary were not late trading, and that being subject to the conditions was not helping the area's culture or reputation, just for the sake of a single venue. It is recommended that SNP boundaries be reviewed according to simple criteria such as: number of late-night trading venues, and; population rate of serious assaults in high alcohol hours.

9.1.5.1. REMOVE CAXTON STREET AS AN SNP

One SNP which is an example of an SNP which does not meet most criteria, including the lack of a functioning SNP board, is Caxton St. It is recommended that Caxton St cease being an SNP.

However, the proximity of Caxton St to Lang Park (Suncorp Stadium) makes it an exceptional case and it is recommended that police resourcing attached to being an SNP and support for large event management be retained.

9.1.5.2. REMOVE IPSWICH AS AN SNP

Another SNP which is an example of an SNP which does not meet most criteria is the current Ipswich SNP. This SNP only has a single venue and fails to capture much of the nightlife activity. It is recommended that Ipswich cease being an SNP and a review determine whether a different area is warranted.

9.1.6. REMOVE FUNDING TO SNP PROJECT SCHEME

The data reviewed in this report found that interventions implemented by SNP board grants were not evidence-based and had not achieved observable reductions in alcohol-related violence and harm.

9.1.6.1. SUPPORT FOR SNP BOARD ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CONTINUE.

Funding for SNP board administration has been reported to facilitate general coordination and improved communication in general. This funding should be subject to a clear set of ongoing objectives and evaluated every two years as a part of wider SNP reviews.

9.1.7. INTRODUCE A TARGETED, EVIDENCE-BASED HIGH-RISK VENUES SCHEME

Queensland government should implement a targeted, evidence-based, high-risk venues scheme which replicates and improves on the NSW Violent Venues scheme to incorporate Last Drinks data from hospitals and ambulance attendance location information.

The Violent Venues scheme in NSW has been consistently successful at reducing alcohol-related violence in NSW. The scheme primarily uses last drinks questions collected by NSW Police (128, 134) and has been associated with a 25 % reduction in assaults since 2008. Just as relevant is that the vast majority of venues identified in the past five years as being most violent changed their practices and are no longer on the register. This data collection has been ongoing for more than a decade and successfully underpins a number of strategies in New South Wales. The scheme is a targeted response built on evidence focused on reducing harm to the community. Implementation costs are very low and models exist from around the world which can be transported and adapted.

One key limitation with the Violent Venues scheme is that it only considers police-recorded incidents, a recording system which carries a number of flaws and misses out on a substantial proportion of intoxication and injury cases related to venues (83).

This is a significant limitation of the scheme, as it does not consider the very substantial burden on ambulance, ED and hospital admissions of heavy intoxication and injury. Murray (now de Andrade) identified that of 492 ambulance assault cases (December 2003-June 2006), only 118 (24%) had a police incident match, based on date (accounting for change at midnight), time (within 1/2 hour of each other), location, gender and description of incident and injuries (135). As shown in this report, this represents around half of the self-reported harm reported by patrons, and most of the workload that arrives in the Emergency Department is on weekend nights.

There is a strong case for Last Drinks data collected to be collected from Emergency Departments in Queensland, following the Cardiff model implemented in Wales and responsible for reductions in alcohol-related violence attendances at hospital emergency departments (130). In Cardiff post data-sharing, police-recorded assault rates fell from seven to five a month per 100,000 population, compared with an increase from five to eight in comparison cities (131). Over a 6-year post data-sharing period in Wirral, UK, intentional ED injury attendances decreased by 35.6% and alcohol-related assault attendances decreased by 30.3% (132). Last Drinks data are now mandatorily collected across England and will be collected in the Northern Territory. It would also allow for more targeted information for off-premise venues, which contribute disproportionality to harm (133), as well as for on-premise venues.

In addition to police and emergency department data, the collection of last drinks information by ambulance officers and safe night support services workers would ensure complete coverage of emergency services. This could also be linked with liquor licensing data to ensure accurate compilation of lists.

As with the New South Wales scheme, venues could be categorised on a number of levels, depending on the level of alcohol-related harm that has been associated with them. Venues which have (for example) more than 20 alcohol-related incidents in any one year (including licencing breaches, police-recorded assaults, identified emergency department attendances or ambulance attendances) would be places on Level 1 of the register. Venues which have more than 10 alcohol-related incidents in any one year (including licencing breaches, police-recorded assaults, identified emergency department attendances or ambulance attendances) would be places on Level 2 of the register.

Information for the scheme should be collated by an office separate to any of the interested agencies, such as the Office of Statistics. The Violent Venues list would be released every six months by the Queensland Government Statistician's Office (QGSO). One potential model could look like:

Venues on Level 1 would have a number of special conditions imposed including:

1. A mandatory 1.00 a.m. venue specific one-way door
2. Mandatory networked ID scanners, if not already inside an SNP
3. Mandatory CCTV at all entry/exit points[60]
4. Ten-minute alcohol sales 'time out' every hour after midnight or active distribution of water and/or food.
5. Level 1 venues which remain on the register at Level 1 for more than 2 consecutive years be subject to 1am closing times until they have recorded six months without more than two alcohol-related incidents.
6. A venue which remains on Level 1 for a further year should have their liquor licence revoked.

Venues on Level 2 would have a number of special conditions imposed including:

1. Mandatory networked ID scanners, if not already inside an SNP
2. Mandatory CCTV at all entry/exit points
3. Level 2 venues which remain on the register at Level 2 for more than 2 consecutive years will be escalated to Level 1.
4. Venues will be removed from Level 2 of the register after the first 12 months once they have not recorded more than three alcohol-related incidents for a six-month period

This scheme should include casinos within it as well, meaning that well-performing casinos see no change in their condition, but that other casinos which continue to contribute to alcohol-related harm in the community would be subject to the same conditions as other venues that are given a licence to make money from the sale of alcohol.

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[60] Subject to government adoption of Option 8 presented below.

9.1.8. ADD A SECTION TO THE LIQUOR ACT (SECTION 9B) TO INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT: 'THE LICENSEE/THEIR EMPLOYEE MUST SATISFY THEMSELVES THAT A PERSON IS NOT UNDULY INTOXICATED BEFORE SERVING THEM ALCOHOL OR ALLOWING CONSUMPTION'.

A crucial element of the impact of the TAFV legislation is the regulatory context in which it occurs. A large amount of literature points to the importance of monitoring and enforcement underpinning levels of harm and venue and patron behaviour in and around nightlife precincts (9). The TAFV legislation included funding for expanded liquor licensing and compliance activities. While the evidence reported herein documents increased levels of activity by the Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation, it also highlights the issue that without adequate legislation, licensing officers and police are unable to successfully prosecute venues that breach their responsible service of alcohol requirements. In line with this, it is indicated that a number of changes may be required in the Liquor Act to underpin the activities of enforcement officials and to ensure that ultimately venues are meeting the requirements of their liquor licences.

9.1.9. THE LIQUOR ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO ENSURE THAT 'MISTAKE OF FACT' (SECTION 24 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE) CANNOT BE EXPLOITED TO AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR SERVING AN UNDULY INTOXICATED PERSON.

The changes should ensure that the modified Mistake of Fact is a defence rather than an excuse, meaning that the defendant would have to establish the defence on the balance of probabilities rather than the prosecution having to exclude the excuse beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically:

a) The changes should ensure that the modified Mistake of Fact is a defence rather than an excuse, meaning that the defendant would have to establish the defence on the balance of probabilities rather than the prosecution having to exclude the excuse beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically:

b) If undue intoxication of a person is material to the charge of an offence against the Act, the operation of section 24 of the Criminal Code is excluded;

c) In these instances it is for the defence to prove that, at the time of the offence, the relevant person honestly and reasonably believed that the person whose undue intoxication is material to the offence was not unduly intoxicated;

d) Evidence that the relevant person did not assess the level of intoxication of the person whose undue intoxication is material to the offence is evidence that any belief that the person was not unduly intoxicated was not reasonable.

9.1.10. AMEND THE LIQUOR ACT TO INCLUDE AN OFFENCE OF NOT COMPLYING WITH RISK ASSESSED MANAGEMENT PLAN

The evidence reviewed in regards to successful prosecution of venues in breach of the Liquor Act suggests that more refined legislation is required. There is a current gap in the Liquor Act whereby it requires liquor retailers to provide a Risk Assessed Management Plan (RAMP), but there is no provision under the Act to enforce this legislation if broken, undermining the ability of regulators to enforce compliance with RAMPs. Suitable penalties should be determined by the Commissioner or a Magistrate.

9.1.11. AMEND THE LIQUOR ACT TO INCLUDE, AND DOCUMENT, CONSIDERATION OF VIOLENCE RATES, FAMILY VIOLENCE RATES AND THE CURRENT DENSITY OF OUTLETS IN ANY GRANTING OF NEW LIQUOR LICENSES OR CHANGES TO EXISTING LICENSES.

A large and robust literature demonstrates the association between increased liquor outlet density and street and domestic violence, indicating the need for such restrictions (126, 127, 150, 151). It is proposed that clear limits be placed on the density of both on- and off-premise alcohol outlets and that family violence rates be a key benchmark for placing caps on any new licenses being allowed. These areas could be identified as 'alcohol harm zones', in lines with recommendations made to the Victorian government recently in their review of the Victorian Liquor Control Act.

It is important within the context of Queensland, and the huge distances between some outlets, that consideration of 'harm' not be confined only to the area it is located, but that it be based on evidence of the catchment of the venue, rather than rule-of-thumb distances such as 30km.

9.1.12. THE LIQUOR ACT SHOULD ENSURE THAT ALL LIQUOR LICENSING DECISIONS ARE TRANSPARENT, THAT REASONS ARE PUBLISHED FOR EVERY DECISION, AND THAT THERE IS TIMELY AND EASY PUBLIC ACCESS TO ALL SUBMISSIONS AND EVIDENCE THAT AN APPLICANT SEEKS TO RELY UPON THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPLICATION.

It is crucial that communities be informed about liquor licensing decisions and the reasons for these decisions. Recent reviews in the Northern Territory and South Australia identified the need for timely and public access to ensure ongoing monitoring and ensuring the community has knowledge of, and influence over, liquor licensing decisions in Queensland.

A single Queensland government interactive smart noticeboard for all alcohol related applications should be created. It should provide free community subscription to applications. The platform should make available relevant outlet density data, crime and health data, surrounding licensed premises information and other relevant information.

Further, there should be relevant regulator data on an applicant's compliance record available to all stakeholders.

9.1.13. AMEND THE LIQUOR ACT TO MAKE CCTV MANDATORY FOR ALL VENUES THAT TRADE AFTER MIDNIGHT

The evidence collected in this report showed that areas outside Brisbane have continued to experience high levels of alcohol-related harm and have been resistant to the current modest measures. One inadvertent consequence of the TAFV legislation was that some venues that were previously required to operate CCTV on entries and exits are no longer required to do so. This presents problems in terms of crowd management and solution of crime and creates a situation where troublemakers might be more inclined to attend venues outside SNPs. There is some anecdotal evidence to support this occurring in North Queensland.

The current legislation is complicated and has special conditions for Brisbane but not for other areas, which vary substantially, reflecting historical licensing conditions and interventions.

Therefore, it is recommended that the current conditions and qualifications around CCTV be replaced by provisions in the liquor act simply stating that any venue operating after midnight requires CCTV (of the standard previously outlined for Brisbane venues) to be in operation during trading hours. Further, they should meet the other requirements outlined in the act for Brisbane in terms of daily checking and equipment quality.

9.1.14. INCLUDE CASINOS IN TRADING HOURS RESTRICTIONS AND MANDATORY ID SCANNING OR THE HIGH-RISK VENUES SCHEME IF IMPLEMENTED

Three out of four casinos across the state were identified in QPS assaults data as contributing to a significant proportion of assaults. This would undoubtedly extend to other harms given findings in Melbourne which identified Crown Casino as the leading source of alcohol-related admissions to St Vincent's Hospital Emergency Department (https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/alcohol-lands-one-in-four-weekend-emergency-patients-in-hospital-with-crown-casino-and-the-mcg-the-leading-danger-spots/news-story/d7233b285f2f615057fe35fef99d89f3). Further, the 24 hour trading of casinos in SNPs materially undermines the reality of limiting the hours that liquor is sold and the

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spirit of the legislation which focussed on reducing alcohol supply in the community. This is especially relevant in terms of the impending opening of the Queens Wharf Brisbane casino, and a preventative approach is indicated.

It is likely that the government's ability to respond is controlled by contractual arrangements established by previous governments, and would likely result in huge financial costs to the community if they tried to make changes. However, it needs to be clear that casinos play a primary role in undermining the wellbeing of the community and exacerbating alcohol-related violence in cities.

9.2. IMPROVING COMMUNITY INFORMATION ON ALCOHOL-RELATED HARM

9.2.1. INTRODUCE LAST DRINKS QUESTIONS TO EMERGENCY SERVICES ACROSS QUEENSLAND

During the course of this study, a number of issues have been identified in terms of the data being collected about alcohol consumption and related harm in Queensland.

9.2.1.1. POLICE

Based on the extensive evidence from NSW (128) and New Zealand (129) on the benefits of being able to accurately identify the most problematic venues associated with incidents attended by police, the Queensland government should implement mandatory collection of the following information by police attending incidents where alcohol was possibly involved, in addition to a mandatory alcohol and drug flag:

Where did you consume your last drink?

This question should be administered to all parties involved (i.e. including 'victims' and 'offenders') given the fluid nature of many fights in nightlife settings.

9.2.1.2. EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS

Based on international studies (155-158) and work currently under way in Australia (http://lastdrinks.info/), it is known that current systems in Emergency Departments underestimate alcohol-attributable presentations (159, 160).The Queensland government should implement mandatory collection of the following information in Emergency Departments for all injury, intoxication and mental health attendances:

Where did the event occur? (to be asked as a routine administration question)

This question should be considered as a basic public health improvement, not only related to alcohol but a range of injuries and incidents. The data collected should be a text field, rather than a drop-down menu, so that specific sites can be identified.

How many alcoholic drinks have you consumed in past 12 hours? (to be asked by clinical or administrative staff)

Where did you consume your last drink? (to be asked by clinical or administrative staff)

An additional field which would be included in mandatory collection with an on/off capacity, but only used on a snapshot basis, would be:

Where did you purchase most of the alcohol you consumed? (to be asked by clinical or administrative staff)

A final field to be filled in by the clinician in consultation with the patient is:

Were intentional or unintentional injuries suspected to be caused by a third party affected by alcohol?

Previous evidence has demonstrated that this question addresses serious shortfalls in other methods because up to 30% of emergency department attendances can be related to the use of alcohol by other parties (161, 162).

This data collection should be combined with systems for facilitating data sharing and use, such as through the trauma registry.

9.2.1.3. AMBULANCE

As discussed previously, research has identified that only 24% of ambulance assault cases had a police incident match (135). This means that ambulance data are a crucial contributor to understanding the sources of alcohol-related harm in our community. Based on international research (156) and work currently under way in Australia (www.lastdrinks.info), the Queensland government should implement mandatory collection of the following information by paramedics:

How many alcoholic drinks have you consumed in past 12 hours?

Where did you consume your last drink?

Introducing these standardised questions to all first responders will allow for a better understanding of the sources of alcohol-related harm, improve the community, government and researchers' ability to build targeted responses to this harm, and further assess how changes in policy impact this burden on society. It would also fill a very substantial gap in the information currently considered by the

Commissioner in relation to liquor licensing decisions, given that there is no formal system to consider ambulance attendances or hospital related attendances/admissions related to specific licensed venues.

The combination of these data, and appropriate data sharing systems, will inform Policy and could allow for government to build targeted responses to alcohol-related harm, such as the NSW Violent Venues scheme (125) or the 'Cardiff model' (158), both of which have seen substantial reduction in harm in the community.

9.2.2. IMPROVE THE COLLECTION OF ALCOHOL SALES DATA

As outlined in the results section, the current available sales data for alcohol is unfit for the purpose of monitoring trends. Under the current system, liquor suppliers (liquor producers, wholesale licensees, and wine producers and merchants) are surveyed yet there is no compulsion for them to contribute data, nor is there any quality assurance system to ensure that the data supplied are accurate. Ultimately, this means that data are being collected which is unreliable and serves no purpose for the community, representing a waste of taxpayer money. To address this it is recommended that:

a)   Liquor suppliers who do not provide comprehensive and accurate data within three months of request should be subject to a substantive penalty.

b)   The OLGR should be given powers under the liquor act to audit liquor suppliers' records to ensure that data provided is accurate

c)   The OLGR should conduct random audits of 5% of the data provided annually.

9.3.   INCREASING PATRON ACCOUNTABILITY

9.3.1. INCREASE OF MINIMUM POLICE BANS TO 1 MONTH WITH AN OPTION OF UP TO 6 MONTHS

The current police banning system in conjunction with ID scanning does not appear to have made major changes to levels of violence in SNPs across Queensland, although there are some promising signs. However, it is clear that the system has been successful in limiting the number of people on bans trying to enter licensed venues. Key informants suggested that the current 10 day police ban is amenable to review, as it does not realistically represent a punishment for most people attending SNPs. While a ban of 10 days is only effectively one weekend, and would not be seen as a penalty for many people, a three month ban as a minimum might be seen as being too punitive by operational police, and use of the ban might decline. Following this reasoning, a two-year trial is recommend for month-long bans, escalating to a 6 month ban with an attached youth services assessment for repeat

offenders. Key variables to be considered would include recidivism rates in this population, assault rates in the community and officer willingness to use longer bans. The scheme should also include provisions for appeal to the bans. It may be that the Magistrates Court is the appropriate body to manage appeals, and it might also be appropriate that normal fees be waived for people apply with low incomes.

9.4. REDUCING ALCOHOL AND DRUG-RELATED HARM IN QUEENSLAND

9.4.1. INTRODUCE A MINIMUM UNIT PRICE ON ALCOHOL ACROSS QUEENSLAND

The most evidence-based measure to reduce alcohol consumption is to increase the price of alcohol (13, 96), either through taxation or the use of a minimum unit price. By targeting the very cheapest alcohol sold in the community, the measure affects problematic drinkers, young drinkers, and pre-drinkers; all three groups are most likely to experience alcohol-related harm (143). A $1.30 minimum unit price was introduced in the Northern Territory in 2018, and has also been found to be associated with a 10.4% reduction in violence when implemented in Canada (99).

9.4.2. TRIAL THE INTRODUCTION OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT SCHEME FOR ORIGINAL LIVE MUSIC PLAYED BEFORE 10 PM.

This evaluation documented that while overall numbers of live music performances were going up, the number of original live music performances in Fortitude Valley at least appears to have been in decline since 2012. It was also suggested that the link between live music being funded by late night drinking is not a healthy basis for ongoing development. However, a number of key informants talked about their successful business practice of promoting bands starting at 8pm, and its ability to attract patrons to the venue earlier. These narratives suggest that a scheme which both supports original live music and gets patrons attending venues earlier in the night might warrant a trial. Bands/acts could be accredited by a suitable body and attract support which will then be paid to a venue upon the bands nomination allowing them to perform in a venue where they might not normally be commercially competitive. Venues could attract people earlier, but also receive some compensation for their ongoing support of original live music in Queensland.

9.4.3. CREATE A HEALTH PROMOTION SCHEME WHEREBY NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL GUIDELINES FOR LOW-RISK DRINKING COULD BE PROMINENTLY POSTED ON ALL POINTS OF SALE IN QUEENSLAND.

Current levels of awareness and knowledge about low-risk drinking guidelines are poor. Research on warning labels, including tobacco labelling, has shown evidence that these labels can help raise awareness of specific risks (139, 140). Combined with other approaches to reducing harm, they can be effective ways to communicate risk at the point of consumption. Posters reporting the NHMRC guidelines for low-risk alcohol consumption should be prominently placed within 2m of the point of sale.

9.4.4. CONDUCT A TRIAL OF THE 'CLUBS AGAINST DRUGS' PROGRAM

Illicit drug use was found at all sites, and drug use was found to significantly predict people experiencing greater violence and injury. Funded trials of interventions such as the 'clubs against drugs' program (141) are recommended. Venues identified as having problematic drug use could be subject to conditions to remove flat surfaces in toilets and having their security increase surveillance of toilet areas.

9.4.5. A COMPREHENSIVE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG (AOD) SCHOOL EDUCATION PROGRAM SHOULD BE COMMISSIONED BY GOVERNMENT

It was impossible for this research team to assess the level of dissemination or impact of the current school education program run by the Queensland Department of Education and Training due to very poor recording and a lack of any systematic roll out or monitoring. Based on the experience of conducting this evaluation, the following solutions are suggested:

a) This review should be led by the Department of Premier and Cabinet and explicitly cover issues of implementation and monitoring, along with the development of an ongoing impact assessment and regular reporting.

b) Every school in the state should identify specific individuals as the responsible anti-violence and alcohol and drug officer, and this person should be listed on reports to the government and on school websites.

c) Every school should have a publicly-available plan for AOD education and anti-violence outlined on the school website.

d) The Department of Education should be required to collect and keep records of the content delivered in each school which document the elements presented, and the year levels and classes delivered to.

e) The Department of Education should report to the Department of Premier and Cabinet annually on the compliance within schools.

f)   A review of program content and delivery should be conducted every 3 years by suitably qualified independent evaluators which includes a range of impact measures to be specified by the review.

g)   Similarly, a comprehensive review of the teaching package should be conducted by suitably qualified, independent, drug education experts, to ensure best practice given the existence of an extensive literature on what works in school based on drug education.

9.4.6. A REVIEW OF ANTI-VIOLENCE STRATEGIES AND CAMPAIGNS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO INFORM A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO VIOLENCE. THE REVIEW SHOULD BE OVERSEEN BY AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The anti-violence awareness campaigns employed under the TAFV legislation were found to have no observable impact on police-recorded assaults, ambulance attendances or ED attendances. The available evidence reported in this evaluation suggested that there was little or no impact of the Danny Green's Stop the Coward's Punch Campaign (CPC) program supported by government as part of the TAFV legislation. Only a small percentage of people who the message was targeted at remembered the campaign. This is consistent with a vast international literature showing that violence and aggressive acts are usually complex and seldom related to a rational act (80), especially when alcohol or drugs are involved (38, 79).

A comprehensive review, incorporating a panel of key experts in the fields of violence prevention, law, policing and public health education should be conducted and provide recommendations for a whole of government strategy based on the best evidence available and already covered in strategies and refuse outlined by venerable bodies such as the World Health Organisation and the Centres For Disease Control. The proposed strategy should sit alongside current family violence responses and include bullying within its remit.

9.4.7. IMPLEMENT AN ALCOHOL AWARENESS CAMPAIGN WHICH CONFORMS TO BEST EVIDENCE AND DOES NOT USE 'RESPONSIBLE DRINKING' WORDING

The available evidence reported in this evaluation suggested that there was little or no impact of the awareness programs implemented by government as part of the TAFV legislation. Blood alcohol levels remained consistently high in safe night precincts, and there were no observable changes in alcohol consumption in the available measures (acknowledging their substantial flaws). In fact, the evaluation conducted on the 'What's your relationship with alcohol?' campaign also showed that

many of the target population (young men and heavy drinkers) actually reported worse drinking patterns and intentions.

This awareness campaign should comply with the internationally recognised best-practice standards (153), including:

a) Mass media campaigns should be included as key components of comprehensive approaches to improving population health behaviours.

b) Sufficient funding must be secured to enable frequent and widespread exposure to campaign messages continuously over time, especially for ongoing behaviours

c) Adequate access to promoted services and products must be ensured.

d) Changes in health behaviour might be maximised by complementary policy decisions that support opportunities to change, provide disincentives for not changing, and challenge or restrict competing marketing.

e) Campaign messages should be based on sound research of the target group and should be tested during campaign development.

f) Outcomes should undergo rigorous independent assessment and peer-reviewed publications should be sought

9.5. ENSURING FUTURE RESPONSES TO ALCOHOL-RELATED VIOLENCE ARE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT

During the course of the evaluation, a number of substantial barriers to further improvement of the public response to alcohol were identified. A number of recommendations are made in regards to specific barriers encountered and with a mind to improving practice going forward:

9.5.1. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SET UP AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT RESEARCH STEERING COMMITTEE TO OVERSEE THE COMMISSIONING AND REPORTING OF ANY MONITORING ALL EVALUATION RESEARCH.

This steering committee should have veto rights, and membership should include suitably qualified people (Ph.D. or MD) with backgrounds in medicine, public health, alcohol and other drugs and social welfare, along with relevant departmental representation.

9.5.2. THE QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT STATISTICIAN'S OFFICE (QGSO) SHOULD AMEND SAMPLING AND REPORTING PRACTICES FOR THE QUEENSLAND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SURVEY

Data from the Queensland Preventative Health Survey provide some useful background trends, but the survey is targeted at overall population health behaviours and is potentially not representative of the key behaviours being addressed in this project. The survey reports a high cooperation rate (~75%), but this potentially overstates the true response rate substantially by not including respondents who were selected but with whom no contact was made. In a telephone survey this is likely to be a substantial number. Furthermore, data from the survey technical report show that non-response was a particular problem for young adults – 18-24 year olds made up less than 4% of the survey sample, but are 12.6% of the adult population. Even if weighting is applied, there is a high probability that the particular 18-24 year olds included in the sample differ in systematic ways from the overall population of 18-24 year olds, making reliable inference problematic. Thus it is recommended that:

1. Younger age groups should be oversampled to provide more representative information of this key demographic for harm, especially alcohol-related harm.

2. To aid better transparency of survey responses the Queensland Government Statistician's Office (QGSO) should publicly release detailed information on the response rates for the Queensland Preventative Health Survey for past and future surveys, as reported by the National Drug Strategy Household Survey. Measures to be reported include:

   b) the denominator was used for determining the response rate;
   c) the number of people who answered the phone
   d) the number of people that didn't answer the phone.
   e) the number of incomplete calls

9.5.3. ENSURE ONGOING INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND MONITORING OF ALCOHOL-RELATED HARM IN QUEENSLAND

Ongoing independent evaluation and monitoring of alcohol-related harm should continue to be supported in Queensland, particularly to measure the ongoing impact of ID scanners which have only been in place for one year, and further impact of any changes in government might make in response to this report. Annual interim reporting is recommended. Key elements of the evaluation are recommended below, based on the lessons learned from this evaluation report:

1) Administrative data are a core component to be monitored. Key data sets would include: police recorded serious assaults, ambulance callouts and attendances, Emergency Department attendances, hospital admissions, and liquor licensing data.

2) Last drinks data collected by police and hospitals, as well as ambulance location data will prove especially important when considering the introduction of Queens Wharf Brisbane casino.

3) Foot traffic data has proved an important objective measure of nightlife vibrancy, and can be reliably measured via phone tower usage data, which should be negotiated with telephone service agencies.

4) ID scanner data from OLGR will also prove a reliable indicator of attendance trends.

5) Transport data, including taxi and Uber data provide an important part of the picture.

6) An annual community alcohol survey to accurately monitor and reduce harmful drinking, using in-depth quantitative and qualitative methods, is required (including high school age children). Such data would address issues beyond simple consumption and harm, to include issues such as exposure to advertising, attitudes to policy, and social perceptions of alcohol, including knowledge of harms.

7) Alcohol Sales data (once made reliable) will provide a crucial objective indication of alcohol consumption in Queensland.

8) Independently monitoring trends around live music have also proven an important part of the evaluation process. It is recommended that the government works closely with APRA to access and report performance and venue data, and to improve current data collection practices, i.e. the use of drop-down menus for suburb and venue names, to reduce extensive resource-intensive data cleaning.

9) We recommend regular interviewing of SNP patrons, including brief interviews to monitor alcohol and drug intoxication, along with core measures of harm experienced. As demonstrated in this evaluation and previous work (16, 19), collecting data from nightlife patrons can be done reliably and provides a much more sensitive source of data on alcohol-related harm and drinking trends for this at-risk population. It is recommended that quarterly data collection sessions in major SNPs be trialled for two years as a part of ongoing monitoring.

10) Future evaluations are best carried out by independent researchers with significant track record in the field (eg. over 10 years of alcohol policy research and 20 related peer-reviewed publications).

9.5.3.1. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT, EXPERT EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE OPENING OF THE QUEEN'S WHARF BRISBANE CASINO THAT IS PUBLICLY AVAILABLE, AND LED BY AN INDEPENDENT STEERING GROUP.

As outlined above, some existing casinos have been found to be associated with substantial harm in the community. Given the size of the proposed Queens Wharf Brisbane casino, an independent evaluation of the impact of it's opening on assaults, intoxication and other harms is warranted.

10. SAFE NIGHT PRECINCT SUPPORT SERVICES RECOMMENDATIONS

Substantial additional funding was granted through the Department of Communities for safe night precinct support services (SNPSS). A separate evaluation of these services was conducted in 2017, funded by the Department of Communities and led by Prof Miller. The SNPSS report will be considered by government. However, a range of data were collected for both evaluations and a range of key issues and policy options were identified for the TAFV evaluation based on the specific data collected and Prof Miller's experience. These are reported in Section 3, key findings and policy options. The recommendations from the SNPSS evaluation report are included here.

10.1. SUPPORT SERVICES FUNDING SHOULD BE SCALED ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF VENUES AND LEVELS OF HARM

Levels of harm should be measured using ambulance attendance and police-recorded serious assaults.

10.2. CONDUCT RECURRENT EVALUATIONS TO MONITOR SUPPORT SERVICE IMPROVEMENT AND NEW RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Evaluation should be conducted every two years and the reports be publicly available to monitor performance on investment.

10.3. CONSIDER FUNDING FOR SUPPORT SERVICES VIA A LEVY ON VENUES

During the evaluation period, many venues were observed using Support Services as a service to support the intoxicated people they had served to intoxication. A co-funding or levy arrangement should be constructed to acknowledge the current situation is tantamount to community sponsorship of failed responsible service of alcohol, albeit a well-meaning harm reduction service in some sites.

10.4. RECURRING FUNDING IS PROVIDED TO TRAIN SUPPORT SERVICE PERSONNEL

Considering that the staff employed by support services engage with young people in riskier environments who are often in intoxicated invulnerable states, it is warranted that support be given to ensure that the staff are adequately trained to deal with the complex situations they encounter. Qualifications may relate to social or youth work; specific qualifications should be determined by the department in consultation with the sector.

10.5. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONDUCT QUARTERLY SITE VISITS IN ORDER TO HOLD INDIVIDUALS AND SUPPORT SERVICES ACCOUNTABLE.

There was a wide range of variance between the skills and quality of Support Services and it is recommended that commissioning officers conduct more rigorous and systematic inspections.

10.6. SUPPORT SERVICES PERSONNEL SHOULD BE REQUIRED WEAR HIGH-VISIBILITY CLOTHING IN ORDER TO STAND OUT IN THE NIGHT-TIME ENVIRONMENT.

The labelling of Support Services personnel should clearly represent the role they are there to perform and be universal across SNPs. It is crucial that this 'uniform' is distinct from emergency services uniforms and universal across SNPs.

10.7. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT ALL REST AND RECOVERY SERVICES HAVE A STABLE PRESENCE IN THE MAIN THOROUGHFARE OF THEIR SNP.

It was observed that services which had a stable presence in the main thoroughfare had greater levels of engagement and were much easier for patrons to locate. This presence can be as modest as a caravan or marquee and can be deployed in conjunction with other resources. Areas where there is not a large enough nightlife presence to justify a stable presence should be determined by the department, in consultation with stakeholders in the SNP.

10.8. A REVIEW SHOULD BE CONDUCTED OF RADIO NETWORKS IN SNPSS, WITH THE AIM OF MAKING USE OF THE NETWORKS MANDATORY FOR ALL PARTIES INVOLVED, INCLUDING POLICE.

Observations showed that radios were an important tool to the operation of Support Services. Radio networks allowed Support Services to respond to incidents and requests across the entire SNP in a timely manner, many of these incidents would not have been addressed without the use of radio communication.

10.9. UNIVERSAL DATA COLLECTION, A MINIMUM DATASET, AND STORAGE METHODS ACROSS SUPPORT SERVICES IS SUGGESTED.

Data storage and collection was vastly different across sites, and this hampered the evaluation's ability to compare and contrast different service models across Queensland. Even when evaluating individual services, limited data collection methods resulted in a limited understanding of the services provided and the demographics of patrons assisted:

a) It is particularly important that incident level data are collected as this gives the best insight into the operation of the services.
b) A data manager should be employed to co-ordinate data collection and storage across sites. This will ensure that data are equivalent and allows for direct comparisons between the different services.

c) The database should be hosted or updated online with automatic uploads after each night service was provided. A capacity to work offline when internet service is down is crucial.
d) Services should collect data on the last venue that served patron users drinks as well as where they consumed the majority of their alcohol (this may include pre-drinking).

10.10. THERE SHOULD BE A UNIVERSAL SET OF GUIDELINES ACROSS SNPSS TO DICTATE HOW SUPPORT SERVICES SHOULD OPERATE.

There are fundamental differences in how Support Services approach their work and operate within the Support Service.

a) There should be a clear set of guidelines for when a situation must be referred to police, ambulance or another service.
b) Clear guidelines should be introduced that unequivocally state what can be done with a service user in terms of: providing services when consent can't be attained, when transportation can be given, and when a nightlife patron should be approached as a potential service user.
c) Clear guidelines need to be developed for the provision of services to underage patrons.
d) Guidelines and a specific referral pathway should be developed for providing services to people that do not speak English.

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