LEGAL AFFAIRS AND COMMUNITY SAFETY COMMITTEE

Members present:

Mr DA Pegg MP (Chair)
Mr DJ Brown MP
Mr MJ Crandon MP
Mrs JA Stuckey MP

Staff present:

Ms E Booth (Acting Committee Secretary)
Ms K Longworth (Assistant Committee Secretary)

PUBLIC BRIEFING—EXAMINATION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTORAL (IMPLEMENTING BELCARRA) AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT BILL 2017

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, 25 OCTOBER 2017

Brisbane

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Committee met at 12.04 pm

CHAIR: Good afternoon. I declare open this public briefing for the committee's examination of the Local Government Electoral (Implementing Belcarra) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2017. I would like to acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we meet. I am Duncan Pegg, member for Stretton and chair of the committee. With me here today are: Michael Crandon MP, member for Coomera and deputy chair; Don Brown MP, member for Capalaba; and Jann Stuckey MP, member for Currumbin.

On 12 October 2017 the Premier and Minister for the Arts, the Hon. Annastacia Palaszczuk, introduced the Local Government Electoral (Implementing Belcarra) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2017 to the parliament. The parliament referred the bill to Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee for examination, with a reporting date of 27 November 2017.

The policy objective of the Local Government Electoral (Implementing Belcarra) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2017 is to implement certain recommendations of the Crime and Corruption Commission's report *Operation Belcarra: a blueprint for integrity and addressing corruption risk in local government* to (1) reinforce integrity and minimise corruption risk that political donations from property developers have potential to cause at both a state and local government level; (2) improve transparency and accountability in state and local government; and (3) strengthen the legislative requirements that regulate how a councillor must deal with a real or perceived conflict of interest or a material personal interest.

The purpose of the briefing this afternoon is to assist the committee with its examination of the bill. The committee's proceedings are proceedings of the Queensland parliament and are subject to the standing rules and orders of the parliament. The proceedings are being recorded by Hansard and the audio is being broadcast live on the parliament's website. I therefore ask you to please identify yourself when you first speak and to speak clearly and at a reasonable pace. Only the committee and invited officials may participate in the proceedings. As parliamentary proceedings, under the standing orders any person may be excluded from the hearing at my discretion.

BRADLEY, Ms Imelda, Director, Strategic Policy and Legal Services, Department of Justice and Attorney-General

DUNNE, Mr Tim, Manager, Local Government and Regional Services, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning

MATHESON, Mr Craig, Deputy Director-General, Local Government and Regional Services, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning

PARTON, Ms Kathy, Deputy Director-General, Strategy, Governance and Engagement, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning

ROBERTSON, Mrs Leanne, Acting Assistant Director-General, Strategic Policy and Legal Services, Department of Justice and Attorney-General

SPENCER, Ms Helen, Assistant Director, Legislation Services, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning

CHAIR: We will now hear from representatives of the Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning who have been invited to brief the committee on the bill. Also joining us this morning are representatives from the Department of Justice and Attorney-General. Thank you for attending this afternoon. I invite you to make an opening statement, after which committee members will have some questions for you.

Ms Parton: Thank you to the committee for the opportunity to provide a briefing on the Local Government Electoral (Implementing Belcarra) and Other Legislation Bill 2017. The bill's objective is to implement certain recommendations of the Crime and Corruption Commission's report *Operation Belcarra: a blueprint for integrity and addressing corruption risk in local government*.

By way of background, following the Queensland local government elections in March 2016, the Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission received a number of allegations about the conduct of candidates for several councils including Gold Coast, Ipswich, Moreton Bay and Logan. The terms of reference for the CCC's public hearings detail that the allegations identified a number of possible breaches of the Local Government Electoral Act 2011 and also identified practices that give rise to potential corruption risks or might otherwise undermine transparency, integrity and public confidence not only in the 2016 elections but in the local government more generally. The CCC established Operation Belcarra to investigate the allegations.

The Belcarra report makes 31 recommendations for change to reduce the risk of corruption and to provide for increased transparency, integrity and accountability in certain local government matters. The government's response to the Belcarra report supports or supports in principle all 31 recommendations. Recommendations 20 and 23 to 26 are considered significant by the government to require urgent legislative change, which is the purpose of this bill. To implement these five recommendations, the bill amends the City of Brisbane Act 2010, the Electoral Act 1992, the Local Government Act 2009 and the Local Government Electoral Act 2011. The aims of the amendments are to, firstly, reinforce integrity and minimise the corruption risk that political donations from property developers have potential to cause at both a state and local government level; secondly, improve transparency and accountability in state and local government; and, lastly, strengthen the legislative requirements that regulate how a councillor must deal with a real or perceived conflict of interest or a material personal interest.

I will focus first on the amendments to the Electoral Act 1992 and the Local Government Electoral Act 2011, which impose a ban on political donations from property developers. A particular concern raised by the CCC in the Belcarra report was the perception of council processes being compromised as a result of political donations received from property developers. The report highlighted there is risk of corruption when donors have business interests that are directly affected by local government decisions. The report also acknowledged there is a perception that property developers hold a position of power and influence in political decision-making above that of ordinary Queenslanders. Further, given the state government plays a critical role in the approval of significant property development, as evidenced by the role of the responsible minister in legislation such as the Integrated Resort Development Act 1987 and the Planning Act 2016, the risks identified in the Belcarra report regarding elected local government members apply equally to elected state government members.

To address the CCC's observations and recommendation 20 of the Belcarra report, the bill contains provisions that prohibit donations from property developers for state candidates and local government candidates and groups of candidates, parties, sitting members of parliament and current councillors. To this end, the bill inserts a new subdivision 4 in part 11, division 8 in the Electoral Act 1992 and a new division 1A in part 6 in the Local Government Electoral Act 2011 which makes it unlawful for a donation from a prohibited donor to be directly or indirectly made or accepted.

Consistent with recommendation 20 of the Belcarra report, these amendments are modelled on part 6, division 4A of the New South Wales Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981. These provisions withstood a High Court challenge in 2015. While the High Court in McCloy v New South Wales accepted that the New South Wales provisions were a burden on the freedom of political communication on government and political matters, the burden was found to have been enacted for the legitimate purpose of removing the risk and perception of corruption and undue influence in New South Wales.

Turning now to the amendments, the bill defines the term 'prohibited donor' to include a property developer corporation and their close associates such as related corporations, directors and their spouses and any industry representative organisation whose members are mainly property developers. For the purposes of the ban, a 'political donation' is defined to include direct and indirect gifts to a political party, elected member or candidate in an election or group of candidates for a local government election. While gifts made to an entity in a private capacity are specifically excluded from the ban, the ban will apply to political party subscription fees which exceed $1,000 per year and any fundraising contributions.

The bill includes a range of new indictable offences and strong penalties. It also includes specific provision for prohibited donations to be recovered by the state. Under these provisions, if a person accepts a prohibited donation, an amount of up to twice the value of the donation may be recovered

as debt due to the state. The bill also includes transitional provisions which ensure that, if the bill is passed, the prohibition on donations from property developers applies from the date of the bill's introduction, which is 12 October 2017. As a result, any payments that are unlawful under those provisions made on or after 12 October will apply on commencement. A ban on property developer donations is aimed at improving public confidence and promoting the actual and perceived integrity of local and state systems of government.

Given the Electoral Act 1992 is administered by the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, my colleagues Leanne Robertson and Imelda Bradley are here to respond to any questions the committee may have in relation to that act.

I will turn now to recommendations 23 to 26 and the amendments in the bill that are aimed at strengthening the legislative requirements that regulate how a councillor must deal with real or perceived conflict of interests or material personal interests. In relation to recommendation 23, the Belcarra report commented that requiring other councillors to decide whether a councillor has a conflict of interest and whether they should stay in the room to vote on a matter ensures that alternative and more independent perspectives are taken into consideration.

The bill implements recommendation 23 by providing that, if a councillor has informed a meeting about their personal interests in a matter and decides not to leave that meeting, the other councillors entitled to vote at the meeting must decide whether the councillor has a real or perceived conflict of interest in the matter. The other councillors also must decide whether the councillor must leave and stay away while the matter is being discussed and voted on.

In relation to recommendation 24, the Belcarra report commented that reintroducing a specific obligation on councillors to report another councillor's conflict of interest would increase councillors' accountability and reinforce the importance of dealing with conflicts of interest in a transparent and accountable way. The bill implements recommendation 24 by providing that if a councillor reasonably believes or suspects that another councillor at the meeting has a material personal interest or a real or perceived conflict of interest and that councillor has not informed the meeting about it, the councillor must inform the chairperson about their belief or suspicion and the facts and circumstances that form the basis of the belief or suspicion.

In relation to recommendation 25, the bill provides for a number of strengthened penalties, including possible removal from office. For example, failing to inform a council meeting of one's own conflict of interest in a matter to be discussed at the meeting will carry a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units, or a year's imprisonment. Failing to comply with a decision of other councillors at the meeting that a councillor with a conflict of interest must leave the meeting will carry a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units, or one year's imprisonment. Taking retaliatory action because a councillor complied with their duty to report another councillor's material personal interest or conflict of interest at a meeting will carry a maximum penalty of 167 penalty units, or two years imprisonment. In addition, the bill provides that the new offences are integrity offences, meaning that a person who is convicted of an integrity offence cannot be a councillor for four years after the person is convicted of an integrity offence.

With regard to reported allegations about the 2016 local government elections that councillors unlawfully influenced the outcome of council decisions on development applications, the bill implements recommendation 26 by making it an offence for a councillor who has a material personal interest or a conflict of interest in a matter to influence or attempt to influence another councillor to vote on the matter in a particular way at a meeting, with a maximum penalty of 200 penalty units, or two years imprisonment. Similarly, the bill makes it an offence for a councillor who has a material personal interest or a conflict of interest in a matter to influence or attempt to influence a council employee or a contractor of the council who is authorised to decide or otherwise deal with the matter in a particular way, with a maximum penalty of 200 penalty units, or two years imprisonment. These offences are also integrity offences. I am happy to take questions from the committee.

CHAIR: I have a question about the recommendations in the Belcarra report. As the explanatory notes state, the government either supports or supports in principle the 31 recommendations. This bill implements five of them. For the benefit of the committee, will you please explain why those five have been prioritised in this particular bill?

Ms Parton: In its response the government considered the banning of donations from property developers for candidates, third parties, political parties, councillors and members of state parliament to be significant and requiring urgent legislative change. That is recommendation 20 and recommendations 23 to 26. The other recommendations in the report will require further consultation with key stakeholders as well as further consideration and review, particularly in relation to the breadth

of some recommendations and how they will be practically implemented and enforced. Many of these recommendations primarily relate to activities and obligations that arise closer to or during the quadrennial local government elections. The next election period is not until 2020, so they were not considered so urgent as to warrant immediate legislative change. The Queensland government will consider these matters and any further legislative changes in due course.

CHAIR: I have a further question about the recovery of prohibited donations. Can you inform us how that would work in practice? For example, who would undertake the recovery, what would the process look like and what would be the costs associated with the recovery process?

Mrs Robertson: The provision provides that the state can recover the amount, and the bill provides that the Electoral Commission can do that in the name of the state. It would be a matter for the Electoral Commission to decide whether or not it wanted to use Crown Law for that purpose or brief it out to a private firm of solicitors. That is the process. It is recovered as a civil debt.

Mr CRANDON: In relation to the definition of a property developer, I am trying to determine what the word 'regularly' means. It is used in the definitions. Is the definition of a property developer a company that may have applied for a development application in the past five or 10 years but has not applied since? In other words, what defines 'regularly' or do you mean 'frequently'? If someone submits a development application every five years, is that regularly enough, or is it about the frequency?

Mrs Robertson: Looking at new section 273(2) which has been inserted by the bill, it is a corporation—and these other words are important as well—'engaged in a business that regularly involves', so it is engaged in a business that does that. I guess the question about whether it is or is not is really a matter ultimately for the Electoral Commission, because there is a provision in the bill that the entity can apply to the commission for a determination in relation to whether or not the entity is actually a property developer within the meaning of the section.

Mr CRANDON: Does the Electoral Commission know what 'regularly' means?

Mrs Robertson: It would be interpreted in the course of its normal meaning. It is not specifically defined in the bill, so it would just be its normal meaning. It is not just 'regularly'; it is 'regularly engaged in the business'. I do not want to pre-empt how the ECQ itself might make that determination.

Mr CRANDON: To try and flesh something out on another angle, is it to do with people who are close associates or organisations that are close associates? Would CBUS Property be considered a property developer and therefore, according to CBUS's website, the CFMEU and other shareholder unions by definition because they hold a significant interest in CBUS? I quote from an extract on the website.

CHAIR: Deputy Chair, are you going to table that extract?

Mr CRANDON: Only if I can print it. It is here on my computer.

CHAIR: It would be beneficial if it could be circulated to committee members and to Mrs Robertson.

Mrs Robertson: I think, Chair, that we may have to take that question on notice in any event.

CHAIR: If Mrs Robertson takes the question on notice, Deputy Chair, we can supply her with the document you are referring to from your laptop at the conclusion of this hearing. Do you have any further questions, Deputy Chair?

Mr CRANDON: Yes, absolutely. In terms of what is a close associate, would that be, for example, a law firm that acts on behalf of developers who are property developers? I am just using that as an example.

Mrs Robertson: Chair, I do not want to be in the position where I am speculating about how the commission might determine that. Having said that, I do not want to be unhelpful to the committee, but I think in fairness we probably need to take those sorts of scenarios on notice.

CHAIR: Deputy Chair, Mrs Robertson has made it clear in response to your first question that she cannot pre-empt how the Electoral Commission would ultimately determine these matters. You are continuing the line of questioning notwithstanding the original response, so I would ask you to take another line of questioning if you have further questions.

Mr CRANDON: Yes, I do. Candidates are obviously captured, not just members of parliament or councillors. Can a candidate or a close associate or a developer in their own right donate or make a contribution to their own campaign? Do you want to take the question on notice?

Mrs Robertson: I am not trying to be difficult, but I think in fairness—

Mr CRANDON: I am happy for you to take the question on notice. I do not have an issue with that at all. How does the exemption application work? How would that apply and who might it apply to? Can you give us some examples of the exemption application?

Ms Bradley: The application could be made by someone who was contemplating receiving a donation from someone and who wanted to make sure that it was appropriate and not a prohibited donation—or a person who may believe they could be a prohibited donor could make an application.

Mr CRANDON: Is the definition of what constitutes a developer exactly the same as in New South Wales?

Ms Bradley: Yes.

Mr CRANDON: Word for word? Aren't the New South Wales laws currently under review?

Ms Bradley: Yes, they are.

Mr CRANDON: Are there any concerns, therefore, that prohibition laws are being circumvented, as has been reported extensively in the media? That is the reason they are under review down there, and yet we have adopted the same—

Mrs Robertson: At the end of the day, it is probably important to note that the recommendation in relation to picking up the New South Wales provisions came from the CCC itself. They have been operational over a number of years and I think the CCC acknowledge in their wording that, whilst there are issues around the laws, they are a good model to follow. I turn to page 78 of the Belcarra report, which states—

Although the CCC acknowledges that this too may not be a perfect solution—

talking about the New South Wales provisions—

continued public concern about the influence of property developer donations on council decision-making demands a stronger response than transparency alone. With New South Wales already having strengthened its legislation based on its early experiences, the current New South Wales provisions are an example of good practice on which to model the Queensland provisions.

The CCC itself acknowledged the dynamics around the New South Wales provisions. Ultimately, of course, it is not a matter for the department's officers to comment on. The government made a policy decision to legislate and to legislate in a timely manner.

Mr CRANDON: How does the law apply to a builder?

Mrs Robertson: I think you are coming back to the same sorts of—

Mr CRANDON: Do you want to take that question on notice again?

Mrs Robertson: Yes. We are going to be busy.

Mr CRANDON: Just to finish that off—

CHAIR: Deputy Chair, I will give you an opportunity to ask another question but then we will give other committee members an opportunity. We will go back to you if time permits.

Mr CRANDON: What I am looking for is maybe an example or a list—some sort of fleshing out of the types of organisations or associates. If I am a developer, not a member of parliament, and my accountant does my books, is he captured under the definition if he is making a donation to another candidate? I would like you to just flesh all of that out. Coming back to managing conflicts of interest, there is something that the secretariat brought to my attention—

CHAIR: Deputy Chair, did you just ask a question and then move on to a second question, or is this all part of the one question?

Mr CRANDON: No, I just fleshed it out. The obligation on councillors regarding conflicts of interest and material personal interest does not apply to ordinary business methods, which include establishing and amending planning schemes, an area where a councillor may have a conflict. Why are ordinary business matters excluded from the obligations, and how would a conflict regarding an ordinary business matter be managed?

Mr Matheson: The definition of 'ordinary business matter' is something that is long standing in the Local Government Act and it relates to a number of items of business that are ordinarily considered by councils. In the context of the example that you have just given, the making or amendment of planning schemes is explicitly captured in the definition of 'ordinary business matters'. In the context of the implementation of the recommendation, the government made a policy decision to take forward these particular recommendations of the CCC. That recommendation did not extend into the territory of ordinary business matters of council and hence those provisions that are in the bill do not extend to

that. That said, however, while the making or amending of a planning scheme is considered to be an ordinary business matter and therefore not within the province of the provisions relating to conflicts of interest or material personal interests, there is nothing in the legislation that prevents a councillor from declaring that they may have a material personal interest or a conflict of interest in relation to an ordinary business matter before the council and then electing to withdraw from the deliberation and decision on that matter, and I am aware of instances where that occurs.

Mr BROWN: For a specific example of that, if a councillor is in, say, a workshop in figuring out a new city plan and they have a family member who owns acreage, they are able to stay in there and lobby for that piece of land to be rezoned without having to declare; is that correct?

Mr Matheson: What needs to occur is you need to look at the package of the recommendations and how they are treated within the context of the bill as a whole. The Operation Belcarra report recommended the introduction of an offence in relation to a councillor with a declared material personal interest or a declared conflict of interest attempting to influence either another councillor or a council employee or contractor in relation to the matter in which they have a material personal interest or a declared conflict of interest. In that context, a councillor who sought to do that would be engaging in an offence that would be created if this legislation were passed.

Mr BROWN: That is captured under recommendation 26?

Mr Matheson: That is correct.

Mr BROWN: Because the specific words are 'a councillor who has a material personal interest or conflict of interest in a matter … must not influence or attempt to influence another councillor to vote on the matter in a particular way at a meeting of the council or any of its committees', so that is captured under—

Mr Matheson: Yes, in the committees but also there is the second element, and I refer to the clause itself in the bill. I refer the member to new section 175I(2), which is on page 41 of the bill, which amends the Local Government Act. It states—

A councillor who has a material personal interest or conflict of interest in a matter must not influence, or attempt to influence, a local government employee or a contractor of the local government who is authorised to decide or otherwise deal with the matter to do so in a particular way.

That is a very broadly drafted provision dealing with the construct of a councillor who has a declared material personal interest or a declared conflict of interest in a matter attempting to influence a person who is involved in the formulation or dealing with that matter.

Mr BROWN: With regard to conflicts of interest during the meeting process, does that extend to workshops and other meetings beforehand? I noticed there is some news from Cairns council about having pre meetings. Would that be captured by this bill?

Mr Matheson: As such, this legislation does not extend to other meetings—I guess what you would call informal meetings—of councils and so forth. The matter that we have just talked about—that is, attempting to influence—is quite broad ranging and does extend beyond those meetings. In terms of looking to prohibit or constrain the conduct of other meetings and so forth, that is not a matter that is the subject of this legislation. As others at the table here have indicated this morning, the decision of government was to move forward with five recommendations as put forward by the CCC in the Operation Belcarra report and that is what the bill before the committee currently seeks to do.

Mr BROWN: I suppose a lot of these changes are reliant on the ECQ to investigate. What is the process to lodge a complaint with the ECQ? Will there be changes once this bill is initiated to advertise that?

Mrs Robertson: How the ECQ communicate the new reforms will be ultimately a matter for them once they are appraised of the implications for the commission and the need to communicate, but that would ultimately be a matter for the ECQ.

Mr BROWN: I will leave it at that. I will not go any further without the ECQ being here.

Mrs STUCKEY: I want to put a scenario that is a very real one, potentially. If I wanted to knock down a duplex that I have owned for many years and build new ones, can I put funds into my own campaign or am I classified as a property developer or am I just an owner-builder?

Mrs Robertson: Again, I think we should take that one on notice.

CHAIR: Yes, you certainly can. Any further questions, member for Currumbin?

Mrs STUCKEY: Yes, I do, and I would be very grateful if that was taken on notice.

CHAIR: It has been, member for Currumbin.

Mrs STUCKEY: I think it is something that could be imminent. Thank you, Mr Chair. You have been generous with other members. If a person accepts a prohibited donation when they knew it was prohibited, they will be required to pay the state twice the amount. Given the Belcarra report identified instances where councillors stated that they did not declare conflicts of interest because they did not know who donors were and recommended an amendment to deem knowledge of the source of the donations, are any problems anticipated in establishing that the person knew a donation was prohibited? Who would be responsible for determining whether a person knew it was unlawful?

Ms Bradley: That would be a matter determined on the facts of the case on the evidence before the investigating authority.

CHAIR: Do you have any further questions, member for Currumbin?

Mrs STUCKEY: No, thank you.

CHAIR: I have a question in relation to how donations would be identified and managed. For instance, is there an intention for active monitoring of the donation registers or will it primarily be complaint driven and what kind of resourcing would there be? I ask you to expand upon that whole area for the benefit of the committee, please.

Mrs Robertson: Again, I think that is probably more a question that probably should go to the ECQ.

CHAIR: All right.

Mrs STUCKEY: Recommendation 24 of the Belcarra report states that an obligation should be imposed on councillors who suspect that another councillor has an undeclared interest to report their suspicion to the person presiding at the meeting or the CEO. However, the amendments in the bill only provide for reporting to the person presiding at the meeting. Could you explain why?

Mr Matheson: When that recommendation was looked at, it was also looked at in the context of the realities in relation to how a council meeting is conducted. The presiding officer at a council meeting will always be the mayor or a councillor and the chief executive officer has no formal role within the construct of a council meeting. On that basis, the amendment that is proposed in the bill places the obligation on the councillor to bring the matter to the attention of the person presiding at the meeting.

Mr CRANDON: Councillors who suspect that another councillor has an undeclared interest have an obligation to report their suspicion to the person presiding at the meeting. Could you please explain how this process would work if the councillor with the undeclared interest is the person presiding at the meeting?

Mr Matheson: The way in which that would work is the presiding officer at that meeting is also a councillor, so the obligation resides with them to report the matter to the council. Again, I go back to my earlier point about looking at all of the recommendations and how they work together. If a matter is brought to the attention of the presiding officer, it must then be dealt with by the council. Again, if you will just bear with me a moment, I will bring up the relevant section of the bill. I refer the member to pages 36 and 37 of the bill which are the amendments to the Local Government Act. Section 175E, 'Councillor's conflict of interest at a meeting', at subsection (3) states—

> Subsection (4) applies if—
>
> (a) the other councillors who are entitled to vote at the meeting are informed about a councillor's personal interests in a matter by the councillor—

who has the interest—

> or another person ...

Therefore, if another councillor informs the meeting that their colleague has a conflict of interest, then it proceeds through the provisions in the bill and the matter must be dealt with by the council at that meeting.

Mr CRANDON: When it says 'report their suspicion to the person presiding at the meeting', it simply means to declare it at the meeting?

Mr Matheson: Effectively, yes. It does not prohibit the councillor who is doing the informing, and I hate to use those words. It does not prohibit that councillor bringing it to the attention of the person presiding at the meeting beforehand, but it still must be dealt with in the meeting as required under what is proposed in the bill.

Mr BROWN: With regard to the definition of 'donation', is a raffle considered a donation? If so, if someone buys $10,000 worth of raffle tickets, do they have to declare that under existing legislation? There is some concern out there given feedback that there will be a raffle prize that is not significant yet $10,000 worth of raffle tickets get bought.

Ms Bradley: The bill specifically provides for fundraising contributions to be regarded as donations. Section 200 of the Electoral Act defines fundraising contribution. Subsection (2) states—

> Without limiting subsection (1), a fundraising contribution includes—
>
> (a) an amount paid for a ticket in a raffle ...

CHAIR: We have run out of time. Thank you for the information you have provided today and thank you to our Hansard reporters. A transcript of these proceedings will be available on the committee's parliamentary web page in due course. In relation to questions taken on notice, your responses will be required by 5 pm on Friday, 27 October so that we can include them in our deliberations. I declare this public briefing for the committee's inquiry into the Local Government Electoral (Implementing Belcarra) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2017 closed. Thank you very much.

Committee adjourned at 12.45 pm